Sudhir Agarwal, J.— Heard Sri Paras Nath Singh, Advocate, for appellants and Sri Lalit Kumar, Advocate, for respondents. 2. Appellants' suit for injunction against the defendant-respondents, whereby they had sought permanent injunction retraining the defendant-respondents from interfering in their peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property in dispute, was dismissed by Civil Judge (Senior Division), Khurja, Bulandshahar vide his judgment dated 2.12.2003 on the ground that the property In dispute is a Muslim graveyard, and, being a waqf, it could not have been a subject matter of transfer by sale, hence, the sale-deed dated 25.7.1969, whereupon the plaintiff-appellants founded their claim, was void ab-initio. 3. The Trial Court recorded a finding of fact that property in dispute was part of a Muslim graveyard and it was also registered in the Abadi Khasra land No. 724 as Kabristan. The Kabristan is a waqf and it could not have been transferred by a sale-deed, and, therefore, the alleged sale-deed, whereby the property in dispute was purchased by the plaintiff-appellants, was void ab-initio. The judgment of Trial Court has been confirmed by the lower Appellate Court dismissing Civil Appeal No. 136 of 2009 vide judgment dated 7.10.2010. 4. Lower Appellate Court has also confirmed the finding of fact that the property in dispute form part of Muslim Graveyard which is a waqf, hence, could not be subject matter of transfer by sale and the sale-deed, whereupon plaintiff-appellants founded their case, is, therefore, nullity. 5. Learned counsel for appellant contended that it was not a public Kabristan, hence not a waqf, and hence the judgments under appeal are wholly illegal. 6. The question as to whether a land belong to a part of Kabristan is a question of fact as held by this Court in Sheoraj Chamar Vs. Mudeer Khan AIR 1934 All. 868 followed in QuadirBakhsh Vs. Saddullah and others A.I.R. 1938 Oudh. 77. Since a finding of fact has been recorded by both the Courts below relying on evidence, in absence of anything to show that any admissible evidence has not been considered by Courts below, or, finding is perverse, I do not find that any substantial question of law is involved in this case. The appeal, therefore, is liable to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. Second appeal dismissed. ____________ Hhhhhhhhh 2013 (1) ARC 813 ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT Pankaj Mithal Ganga Prasad Rawat Vs. The appeal, therefore, is liable to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. Second appeal dismissed. ____________ Hhhhhhhhh 2013 (1) ARC 813 ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT Pankaj Mithal Ganga Prasad Rawat Vs. Shivhare Pharmacy, Fatehpur & Others First Appeal From Order No. 13 of 2003 13-1-2012 (A) Civil Procedure Code, 1908—Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, Order XLIII, Rule 1 (r)—Trade Marks Act, 1999—Sections 28 and 134—Suit for permanent injunction, restraining defendant, his agents and his representatives for using trade names as specified, granted by trial Court—Appeal under—Rights conferred by registration—Aspects of suit for infringement etc as stipulated—Legality of—Appreciation of evidence—In result, under circumstances held that injunction granted by Court below noticed justified, however, in view of subsequent registration granted to defendant/appellant modified to till date of registration i.e. October 4, 2009 as observed—Trial Court to decide suit expeditiously—Direction issued—Appeal accordingly disposed of. (Paras 14 to 36) (B) General Clauses Act, 1897—Section 3 (17)—U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904—Section 4 (12)—Trade Marks Act, 1999—Section 134—Term "District Judge"—Meaning of— " Judge of a principle Civil Court of original "jurisdiction"—In present case, a suit, though, filed under Section 134 of Act under, required to be instituted before District Judge while on assignment by district Judge could be decided by Additional Judge also—Relied on.(Paras 17 to 19) ___________