JUDGMENT : C.L. Soni, J. During the course of hearing of this petition, learned advocate Shri C.B.Patel appearing for the petitioner as also learned AGP appearing for respondents No. 1, 2, 3 and 5, since agreed for final hearing of the petition, the following order is passed. 2. Rule. Learned AGP Shri Niraj Ashar waives service of Rule for respondents No. 1, 2, 3 and 5. Respondent No. 4 stands deleted at the instance of the learned advocate for the petitioner as the respondent No.4 is a formal party. With the consent of the learned advocates for the parties, the matter is taken up for final disposal. 3. What is challenged in the present petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is the order dated 09.04.2013, passed by the Gujarat State Cooperative Tribunal in Misc. Application No. 6 of 2012, filed by the petitioner, seeking condonation of delay of 12 years and 4 months, occurred in filing appeal before the Tribunal against the order dated 30.06.1999, passed under Section 93 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 (‘the Act’ for short). 4. It is the case of the petitioner that he was serving as Manager of respondent No. 5 Society and in respect of some irregularities, inquiry under Section 93 of the Act was initiated. The petitioner has averred that pursuant to the notice given to the petitioner in respect of the said inquiry, the petitioner filed detailed reply on 11.05.1999. However, the final report or order in the inquiry was not served upon the petitioner. The petitioner has averred that the petitioner came to know about such order on 03.11.2011, when he was served with notice calling upon him to deposit amount of Rs. 6,03,381.12 ps. as per the order under Section 93 of the Act. As further averred by the petitioner, the petitioner preferred appeal against the order dated 30.06.1999, passed under Section 93 of the Act by filing appeal before the Tribunal with an application for condonation of delay. 6,03,381.12 ps. as per the order under Section 93 of the Act. As further averred by the petitioner, the petitioner preferred appeal against the order dated 30.06.1999, passed under Section 93 of the Act by filing appeal before the Tribunal with an application for condonation of delay. The Tribunal, however, rejected the said application by impugned order on the ground that the petitioner was served with the show cause notice for initiation of proceedings under Section 93 and the petitioner even replied to such show cause notice and therefore, the petitioner had full knowledge about the inquiry made under Section 93 of the Act and therefore, the petitioner could not be said to have made out sufficient ground for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal. 5. I have heard learned advocates for the parties. Learned advocate Shri C.B.Patel appearing for the petitioner submitted that after the petitioner was served with the notice for initiating inquiry under Section 93 of the Act, the petitioner replied to such notice through his advocate, but then, the petitioner was not communicated the final order dated 30.06.1999 made by the inquiry officer. Learned advocate Shri Patel submitted that it is not the case that the inquiry officer had made the order under Section 93 in presence of either the petitioner or his advocate. Learned advocate Mr.Patel submitted that the petitioner submitted his reply on 11.05.1999 and thereafter, the inquiry officer made order on 30.06.1999. The petitioner was therefore not aware about the final order passed by the inquiry officer. Learned advocate Mr.Patel submitted that Section 153 for appeals provides that the appeal shall be filed against the order made under Section 93 of the Act within 2 months from the date of communication of the order or decision. Mr.Patel, therefore, submitted that unless the order made under Section 93 is communicated, the limitation period would not start and therefore, since, the order under Section 93 was never communicated to the petitioner, delay occurred in filing the appeal was required to be condoned. Mr. Patel thus, urged to allow the petition and to quash and set aside the impugned decision of the Tribunal and to allow the application for delay preferred by the petitioner and to direct the Tribunal to hear the appeal preferred by the petitioner on its own merits. 6. Mr. Patel thus, urged to allow the petition and to quash and set aside the impugned decision of the Tribunal and to allow the application for delay preferred by the petitioner and to direct the Tribunal to hear the appeal preferred by the petitioner on its own merits. 