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2013 DIGILAW 536 (MP)

Shammi Sharma v. Municipal Corporation, Gwalior

2013-04-17

SUJOY PAUL

body2013
JUDGMENT : In this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioners, Corporators of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior, prayed for a direction to the respondents for calling/convening the meeting of the Corporation as per their written requisition, AnnexureP-2. The relevant facts for adjudication of this matter are as under :- 2. The petitioners are elected councillors of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Petitioner No. 1 is also leader of opposition whereas the petitioner No. 2 is former leader of opposition. On 27-12-2012 petitioners and 22 other elected councillors submitted a written requisition for calling the meeting of the Corporation to discuss eight points mentioned in their requisition letter. It is stated that the said points are of great public importance which require urgent consideration by the Corporation. It is further stated that total number of elected councillors is 60 and written requisition is signed by 24 elected councillors. 3. It is the case of petitioners that as per section 30 of Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (for brevity, the 'Act') the Speaker or in the event of his incapacity, the Mayor must call a special meeting within two weeks of receipt of written requisition signed by not less than one third of the total number of elected councillors. It is further argued that in the event Mayor or Speaker do not act on the said requisition, the proviso makes it obligatory for the Commissioner to convene such meeting and in the present case the Commissioner has also failed to act in accordance with the statutory mandate of section 30 aforesaid. 4. Shri Arvind Dudawat, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that after the said requisition letter the petitioners also served a legal notice upon the respondents but the said respondents have not called the special meeting. It is further argued that earlier also the petitioners were required to file Writ Petition No. 875/2012, which was disposed of by this Court on 14-2-2012, Annexure P-l. In view of the stand of the parties in the said matter, this Court directed the Corporation to act in accordance with section 30 and other provisions of the Act and call a meeting within 15 days. Shri Dudawat further submits that the Corporation obtained a legal opinion against the said order passed by this Court and the Senior Advocate by letter dated 22-2-2012, Annexure P-5, opined that as per section 30, it is obligatory on the part of Corporation to call a special meeting within 15 days. In nutshell, it is stated that the respondents have failed to comply with the statutory mandate of section 30 and, therefore, a mandamus be issued to fulfil said statutory requirement. 5. Shri Deepak Khot, learned counsel for the respondents by placing reliance on certain paragraphs of the return, submits that section 30 of the Act does require and casts an obligation on the Mayor and Speaker to call a special meeting on the requisition of one third of total number of elected councilors. It is further stated by learned counsel for the Corporation that it is also provided that if such meeting is not convened within the stipulated time by the Speaker or Mayor, as the case may be, such meeting shall be called by Municipal Commissioner under intimation to the State Government. However, it is argued that the method of calling meeting is prescribed in section 29 of the Act. The agenda is to be prepared by the Commissioner and needs to be submitted before the Mayor for approval. The Mayor is required to approve the agenda and send it to the Speaker. In turn, it is the Speaker who shall send the notices to the councilors for convening the meeting. The Speaker can neither exclude nor include any item in the agenda provided by the Mayor. Shri Deepak Khot submits that the provision of section 29 of the Act makes it clear that section 29(5) is application on section 30 for preparation of agenda. The Commissioner who has to prepare the agenda is required to deal with the agenda proposed by the petitioners and for this purpose, he has already sent a letter to Secretary of Council to call the petitioners through a notice to discuss and submit the reply for preparation of agenda as items mentioned in the requisition have already been discussed by the Council many times earlier and same would be wastage of time of Council. It is further argued that as and when reply is submitted by the petitioners and they appear for discussion on the agenda, the final agenda would be submitted to the Mayor for further action. It is stated that the petition is premature. The document dated 30.3.2013, Annexure R/1, is filed which shows that the Commissioner has written a letter to the Secretary of the Corporation. This letter contains the point of the agenda for which meeting is sought to be requisitioned by the petitioners and in juxtaposition to that the real situation as per the Commissioner's opinion is disclosed. The same is the stand in the second letter dated 30.3.2013 annexed with the return. These letters were sent to the Secretary of the Corporation and copies are sent to the Mayor, Speaker and leader of the opposition. It is stated in the letter that if the applicants want to produce any new fact, a letter may be issued to them so that they can submit their written representation. Along with the return, certain resolutions are filed to show that the agenda item were already discussed earlier. Lastly, Shri Khot submits that the requisition meeting cannot be called on mere asking. If it is permitted, there may be endless meetings. Thus, the requisition meetings may include an agenda which has not already been discussed. 