Judgment : 1. Heard Sri K.S. Murthy, learned counsel for the petitioner, and the learned Government Pleader for Home appearing for the respondents 1 to 3. 2. This writ petition is filed by the petitioner seeking a writ of mandamus to declare the action of the respondents in altering FIR.No.178 of 2008 dt.28.10.2008 of Tuni Town P.S., East Godavari District, on 08.12.2008 as illegal and unconstitutional and consequently to quash the FIR.No.178 of 2008 dt.28.10.2008 of Tuni Town P.S., East Godavari District as altered on 08.12.2008 . 3. The said complaint was made by 4th respondent, who belongs to “Madiga” (Scheduled caste) community against petitioner alleging that petitioner is his tenant and is residing in ground floor of his house; that petitioner went to a hostel where the 4th respondent’s daughter (6th respondent) resides and talked “unculturedly”; that when 4th respondent and his wife went to petitioner’s portion and questioned him why he went to the hostel of 6th respondent and misbehaved with her, he hit the 4th respondent and his wife on the head with an iron rod and also pushed 6th respondent in a manner causing her head to hit a wall. In the FIR lodged on 28.10.2008 with 3rd respondent, the petitioner was alleged to have committed offences u/S.324 and 509 IPC . 4. It appears that 6th respondent lodged a complaint on 08.12.2008 before 2nd respondent stating that petitioner abused her by her ‘caste’ name; pursuant to the said complaint, 2nd respondent endorsed and forwarded the same to 3rd respondent and on receiving the same, 3rd respondent added a charge under Section 3 (i)(x) of the SC and ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1889, (for short, the ‘Act’) and forwarded it to the Sub-divisional police officer, Kakinada for investigation. After investigation by the police, a charge-sheet in PRC.No.4 of 2009 was filed before the Judicial Magistrate of the I Class, Tuni, against petitioner for offences punishable not only under Section 324, 323 and 509 IPC but also under Section 3(i)(x) of the Act. 5. Questioning the same, petitioner filed Criminal Petition No.4023 of 2009 in this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. By order dt.30.09.2010 the said Criminal Petition was dismissed. 5. Questioning the same, petitioner filed Criminal Petition No.4023 of 2009 in this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. By order dt.30.09.2010 the said Criminal Petition was dismissed. This court observed : “It is contended by the petitioner’s counsel that there is inconsistency with regard to the fact as to when the second respondent received injury from the accused in both the original report and the subsequent representation and that it cuts at root of the original report. The inconsistency in the allegation regarding the second respondent sustaining injury has to be explained by the prosecution during trial. At this stage I do not find that adding of Section 3(i)(x) of the Act to the case is not in any way illegal, as subsequent representation given by the respondents 2 to 4 to the Superintendent of Police contain a subsequent event of the accused insulting and abusing in the name of ‘Madiga’ caste. Truth or falsity of the said allegation cannot be decided by this Court in this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is for the trial court to decide the same after recording entire evidence to be let in by the prosecution as well as the accused and after appreciating the said evidence before the court. I do not find any legal or valid reasons to come to the conclusion that charge sheet filed by the police against the petitioner/accused is abuse of process of law.” 6. After the dismissal of this Crl.P, petitioner filed the present writ petition again challenging the action of the respondent Nos.2 and 3 in altering the original FIR and taking on record allegedly a new “story” and changing the nature of the alleged crime completely. 7. The counsel for petitioner contended that under Article 226 of the Constitution of India this Court is empowered to exercise its jurisdiction to do justice in cases like the present one; that in the original complaint dt.28.10.2008 there was no mention about the abuse allegedly made by petitioner towards 6th respondent and it was only alleged that petitioner’s behaviour was indecent; that after the petitioner got bail on 03.11.2008, respondent Nos.4 to 6 rushed to 2nd respondent, cooked up new allegations of abuse and got the FIR altered on 08.12.2008 by including the allegation of commission of offence under the Act. 8. 8. The learned Government Pleader contended that during the investigation, 6th respondent lodged a complaint on 08.12.2008 before 2nd respondent stating that petitioner abused her in her ‘caste’ name; pursuant to the said complaint, 2nd respondent endorsed and forwarded the same to 3rd respondent and on receiving the same, 3rd respondent added a charge under the Act and forwarded it to the Sub-divisional police officer, Kakinada, for investigation. It is also contended that respondent Nos. 4 to 6 belong to SC Madiga community; that after completion of investigation the charge-sheet in PRC.No.4 of 2009 was filed alleging that petitioner committed offences under Section 323, 324, 509 and 3(i)(x) of the Act; as the application of petitioner to quash the same criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in Criminal Petition No.4023 of 2009 was dismissed on 30.09.2010, the present writ petition is not maintainable and is barred by principle of res judicata. 9. The counsel for the petitioner reiterated the stand of the petitioner in the writ petition and also relied upon the judgment in Mahindra and Mahindra Financial Services Limited and another v. Rajiv Dubey ( (2009) 1 SCC 706 ). The learned Government Pleader reiterated the stand taken by 3rd respondent in the counter. 10. I have noted the submissions of the respective parties. 11. The question for this Court’s consideration is whether a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be maintained for quashing criminal proceedings after an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for the same relief was rejected. 12. It is not in dispute that the petitioner filed Criminal Petition No.4023 of 2009 to quash the proceedings in FIR.No.178 of 2008, dt.28.10.2008, of Tuni Town P.S., as amended on 08.12.2008, and the consequential charge-sheet in PRC.No.4 of 2009 on the file of Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Tuni, and that the said Criminal Petition was dismissed on 30.09.2010, as mentioned above. After the dismissal of the said petition, the present writ petition has been filed. 