JUDGMENT : N.V. Anjaria, J. The present Second Appeal preferred by the original plaintiff is directed against judgment and order dated 21st September, 2004 of learned 2nd Extra Assistant Judge, Veraval, dismissing Regular Civil Appeal No.14 of 2002, in turn confirming judgment and order dated 28th February, 2002 passed by learned Civil Judge (S.D.), Veraval in Civil Suit No.454 of 1989. It was a suit for relief of declaration and permanent injunction, which came to be dismissed. 2. At the time of admission of the appeal, following substantial questions of law were formulated by this Court for consideration: "(1) Whether no period of limitation would apply with respect to exercise of suo motu power by the Collector under Section 211 even in the cases where initial order or the proceedings are ab-initio void or invalid? (2) Whether without initiation of proceedings in a competent forum to set aside the sale deed executed by the Gram Panchayat pursuant to the permission granted by the Taluka Development Officer with respect to the sale of the land, could exercise of powers which have the effect of nullifying registered sale deed be taken? (3) Whether the Collector could have exercised powers under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code so as to revise order of the Taluka Development Officer rendered in the year 1982 after more than four years by issuing show cause notice in 1986 and could an order have been rendered in the year 1988 after six years of the order having been passed by the original authority?" 2.1. When the appeal was taken up for final hearing, upon hearing of the parties, following additional question was found to be arising as a substantial question of law. After giving opportunity to learned advocate for the respondent on the proposed question of law, the same was framed by order dated 06th August, 2013, which reads as under: "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Collector could have competently exercised his powers under section 211 of Bombay Land Revenue Rule read with 108 of Bombay Land Revenue Rules, so as to set aside the order of Taluka Development Officer, which was passed by him in exercise of powers under the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993?" 3. Before proceeding to consider the questions of law, a preview of facts may be highlighted. Before proceeding to consider the questions of law, a preview of facts may be highlighted. In the Civil Suit, it was the case of the appellant-plaintiff that he was an agriculturist, residing at Village Dhava (Gir). Land situated on the Sasan Road at Village Talala originally belonged to one Jentilal Bhagvanji-respondent No.5 herein-original defendant No.5. Adjoining to the said land of defendant No.5, a piece of land on the northern side admeasuring 41.48 Sq. Meters was situated. The said defendant No.5 Jentilal had made an application to the Gram Panchayat for granting the said land as Lagu (adjoining) land. By virtue of Notification dated 06th November, 1971 and upon a consequential order of the District Panchayat, Taluka Development Officer-defendant No.3 passed order dated 23rd December, 1982 granting the land to defendant No.5. Thereafter Talala Gram Panchayat upon payment of the price fixed for the said land, executed registered document of sale dated 19th January, 1984 in favour of said Jentilal Bhagvanji. He was put in possession of the land. 3.1. It was the further case that appellant-plaintiff was desirous to purchase the entire land comprising of the land belonging to defendant No.5- Jentilal Bhagvanji as well as the aforementioned Lagu land granted to him, total area being 104.80 Sq. Meters. The plaintiff, by virtue of registered Deed dated 20th January, 1984, purchased the said entire land and became owner thereof. Having been purchased the land as aforesaid, in the year 1987, appellant applied on 03rd July, 1987 before the Gram Panchayat for permission to make construction on the said land. Talala Gram Panchayat granted necessary Rajachitthi (permission to construct) on 19th July, 1987. 3.2. The events having travelled thus far, the Collector, Junagadh, issued notice dated 06th October, 1986 stating inter alia that adjoining land was held by defendant No.5 by way of encroachment. The appellant was accordingly called upon to show cause as to why the order of Taluka Development Officer dated 26th December, 1982 granting adjoining land to defendant No.5 should not be set aside. In other words by the said notice, Taluka Development Officer questioned the title of the appellant's predecessor-defendant No.5. Thereafter the Collector acting under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, started revisional proceedings being Revision Case No.06 of 1986. Exercising the power, Collector by his order dated 23rd March, 1988 cancelled and set aside the order of the Taluka Development Officer. Thereafter the Collector acting under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, started revisional proceedings being Revision Case No.06 of 1986. Exercising the power, Collector by his order dated 23rd March, 1988 cancelled and set aside the order of the Taluka Development Officer. Against the said order of the Collector the appellant preferred Revision before the Additional Chief Secretary, Revenue Department (Appeals)-respondent No.6 herein. The said Revision No.31 of 1988 came to be rejected on 05th August, 1988. The said Authority further directed to remove the construction within three months. 