5. I have bestowed my anxious consideration to the rival contentions of the parties and perused the record. 6. In view of the aforesaid stand of the parties, it is not in dispute that the requisition dated 27.12.2012 is submitted by requisite number of councilors. It is also not in dispute that as per section 30 of the Act, it is obligatory on the part of the Mayor and Speaker to call a meeting within a stipulated time and if they fail to do the same, it is obligatory for the Commissioner to call the said meeting. Learned counsel for the Corporation posed the questions as to (i) Whether the conjoint reading of sections 29 and 30 of the Act permits the Corporation to delay the meeting beyond 15 days on the ground of preparation of the agenda etc. ? (ii) Whether there is a cap/impediment in calling a requisition meeting more than once/repeatedly ? (iii) Whether an issue already discussed or remotely discussed can become subject matter of a requisition meeting ? 7. ? (ii) Whether there is a cap/impediment in calling a requisition meeting more than once/repeatedly ? (iii) Whether an issue already discussed or remotely discussed can become subject matter of a requisition meeting ? 7. In the opinion of this Court, it is apt to quote sections 29 and 30 of the Act for its proper adjudication. The said provision reads as under:- 29. Convening of meetings.-(1) A meeting of the Corporation shall be either ordinary or special. (2) The date of every meeting except the meeting referred to in Section 18 and 23-A, shall be fixed by the Speaker with the consent of the Mayor or in the event of his being incapable of acting by the Mayor: Provided that if the date of the meeting is not fixed by the Speaker or by Mayor, as the case may be, the Municipal Commissioner shall fix the date of the meeting under intimation to the State Government. (3) Subject to the provisions of Section 18 or 23-A or 24, notice of every meeting specifying the time and place thereof and the business to be transacted thereat shall be dispatched to every councillor and exhibited at the Municipal Office seven clear days before an ordinary meeting and three clear days before a special meeting: Provided that if the notice other than a notice of meeting under Section 18 or 23-A or 24 has been exhibited at the Municipal Office, failure to serve it on a councillor shall not affected the validity of a meeting. (4) No business other than that specified in the notice relating thereto shall be transacted at a meeting except with the consent of two-thirds of the members present. (5) The Commissioner shall prepare the list of the business (agenda) to be transacted in the meeting as mentioned in sub-section (3) and submit it to the Mayor for approval. The Mayor shall approve the agenda and send it to the Speaker. The Speaker shall arrange to send the same along with the notice of meeting to the Councillors. The Speaker shall neither exclude nor include any item in the agenda as approved by the Mayor. 30. The Mayor shall approve the agenda and send it to the Speaker. The Speaker shall arrange to send the same along with the notice of meeting to the Councillors. The Speaker shall neither exclude nor include any item in the agenda as approved by the Mayor. 30. Power of Speaker and Mayor to call Special Meeting-The Speaker or in the event of his being incapable of acting by the Mayor, may, whenever he thinks fit, call a special meeting and shall be bound to do so within two weeks of the receipt of written requisition signed by the not less than one third of the total number of elected Councillors: Provided that if on receipt of requisition the special meeting is not convened within the stipulated time by the Speaker or the Mayor, as the case may be, the Municipal Commissioner shall convene such meeting under intimation to the State Government. 8. Section 30 was introduced by way of amendment by M.P. Act No. 18 of 1997. The basic purpose of insertion of this provision was to ensure that requisition meeting is called within stipulated time. Section 30 makes it clear that in the event of presentation of written requisition signed by not less than one third of total number of elected councilors, the Mayor and Speaker are bound to call the meeting within two weeks of the said written requisition. In section 30 the relevant words are "....... and shall be bound to do so within two weeks of the receipt of written requisition signed by not less than requisite members." In my opinion, the intention of the Legislature is clear while employing the words "shall be bound to do so". These words are clearly mandatory in nature and firstly it is the duty of the Mayor and Speaker to call the said meeting within the time stipulated in the provision. However, the proviso makes it clear that in the event the Speaker or Mayor do not convene the said meeting, "the Municipal Commissioner shall convene such meeting." The first portion of section 30 read with proviso makes it clear that a duty is cast on the Commissioner to convene "such meeting". The words "such meeting" means the meeting which was required to be called by Speaker and Mayor and they did not convene/call the said meeting. The words "such meeting" means the meeting which was required to be called by Speaker and Mayor and they did not convene/call the said meeting. Thus, the time limit prescribed for calling that meeting by the Mayor and Speaker would be the same for the Commissioner because of the use of words "such meeting". In other words, in my opinion, the use of word "such meeting" has a definite purpose and the same are inserted with a view to make it mandatory on the part of the Commissioner to call the meeting which should have been called by the Speaker and Mayor at the first instance. Here also the mandatory word "shall" is used to ensure that the Speaker positively calls that meeting within 15 days. The entire section read together shows that at the first instance it is for the Mayor and Speaker to call a requisition meeting within two weeks of the receipt of written requisition. If it is not done within 15 days, the duty is shifted on the Municipal Commissioner to convene such meeting. A harmonious reading of the entire provision will show that if a meeting was required to be called by the Mayor and Speaker and they do not call the said meeting within 15 days, the Commissioner is bound to call/convene such meeting within 15 days therefrom. The proviso further employs the words "shall convene such meeting under intimation to the State Government" (emphasis supplied). 