JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.—Heard Sri S.P. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel. Through this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the judgment and order dated 8.6.2012 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation (in short, ‘DDC’) on a restoration application filed in revision No. 101 (Jagdish v. Surajbhan and others), by which learned DDC has allowed the restoration application by setting aside the order dated 16.12.2009. 2. The facts giving rise to this case are that, it appears, revision was decided in absence of Natthu Singh S/o Sri Khadag Singh (respondent No. 2 herein). For recall of the aforesaid order, an application was filed by respondent No. 2 on 2.8.2010 on the ground that the applicant therein (respondent No. 2) was unaware about the pendency of the revision as well as the decision rendered therein and he only came to know the same on 31.2.2010. 3. An objection was filed by the petitioner that February month is only of 28/29 days and the grounds taken in the restoration application are totally false. In response thereto, a reply was filed by respondent No. 2 stating therein that due to typographical mistake, instead of 31.7.2010, 31.2.2010 was mentioned, therefore, respondent No. 2 be permitted to amend the aforesaid date. This application was allowed by the DDC on 8.6.2012, but it appears, no amendment was made in the restoration application. In due course, the petitioner herein has filed an application on 25.7.2012 taking objection that in view of Order VI, Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure, either the amendment can be made within time granted by the Court or within 14 days from the date of order and since no such amendment has been made, therefore, now in view of the provisions contained in Order VI Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the petitioner cannot be permitted to amend the grounds. The DDC, however, has permitted the correction on payment of Rs. 100/- as cost payable to the petitioner and thereafter, allowed the restoration application on the ground that while passing the order dated 14.12.2009, the respondent No. 2 was not heard. 4. The DDC, however, has permitted the correction on payment of Rs. 100/- as cost payable to the petitioner and thereafter, allowed the restoration application on the ground that while passing the order dated 14.12.2009, the respondent No. 2 was not heard. 4. Sri Mishra vehemently contended that the provisions contained under Order VI Rule 18 of Code of Civil Procedure are mandatory in nature and in three eventuality, the amendment could be carried on, i.e., (i) within time allowed by the Court, (ii) within a period of 14 days from the date of order and (iii) if the time is extended by the Court. Here in this case, in his submissions, firstly, the Court has not fixed any time for carrying out the amendment, secondly, no amendment was made within 14 days and thirdly, the Court has not extended the time for making the amendment, therefore, the amendment made could not be taken into consideration. 5. On being confronted as to whether the provisions contained under Order VI Rule 18 of Code of Civil Procedure are applicable in the consolidation proceedings, learned counsel for the petitioner could not show from the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 that this provision is applicable. 6. On the contrary, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State has submitted that in the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), it has been made specific in certain sections where the Legislature has intended to follow the procedure contained in Code of Civil Procedure. Learned Standing Counsel has invited attention of this Court towards Sections 28, 38 and 41 A of the Act. 7. For appreciating the controversy, the provision contained under Rule 18 of Order VI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be necessary to be looked into, which is reproduced hereinunder: “18. Learned Standing Counsel has invited attention of this Court towards Sections 28, 38 and 41 A of the Act. 7. For appreciating the controversy, the provision contained under Rule 18 of Order VI of the Code of Civil Procedure would be necessary to be looked into, which is reproduced hereinunder: “18. Failure to amend after order.—If a party who has obtained an order for leave to amend does not amend accordingly within the time limited for the purpose by the order, or if no time is thereby limited then within fourteen days from the date of the order, he shall not be permitted to amend after the expiration of such limited time as aforesaid or of such fourteen days, as the case may be, unless the time is extended by the Court.” From the bare reading of Rule 18, Order VI, it would transpire that when the Court granted leave to make amendment, then amendment has to be made within time limit fixed by the Court or if no time limit is fixed, then within 14 days from the date of the order and failure of above conditions, the person shall not be permitted to carry out amendment, unless the time is extended by the Court. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the provisions contained under Rule 18, Order VI of the Civil Procedure Code are mandatory in character. 