13. It is not as if this writ petition is a remedy akin to a intra-court appeal against the said order provided by statute. In my opinion, if this writ petition is entertained and relief is granted to petitioner, it would result in nullifying the order passed in Criminal Petition No.4023 of 2009 dt.30.09.2010. 13. It is not as if this writ petition is a remedy akin to a intra-court appeal against the said order provided by statute. In my opinion, if this writ petition is entertained and relief is granted to petitioner, it would result in nullifying the order passed in Criminal Petition No.4023 of 2009 dt.30.09.2010. It would also amount to sitting in appeal over the correctness of the said order. This is impermissible for the reasons set out below. 14. In Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and others v. State of Maharashtra and another ( AIR 1967 SC 1 ), the High Court of Bombay, while trying a suit filed against the editor of a weekly newspaper, exercised its inherent power under Section 151 C.P.C. to conduct the trial of the suit in camera and prohibited publication of the evidence and the proceedings so as to prevent business of the editor of the newspaper being affected. A writ petition was filed by a journalist under Article 32 of the Constitution of India before the Supreme Court of India challenging the validity of the order of the High Court contending inter alia that the High Court had no jurisdiction to prohibit publication of the news and that it’s order affected the petitioner’s rights under Article 19(1)(a). The said writ petition was resisted on the ground that a writ under Article 32 was not maintainable to review a judicial order of the High Court. A seven Judge Bench of the Supreme Court by a majority held that petitioner had no fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a), that the High Court had inherent power and jurisdiction under Section 151 C.P.C. to conduct in-camera trial and to prohibit publication of its proceedings or evidence and that a writ petition under Article 32 is not maintainable to quash the judicial order. In the said case, the Supreme Court observed that where an impugned order has been passed by a superior Court of Record in exercise of its inherent powers, the question about the existence of the said jurisdiction as well as the validity or propriety of the order cannot be raised in writ proceedings taken up by the petitioners for the issue of writ of certiorari under Article 32. The Supreme Court also held that when a person is aggrieved by an order passed by a superior Court of Record such as the High Court, he can challenge the said order in appropriate proceedings either in appeal or revision and it would not be open to be corrected by exercise of writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 15. In Rupa Ashok Hurra and Ashok Hurra and another ( (2002) 4 SCC 388 ), a five Judge-Bench of the Supreme Court held that a writ petition is a supervisory jurisdiction over inferior courts/tribunals and therefore, on principle, a writ of certiorari cannot be issued to coordinate courts and a fortiori to superior courts. It held that a High Court cannot issue a writ to another High Court nor can one Bench of a High Court issue a writ to a different Bench of the same High Court; much less, can the writ of jurisdiction of a High Court be invoked to seek issuance of a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court; and that though, the judgments/orders of High Courts are liable to be corrected by the Supreme Court in its appellate jurisdiction under Articles 132, 133 and 134 as well as under Article 136 of the Constitution, the High Courts are not constituted as inferior courts in our constitutional scheme. 16. In SBP and Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. and another ( (2005) 8 SCC 618 ), a seven Judge-Bench of the Supreme Court held on a similar principle that an order passed by the Chief Justice under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, cannot be subjected to scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution at the hands of another Judge of the High Court; that in the absence of any conferment of an appellate power, it is not possible to say that a certiorari would lie against the decision of the High Court in the very same High Court; and that if it is permitted, even in the case of an international arbitration, the decision of the Chief Justice of India would become amenable to a challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution before a High Court. 17. It is not in dispute that petitioner also has a remedy in challenging it under Art.136 of Constitution of India before the Supreme Court of India. 17. It is not in dispute that petitioner also has a remedy in challenging it under Art.136 of Constitution of India before the Supreme Court of India. But for reasons best known to him, the petitioner has not chosen to avail of it. As the order dt.30.9.2010 in Criminal Petition No.4023 of 2009 is an order passed by this Court (which is a Court of Record), it is not open to petitioner to collaterally challenge the correctness of the said order in this writ petition under Article 226 before this Court again and seek to wriggle out of the consequences of the dismissal of the Criminal Petition No.4023 of 2009. Propriety also precludes this Court from re-considering the issue in this Writ Petition and deciding in favour of petitioner when another Learned Judge of this Court refused to exercise powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and declined to grant him relief. 18. In Rajiv Dubey (1 supra), cited by counsel for petitioner, the Supreme Court held that proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. could be initiated to quash criminal proceedings following the guidelines mentioned below, which were laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal ( AIR 1992 SC 604 ) : “(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 19. There is no dispute with the above proposition of law but since the petitioner has not been able to secure the quashing of the criminal proceedings against him in Criminal Petition No.4023 of 2009 on the basis that his case falls within the above principles, it is not open to him to re-agitate the same issue by way of this writ petition. 20. Therefore I am of the opinion that the writ petition has to fail. It is accordingly dismissed, no costs.