3.3. Thereafter the appellant instituted the suit, originally numbered as Regular Civil Suit No.616 of 1988 and re-numbered as Regular Civil Suit No.454 of 1989. The suit was instituted on 16th September, 1988. The prayer in the suit was to set aside the order of defendant No.2-Collector in Revision being order dated 23rd March, 1988 (Exh.84) as well as the order dated 05th August, 1988 passed by defendant No.6- Secretary (Appeals), further praying for permanent injunction against the execution of the said orders. It appears that by passing order below Exhibit 6 application, the Court directed to maintain status-quo with regard to the land in question on 17th May, 1991. 3.4. The defendants contested the suit of the plaintiff by filing written statement. Defendant No.3- District Development Officer filed his written statement at Exhibit 18. Defendant No.5 filed his written statement at Exhibit 24 and defendant No.1's written statement was at Exhibit 64. Defendant No.3 contended that the power to grant adjoining land by way of sale was with District Development Officer and in that view the order (Exh.81) was without opportunity of law. It was contended that earlier the request for sale of land was rejected. 3.5. The Trial Court framed issues at Exhibit 39. The Trial Court held against the plaintiff and dismissed the suit. The appeal preferred by the plaintiff-appellant met with the same fate and came to be dismissed on 21st September, 2004 by the first appellate court. Both the Courts reasoned and held that for selling the land admeasuring 41.84 Sq. Meters above, Taluka Development Officer was not a competent authority since population of the village where the land was situated was more than 5000, it was held, that powers to sell the land were vested with the District Development Officer in view of revenue department Notification dated 28th July, 1976. 4. Meters above, Taluka Development Officer was not a competent authority since population of the village where the land was situated was more than 5000, it was held, that powers to sell the land were vested with the District Development Officer in view of revenue department Notification dated 28th July, 1976. 4. Heard learned advocates for the parties. 5. Addressing the substantial questions of law, from the facts on record it was seen that after the competent authority granted to defendant No.5 the piece of land in question by order dated 23rd December, 1982 (Exh.81), sale deed was executed in favour of defendant No.5 and the appellant was the subsequent purchaser from defendant No.5 under a separate sale deed executed by defendant No.5. Thereafter in the year 1986, the Collector exercised his revisional powers under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 and took the order of the Taluka Development Officer granting rent to defendant No.5 (Exh.81) in suo motu revision. As stated above, it was on the ground that not the Taluka Development Officer but the District Development Officer could have exercised the powers. 5.1. Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 reads as under: "211. Power of State Government and of certain revenue officers to call for and examine records and proceedings of subordinate officers :- The State Government and any revenue officer, not inferior in rank to an Assistant or Deputy Collector or a Superintendent of Survey, in their respective departments, may call for and examine the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any subordinate revenue officer for purpose of satisfying itself or himself, as the case may be, as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed, and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such officer. The following officer may in the same manner call for and examine the proceedings of any officer subordinate to them in any matter in which neither a formal nor a summary inquiry has been held, namely, a Mamlatdar, a Mahalkari, an Assistant Superintendent of Survey and an Assistant Settlement Officer. The following officer may in the same manner call for and examine the proceedings of any officer subordinate to them in any matter in which neither a formal nor a summary inquiry has been held, namely, a Mamlatdar, a Mahalkari, an Assistant Superintendent of Survey and an Assistant Settlement Officer. And to pass orders thereupon :- If in any case, it shall appear to the State Government, or to such officer aforesaid, that any decision or order or proceedings so called for should be modified, annulled or reversed, it or he may pass such order thereon as it or he deems fit. Provided that an Assistant or Deputy Collector shall not himself pass such order in any matter in which a formal inquiry has been held, but shall submit the record with his opinion to the Collector, who shall pass such order thereon as he may deem fit." 5.2. It is well settled by catena of decisions starting from the Apex Court's decision in State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha, (1969)2 SCC 187 that the revisional powers are required to be exercised within reasonable time, notwithstanding that the legislature has not fixed any period for exercise of these powers. This principle