Judgment : ChallaKodanda Ram, J. Seemingly, a simple issue like correction of date of birth in School Leaving Certificate and a consequent change in the Service Register created a highpitual legal battle between two high ranking officials of the State concentrating their energies in the legal battle in stead of preparation of planned strategies for the betterment of the people. 2. There are four writ petitions before this Court praying for issuance of a Writ of certiorari and seeking to quash common order dated 30.11.2012 issued by the A.P. Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad (referred hereinafter as “the Tribunal”) in O.A. Nos.2066 and 2236 of 2012. W.P. No.8603/2013 is filed against the order in O.A. No.2066/2013 by the Government of Andhra Pradesh represented by its Principal Secretary, Engineering Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad; and W.P. No.8547/2013 is filed against O.A. No.2236 of 2012, and W.P. No.39308 of 2012 and W.P. No.39309 of 2012 are filed by one Sri K.Siva Reddy against the orders in O.A. Nos.2066 and 2236 of 2012. In these writ petitions M.Gangadharam S/o M.Krishnaiah, who was the applicant in O.A.No.2066 of 2012 and Sri S.Rama Murthy S/o Kondaiah, the applicant in O.A. No.2236 of 2012 are common respondents. Inasmuch as the challenge is to the common order passed by the Tribunal, at the request of the parties, all the Writ Petitions have been clubbed together and were heard together. 3. For the purpose of brevity the parties herein are referred to as in W.P. No.39308 of 2012 and as the pleadings are more or less being same in all the Writ Petitions, for reference the pleadings in the said affidavit are referred to. A.Siva Reddy, S/o K.Subba Reddy, who is the petitioner in W.P. No.39038 of 2008 and W.P. No.39039 of 2012, is hereinafter referred to as petitioner. The State of Andhra Pradesh is referred to as 1st respondent; M.Gangadaram, S/o M.Krishanaiah is referred to as 2nd respondent and S.Rama Murthy, who is 1st respondent in W.P. No.8547/2013 and 2nd respondent in W.P. No.39309 of 2012, is hereinafter referred to as S.Rama Murthy. 4. The brief facts, which has created the litigation, are as follows: Petitioner is an Engineering Graduate and entered into the service as Deputy Executive Engineer (R&B), in 1982 and at the time of entry in the service his date of birth was recorded as 02.05.1954, which in fact was recorded in his School Leaving Certificate. 4. The brief facts, which has created the litigation, are as follows: Petitioner is an Engineering Graduate and entered into the service as Deputy Executive Engineer (R&B), in 1982 and at the time of entry in the service his date of birth was recorded as 02.05.1954, which in fact was recorded in his School Leaving Certificate. Over the years he had climbed the ladders and reached the position of in-charge Engineer-in-Chief (Admin and NH), R&B Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh. As per averments in the Writ Petition, in and around 1983 he realised that his date of birth is in fact 18.02.1956 and desired to get it corrected as 18.02.1956, as it is the correct date of birth, and approached the Chief Engineer (R&B), Hyderabad through proper channel seeking substitution of the correct date of birth in his Service Register. The Superintending Engineer (R&B), Kadapa through his memo dated 20.04.1983 had informed him that the change of date of birth would be considered on his getting the change effected in SSC certificate by the competent authority. He then approached the District Munsif Court at Banganapalle, his native place, by filing O.S. No.287 of 1987 and the suit was finally decreed on 23.12.1988 directing the Board of Secondary Education to correct his date of birth as 18.02.1956 in the School Leaving Certificate. Consequent to issuance of G.O. Rt.No.3, Dated 02.01.1991, finally in his Secondary School Certificate, his date of birth was corrected on 22.01.1991 and since then in his Secondary School Certificate, the date of birth is shown as 18.02.1956. Thereafter, on 16.03.2008, the petitioner approached the 1st respondent with a request to enter his date of birth as 18.02.1956 in his Service Register in place of 02.05.1954. On representation dated 16.03.2008 the 1st respondent issued G.O.Ms. No.350, Transport, Roads and Buildings (Ser.I) Department, dated 08.12.2008, ordering alteration of his date of birth in Service Register as 18.02.1956 in place of 02.05.1954 by relaxing the Sub Rule (5) of Rule 2 of A.P. Public Employment (Recording and Alteration of Date of Birth) Rules, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”). G.O.Ms.No.350, dated 08.12.2008 is extracted hereunder: ABSTRACT Public Services – Roads and Buildings Department – Sri K. Siva Reddy, in-charge Engineer-in-Chief (R&B) – Request for correction of date of birth as 18.02.1956 instead of 02.05.1954 as per the school record – Accepted – Orders – Issued. G.O.Ms.No.350, dated 08.12.2008 is extracted hereunder: ABSTRACT Public Services – Roads and Buildings Department – Sri K. Siva Reddy, in-charge Engineer-in-Chief (R&B) – Request for correction of date of birth as 18.02.1956 instead of 02.05.1954 as per the school record – Accepted – Orders – Issued. Transport, roads and buildings (serv.i) department G.O.Ms.No.350 Dated:8.12.2008. Read the following: 1. From Sri K. Siva Reddy, Letter No.Nil, Dated:02.03.83 addressed to CE(R&B), Hyderabad. 2. Memo.No.3984/A2/83 of the SE(R&B) Cuddapah Circle, Cuddapah, Dated:20.04.1983. 3. Birth Extract issued by the MRO, Banaganapalli, Dated: 15.05.1986 4. Certified copy of the Judgment and Decree in O.S.No.285 of 1987 on the file of the court of the Dist. Munsif, Banaganapalle, Kurnool District, Dated:23.12.1988. 5. G.O.Rt.No.3, Education (SE) Department, Dated:02.01.1991. 6. SSC Certificate issued by the Board of Secondary Education issued in favour of Sri K. Siva Reddy, with date of birth correction endorsement by the Board of Secondary Education. 7. Representation of Sri K. Siva Reddy, I/c ENC(R&B)(Admn.), Dated:16.03.08. ORDER: 1. Sri K. Siva Reddy, has represented that he was actually born on 18.02.1956 at Mittipalli (V), Banganapalli Tq. In Kurnool District. But his father, being an illiterate, got it entered it in the School records wrongly as 2-5-1954. He came to know about the actual date of birth during 1983, by which time he has already entered into Government service. He has been selected through the APPSC and appointed as Dy.E.E. in R&B Department in Zone-IV and joined as such on 19-8-1982 FN. Having come to know about his actual date of birth, he made an application in the reference 1st read above, requesting for correction of his date of birth. The Superintending Engineer (R&B), Cuddapah, in his Memo, 2nd read above, has in turn informed that the date of birth in S.R. will be changed after getting date of birth changed in the SSC register by the competent authority. He approached the concerned authorities for getting the date of birth corrected and in the process he filed a suit O.S. No.285 of 1987, on the file of the Court of the District Munsif, Banaganapalle, and for correction of the date of birth in his School Certificate, that the matter has been examined in Education Department and they have issued orders in G.O. Rt.No.3, Education (SE.I) Department dated 2-1-1991 for effecting necessary correction in the SSC register. Consequently, his date of birth has been corrected in the SSC register by the Director of School Education – vide D.Dis.No.4649143/87, dated 22-1-1991. 2. He has further represented that in the mean time, the Government has introduced AP Public Employment (Recording and Alteration of Date of Birth) Rules, 1984 – vide G.O.Ms.No.165, Finance and Planning Department dated 21-4-1984 and according to these rules, there is an embargo on applications for correction of date of birth. But, he stated that he had already laid his claim well before the promulgation of the said rules and his application was not finally disposed of then and inasmuch as it required him to get the date of birth corrected first in the SSC register and then approach the authorities for taking necessary further action. He stated that the present application cannot be treated as a fresh application and it has to be treated as a continuation to his earlier application 1st read above. Because of the transfers and postings including promotions at that time, the original papers such as Judgment of the Civil Court and other relevant material were mixed up with certain other papers and he could not trace the same till recently and therefore he could not make an immediate attempt and requested for condoning the delay and to uphold his genuine claim and do justice. He has also quoted certain precedent cases where Government have altered the date of birth of the individuals in their Departments recently. 