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2013 DIGILAW 537 (GAU)

Yumnam Rajen Singh v. Yumnam Lukhoi singh and Anr.

2013-08-06

A.M.SAPRE

body2013
A.M. Sapre, CJ.- This is a civil revision petition filed by the defendant under section 115 of the C.P. Code against the order dated 12.04.2010 passed by Civil Judge (JD), Imphal East in Judicial Misc. Case No.2 of 2010. 2. By impugned order, the trial court rejected the application filed by the defendant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking for condonation of delay of around one year and forty six days in filing the application filed under Order 9 Rule 13 of the C.R Code for setting aside of the ex-parte decree dated 12.04.2010 passed by Civil Judge (JD), Imphal East in Judicial Misc. Case No.2 of 2010 against the defendant. 3. So the short question which arises for consideration in this revision petition is whether trial court was justified in dismissing the application filed by the defendant under section 5 of the Limitation Act and thereby was justified in dismissing the application filed by the defendant under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code as barred by limitation? 4. At the outset, I consider it apposite to state that this revision filed by the defendant under Section 115 of the Code is not maintainable because of the availability of remedy of appeal to petitioner to challenge the impugned order under Order 43 Rule (d) ibid and hence the revision under Section 115 is not maintainable in the light of bar contained in Section 115(1) and (2) ibid. 5. Section 115 and Order 43 Rule 1 (d) of the Code read as under: "115. 5. Section 115 and Order 43 Rule 1 (d) of the Code read as under: "115. Revision (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate court appears- (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit: Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings. (2) The High Court shall not, under this section vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any court subordinate thereto. (3) A revision shall not operate as a stay of suitor other proceeding before the Court except where such suit or other proceeding is stayed by the High Court," (emphasis supplied) "Order 43 Rule 1 "1. Appeal from orders.- An appeal shall lie from the following orders under the provisions of section 104, namely:- (a) an order under Rule 10 of the Order VII returning a plaint to be presented to the proper court except where the procedure specified in Rule 10A of Order VII has been followed; .. .. .. .. (d) an order under Rule 13 of Order IX rejecting an application (in case open to appeal) for an Order to set aside a decree passed ex parte;" (emphasis supplied) 6. As observed supra, by impugned order, the trial court dismissed the application filed by the defendant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and declined to condone the delay in filing the application under Order 9 Rule 13 ibid. This dismissal of the application also resulted in dismissal of the application filed under Order 9 Rule 13 ibid. As observed supra, by impugned order, the trial court dismissed the application filed by the defendant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and declined to condone the delay in filing the application under Order 9 Rule 13 ibid. This dismissal of the application also resulted in dismissal of the application filed under Order 9 Rule 13 ibid. In other words, the effect and consequence of dismissing the application for condonation of delay was that the application for setting aside of the ex-parte decree was also dismissed on the ground of limitation. 7. As would be clear from clause (d) of Order 43 Rule 1, the order dismissing the application passed under Order 9 Rule 13 ibid is appealable under Order 43 Rule l(d) ibid. It is of no consequence as to on what ground it was passed. In order to decide the question as to whether an order is appealable or not, the ground on which it was passed is not material and what is required to be seen is the consequence of the order passed a particular provision. 8. As would be clear from Section 115(1)(2), if the order is appealable then revision is barred against such order by virtue of bar contained in Section 115(1) and (2) itself. A fortiori a writ under Article 227 of the Constitution would also not be entertained in such case. 9. In the light of foregoing discussion, in my view the present revision is not maintainable and the remedy of the petitioner in this case was to file Misc. Appeal under Order 43 Rule l(d) ibid against the impugned order. 10. Since the appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(d) lies to this High Court against the impugned order and hence in order to do substantial justice and without relying upon the technicalities and instead of dismissing the petition on this ground and then permitting him to file the fresh appeal against the impugned order, I allow the petitioner to convert this petition in Misc Appeal as if filed under Order 43 Rule 1(d) of the Code by making necessary amendment in cause title of the petition at all appropriate places and on such amendment being incorporated, the registry is directed to register this petition as Misc. Appeal in the register of appeal and treat the disposal of this petition in the category of cases of Misc. Appeal in the register of appeal and treat the disposal of this petition in the category of cases of Misc. appeal as per rules in place of petition by allotting new appeal number. It be done by the petitioner within a week. 11. Coming now to the merits of the case, the case in hand out of which this appeal arises, is between the father and son. The plaintiff is a father whereas the defendant is his son. It is in relation to their family property (immovable). 12. The father had to file a suit against his son to claim his share and possession in the suit properties. The son contested the suit by filing written statement and was then proceeded ex-parte. The trial court examined the case on the basis of pleading and evidence (ocular/documentary) adduced and by judgment/decree, decreed plaintiff's suit on 25.11.2008 against the defendant. 13. The defendant waited for almost one year and 47 days to file an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code for setting aside of the said ex-parte decree dated 25.11.2008 pleading therein that he had neither any knowledge of the ex-parte order and nor of ex-parte decree and that he came to know very recently before the filing of the application. Since the application was barred by time because the limitation to file an application for setting aside of ex-parte decree is 30 days whereas in this case, the defendant had filed the application after expiry of one year and 46 days from the date of ex-parte decree and hence the application seeking condonation of delay was filed by him under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. As observed supra, it was in substance alleged in the application that applicant (defendant) was not aware of the ex-parte order and the ex-parte decree. The Trial court examined the issue of delay and found no merit therein. The cause pleaded was not found bonafide. It is for this reason, the application was dismissed as not making out any sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of ibid and so the application for setting aside of ex-parte decree was also dismissed as barred by time. 14. In my considered opinion, the petitioner has no case on facts and the Trial Court was justified in dismissing the application as barred by time. 14. In my considered opinion, the petitioner has no case on facts and the Trial Court was justified in dismissing the application as barred by time. This was not the case where the petitioner (defendant) was not served with the copy of the plaint. Here the case was that defendant entered appearance in the suit, filed his written statement and contested the suit for several months. Under these circumstances, and in this view of the matter, he could not possibly take the plea of ignorance of legal proceedings filed against him which resulted in passing ex-parte order and then decree against him. 15. In my opinion, it was a clear case of harassment meted out by a son to his father who was compelled to file a suit against his own son. It clearly appears from the conduct of the son (defendant) that he was trying to delay the proceedings in the trial and with that end in view, indulged in all kind of delaying tactics. The trial court was therefore right in declining to condone the delay in filing the application for setting aside of ex-parte decree. Even otherwise a delay of more than one year cannot be said to be either sufficient or reasonable. No interference in such order is thus called for. 16. As a result of foregoing discussion, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. No costs.