Judgment Joymalya Bagchi, J. 1. The appellant has assailed the judgment and order dated 30.01.2009 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 7820 (W) of 2002 rejecting his prayer for fixation of scale of pay with retrospective effect from 05.12.1988 equal to the pay of his junior, namely, respondent no. 6 herein, and accordingly grant him higher pensionary and all other post retiral monetary benefits with retrospective effect. 2. The case of the appellant is that he and the respondent no. 6 were initially posted in the cadre of Technical Assistant, Grade–I. Scale of pay of all employees in the said cadre was same till 01.08.1983. After 01.08.1983, pursuant to a bipartite agreement arrived at between the management and the employees’ union, employees in category III and IV of the respondent Corporation were entitled to exercise their option for being governed either under Central Dearness Allowance (CDA) pattern or under Industrial Dearness Allowance (IDA) pattern. Such permission was sought for pursuant to the direction given by the Apex Court vide order dated 15.03.1989 in CMP No. 1962/89 (in CA No. 2336/85) with CMP Nos. 2720 and 2736 of 1989 (in TC No. 82-83/85) and VMP No. 5304/89. 3. It appears that the appellant did not exercise option to be governed by IDA pattern, whereas, the respondent No. 6 opted for IDA pattern scale. There was pay revision of IDA pattern scale on four occasions, namely, 01.08.1983, 01.08.1987, 01.02.1992 and 01.01.1997 whereas in CDA pattern scale there were only two pay revisions, namely, 01.01.1986 and 01.01.1996. 4. Further, while respondent no. 6 opted for selection grade it is an admitted position that the appellant did not opt for such selection grade. Accordingly, the appellant and respondent no. 6 were placed in different pay patterns in the initial posting itself. Consequently, upon promotion to the next higher post, namely, Assistant Manager, Quality Control, on 05.12.1988 basic pay of respondent no. 6, who was junior to the appellant, was fixed at a higher level, namely, Rs.2750/- per month whereas that of the appellant was fixed at Rs.2650/- per month. 6. Appellant made repeated representations which were ultimately turned down by letter dated 11.03.2002. 7. Learned Single Judge has declined the prayer of the appellant that there was discrepancy in the basic pay of the appellant with that of the respondent no. 6. Appellant made repeated representations which were ultimately turned down by letter dated 11.03.2002. 7. Learned Single Judge has declined the prayer of the appellant that there was discrepancy in the basic pay of the appellant with that of the respondent no. 6 on the premise that latter had opted for IDA pattern scale of pay and selection grade whereas the appellant had not done so. Learned Single Judge also held that the circular No. 21 of 1988 dated 22.07.1998, which was relied on by the appellant, was of no assistance to him. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the appellant and respondent no. 6 were performing the same work and respondent no. 6 being junior to the appellant, salary of respondent no. 6 could not have been fixed at higher level than that of the appellant. He further submitted that the action of the respondent authorities was contrary to Section 12A of Food Corporation Act, 1964 and that it was violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. He also submitted that adequate opportunity for exercising option was not given to him and that he made repeated representations during his service tenure, which were not considered. 9. Learned advocate appearing for the respondent Corporation submitted that the claim for pay parity, as canvassed by the appellant, was based on unsound reasoning. Respondent no. 6 was not getting the same pay as that of the appellant in the lower post, namely, Technical Assistant, Grade – I, as he had opted for IDA pattern scale and selection grade while the appellant had not. He further submitted that as circular no. 21 of 1988 dated 22.07.1989 could not have been applied to the appellant retrospectively nor were the terms of the said circular applicable to the facts of this case. 10. We have considered the submissions of the parties. 11. We find that on 01.08.1983 pursuant to the direction of the Supreme Court, employees of category III and IV which included Technical Assistant, Grade – II employees, were given option to avail of IDA pattern scale or CDA patter scale in terms of a bipartite settlement executed between the respondent Corporation and its employees’ union. 12. Respondent no. 6 opted for IDA pattern scale and thereby enjoyed four pay revisions. 12. Respondent no. 6 opted for IDA pattern scale and thereby enjoyed four pay revisions. On the other hand, appellant chose to remain in CDA pattern pay scale and got only two pay revisions. We are unable to accept the contention of the appellant that the option given to employees in category III and IV of respondent Corporation to opt for IDA pattern or CDA category in terms of the direction given by the Supreme Court can be said to be in violation of the provisions of Section 12A of Food Corporation Act, 1964. Section 12A of Food Corporation Act, 1964 provides for an option to be governed by the scale of pay of the government or the corporation to an employee of a government department being transferred to the respondent Corporation. 