3. Rule (4) of AP Public Employment (recording and Alteration of Date of Birth) Rules, 1984 laid down a salutary principle to prohibit reopening of the question of correction of date of birth which may have become final prior to the enforcement of 1984 rules. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that Rule 5 thereof lays down that where application of a Government servant was pending on the date of commencement of those rules, the same will be dealt with on the basis of date of birth recorded in the School and College records. 4. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that Rule 5 thereof lays down that where application of a Government servant was pending on the date of commencement of those rules, the same will be dealt with on the basis of date of birth recorded in the School and College records. 4. It is observed that Sri K.Siva Reddy has already represented for correction of his date of birth prior to the issue of A.P. Public Employment (Record and Alteration of Date of Birth) Rules, 1984, i.e., before 21-4-1984, and that the S.E.(R&B) has asked him to get his date of birth changed in his School Records first, and accordingly, he obtained a declaration from the District Munsif Court, Banganapalle and Government in Education Department also issued orders in the G.O. 5th read above based on which his correct date of birth has been corrected in SSC Certificate. Since his application is pending as on the date of the commencement of the AP Public Employment (Record and Alteration of Date of Birth) Rules, 1984, the same has to be dealt with on the basis of the recorded age in the School as per rule 5 of the said Rules. 5. After careful examination observe that the Memo 2nd read above issued by the Superintending Engineer (R&B) tantamount to formal acceptance of the request of the individual that his date of birth in the SR can be changed after changing of the same in SSC Register by the competent authority and that in fact his date of birth has been changed in the SSC certificate based on the orders issued in the G.O. 5th read above and in these circumstances Government have decided to accept the request of Sri K. Siva Reddy, I/c.ENC(R&B), for alteration of his date of birth in the SR from2-5-1954 to 18-2-1956 duly relaxing Sub-rule (5) of rule 2 of AP Public Employment (Recording and Alteration of Date of Birth) Rules, 1984. 6. Accordingly Government hereby relax Sub-rule (5) of rule 2 of AP Public Employment (Recording and Alteration of Date of Birth) Rules, 1984 in favour of Sri K. Siva Reddy, I/c ENC(R&B) NH Admn. And order for the correction of his date of birth in his Service Register from 2-5-1954 to 18-2-1956. 7. The ENC(R&B) Admn. 6. Accordingly Government hereby relax Sub-rule (5) of rule 2 of AP Public Employment (Recording and Alteration of Date of Birth) Rules, 1984 in favour of Sri K. Siva Reddy, I/c ENC(R&B) NH Admn. And order for the correction of his date of birth in his Service Register from 2-5-1954 to 18-2-1956. 7. The ENC(R&B) Admn. Shall take necessary action in carrying out the corrections in the S.R. of Sri K. Siva Reddy, I/c. ENC(R&B) as ordered above. 8. This order issues with the concurrence of Finance Department – vide their U.O. No.29119/463/FR.I/08, Dated 22-10-2008. (BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNOR OF ANDHRA PRADESH) Dr. T. CHATTERJEE. PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT 5. Respondent No.2 and S.Rama Murthy, both belonging to Scheduled Tribe category, who are also working in the Engineering Department of R&B, had filed O.A. Nos.2066 and 2236 of 2012 respectively before the Tribunal with a prayer “Hon’ble Court may be pleased to declare the G.O.Ms. No.350, dated 08.12.2008 as illegal, arbitrary as one issued beyond the competence of the Government of Andhra Pradesh and it is therefore violative of Article 14, 16 & 21 of the Constitution of India and pass such order or orders as this Hon’ble Court may deemed fit and proper in the circumstances of the case”. After hearing at length the Tribunal by its Order dated 30.11.2012 declared the said G.O. as illegal, arbitrary and beyond the competency of the 1st respondent and also Rules. 6. This order of the Tribunal is assailed before us in these four Writ Petitions. The Tribunal considering the pleadings in O.S. No.285 of 1987 of the petitioner that he had come to know about his correct date of birth only in the year 1986, did not believe the claim of the petitioner that he had in fact made an application to Chief-Engineer seeking correction of his date of birth in the Service Register in 1983 itself, and the Superintending Engineer, Cuddapah, purported in issuing Memo dated 20.04.1983 requiring him to get the change effected in S.S.C. Certificate. The Tribunal found it strange that even after the change effected in 1991, the petitioner kept quiet for 16 long years and in the year 2008 at the fag end of the petitioner’s service, the Government had chosen to issue the G.O.Ms. No.350, dated 08.12.2008. The Tribunal found it strange that even after the change effected in 1991, the petitioner kept quiet for 16 long years and in the year 2008 at the fag end of the petitioner’s service, the Government had chosen to issue the G.O.Ms. No.350, dated 08.12.2008. Further, the Tribunal rejected the contention of the petitioner that the respondent No.2 and Sri S.Rama Murthy are not aggrieved parties and no O.A. would lie at their instance and they do not have locus standi to challenge the said G.O. Assuming without conceding, that the private respondents could challenge the G.O., their application ought not to have been entertained as the same is hopelessly barred by time and the Tribunal lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the applications challenging the G.O. 7. It may be apt to mention at this stage itself that at the threshold both the petitioner as well as 1st respondent raised objection with regard to locus standi of the Applicants and the maintainability of such application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (for short “the Act”) and sought rejection of the applications and requested the Tribunal to decide the issue as a preliminary issue. The Tribunal, by an elaborate Order dated 04.06.2012 and after discussing various judgments and in particular- 1) Devki nanda Verma Vs. State of Haryana and another (1995 Suppl. (3) SCC 431). 2) Director of Technical Education Vs. K. Sita Devi ( AIR 1991 SC 308 ). 3) Jasbi Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar ( AIR 1976 SC 578 ). 4) Lakhi Ram Vs. State of Haryana and others ( 1981 (2) SCC 674 ). 5) Burn Standard Co. Ltd., and Others Vs. Dinabandu Majumdar and another (1995) 4 SCC 172 ). 6) Andhra bank Officers Union, Hyderabad Vs. Andhra bank and Another (1997 (2) ALD 390). 7) G.M. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., West Bengal Vs. Shib Kumar Dushad (2008) 8 SCC 696). 8) State of U.P. & Others Vs. Smt. Gulaichi (2003) 6 SCC 483 ). 9) P.Lal Vs. Union of India and others (2003) 3 SCC 393 ). had categorically found that the 2nd respondent and S.Rama Murthy had locus standi to question the legality of the G.O., and the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to entertain the same. The issue with respect to limitation was also rejected. Smt. Gulaichi (2003) 6 SCC 483 ). 9) P.Lal Vs. Union of India and others (2003) 3 SCC 393 ). had categorically found that the 2nd respondent and S.Rama Murthy had locus standi to question the legality of the G.O., and the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to entertain the same. The issue with respect to limitation was also rejected. Questioning the said Order dated 04.06.2012 of the Tribunal, the petitioner filed W.P. Nos.19696 & 22140 of 2012 and the said Writ Petitions were dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court by a Common Order dated 25.07.2012 with an observation “The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed. The Tribunal may dispose of O.A.No.2056 of 2012 and O.A.2236 of 2012 uninfluenced by any of the observations made either in this order or in the impugned order independently, on merits on all aspects. No costs”. 