ORDER Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and learned counsel appearing for the Vigilance. 2. Entire criminal proceeding of Special Case No. 2 of 1998 (Vigilance Case No. 3 of 1998) including the order dated 8.12.2011 under which cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 477, 409 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act has been taken against the petitioner has been challenged on the ground that sufficient evidences are not there to put the petitioner on trial and that there has been denial of right to speedy justice, as the occurrence is said to have taken place in the year 1981-82, whereas the first information report had been lodged in the year 1998 and the charge-sheet was submitted only in December, 2011. 3. Mr. Anil Kumar, learned, counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that though number of allegations are there in the first information report but all those allegations are not concerned with the petitioner. So far petitioner is concerned, one of the allegations are there that the petitioner being the member of the Purchase Committee and also other members of the Purchase Committee, did award a contract, for supply of plaster of peris, to a person, who had submitted its tender papers after the last date fixed in the notice and that when plaster of peris was supplied its strength was not found to be the same, as it was specified in NIT (Notice Inviting Tender), rather it was of inferior quality and for that the petitioner cannot be held responsible, as the role of the petitioner was only to select a person for awarding contract. Thus, what has come against the petitioner is that the petitioner and others, being members of the Purchase Committee, awarded contract to a person, who was not entitled to get it. Except that, nothing more has come against the petitioner so as to put the petitioner on trial and that there has been denial of right to speedy justice and, therefore, the order taking cognizance is itself fit to be quashed, in view of a decision rendered in a case of Vakil Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar, (2009)3 SCC 355 [ : 2009(1) JLJR (SC) 277]. 4. As against this Mr. 4. As against this Mr. Shailesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel appearing for the vigilance submits that the petitioner, who was posted as Assistant Civil Engineer, High Tension Insulator Factory, Namkom, Ranchi, at the relevant point of time, and others, being the members of the Purchase Committee, adopted corrupt practices in awarding contract for supply of the materials whereby heavy loss was caused to the Government exchequer. 5. In this regard, it was pointed out by him that lowest price was quoted by some of the tenderers for supply of Ball Socket Caps and Tongue Clevis Caps, but it was awarded to M/s Casfit Malleables and M/s Star Iron Works @ Rs. 27.25 per piece and that Members of the Purchase Committee were closely associated with the Management of M/s Casfit Malleables and thereby heavy loss was caused to the Government exchequer and in such situation, the order taking cognizance never warrants to be quashed even though the matter relates to 1981-82. 6. In reply it was submitted that whatever submission was made with respect allegation that does not pertain to this petitioner. 7. Be that as it may, the allegations seem to be there on the basis of which, the court has taken cognizance of the offence as aforesaid. In such situation, it would not right in the interest of justice to quash the entire proceeding on the ground of delay in investigation. 8. Here at this stage, I may refer to a decision of Vakil Prasad Singh (supra), wherein Their Lordships after noticing the principle laid down in number of cases hereinbelow, relating to right of a person to speedy justice Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, (1978)1 SCC 248 , Hussainara Khatoon and Others vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980)1 SCC 81 [ : 1979, PLJR (SC) 405], Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors. vs. R.S. Nayak & Anr; (1992)1 SCC 225 [: 1992(1) PLJR (SC) 41]; "Common Cause" A Registered Society vs. Union of India and Others [ (1996)4 SCC 33 ] [ : 1997(1) PLJR (SC) 9], A Registered Society vs. Union of India and Others [ (1996)6 SCC 775 ], Raj Deo Sharma vs. State of Bihar [ (1999)7 SCC 604 ] [: 1998(3) PLJR (SC) 57] and P. Ramachandra Rao vs. State of Karnataka [ (2002)4 SCC 578 ] [ : 2002(3) JLJR (SC) 20], was pleased to hold as under:- "It is, therefore, well settled that the right to speedy trial in all criminal persecutions (sic prosecutions) is an inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution. This right is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in court but also includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well. The right to speedy trial extends equally to all criminal prosecutions and is not confined to any particular category of cases. In every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the court has to perform the balancing act upon taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances, enumerated above, and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. Where the court comes to the conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, may be quashed unless the court feels that having regard to the nature of offence and other relevant circumstances, quashing of proceedings max not be in the interest of justice. In such a situation, it is open to the court to make an appropriate order as it may deem just and equitable including fixation of time-frame for conclusion of trial." 9. Keeping in view the gravity of the offence, quashing of the proceeding would not be in the interest of justice. 10. Accordingly, this application stands dismissed. 11. Before parting with this order, it be observed that since much time has already been consumed during investigation, now it would be proper and appropriate that the trial, on appearance of all the accused persons, be commenced at the earliest.