6. As against the above arguments, learned AGP Shri Ashar submitted that the petitioner had participated in the proceedings initiated under Section 93 of the Act. Learned AGP Shri Ashar submitted that the Tribunal has rightly observed that the petitioner has not only submitted its reply to the notice under Section 93 of the Act, but had also noted about the proceedings taken out against him and therefore, non-service of the order to the petitioner could not be a ground for condoning long and unreasonable delay of more than 12 years in filing appeal by the petitioner against the order passed under Section 93 of the Act. Learned AGP Shri Ashar thus, urged to dismiss the petition. 7. Having heard learned advocates for the parties and having perused the record of the case, it appears that after the petitioner was served with the notice in respect of the proceedings under Section 93 of the Act, the petitioner filed his reply before the Inquiry Officer. Such reply of the petitioner was dated 11.05.1999. 8. However, the Inquiry Officer made final order dated 30.06.1999 holding the petitioner and other officers of the society responsible for financial loss to the society. Thus, about 19 days after the petitioner tendered the reply to the notice before the Inquiry Officer, the Inquiry Officer passed final order. 9. There is no dispute about the fact that the petitioner was never communicated with the order passed by the Inquiry Officer under Section 93 of the Act. Though, learned AGP Shri Ashar further submitted that after the final order was passed by the Inquiry Officer, same was sent for serving to the petitioner to the president of the society, but then, learned AGP Shri Ashar could not point out from the record that there was actual service of said order to the petitioner. Therefore, it appears that thought the petitioner had participated in the proceedings initiated under Section 93, still he was not served with the final order passed under Section 93 by the Inquiry Officer. 10. Therefore, it appears that thought the petitioner had participated in the proceedings initiated under Section 93, still he was not served with the final order passed under Section 93 by the Inquiry Officer. 10. Section 153 of the Act provides for appeal against the order or decision passed under different provisions of the Act, including the provisions of Section 93. The appeal against the order passed under Section 93 could be filed under Sub Section 4 of Section 153 within 2 months from the date of communication of order or decision. Therefore, the period of limitation would be counted from the date of communication of order or decision under Section 93 of the Act. 11. Unlike provisions of Section 102 which provides for filing of appeal against the decision of Registrar or his nominee or Board of Nominees, within 2 months from the date of decision or order for appeal to the Tribunal, Section 153 clearly provides of starting of limitation from communication of the order or decision. Therefore, when there is a clear provision for filing of appeal under Section 153 within 2 months from the date of communication of the order and when undisputedly the decision/order passed under Section 93 by the Inquiry Officer was not communicated to the petitioner, the limitation for filing the appeal by the petitioner could not be said to have started. The petitioner has averred in the petition that he could know about the impugned order only when he received notice from the liquidator of the respondent No.5 society on 03.11.2011. The petitioner made application for condonation of delay on 25.01.2012 along with the appeal. Therefore, though the appeal of the petitioner could be said to have been filed after about 2 months and 24 days from the date when the petitioner could know about the final order dated 30.06.1999, passed under Section 93 of the Act, however, such could be said to be no delay in the facts of the case, especially, when the petitioner had never been communicated with the final order under Section 93 of the Act. 12. In such facts/situation, the Tribunal was required to condone delay occurred in filing the appeal against the order dated 30.06.1999. The Tribunal having not done so, has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested with it. 12. In such facts/situation, the Tribunal was required to condone delay occurred in filing the appeal against the order dated 30.06.1999. The Tribunal having not done so, has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested with it. Therefore, the order passed by the Tribunal rejecting the application for condonation of delay is required to be quashed and set aside and the Tribunal is required to be directed to decide the appeal preferred by the petitioner on its own merits. 13. For the reasons stated above, the impugned order dated 09.04.2013 passed by the Tribunal in Misc. Application No.6 of 2012 is quashed and set aside and the application preferred by the petitioner seeking condonation of delay in preferring the appeal against the order dated 30.06.1999 passed under Section 93 of the Act is allowed. The Tribunal is directed to hear and decide the appeal preferred by the petitioner on its own merits in accordance with law. 14. Rule made absolute. Application allowed.