8. The learned counsel Sri Prathap Narayan Sanghi, learned Special Government Pleader representing the Additional Advocate General, while drawing attention of the Court to the facts that the petitioner had joined service on 19.08.1982, that he submitted a representation on 02.03.1983 seeking correction of date of birth as 18.02.1956; the department had agreed to consider his request and directed him to get correction in Secondary School Certificate vide a Memo dated 20.04.1983; on filing of a suit in O.S. No.285 of 1987 being decreed on 23.12.1988 and implementation of the judgment by issuance of G.O.Rt. No.3, dated 02.01.1991 and reasons as stated in the G.O. acceding to the change of date of birth in the Service Register. He further submitted that in view of Rule 2(2) read with Rule 5 of the Rules, the State is under obligation to determine the date of birth when application is made, and inasmuch as the application was pending as on the date of the Rules coming into force, the State had considered the case of the petitioner and in relaxation of the sub rule (5) of Rule 2 of the Rules correction of date of birth in the Service Register of the petitioner has been ordered by issuance of G.O.Ms. No.350, dated 08.12.2008. By drawing attention of the Court to Para 9 of the application he would submit that the prayer in O.A. is limited and grievance with respect to seniority list being a separate and independent cause of action, the challenge to the G.O.Ms. No.350, dated 08.12.2008. By drawing attention of the Court to Para 9 of the application he would submit that the prayer in O.A. is limited and grievance with respect to seniority list being a separate and independent cause of action, the challenge to the G.O.Ms. No.350 dated 08.12.2008 is not in order. He also would submit that there is no explanation about the delay in challenging the G.O.Ms.No.350, dated 08.12.2008 and the Tribunal had mixed up the issues relating to the change of date of birth and seniority list. He also would urge referring to Sections 20 and 21 of the Act, the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction and applications are barred by limitation. In support of his contention he placed reliance on S.S.RathorVs. State of Madhya Pradesh ( AIR 1990 SC 10 ); Ayaaubhkhan Noorkhan Pathan Vs. State of Maharastra ( AIR 2013 SC 58 ); and High Court of A.P. Vs. N. Sanyasi Rao ( 2012 (1) SCC 674 ). 9. Now before us appearing as petitioner’s Counsel in W.P.No.39308 of 2012 Sri R.V. Mallikarjuna Rao, in clear and crystal terms raised three grounds: (1) G.O.Ms.No.350 issued on 08.12.2008 and application challenging the said G.O. was filed in December, 2012 and in view of Section 21 of the Act, which ad vest gives a period of 18months, is barred by limitation and as such the challenge to the G.Os., ought not to have been entertained by the Tribunal as they are time barred. The G.O. has been notified in the web site and as a matter of fact while numbering the O.A., the Registry had raised objection that no condonation of delay petition was even filed. He refers to Sections 3(q), 19 and 21 of the Act. (2) By referring to Section 3(q) and Section 19 of the Act, he contends that the 2nd respondent and Sri S.Rama Murthy are not persons aggrieved as petitioner is in Rank No.1 and Respondent No.2 is at Rank No.152 both in the State as well as in zonal seniority. Further the petitioner and respondent No.2 and S.Rama Murthy are all already Engineers- in-Chief and there is no other higher post than this post and as such they are not affected and not aggrieved. It is only a person aggrieved, who can move an application before the Tribunal and as such the application filed at their instance ought not to have been entertained. It is only a person aggrieved, who can move an application before the Tribunal and as such the application filed at their instance ought not to have been entertained. (3) Government has power to relax the rigor of Rules and it is not open and within the competence of the Tribunal to hold otherwise, and the power of relaxation has been exercised for bonafide reasons and in the facts of the case the interference by the Tribunal is unwarranted. He placed reliance on judgment of Supreme Court reported in JasbhaiMotibhai Desai Vs. Roshna Kumar (1976 SCC 578). He further submits that G.O.Ms. No.350 under challenge essentially is a matter concerning between the petitioner and the Government and his service conditions, and the same is in no way connected or concerned with the service conditions of either Respondent No.2 or Sri S.Rama Murthy, and in that view of the matter the challenge to the said G.O. before the Tribunal is totally unmeaning and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to declare the G.O. as arbitrary and illegal finding fault with the judgment and decree in O.S. No.285 of 1987. 10. Sri Suresh Reddy, Advocate, appearing on behalf of D.Ramakrishna, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P. No.39309 of 2012, specially drawing attention to the pleadings in O.A. would submit that the petitioner is of 1982 batch and the said S.Rama Murthy is of 1986 Batch, and in no way Sri S.Rama Murthy would get affected with the change in date of birth of the petitioner. He also would submit referring to Para No.5 of the O.A. No.2236 of 2012 that it is no where stated how Sri S.Rama Murthy is aggrieved. He would urge the reliance of the Tribunal on the Judgment of Andhra Bank Officers Union Vs. Andhra Bank (1997 (2) ALD 390) as is irrelevant on account of the fact that the same is filed by association that too in the High Court. He would submit that to question the G.O.Ms. No.350 probably a Writ may lie but not an application before the Tribunal inasmuch as the Tribunal being a creature of the statute its jurisdiction is confined to within the parameters of the provisions of the statute. He would submit that to question the G.O.Ms. No.350 probably a Writ may lie but not an application before the Tribunal inasmuch as the Tribunal being a creature of the statute its jurisdiction is confined to within the parameters of the provisions of the statute. He further would submit that the finding recorded in the Tribunal’s Order at para No.23 to the effect that respondent No.2 and S.Rama Murthy are affected parties on account of change of date of birth of the petitioner is without any basis. He also submits that though in Para 26 of the impugned order, various aspects with respect to seniority and other litigation pending before the Tribunal have been stated, inasmuch as Memo No.960/Ser.I (3)/2011, dated 04.08.2011 is not under challenge in O.A. Nos.2066 and 2236 of 2012,the finding of the Tribunal that the application is within the limitation is not correct. As a matter of fact, the issue with respect to objections raised on account of limitation has not been dealt with by the Tribunal. He further would submit that the Tribunal had relied on the judgments of Supreme Court reported in P.LalVs. Union of India & Others (2003) 3 SCC 393 )case, GurupreethSingh Bullar Vs. Union of India ( AIR 2006 sc 1484 ) case, Secretary & Commissioner, Home Department Vs. R.Kirubakaran (1994 Suppl. (1) SCC 155) caseand also DevkiNandan Varma Vs. State of Haryana and Another (1995 Supp (3) SCC 431) case; the reliance on those cases by the Tribunal is not correct inasmuch as in those cases the persons who challenged the orders, were found to be aggrieved parties unlike in these cases. 