requiring the authority to act within reasonable time, has been propounded not only with reference to Section 211 of the Code, but it stands true in respect of authority exercising the revisional powers under other enactments where the Section conferring such powers is silent on the period of limitation. The rationale is that it would be harsh and inequitable to upset the state of affairs after lapse of unreasonable time when a person has changed his position with regard to the subject matter and equities have arisen. A statutory authority is estopped from disturbing the position and cannot be permitted to exercise power to revise the order passed after long time. What constitute reasonable period for exercise of revisional power depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is also held that the original order could be termed as nullity, the authority may exercise revisional powers at any time. 5.3. Reverting to the facts of the case in the above context, land was granted in 1982 to defendant No.5, who went out of the scene, having sold the land purchased by him under registered sale deed executed by the Panchayat, to the appellant-plaintiff. 5.3. Reverting to the facts of the case in the above context, land was granted in 1982 to defendant No.5, who went out of the scene, having sold the land purchased by him under registered sale deed executed by the Panchayat, to the appellant-plaintiff. The appellant-plaintiff became owner by virtue of a registered document. It was after gap of four years that the Collector exercise his powers under Section 211 of the Code and took exception to the original order of 1982 (Exh.81). It transpires from the record that in favour of appellant-plaintiff permission to construct was also granted by way of Rajachitthi (Exh.88). The contents of the order of the Collector dated 23rd March, 1988 (Exh.84) exercising suo motu powers itself revealed that after the permission to construct having been obtained, the plaintiff had put up construction on the land and had obtained water and electricity connection as well. The appellant had thus changed his position. Exhibit 81 was the order in favour of defendant No.5-the predecessor in title. Furthermore the land which was purchased by the appellant was the entire land which comprised of the land owned by defendant-respondent No.5 as well as the piece of land which was subject matter of order of the Collector (Exh.84). 5.4. The appellant had purchased the same for valuable consideration and had incurred expenditure thereon. Even the grant of piece of land to defendant No.5 by way of sale was upon fixation of price determined on the basis of average price applicable on the basis of past years. As far as the appellant is concerned, no fraud or misrepresentation could be attributed to him. He had purchased entire land as above by registered sale deed from defendant No.5. The ground on which the Collector sought to exercise revisional powers was also one which could not be characterised as rendering the act to be nullity. It was not that the sale of the adjoining land was not permissible. The ground was that it was the one authority as against other authority which was required to grant the permission. 5.5. The ground on which the Collector sought to exercise revisional powers was also one which could not be characterised as rendering the act to be nullity. It was not that the sale of the adjoining land was not permissible. The ground was that it was the one authority as against other authority which was required to grant the permission. 5.5. Given the above consideration and aspects it has to be held that in the facts and circumstances of the case, exercise of powers under Section 211 of the Code by the Collector was beyond reasonable time and he could not have taken the order (Exh.81) in suo motu revision to set aside the same. Looking to the ground as well as the delayed exercise of powers, the same was impermissible in law. The exercise of revisional powers could be questioned from yet another angle in as much as ownership was vested in appellant-plaintiff under a registered sale deed and the Collector could not have set aside the registered sale deeds executed in the first instance by the Gram Panchayat in favour of plaintiff's predecessor in title-defendant No.5 and thereafter the sale deed executed by defendant No.5 in favour of the plaintiff. 6. Turning to the question as to whether the Collector acting under Section 211 of the Code could have set aside the order of the Taluka Development Officer. The order Exhibit 81 which was sought to be brought under the control of revisional powers under the Code, was an order granting land passed by the Taluka Development Officer. Indisputedly, the Taluka Development Officer acted under Section 98(1) and 98(2) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961 and exercised his powers under the said provisions. When the order sought to be taken in suo motu revision was passed by an authority under the different enactment, the Collector could not have embarked upon to employ Section 211 of the Code and to proceed to exercise his revisional powers under the Code in respect of the said order. 