13. In the instant case the appellant had opted for the scale of pay applicable to his post in the respondent Corporation. Option given by the respondent Corporation to certain categories of employees (to which both the appellants and the respondent no. 6 belonged) to avail of different DA patterns, it cannot be said to be violative of the aforesaid provision of the Food Corporation Act. 14. The appellant with his eyes opened chose neither to avail of IDA pattern scale or the selection grade. Therefore, a difference in level of pay was created at the lower post itself i.e. Technical Assistant Grade – I between the appellant and respondent no. 6. Appellant chose to accept the same. Subsequently when the appellant and respondent no. 6 were promoted to the next higher post, that is, Assistant Manager, Quality Control, on 05.12.1988 the basic pay of the respondent no. 6 became higher than that of the appellant. Such difference in basic pay was not due to a faulty pay structure of the respondent Corporation but attributable to the failure on the part of the appellant to exercise option for IDA pattern and selection grade in the lower post. Due to such failure on the part of the appellant, the pay pattern of the appellant and the respondent no. 6 became different and hence the appellant cannot allege unfair and discriminatory treatment at the hands of his employer and that too belatedly, that is, four years after his superannuation. 15. We have examined the circular no. Due to such failure on the part of the appellant, the pay pattern of the appellant and the respondent no. 6 became different and hence the appellant cannot allege unfair and discriminatory treatment at the hands of his employer and that too belatedly, that is, four years after his superannuation. 15. We have examined the circular no. 21 dated 22.07.1998 and are in agreement with the reasonings given by the learned Single Judge that the said circular cannot apply retrospectively. That apart, the terms of the circular also do not fit into the factual matrix of the appellant’s case. The appellant was not drawing the same pay in the lower post as the appellant and the respondent no. 6 were governed by different pay patterns, namely, IDA pattern and CDA pattern respectively and the respondent no. 6 had opted for selection grade. 16. For the aforesaid reasons, we are unable to accept the submission of the appellant that he had been discriminated by having his basic pay fixed at a lower level than that of his junior, namely, the respondent no. 6. 17. We are also not convinced as to the explanation of the appellant for the delay in his approaching the Court. The appellant had been receiving the lower scale of pay since 1988 and chose to approach this Court as late as in 2002, four years after his superannuation. His only explanation that he made representations which were rejected only on 11.03.2002 does not justify his inaction to seek legal redress earlier. 18. We are of the opinion that when the appellant felt that he had been discriminated way back in 1988 he ought to have promptly approached the Court as his representations were not being considered. Having failed to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court for more than 14 years, his prayer for fixation of higher scale of pay after superannuation ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches alone. 19. The decisions cited on behalf of the appellant are also not apposite. In (1989) 2 SCC 229 the Apex Court held that upgradation of pay scale in some trades in military engineering services from an earlier date was discriminatory. In the instant case, there is no upgradation of pay scale on a pick and choose basis. 19. The decisions cited on behalf of the appellant are also not apposite. In (1989) 2 SCC 229 the Apex Court held that upgradation of pay scale in some trades in military engineering services from an earlier date was discriminatory. In the instant case, there is no upgradation of pay scale on a pick and choose basis. Category III and IV employees were directed to give option pursuant to interim order passed by the Apex Court in terms of the bipartite agreement arrived at between the respondent Corporation and the employees’ union. The appellant with his eyes opened failed to exercise option in favour of IDA pattern. The aforesaid judgment is, therefore, of no assistance to the appellant. 20. In Union of India Vs. P.N. Natarajan, Civil Appeal Nos. 238-244/2004 the Apex Court held that pensionary benefits given to a class of employees could not be prejudicially altered without giving an opportunity of hearing. 21. In the instant case, we are factually satisfied that adequate opportunity was given to the appellant to avail IDA pattern of pay or selection grade pay. He failed and/or neglected to do so. He did not even resort to legal remedies during his service tenure on the score of lack of adequate opportunity in that regard. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of the appellant that adequate opportunity had not been given to him to exercise his option in the factual matrix of the case. Ratio of the aforesaid decision is wholly inapplicable to this case. On the other hand, in the aforesaid judgment the Apex Court had held that option once exercised is binding upon the employee. 22. For the aforesaid reasons, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment and order under appeal. 23. The appeal and all other connected applications are accordingly dismissed.