11. Dr. K.Lakshmi Narasimha, appearing as a counsel for the 2nd respondent in Writ Petition No.8603 of 2013, and the writ petitioner in the present proceedings, elaborately and copiously has drawn attention of the Court, how the Tribunal went wrong in finding 2nd respondent and S.Rama Murthy as aggrieved parties and about the locus standi by placing reliance on the inapplicable judgments. He very efficiently tried to persuade the Court that the Tribunal fell in error in placing reliance on the judgments referred to by it though facts and circumstances in all those cases were different. He would rely on the judgment of Supreme Court reported in MehboobDawood Shaik Vs. He very efficiently tried to persuade the Court that the Tribunal fell in error in placing reliance on the judgments referred to by it though facts and circumstances in all those cases were different. He would rely on the judgment of Supreme Court reported in MehboobDawood Shaik Vs. State of Maharastra ( 2004 (2) SCC 362 ) to state that the judgment is precedent with respect to the question of law raised and argued and each case would have to be appreciated by taking into consideration of the totality of the circumstances. He would submit that the Tribunal had failed to discuss about the locus standi, and there being no delay condonation petition, and would urge that the Tribunal had considered a stale issue which ought not to have been entertained. The learned counsel also would find fault with the approach of the Tribunal in not deciding the issue with respect to locus standi by ignoring the orders of the Hon’ble High Court in W.P.No.19696 & 22140 of 2012, dated 25.07.2012. 12. The last of the samurai Sri C Nageswararao appearing as counsel for the 2nd respondent in W.P.No.8547 of 2013, who is petitioner herein, while reiterating the arguments of the counsel who had appeared on behalf of the petitioner would place on record the judgment reported in G.S.Lamba& Ors., Vs. Union of India & Ors., (1985) 2 SCC 604 ) and would submit that the third parties have no say in change of date of birth and finds fault with the findings of the Tribunal. He also would submit that there are some other reasons for issuance of G.O.Ms. No.350 other than the Judgment and Decree of the Civil Court. By reading the contents of the G.O., in particular Para Nos. 2 to 5, he would submit that the Government had considered the relevant facts and only thereafter had directed change in date of birth in the Service Register of the petitioner, and that the Tribunal ought not to have interfered with the same. 13. By reading the contents of the G.O., in particular Para Nos. 2 to 5, he would submit that the Government had considered the relevant facts and only thereafter had directed change in date of birth in the Service Register of the petitioner, and that the Tribunal ought not to have interfered with the same. 13. (a) Sri P. Bala Krishna Murthy, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the 1st respondent in W.P.No.8547 of 2013 i.e. S. Rama Murthy, would submit that the petitioner had played fraud on the Courts and falsely pleaded and deposed in O.S. No.285 of 1987 on the file of learned District Munsif Court, Banaganapalle, with regard to his knowledge about his true date of birth, that petitioner did not state anywhere in the pleadings that he had submitted an application to the Chief Engineer through proper channel seeking correction of date of birth and about receiving the Memo dated 20.04.1983 from the Superintending Engineer, that as a matter of fact, these are all brought up documents and are invented for the purpose of issuance of G.O.Ms. No.350; that if the representation of the petitioner dated 02.03.1983 is true and if he had disclosed the same before the Civil Court, the suit would not have been maintained, as declaratory suit could only be filed within three years from 02.03.1983, that further notwithstanding that the G.O.Rt. No.3 was issued on 02.01.1991 and correction is said to have been carried out in Secondary School Certificate on 22.01.1991, there was no whisper about the same at any time, earlier to issuance of G.O.Ms. No.350, dated 08.12.2008. He placed on record the developments which have taken place in the department and the inter se disputes which are being fought between petitioner, respondent No.2 and S.Rama Murthy. (b) He would also submit that 2nd respondent belongs to Scheduled Tribe category and in fact pursuant to the Orders in W.P.No.20707/2005, G.O.Ms. No.50, dated 02.03.2007 was issued, on account of which he would figure in the promotion panel between C.Vital Roy and Sri M.Shyam Sunder centred (9th place) in the promotion panel issued in G.O.No.31, dated 13.03.2003. Likewise, S.Rama Murthy would figure in between P. Satyanarayana 32nd place and P. Subbarao. No.50, dated 02.03.2007 was issued, on account of which he would figure in the promotion panel between C.Vital Roy and Sri M.Shyam Sunder centred (9th place) in the promotion panel issued in G.O.No.31, dated 13.03.2003. Likewise, S.Rama Murthy would figure in between P. Satyanarayana 32nd place and P. Subbarao. Respondent No.2 and S.Rama Murthy being younger to the petitioner and also being Scheduled Tribe candidates their seniority is affected and it is not correct to state that both the petitioner and the respondent No.2 are Engineers-in-Chief and as such there cannot be any grievance. He would point out that if even as per G.O.Ms. No.31 dated 13.03.2003 by making correction to the said G.O. by placing the 2nd respondent, he would be in the slot No.8 as Superintending Engineer with effect from 01.04.2003, whereas the petitioner K. Sivareddy is at 55th place. It is only on account of political bosses and ingenious method of appointing the petitioner as in charge Chief Engineer, the respondent and other juniors are deprived of their legitimate place in the administrative hierarchy. In that view of the matter he would submit that however small, seniority benefit and advantage for which they are entitled to it, cannot be denied to them and they are entitled to knock at the doors of the justice by making a grievance. He would submit that this subterfuge method adopted by the petitioner in getting his date of birth surreptitiously altered in the Service Register would affect their chances to have whatever little benefit they can have which they are otherwise entitled to. It cannot be said that as they are not aggrieved party, they have no locus standi to question the G.O.Ms. No.350. He would also draw the attention of the Court to the Orders of the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition Nos.19696 and 22140 of 2012 dismissing the challenge to the orders of the Tribunal dated 13.11.2012 in O.A.Nos.2026 and 2236 of 2012 raising the issue of limitation and locus standi. He would submit that the grounds with respect to locus standi and limitation are once again not available to the petitioner as they are hit by the principles of estoppel and res judicata. Further he would submit that under the Rules there is no power to relax, and power of relaxation is alien to the Rules. He would submit that the grounds with respect to locus standi and limitation are once again not available to the petitioner as they are hit by the principles of estoppel and res judicata. Further he would submit that under the Rules there is no power to relax, and power of relaxation is alien to the Rules. Even assuming that such power is there, a harmonious reading of the Rules would go to show that in view of Rule 5, the change of date of birth cannot be other than what has been entered in the Service Register at the time of entry into the service. He drew the attention of Para 7 of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Government of A.P. Vs. M. Hayagreev Sarma ( 1990 (2) SCC 682 ) which is extracted hereunder: “The object underlying Rule 4 is to avoid repeated applications by a government employee for the correction of his date of birth and with that end in view it provides that a government servant whose date of birth may have been recorded in the service register in accordance with the rules applicable to him and if that entry had become final under the rules prior to the commencement of 1984 Rules, he will not be entitled for alteration of his date of birth. Rule 4 laid down a salutary principle to prohibit reopening of the question of correction of date of birth which may have become final prior to the enforcement of 1984 Rules. As regards validity of Rule 5 is concerned, the view taken by the Tribunal is wholly misconceived. Rule 5 lays down that where application of a government employee for alteration of his date of birth was pending on the date of the commencement of 1984 Rules the same will be dealt with on the basis of date of birth recorded in the school and college records at the time of the entry of the employee into service. In substance Rule 5 lays down that the pending applications of the employees for alteration of their date of birth shall be decided on the basis of the age as recorded in the school and college records. In substance Rule 5 lays down that the pending applications of the employees for