9. There is no doubt in my mind that section 29 deals with ordinary and special meetings both. The meeting required to be called in the present case is admittedly a "special meeting". Under section 29(2) the date of that meeting is required to be fixed by the Mayor and Speaker or in the event of their being incapable of acting, by the Municipal Commissioner under intimation to the State Government. Sub-Section (3) of section 29 prescribes that the notice of meeting including special meeting must specify the time and place. In the event of special meeting, three days clear notice before the meeting is required to be given. The proviso makes it clear that if the notice is exhibited at the Municipal Office, failure to serve it on councilors shall not affect the validity of the meeting. In the event of special meeting, three days clear notice before the meeting is required to be given. The proviso makes it clear that if the notice is exhibited at the Municipal Office, failure to serve it on councilors shall not affect the validity of the meeting. Sub-section (5) of section 29 makes it obligatory for the Commissioner to prepare the list of business (agenda) which needs to be transacted in the meeting as per sub-section (3) and submit it to the Mayor for approval. The Mayor shall approve the agenda and shall send it to the Speaker. In turn, Speaker shall issue notice of meeting to the councilors. 10. There is no dispute between the parties that section 30 mandates the Mayor and Speaker at the first instance and then the Commissioner to call a requisition meeting as mandated in section 30. The stand of the Corporation is that section 29 is also applicable because the meeting in question is a special meeting. For calling this special meeting also the provision of section 29 has to be applied. Before dealing with this aspect, it is apt to examine the action of the respondent No. 4 in the present matter. Admittedly, the respondents No. 2 and 3 (Mayor and Speaker, respectively) did not act on the requisition and, therefore, it became obligatory for the respondent No. 4 to act on the said resolution. At the cost of repetition, it is clear that the Speaker and Mayor as per first portion of section 30 were required to call a special meeting within 15 days. If they failed to do so, it is mandatory on the part of the Commissioner to call "such meeting". Thus, if Mayor and Speaker failed to call the meeting within 15 days, the Commissioner was required to call that meeting within 15 days therefrom. In the present case, the requisition was submitted on 27.12.2012. The Commissioner for the first time issued letter, Annexure R-1, dated 30.3.2013. The Mayor and Speaker were required to act on this requisition within 15 days from the date of submission of requisition dated 27.12.2012. If they failed to do so for whatever reason, the Commissioner was required to do so within 15 days therefrom. However, in the present case it appears that the Commissioner initiated action only after receiving notices from this Court in the present writ petition. If they failed to do so for whatever reason, the Commissioner was required to do so within 15 days therefrom. However, in the present case it appears that the Commissioner initiated action only after receiving notices from this Court in the present writ petition. This is clear from the foot remark of the letter dated 30.3.2013. Thus, in my opinion, the Commissioner has utterly failed to take desired action and convene the meeting as mandated in section 30. He was required to promptly act within 15 days as mandated in section 30 of the Act. Section 29(5) of the Act makes it clear that Commissioner must prepare an agenda to be transacted in the meeting and is required to submit it to the Mayor. In the entire sub-section, the Legislature has chosen to employ the word "shall". It casts mandatory duty on the part of the Commissioner, Mayor and Speaker to act in the manner prescribed in this sub-section. Thus, it was mandatory on the part of the Commissioner to prepare the agenda and submit it before the Mayor and Speaker. Annexure R-1 is not the agenda prepared in consonance with section 29(5). Even assuming that the Commissioner wanted to discuss with the petitioners whether any meeting is required to be called, this should have been done by the Commissioner within the time aforesaid, i.e., 15 days from the date Mayor and Speaker had failed to call the meeting. If the contention of the Corporation is accepted that conjoint reading of sections 29 and 30 means an unlimited period of time in the hands of the Corporation to discuss and prepare the agenda, then in my opinion, the very purpose of insertion of section 30 and its proviso would be frustrated and defeated. This is the golden rule of interpretation that the composite perception is to be seen. The judicial key to construction is the composite perception of the deha and the dehi of the provision. A narrow interpretation which kills the intention of the Legislature or makes the provision redundant cannot be accepted. The interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. The interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. The interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. The interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. The aforesaid view was taken by Supreme Court in the cases reported in : (1977) 2 SCC 256 (The Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines and another, and in : (1987) 1 SCC 424 (Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and others). 