JUDGMENT : Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J. The revision petitioner filed an online application in Form 1B to remit compounded tax for cooked food on 10.08.2012. The last date for filing compounding application under S. 8 of the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003, was 15.5.2012. In terms of R.11 of the Kerala Value Added Tax Rules, 2005, the authority found that the application was not within the time prescribed, and accordingly, the application for condonation of delay was dismissed. The statutory appeal also stands dismissed, and hence, the assessee is in revision. 2. The fact of the matter remains that as rightly noted by the authority below, the application was not filed within time. To our query, we are told that even the tax at compounded rate was also not paid before the cut off date, i.e., 15.05.2012. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner argued that there is no prohibition or inhibition going by the phraseology of R.11 of the Rules, and therefore, the statutory authority could have accepted the application for compounding, since they did not find any other default or defect in it. It is argued that the doctrine of implied powers as enunciated by the Apex Court and this Court in different situations supports the case of the revision petitioner. It is also pointed out that on two earlier occasions, the authorities had extended by general notification the last date for filing of returns. 3. For one thing, the two instances, which are shown to us where the authorities had by general notification extended the period of time for filing returns, were attributable specifically to the failure of the net connectivity or other issues in connection with online filing of returns and also the system of e-governance in connection with the Department of Taxes. None of those cases revolved on any failure of the assessee in doing any particular act except on ground referable to the failure of the system maintained by the Government. 4. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner has placed the decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court of India in Income Tax Officer, Cannanore v. M.K.Mohammed Kunhi ( AIR 1969 SC 430 ), Savitri w/o Govind Singh Rawat v. Govind Singh Rawat ( (1985) 4 SCC 337 ), Union of India & Anr. 4. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner has placed the decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court of India in Income Tax Officer, Cannanore v. M.K.Mohammed Kunhi ( AIR 1969 SC 430 ), Savitri w/o Govind Singh Rawat v. Govind Singh Rawat ( (1985) 4 SCC 337 ), Union of India & Anr. v. Paras Laminates (P) Ltd. ( (1990) 4 SCC 453 ), Reserve Bank of India and Others v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Company Ltd. & Anr. ( (1996) 1 SCC 642 ), Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi v. Hari Chand Shri Gopal & Ors. ( (2011) 1 SCC 236 ), Rajendra Prasad Gupta v. Prakash Chandra Mishra and Others (2011) 2 SCC 705 ), and of this Court in Thankam R. Pillai v. Arbitrator ( 1996 (1) KLT 225 ) and in Johnson & Johnson Ltd. v. Asst. Commissioner (Assmt.) 2009 (17) KTR 613 (Ker.) in support of his contentions. 5. The reference made to the precedents of the Apex Court and of this Court, fundamentally, show that the doctrine of implied powers as also the doctrine of substantial compliance apply to cases where incidental and ancillary powers are recognised to exist with the repository of a particular power to effectuate the power so granted. Thus arbitrator was found to have the authority to deal with certain interlocutory issues inter se the parties; arbitrator under the Co-operative Societies Act was held to have the power to order impleadment of legal representatives. The courts were held to have the power to permit withdrawal of an application for withdrawal of a suit. Such matters, which are intricately connected with the main matter, are necessarily to be found covered by the doctrine of implied powers to enable appropriate conclusion of the main proceedings. The doctrine of substantial compliance does not, in any manner, authorise a statutory authority to permit institution of certain matter in the form of returns etc., after the period prescribed. If the doctrine of implied power or the doctrine of substantial compliance is stretched to that limit, we can easily foresee abuse of power. The provision in R.11 of the K.V.A.T. Rules, read with S.8 of the K.V.A.T. Act, does not provide any room for the statutory authority to condone delay on a ground referable to default of the assessee or his Accountant, as in the case here. 6. The provision in R.11 of the K.V.A.T. Rules, read with S.8 of the K.V.A.T. Act, does not provide any room for the statutory authority to condone delay on a ground referable to default of the assessee or his Accountant, as in the case here. 6. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any ground to entertain this revision. The revision fails. In the result, this Revision Petition is dismissed.