alteration of their date of birth shall be decided on the basis of the age as recorded in the school and college records. Thus if on the date of entry into service the date of birth of an employee is not based on school or college records the Rule 5 does not operate as a bar to consideration of other relevant materials in determining the date of birth of the employee”. (c) He further would submit that Rule 2-A introduced with effect from 21.04.1984 is an absolute bar of altering date of birth based on Civil Court decrees. Rule 31 of the State Subordinate Service Rules gives power to relax those Rules but not “the Rules”, as, so far as the change of date of birth is concerned, A.P. Public Employment (Recording & Alteration of Date of Birth) Rules, 1984, are complete Code by itself. He submits that the Government’s assertion that they had exercised the powers is not correct as they do not have such power. He has also rebutted the contention with regard to the limitation stating that they came to be aware of G.O.Ms.No.350 only in the year 2011 and at no point of time earlier to the year 2011 there was any occasion to them to come to know about the said G.O., and as a matter of fact petitioner’s date of birth was shown as 02.05.1954 in the final zonewise list of Deputy Executive Engineers dated 29.11.1994, G.O.Ms. No.72 final seniority list of Deputy Executive Engineers dated 06.05.2000, G.O.Ms. No.37 integrated seniority of Deputy Executive Engineers list dated 23.03.2002, G.O.Ms. No.129 revised integrated seniority list of Deputy Executive Engineers of R&B dated 17.09.2004. He would further submit that even in O.A. No. 6582/2008 filed on 10.08.2008 petitioner had stated that he would be retiring on 31.05.2012. He would also submit that in the capacity of an Engineer-in-Chief, the petitioner was middled in the seniority list, and challenging the same various proceedings are pending whereunder the petitioner is a party respondent in the Tribunal and before this Court. The details of cases are O.A. Nos.5388, 6582 of 2008 and O.A. Nos.2066 and 2236 of 2012 on the file of the Tribunal. Placing reliance on judgment of Supreme Court reported in Chandra Kumar Vs. The details of cases are O.A. Nos.5388, 6582 of 2008 and O.A. Nos.2066 and 2236 of 2012 on the file of the Tribunal. Placing reliance on judgment of Supreme Court reported in Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors., (AIR 1997 SC1125) he would submit that the Tribunal has extensive powers in relation to service matters and would rebut the contention of the petitioner that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction. 14. Sri M. Surender Rao, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 in Writ Petition No.8603 of 2013 and for the respondent No.2 in W.P. No.39308 of 2012 while reiterating the arguments of learned counsel Sri Bala Krishna Murthy would draw attention to the Sections 15, 19, 20 and 21 of the Act, and would submit that the powers of the Tribunal in relation to service matters are wide and extensive and merely basing on the definition of Section 3(q) of the Act, it cannot be said that the 2nd respondent and S.Rama Murthy are not entitled to agitate before the Tribunal. Definition under Section 3 (q) of the Act cannot curtail the jurisdiction of the Tribunal which it has otherwise, vested with under Sections 15 and 19 of the Act. He would further submit that there is no limitation to challenge the like orders as in G.O.Ms. No.350 inasmuch as there is no provision in the Act to make a grievance under Section 20 of the Act. Inasmuch as under Section 21 of the Act, the prescription of limitation being only with respect to orders passed under Section 20 of the Act, the orders like in G.O.Ms.No.350 are not hit by the limitation prescribed in Section 21 of the Act. 15. In the light of elaborate and erudite arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, the issue as to the legality of the order of the Tribunal needs to be considered. At the outset, we would like to make it clear that we do not intend to go into the method and manner of the Judgment and Decree in O.S.No.287 of 1987 came to be passed and also the G.O.Rt. No.3 and G.O.Ms. No.350. However, the question with regard to its validity and the source of power of the Government for passing the said G.Os. is the one necessarily required to be considered and commented upon. 16. No.3 and G.O.Ms. No.350. However, the question with regard to its validity and the source of power of the Government for passing the said G.Os. is the one necessarily required to be considered and commented upon. 16. It may be noted that entire effort of the Counsels appearing on behalf of the petitioner is to demonstrate how and why the Tribunal ought not to have entertained and interfered with the change of Date of Birth permitted in favour of petitioner by G.O.Ms. No.350 dated 08.12.2008, rather than the very decision of altering the date of birth in the Service Register of the petitioner. Principally, the order of the Tribunal as set out above, is challenged on the grounds of 1) Tribunal’s lack of jurisdiction 2) Lack of locus standi of Respondent No.2 and S.Ramamurthy as they are not persons aggrieved, 3) O.A.Nos.2066 & 2236 of 2012 as having been filed as barred by limitation under Section 21 of the Act. Jurisdiction and Limitation: 17. Jurisdiction and Limitation: 17. For answering the issue under the head of jurisdiction the following provisions of the A.P. Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, may necessarily have to be referred to: Section 3 (b): “application” means an application made under Section 19; Section 3(q): “Service matters”, in relation to a person, means all matters relating, to the conditions of his service in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the controle of the Government of India, or, as the case may be, of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government, as respects- (i) Remuneration (including allowances), pension and other retirement benefits; (ii) Tenure including confirmation, seniority, promotion, reversion, premature retirement and superannuation; (iii) Leave of any kind; (iv) Disciplinary matters; or (v) Any other matter whatsoever; Section 3(r): “service rules as to redressal of grievances”, in relation to any matter, means the rules, regulations, orders or other instruments or arrangements as in force for the time being with respect to redressal, otherwise than under this Act, of any grievances in relation to such matters; Section 15 (1) jurisdiction powers and authorities of said Administrative Tribunals:- (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Administrative Tribunal for a State shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all courts in relation to- (a) Recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any civil service of the State or to any civil post under the State: (b) All service matters concerning a person (not being a person referred to in clause (c) of this sub-section or a member, person or civilian referred to in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 14) appointed to any civil service of the State or any civil post under the State and pertaining to the service of such person in connection with the affairs of the State or of any local or other authority under the control of the State Government or of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the State Government; (c) All service matters pertaining to service in connection with the affairs of the State concerning a person appointed to any service or post referred to in clause (b), being a person whose services have been placed by any such local or other authority or corporation or society or other body as is controlled or owned by the State Government, at the disposal of the State Government for such appointment; Section 19-Applications to Tribunals:- (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal may make an application to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance. Explanation:- for the purposes of this sub-section, “order” means an order made- (a) By the Government or a local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or by any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government; or (b) By an officer, committee or other body or agency of the Government or a local or other authority or corporation or society referred to in clause (a). Section 20 Application not to be admitted unless other remedies exhausted:- (1) A tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances. (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances,- (a) If a final order has been made by Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order under such rules, rejecting any appeal preferred or representation made by such person in connection with the grievance; or (b) Where no final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer of other person competent to pass such order with regard to the appeal preferred or representation made by such person, if a period of six months from the date on which such appeal was preferred or representation was made has expired. (3) For the purposes of sub-sections (1) and (2), any remedy available to an applicant by way of submission of a memorial to the President or to the Governor of a State or to any other functionary shall not be deemed to be one of the remedies which are available unless the applicant had elected to submit such memorial. (3) For the purposes of sub-sections (1) and (2), any remedy available to an applicant by way of submission of a memorial to the President or to the Governor of a State or to any other functionary shall not be deemed to be one of the remedies which are available unless the applicant had elected to submit such memorial. Section 21:Limitation:- (1) A tribunal shall not admit an application,- (a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made; (b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where- (a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the mater to which such order relates; and (b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, The application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may be, clause (b), of sub-section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later. 18. A reading of the definition in Section 3(q) of the Act, in particular Section 3(q)(ii) of the Act, makes it clear that an employee’s grievance in relation to seniority, promotion and superannuation would fall within the scope of service matter, and the words “any other matter whatsoever” contained in Section 3(q)(v) of the Act, enlarges the scope of the definition of the service matters. In other words the meaning that is required to be given to the expression service matters is wide and all encompassing. This further becomes clear when we consider the scope and power of the Tribunal under Section 15 of the Act, which starts with expression: (1) “Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Administrative Tribunal for a State shall exercise, on and from the appointed ay, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day all Courts in relation to – (a) Recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any civil service of the State or to any civil post under the Sate: (b) All service matters concerning a person [not being a person referred to in clause (c) of this sub-section or a member, person or civilian referred to in clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 14] appointed to any civil service of the State or any civil post under the State and pertaining to the service of such person in connection with the affairs of the State or of any local or other authority under the control of the State Government or of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the State Government; (c) All service matters pertaining to service in connection with the affairs of the State concerning a person appointed to any service or post referred to in clause (b), being a person whose services have been placed by any such local or other authority or corporation or society or other body as in controlled or owned by the State Government, at the disposal of the State Government for such appointment. is of widest amplitude and encompasses that any and all disputes are within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 19. In the case on hand, the grievance of the respondent No.2 and S.Rama Murthy is to the effect that on account of the change in date of birth of the petitioner from 1954 to 1956, petitioner would be getting extension of service for a period of one year and eight months. In that view of the matter he would be occupying the seat (whatever may be the position), which otherwise would become vacant thereby giving an opportunity for the respondent No.2, S.Rama Murthy and others in line. The fact remaining that respondent No.2, S.Rama Murthy and others are younger to the petitioner. In that view of the matter he would be occupying the seat (whatever may be the position), which otherwise would become vacant thereby giving an opportunity for the respondent No.2, S.Rama Murthy and others in line. The fact remaining that respondent No.2, S.Rama Murthy and others are younger to the petitioner. If one takes into consideration the original date of birth as entered in Service Register of the petitioner as not in dispute, on the petitioner’s demitting office, respondent No.2, S.Rama Murthy and others would be climbing up the ladder cannot be denied. Even assuming for argument sake that petitioner and the contesting respondents are all of the same cadre yet it cannot be denied that when it comes to reference, who is senior in service, there would be an element of difference. The difference may be hypothetical and may only be notional, yet the same is real especially when the individuals are fighting pitched battles. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to decide the root cause and the germination of the grievance. As set out in Para No.13(c), the petitioner and respondents are at loggerheads on one issue or other and are engaged in legal battles. Retirement of the petitioner may put at rest some or many of the cases pending and the effect of validity of G.Os., may also have bearing on many of the cases that are being fought between the parties. In the context of, the complex web of litigation, which is being fought between the parties, it cannot be said that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain to challenge to G.O.Ms. No.350. Though on the face of it the said G.O. looks innocuously dealing with the change of date of birth of the petitioner, the same would certainly affect service conditions of the respondent and others, which are within the grievance which can only be redressed by the Tribunal. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain the applications of the respondent No.2 and S.Rama Murthy. 20. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain the applications of the respondent No.2 and S.Rama Murthy. 20. So far as locus standi is concerned, we had the benefit of listening to the fine dissection of the facts and judgments to discover what has been decided or otherwise in each of the judgments referred to by the learned counsels with respect to locus standi and the person aggrieved. Fortunately, for us, we have been saved much trouble of fathoming the ratio of each judgment on account of the fact that the issue with respect to the locus standi and limitation has already been decided inter parties to this litigation by the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in W.P.Nos. 19696 and 22140 of 2012, which is useful to extract the relevant portion hereunder: “By the aforesaid G.O., the Government accepted the request of the petitioner for change of his date of birth in the service record in relaxation of sub-rule (5) of Rule 2 of A.P. Public Employment (Recording and Alteration of Date of Birth) Rules, 1984 ordering correction of his date of birth in the service record from 02.05.1954 to 18.02.1956. A preliminary objection was raised by the petitioner in the said O.As with regard to the locus standi of the applicants to maintain O.As. Questioning the order of the Government on the ground that the applicants are not affected parties and that the petitioner is admittedly senior to both of the applicants and therefore the O.As are not maintainable. The Tribunal rejected the preliminary objection based on various judgments of the Supreme Court, but however made the following Order: “After going through Sections 14 and 19 of Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and after going through the case law referred above, we are convinced that the applicants are agitating that alteration of date of birth of the 2nd respondent was not done according to the procedure under law and as per Andhra Pradesh Public Employment (Recording and Alteration of Date of Birth) Rules, 1984. In such a case, the applicants have locus standi to question the legality of such order and the Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain such matters. Therefore, we reject the contention of the Respondents that the applicants have no locus standi to maintain the Applications and that the Applications are barred by limitation.” 