11. In the light of aforesaid principle of interpretation, in my opinion, the intention of the Legislature is to ensure that the special requisition meetings are called within 15 days and, therefore, it is made clear that if such meeting is not called within the stipulated time by Speaker and Mayor, the Commissioner shall call that meeting under intimation to the State Government. In the opinion of this Court, it was obligatory on the part of the Commissioner to act in quite promptitude after 15 days from the date Mayor and Speaker failed to call the said meeting and if he wanted to discuss or deliberate on the issue of agenda, he was required to do and complete it within 15 days. Merely because in section 29(5) no time limit is given for preparation of agenda, it cannot be left to the Commissioner for unlimited period when the meeting is a special requisition meeting to be called under section 30 of the Act. A harmonious reading of sections 29 and 30 makes it clear that special meeting needs to be called as per sections 29 and 30 both but the time limit and mandate in this regard has to be followed even while applying section 29 of the Act. Thus, in my opinion, the respondents have miserably failed to call the said meeting within the stipulated time. Annexure R-1, by no stretch of imagination, can be said to be an agenda and, therefore, the Commissioner has failed to prepare the agenda as mandated in section 29(5) of the Act. 12. Thus, in my opinion, the respondents have miserably failed to call the said meeting within the stipulated time. Annexure R-1, by no stretch of imagination, can be said to be an agenda and, therefore, the Commissioner has failed to prepare the agenda as mandated in section 29(5) of the Act. 12. Apart from this, since the word "shall" is repeatedly employed in sub-section (5) of section 29, it shows the intention of the Legislature to ensure that agenda is prepared, approved and translated in the shape of notice by the Commissioner, Mayor and Speaker, respectively. This entire exercise of calling special meeting needs to be undertaken by the said authorities within the stipulated time. Thus, on the pretext of preparation of agenda, the authorities cannot sit tight over the agenda and they are required to complete the exercise within 15 days. Any other interpretation will defeat the purpose of insertion of section 30 and will ultimately have an effect of nullifying the mandate of calling the meeting within the stipulated time. Apart from this, this is also settled principle of interpretation that when the words of Statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e., they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. This view is taken by Supreme Court in catena of judgments including : (1992) 4 SCC 711 (Nelson Motis v. Union of India). Thus, the proper consideration of text and context of sections 29 and 30 read together shows that section 29 prescribes the procedure of calling a meeting whereas section 30 mandates that the meeting needs to be called within 15 days. Thus, section 30 mandates the authorities to call the meeting within stipulated time and section 29 prescribes the method to call the meeting. Combined reading of the said provisions will lead to an inevitable conclusion that in the event of calling of a requisition meeting in accordance with law, the authorities are bound to call it within 15 days, as discussed above. 13. The contention of Corporation is that section 30 cannot be invoked again and again and the topics which have been discussed, cannot become subject matter again. 13. The contention of Corporation is that section 30 cannot be invoked again and again and the topics which have been discussed, cannot become subject matter again. Shri Dudawat to this submits that a microscopic reading of the agenda with earlier resolution shows that the topics are not exactly the same and the Commissioner has utterly failed in relying on the earlier agenda which do not deal, cover and match with agenda/points mentioned in the requisition letter. In my opinion, there is nothing in section 30 which puts a cap on number of requisition meetings. In other words, section 30 does not prescribe any impediment for calling a special meeting on more than one occasion nor it contains any provision about the nature of the issues to be raised in the said meeting. It appears that visualising that difficulty in the State of Chhattisgarh, an amendment was made in section 30 of the Act. Said provision reads as under:- Amendment of Section 30.--In Section 30 of the Principal Act, after the word "special meeting" the words "to discuss any emergent and burning issues of the town" shall be inserted. After proviso following shall be inserted:- Provided further that such meeting shall not be more than three in a year. In absence of any such prohibition in Madhya Pradesh, I am unable to hold that either number of the requisition meetings or the subject can be a reason for not convening such meeting. On the basis of aforesaid analysis, this petition deserves to be allowed. The respondents have failed to act in accordance with the statutory mandate of section 30 of the Act. Resultantly, petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to call the said meeting within 15 days in accordance with law. No costs.