Judgment Jayant Patel, J.—With the consent of the learned advocates appearing for both the sides, the appeals are finally heard. 2. The short facts of the case are that the officers of the respondent Corporation fixed the GRV of the premises of the appellant and assessed the municipal tax for the year 1986-1987 to 2008-2009 and issued the bills. The appellant being aggrieved by the same, preferred appeals being MAV Nos. 21/09 and 22/09. The learned Judge of the Small Cause Court, at the conclusion of the appeals, passed the judgment and order, whereby he found that no appeals would not be maintainable against the bills and therefore, he dismissed both the appeals. Under the circumstances, the present appeals before this Court. 3. We have heard Mr. Dipak Dave, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant and Ms. Jirga Jhaveri for the respondent. 4. It appears from the perusal of the order passed by the lower Court that the learned Judge has been guided by the decision of this Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of City of Ahmedabad vs. The Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd. reported at AIR 1994 (Guj) 167 . Unfortunately, the subsequent decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Gujarat Vidhya Sabha vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad reported at 1995(1) GLR 419 was not brought to his notice. It may be recorded that in the case of Gujarat Vidhya Sabha (Supra), once again the Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the earlier decision of this Court in the case of Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. (Supra) and at paragraphs 14 to 16, observed thus — “14. In Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company’s case, this Court was concerned with the question whether the rateable value can be challenged by filing an appeal only against the bill which is sent demanding tax which is determined. It was held that Section 406(2)(b) specifically relates to the appeal against the rateable value and Sub-clause (d) relates to the appeal against any amendment made in the assessment book of the property tax. It was held that Section 406(2)(b) specifically relates to the appeal against the rateable value and Sub-clause (d) relates to the appeal against any amendment made in the assessment book of the property tax. In this connection, it was observed that: “...neither the Act nor the Rules contemplate any complaint being filed against a bill of property tax and complaints, relating to property tax, can only be filed against the rateable value....” It was then emphasised that the Legislative intent was that the appeal is to be filed against the rateable value and in this connection it was observed that: “...no appeal can be preferred against a bill levying tax as a consequence of the rateable value having been determined....” Again, while summarising, it was observed by this Court: “...an appeal cannot be filed against a bill for the purposes of challenging the rateable value if complaint against a proposed fixation of rateable value had not been filed though opportunity had been given....” It is clear in our mind that the observations in Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company’s case that no appeal could be filed against the bill levying tax was only in so far as in the said appeals the challenge which was sought to be raised refers to the rateable value. In other words, the challenge to the rateable value has been provided for independently under Section 406 and for which the condition provided by Section 406(2)(b) has to be satisfied and the same cannot be circumvented by filing an appeal against the tax bill and challenge the rateable value. 15. Section 406(1) does contemplate an appeal against the tax fixed or charged under the Act, in addition to appeal against the fixation of rateable value. It is open to an assessee not to challenge the rateable value but to challenge the tax fixed or charged on other grounds or relating to other matters. In Anant Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Municipal Corporation for the City of Ahmedabad and Ors. 1993 (2) GLH 897 at page 920, it was observed by a Division Bench of this Court, while examining Section 406 and other relevant Sections, that questions of law regarding the determination of rateable value could be raised in appeal. In Anant Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Municipal Corporation for the City of Ahmedabad and Ors. 1993 (2) GLH 897 at page 920, it was observed by a Division Bench of this Court, while examining Section 406 and other relevant Sections, that questions of law regarding the determination of rateable value could be raised in appeal. Furthermore, in an appeal against the tax, questions of law such as, whether the appellant was primarily liable for payment of property tax, whether the premises were liable to be assessed to property tax and the like, could also be raised. Similarly, in our opinion, the question whether the appellant is entitled to the benefit of Section 132 could be raised in the appeal before the Small Causes Court. Such a question may be a pure question of fact or a mixed question of fact and law, but raising of such a contention would not amount to challenging the rateable value of the property in question, when such an appeal is filed on the receipt of the tax bill. The learned Counsel for the Corporation had sought to rely on the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Municipality of Ankleshwar vs. Chhotalal Ghelabhai Gandhi LVII BLR 547, Gopal Mills C. Ltd. vs. The Broach Borough Municipality LVIII BLR 300 and Balakrishna Dharamdas Vora vs. The Poona Municipal Corporation LXV BLR 119. In our opinion, the said decisions have no application. In those cases, it was, inter alia, observed that the question of validity of tax cannot be decided by the authorities under the Act. The question whether the appellant is entitled to exemption under Section 132 is not one relating to the validity of the tax. This question relates to an aspect of assessment to tax within the four corners of the law and a decision on the same does not amount to deciding upon the validity of the tax imposed under the Law. 16. In our opinion, therefore, the question whether the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Section 132 was one which should have been decided by the Small Causes Court and a favourable decision not having been obtained, the appellant can agitate that question before this Court under Section 411 of the Act.” 5. 16. In our opinion, therefore, the question whether the appellant was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Section 132 was one which should have been decided by the Small Causes Court and a favourable decision not having been obtained, the appellant can agitate that question before this Court under Section 411 of the Act.” 5. The aforesaid makes it clear that there is no bar operating for maintainability of the appeals against the tax bills issued by the Corporation. In our view, the law is clear on the said aspect and therefore, it can be said that ex facie error has been committed by the learned Judge in relying upon the decision in the case of Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. (Supra) without considering the subsequent decision of this Court in the case of Gujarat Vidhya Sabha (Supra). 6. Apart from the above, Mr. Dave, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant raised serious grievance about the bills itself issued by the Corporation on the ground that the Corporation has issued the tax bill for the period from 19861987 to 20082009, roughly for previous more than 20 years for which there is no authority with the Corporation. In support of his submission, he relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Kanaiya Prints Pvt. Ltd. vs. Assessment and Recovery Officer reported at 2003(1) GLH 449 and he mainly relied upon the observations made by this Court from Paras 5 to 8 and ultimate conclusion at Para 8.2 holding that by virtue of Rule 21B, once the assessment books are closed at the expiry of the year, the same cannot be reopened unless there is any order of the competent Court or competent authority. It was submitted that therefore, even if the Corporation had any power, it could be for the said respective year of 2008-2009 and not for the earlier period. 7. Whereas, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that by virtue of Rule 21A read with Rule 5, the Corporation could examine the said aspects. 8. It was submitted that therefore, even if the Corporation had any power, it could be for the said respective year of 2008-2009 and not for the earlier period. 7. Whereas, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that by virtue of Rule 21A read with Rule 5, the Corporation could examine the said aspects. 8. In our view, the matter prima facie can be said as covered by the aforesaid decision, but as the aforesaid aspect is not examined by the Lower Court and the matter was decided only on the ground of maintainability of the appeals, and as the other aspects were not examined by the Court, we need not finally rule on the said aspects. Suffice it to state that the lower Court shall decide the question of power of the Corporation to assess for the preceding years in accordance with law after giving opportunity of hearing to all concerned. 9. In view of the aforesaid observations and discussions, we find that the impugned judgment and order passed by the lower Court cannot be sustained. Hence, the same are quashed and set aside with the further direction that the both the appeals shall stand restored with the file of the learned Small Cause Judge. The learned Small Cause Judge after giving opportunity of producing the evidence and of hearing to the parties, shall decide afresh in accordance with law, preferably within a period of six months from the receipt of the order of this Court. 10. Both the appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent. Considering the facts and circumstances, no order as to costs. * * * * *