6.1. A reading of Section 211 makes it clear that it empowers the State Government or any revenue officer of the rank contemplated, to call for and examine the record of any inquiry or proceedings of any subordinate revenue officer for satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the decision or order of such officer. 6.1. A reading of Section 211 makes it clear that it empowers the State Government or any revenue officer of the rank contemplated, to call for and examine the record of any inquiry or proceedings of any subordinate revenue officer for satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the decision or order of such officer. Now the words "any subordinate revenue officer" in the Section has to be taken as referring to the officers acting under and exercising powers under the Bombay Land Revenue Code. Section 3(1) of the Code defines "revenue officer" to mean every officer of any rank whatsoever appointed under any of the provisions of this Act, and employed in or about the business of the land revenue or of the surveys, assessment, accounts, or records connected therewith and for the purposes of section 25 and 26 includes village-officer appointed or officiating under any of the provisions of the Bombay Hereditary Officers Act or the Matadars Act, 1887. Revisional powers conferred under Section 211 of the Code could be said to be available to the revisional authority only in respect of those decisions and orders passed by "any subordinate revenue officer". The Taluka Development Officer could not be termed as subordinate revenue officer to the Collector. It is not possible to cloth the powers under Section 211 with the Collector to bring in the order of the Taluka Development Officer which was traceable to his authority and power under the Panchayats Act. 7. It is also well settled that the powers available under different enactments are not to be intermixed. Powers under one statute cannot be exercised for dealing the matter covered or falling under another statute. It has been laid down by this Court in Evergreen Apartment Co-operative Housing Society Limited v. Special Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department, ( 1991(1) GLH 155 ) that an officer of the revenue department occupying different capacity under different statute, but it would not empower him to exercise powers under one enactment while proceeding under another enactment. It was so held in the context of powers to be exercisable under Rule 108 of the Bombay Land Revenue Rules. An officer cannot pass the orders, in the RTS proceedings, to cancel the mutation entry on an assumption that the transaction recorded in entry is against or contrary to a provision in another statute. It was so held in the context of powers to be exercisable under Rule 108 of the Bombay Land Revenue Rules. An officer cannot pass the orders, in the RTS proceedings, to cancel the mutation entry on an assumption that the transaction recorded in entry is against or contrary to a provision in another statute. This proposition of law laid down though slightly in a different context, it applies analogically. It has got to be held that it is not open to the Collector to take under revision an order which is not passed by a subordinate revenue officer but it is an order of another authority acting under another statute, in the instant case the Taluka Development Officer, exercising powers under the relevant provisions of the Gujarat Panchayats Act. He cannot be categorised as "any subordinate revenue officer" for the purpose of Section 211 of the code 8. As the order of Taluka Development Officer (Exh.81) was under the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961, a remedy against that orders and decisions was available under the provision of the very enactment. Section 290 of the 1961 Act provides for appeals against order of Gram Panchayat or Nagar Panchayat or Taluka Panchayat. Any order or decision passed by these authorities could be subjected to an appeal before the District Panchayat in whom the appellate powers are vested by virtue of said Section. Section 290-A provides for Appeal Committee of the District Panchayat which exercises the appellate powers. Section 290-B speaks of the authorities to whom the appeal may be addressed. Moreover, under Section 291 of the Act the District Panchayat has powers to call for the proceedings of any Panchayat subordinate to it and power to issue directions to subordinate Panchayat. Without having recourse to the above remedial course available under the very statute, in this case the District Development Officer made a proposal to the Collector asking him to exercise powers under Section 211 of the Code and cancel the order of Taluka Development Officer (Exh.81). 9. For all the foregoing reasons and discussion, the appeal deserves to be allowed. Judgment and order passed by the first appellate court confirming the dismissal of the suit by the Trial Court as well as judgment and order of Trial Court are hereby set aside. As a result, the suit prayers stands allowed. The appeal stands allowed. 10. 9. For all the foregoing reasons and discussion, the appeal deserves to be allowed. Judgment and order passed by the first appellate court confirming the dismissal of the suit by the Trial Court as well as judgment and order of Trial Court are hereby set aside. As a result, the suit prayers stands allowed. The appeal stands allowed. 10. Registry shall sent back the records and proceedings. Appeal allowed.