9. For deciding as to whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory, there can be no straight jacket formula. The Supreme Court in the case of Dattatraya Moreshwar v. The State of Bombay and others, AIR 1952 SC 181 , has observed that a law which creates public duty is directory but if it confers private rights, it is mandatory. Relevant passage from this judgment is quoted below : “It is well-settled that generally speaking the provisions of the statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring private rights are imperative. Relevant passage from this judgment is quoted below : “It is well-settled that generally speaking the provisions of the statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring private rights are imperative. When the provision of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of legislature, it has been the practice of the Courts to hold such provisions to be directory only the neglect of them not affecting the validity of the acts done.” 10. A Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. and others v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751 , while considering the issue as to whether a provision contained in a Statute is mandatory or directory, observed as under : “For ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature, the Court may consider, inter alia, the nature and the design of the statute, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other, the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided, the circumstance, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions, the fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty, the serious or trivial consequences that flow therefrom, and, above all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered.” 11. In Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., Rampur v. Municipal Board, Rampur, AIR 1965 SC 895 ; and State of Mysore v. V.K. Kangan, AIR 1975 SC 2190 , whether a provision is mandatory or directory, would, in the ultimate analysis, depend upon the intent of the law-maker and that has to be gathered not only from the phraseology of the provision but also by considering its nature, its design and the consequence which would follow from construing it in one way or the other. In Sharif-Ud-Din v. Abdul Gani Lone, AIR 1980 SC 303 , the Supreme Court, while considering the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 89 of the J&K Representation of People Act, 1957, held that the difference between a mandatory and directory rule is that the former requires strict observance while in the case of latter, substantial compliance of the rule may be enough and where the statute provides that failure to make observance of a particular rule would lead to a specific consequence, the provision has to be construed as mandatory. The Apex Court held as under : “In order to find out the true character of the legislation, the Court has to ascertain the object which the provision of law in question is to sub-serve and its design and the context in which it is enacted. If the object of the law is required to be defeated by non-compliance with it, it has to be regarded as mandatory.....Whenever the statute provides that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that the failure to compliance with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it would be difficult to hold that the requirement is not mandatory and the specified consequence should not follow.” 12. Similar view has been reiterated in Dinkar Anna Patil and another v. State of Maharashtra and others, (1999) 1 SCC 354 ; Shashikant Singh v. Tarkeshwar Singh, AIR 2002 SC 2031 ; Balwant Singh and others v. Anand Kumar Sharma and others, (2003) 3 SCC 433 ; Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd. and others, AIR 2003 SC 511 ; and Chandrika Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar and others, AIR 2004 SC 2036 ). 13. In view of the various decisions of the Apex Court, it is clear that while holding a particular statute as mandatory or directory, it would be necessary to look into the intention of the Legislature. Here in Rule 18 of Order VI of the Code of Civil Procedure on grant of permission to amend the pleadings, two conditions have been laid down; one amendment has to be made within time limit granted by the Court or in case no limit is fixed, within 14 days from the date of order and in the case of failure, it cannot be amended, unless time granted by the Court. The putting of the conditions for carrying out an amendment pursuant to the Court’s order, appears to be directory in character as the rule has been framed to carry out the amendment in a particular manner. The amendment is always made to improve the pleadings and improvement of pleadings clears theýÿ way of decision making process. 14. Procedural laws are enacted to facilitate the process of getting justice from the Court, therefore, in my considered opinion, the procedure contained under Rule 18, Order VI are directory in character and not mandatory. Other wise also, in this case, the Court has allowed the amendment after payment of cost, meaning thereby, the Court has extended the time limit for amendment. Pursuant thereto, amendment was made on 28.7.2012. 15. The Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, JT 1987 (1) SC 537, has observed that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds, but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. In view of the foregoing discussions, no infirmity can be attached with the view taken by the DDC. The writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. —————-