21. In such a case, the applicants have locus standi to question the legality of such order and the Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain such matters. Therefore, we reject the contention of the Respondents that the applicants have no locus standi to maintain the Applications and that the Applications are barred by limitation.” 21. A careful reading of the judgment extracted above would reveal that what has been interfered by this Court is only with respect to finding, with regard to the underlined portion above, expressing opinion on merits. This becomes clear on further reading of the order whereunder while directing the Tribunal to dispose of the case on merits, the Division Bench had sustained the order on the aspect of the respondents-applicants in O.A. being aggrieved parties and also their locus standi to question the validity of the G.O. At this stage, we may also refer that in earlier proceedings when the Tribunal had decided the issue of locus standi the Govenremnt-1st respondent had accepted the Tribunal’s decision by not challenging the same, and the said decision inter parties is binding on the Government. The decision and finding in the preliminary order dated 04.06.2012 in O.A. Nos.2066 and 2236 of 2012 which was confirmed by this Court would operate as res judicata as against the petitioner and Government and the issue is not open to challenge again. 22. So far as limitation aspect is concerned, it is the contention raised by the respondents in O.A. Nos.2066 & 2236 of 2012 that though the alteration of date of birth of the petitioner was made in the year 2008, the applicants kept quiet and filed the present Applications in the year 2012, and therefore, there was a delay in filing applications in 2012, and hence requested to dismiss the Applications by holding that they are barred by limitation. 23. So far as limitation aspect is concerned, notwithstanding the fact in earlier round of litigation, the Tribunal had found as a matter of fact, that the O.As. are within the limitation and rejected the challenge by the impugned order dated 30.11.2012. 23. So far as limitation aspect is concerned, notwithstanding the fact in earlier round of litigation, the Tribunal had found as a matter of fact, that the O.As. are within the limitation and rejected the challenge by the impugned order dated 30.11.2012. For the reasons best known to the petitioner in the present Writ Petition and the Government, they had not chosen to challenge the said finding in W.P.No.19696 and 22140 of 2012, and the said finding had become final, and in that view of the matter limitation being a mixed question of fact and law, we are not inclined to consider the said issue once again. Our reasoning on the issue of locus standi would equally apply with respect to limitation aspect as well. 24. With regard to the subject of limitation we are unable to subscribe to the interpretation sought to be placed by the learned counsel Sri Surender Rao with respect to there being no limitation prescribed for challenging the order like in G.O.Ms. No.350, the respondents not having a statutory right to make a grievance before the competent authority. As pointed out by the learned counsel Sri R.V. Mallikarjuna Rao, and on a careful reading of Section 20(2)(a) of the Act, an opportunity has been given to the aggrieved person to make a representation to the competent authority, and on such representation, either being disposed of or not being disposed of, would provide a right on the employee making representation to file a petition before the Tribunal and in that view of the matter limitation under Section 21 of the Act would get triggered. However, as held by us in the previous paragraphs, in the facts of this case the issue based on interpretation of Section 20 does not arise. 25. Now the point for consideration is “Whether the G.O.Ms. No.350, dated:08.12.2008 is of ultra vires of the powers of the Government and legally valid?” POINT: 26. Whatever may be the position prior to 1984, i.e. before A.P. Public Employment (Recording & Alteration of Date of Birth) Rules, 1984, came into force, after the Rules came into force, the change of date of birth in Service Register is strictly governed by the said Rules. Whatever may be the position prior to 1984, i.e. before A.P. Public Employment (Recording & Alteration of Date of Birth) Rules, 1984, came into force, after the Rules came into force, the change of date of birth in Service Register is strictly governed by the said Rules. Further, after insertion of Rule 2-A with effect from 21.04.1984 the judgment and decree of Civil Court cannot be the basis for making alteration in the date of birth and in the Service Register of an employee. On this aspect, there is a consensus between the counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and respondents. However, it is the contention of the petitioner’s counsel that the Government considering the petitioner’s request for alteration of the date of birth in the Service Register made in 1983, and he was directed to get the change of date of birth effected in Secondary School Certificate, and after alteration was effected in Secondary School Certificate, had issued the impugned G.O. by relaxing the sub-rule (5) of Rule 2 of the Rules. For better appreciation, the A.P. Public Employment (Recording & Alteration of Date of Birth) Rules, 1984, with amendments from time to time, extracted as under: 1. Short title, application and commencement:- (1) These Rules may be called the Andhra Pradesh Public employment (Recording and Alteration of Date of Birth) Rules, 1984. (2) They shall apply to all persons appointed to Public Services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State of Andhra Pradesh. (3) They shall come into force with immediate effect. 2. Recording of the date of birth:- (1) Every Government employee shall within one month from the date on which he joins duty, makes a declaration as to his date of birth. (3) They shall come into force with immediate effect. 2. Recording of the date of birth:- (1) Every Government employee shall within one month from the date on which he joins duty, makes a declaration as to his date of birth. (2) On receipt of the declaration made under sub-rule (1), the Head of Office or any other officer who maintains the service records in respect of such Government employee shall, after making such enquiry as may be deemed fit, with regard to the declaration and after taking into consideration such evidence, if any, as may be adduced in respect of the said declaration, make an order within four months from the date on which the Government employees joins service, determining the date of his birth: Provided that in cases where the date of birth as determined under this sub-rule is different from the one declared by the Government employees concerned under sub-rule (1), he shall be given an opportunity of making a representation, before a final order is made. (3) Where a Government employee fails to make a declaration within the time specified in sub-rule (1), the Head of Officer of the officer who maintains the service records shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available and after giving an opportunity of making a representation to the Government employee concerned, determines the date of birth of the employee within six months from the date on which the Government employee joins service. (4) The date of birth determined under this rule shall be entered in the service records of the employee concerned duly attested by the Head of the officer or the officer who maintains the service records and the date of birth so entered shall be final and binding and the Government employees shall be estopped from disputing the correctness of such date of birth. (5) the date of birth as determined on the basis of the school records of any proof produced at the time of entering into service and entered in the service record shall be final and no subsequent variation of date of birth in the school records for any reason, shall be relevant for the purpose of service and on that basis the date of birth entered in the service records shall not be altered except in the case of bonafide clerical error, under the orders of the Government. 2-A. “Civil Courts” Decree not to be taken into consideration:- In any proceedings before the Government or any Court, Tribunal or other authority for the alteration of date of birth in the service records, the decree of a Civil Court in regard to alteration of the date of birth in the School or the University records of the contents in the Judgment leading to such decree, or the effect of its implantation shall not be taken into consideration in derogation to these rules and it is hereby declared that these rules shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any Judgment, Decree or Order of a Civil Court in regard to the alteration of date of birth in the School or the University records whether or not the Government is a party to such proceedings. 3. Procedure in recording date of birth of employees appointed before the commencement of these rules:- the date of Government employee who has been appointed before the commencement of these rules and whose service register has not been opened, shall be recorded in the manner laid down in Rule 2. 4. Alteration of date of birth in past cases:- (1) No Government employee in service, before the commencement of these rules: (a) whose date of birth has been recorded in the Service Register in accordance with the rules applicable to him; or (b) whose entry relating to date of birth became final and binding under the rules in force prior to the commencement of these rules, shall be entitled to claim alteration of his date of birth. (2) No subsequent variation of the date of birth in the school records shall be relevant for the purpose of service nor shall such variation be a valid ground for ordering an alteration of the date of birth by any Court, Tribunal or other authority. 5. Cases pending on the date of commencement of these rules:- The cases in which the Government employees have already applied for alteration of their date of birth and which are pending on the date of commencement of these rules, shall be dealt with on the basis of recorded age in school and college records at the time of entry into service. 6. 6. Effect to the rules:- No rule made or deemed to have been made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India shall, in so far as it is inconsistent with any of the provisions of these rules, shall have any effect. 27. In this case the G.O.Ms. No.350 stated to have been issued by relaxation of sub-rule (5) of Rule 2. A close scrutiny of Rules would reveal that there is no Rule empowering the Government to relax to alter the date of birth in Service Register. Assuming there is any such power, the alteration has to be done in terms of the frame work of A.P. Public Employment (Recording & Alteration of Date of Birth) Rules, 1984. Rule 4(1)(b) placed a prohibition on an employee to seek change of date of birth. Further, sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 also further prohibits change of date of birth even if there is a change of date of birth in school record. Rules 1 to 4 would apply to the cases of requests of the employees on or after 21.04.1984. Considering the case of the petitioner that his application is of the year 1983 and assuming his case would fall under Rule 5, but Rule 5 specifically mandates the Government to take the date of birth as recorded in the school and college records, which was submitted at the time of entry into the service and not any other date. In other words the outer limit of variation is the school or college certificate originally submitted at the time of entry into the service can only be considered. 28. Viewed from any angle, the alteration of date of birth effected in favour of the petitioner is ultra vires the powers of the Government. It is now settled law that the Government cannot resort to their general executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution of India, in contravention of a statutory Act or Rule. In this context, it is pertintent to refer to the dicta laid down in Supreme Court in State of Madhya PradeshVs. Bharat Singh ( AIR 1967 sc 1170 ) wherein it is held that the cause of action which operates to the prejudice to any person must have authority of the law to support it. This is well settled in the said Judgment. Bharat Singh ( AIR 1967 sc 1170 ) wherein it is held that the cause of action which operates to the prejudice to any person must have authority of the law to support it. This is well settled in the said Judgment. The relevant paras are extracted hereunder: “Our federal structure is founded on certain fundamental principles: (1) the sovereignty of the people with limited Government authority, i.e., the Government must be conducted in accordance with the will of the majority of the people. The people govern themselves through their representatives, whereas the official agencies of the executive Government possess only such powers as have been conferred upon them by the people: (2) Thee is distribution of powers between the three organs of the State-legislative, executive and judicial-each organ having some check direct or indirect on the other; and (3) the rule of law which includes judicial review of arbitrary executive action. As pointed out by dicey in his “Introduction to the study of the Law of the Constitution:, 10th Edn., at p.202, the expression “rule of law” has three meanings, or may be regarded from three different points of view. “It means, in the first place, the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the Government:. At p.188, Dicey points out: “In almost every continental community the executive exercise far wide discretionary authority in the matter of arrest, of temporary imprisonment, of expulsion from its territory, and the like, than is either legally claimed or in fact exerted by the Government in England: and a study of European politics now and again reminds English readers that wherever there is discretion there is room for arbitrariness, and that is a republic no less than under a monarchy discretionary authority on the part of the Government must mean insecurity for legal freedom on the part of its subjects.” We have adopted under our Constitution not the continental system but the British system under which the rule of law prevails. Every Act done by the Government or by its officers must, if it is to operate to the prejudice of any person, be supported by some legislative authority. Every Act done by the Government or by its officers must, if it is to operate to the prejudice of any person, be supported by some legislative authority. Counsel for the State relied upon the terms of Art. 162 of the Constitution, and the decision of this Court in Ram Jawaya kapur Vs. State of Punjab, 1955-2 SCR 225: ( AIR 1955 SC 549 ), in support of the contention that it is open to the State to issue executive orders even if there is no legislation in support thereof provided the State could legislate on the subject in respect of which action is taken. Article 162 provides that subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the executive power of a State shall extend to the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws. But Art. 162 and Art.73 are concerned primarily with the distribution of executive power between the Union on the one hand and the States on the other, and not with the validity of its exercise. Further, this case also is squarely covered by the Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in HayagreevSarma Case (18 supra). 29. In the light of discussion above, we do not find either error of jurisdiction or illegality in the order of the Tribunal which is under challenge to interfere with in exercise of our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 30. In the result, there are no merits in these Writ Petitions, and accordingly these Writ Petitions are dismissed, confirming the common Order dated 30.11.2012 passed by the A.P. Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad, in O.A. Nos.2066 and 2236 of 2012, with costs estimated at Rs.10,000/- in each writ petition payable to the private respondents viz., M. Gangadharam and S. Rama Murthy.