Judgment : 1. The jurisdiction of the Magistrate in taking cognizance of the complaint filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,1881 (for short “the Act”) is the subject matter of challenge in the present petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “the Code”). 2. Brief facts which are essential to decide the issue on hand are as under: A-2 who is the proprietor of A-1 firm took Rs.4 lakhs as a hand loan for business of his firm from the second respondent-complainant at Pernamitta village under a voucher dt. 9-8-2010 promising to repay the amount immediately. Since the amount was not paid as agreed upon, the complainant pressurized A-2, which lead to issuance of a cheque bearing No.000575 dt. 8-10-2010 for Rs.4 lakhs drawn on City Union Bank Limited, Vijayawada. The said cheque when presented at Karur Vysya Bank Limited, Ongole, was returned on 12-10-2010 with a memo ‘exceeds arrangement’. Thereafter, the complainant got issued a notice on 8-10-2010 to both the accused from Ongole, which were returned. Hence, the present complaint is filed at Ongole. 3. Relying upon a judgment of this Court in N. SANTHI LAKSHMI V. STATE OF AP REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSEUCTOR, HIGH COURT OF A.P. (LAWS (APH) 2012-2-15)the Counsel for the petitioners submits that the court at Ongole will not get jurisdiction to entertain the complaint as the said complaint has to be presented only within the jurisdiction of the court of the drawee bank ie., at Vijayawada. 4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the second respondent opposed the criminal petition on the ground that the cause of action took place within the limits of Pernamitta village and that the court at Ongole alone will get jurisdiction to try the case in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in K. BHASKARAN V. SANKARAN VAIDHYAN BALAN ( (1999) 7 SCC 510 ). 5. The short question that arises for consideration in the present case is whether the court at Vijayawada alone would get jurisdiction to try the case? 6. It may not be inapposite in this context to refer to Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Definition of the offence and punishment for such offence appears in the body of Section 138 which is as under: 138. 6. It may not be inapposite in this context to refer to Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Definition of the offence and punishment for such offence appears in the body of Section 138 which is as under: 138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.- Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed the offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless- (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Explanation :- For the purposes of this section, "debt or other liability" means a legally enforceable debt or other liability. 7. As seen from the complaint an amount of Rs.4 lakhs was borrowed at Pernamitta village under a voucher dt. 9-8-2010 promising to repay the same immediately. Explanation :- For the purposes of this section, "debt or other liability" means a legally enforceable debt or other liability. 7. As seen from the complaint an amount of Rs.4 lakhs was borrowed at Pernamitta village under a voucher dt. 9-8-2010 promising to repay the same immediately. The cheque for Rs.4 lakhs drawn on City Union Bank, Vijayawada was presented at Ongole and thereafter notice as contemplated under the Act was issued from Ongole. Further, the complaint also discloses that the cheque was handed over to the complainant at Pernamitta village only. That being the position, it is to be seen whether court at Vijayawada alone will get jurisdiction to try the case. 8. In K.BHASKARAN’s case (2 supra) the complainant presented a cheque at Syndicate Bank's branch office at Kayamkulam (Kerala) for encashment. The said cheque was returned due to ‘insufficiency of funds’. After complying with the statutory requirements, the complainant filed a complaint before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class at Adoor, Pathanamthitta District, Kerala State. The question which fell for consideration before the Apex Court was whether the Court at Adoor is competent to try the case. After referring to the provisions of law, the Apex Court held that under Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code "every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried in a court within whose jurisdiction it was committed. The locality where the bank (which dishonoured the cheque) is situated cannot be regarded as the sole criteria to determine the place of offence. It must be remembered that offence under Section 138 would not be completed with the dishonour of the cheque. It attains completion only with the failure of the drawer of the cheque to pay the cheque amount within the expiry of 15 days mentioned in clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act. It is normally difficult to fix up a particular locality as the place of failure to pay the amount covered by the cheque. A place, for that purpose, would depend upon a variety of factors. It is normally difficult to fix up a particular locality as the place of failure to pay the amount covered by the cheque. A place, for that purpose, would depend upon a variety of factors. It can either be at the place where the drawer resides or at the place where the payee resides or at the place where either of them carries on business.“ The Apex Court further held that “even otherwise the rule that every offence shall be tried by a court within whose jurisdiction it was committed is not an unexceptional or unchangeable principle. Section 177 itself has been framed by the legislature thoughtfully by using the precautionary word 'ordinarily' to indicate that the rule is not invariable in all cases. Section 178 of the Code suggests that if there is uncertainty as to where, among different localities, the offence would have been committed the trial can be had in a Court having jurisdiction over any of those localities. The provision has further widened the scope by stating that in case where the offence was committed partly in one local area and partly in another local area the Court in either of the localities can exercise jurisdiction to try the case.” Ultimately, the Apex Court summed up stating that the offence under Section 138 of the Act can be completed only with the concatenation of a number of acts. The following are the acts which are components of the said offence: (1) Drawing of the cheque, (2) Presentation of the cheque to the bank, (3) Returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank, (4) Giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount, (5) failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. Thus, the Apex Court held that if the five different acts were done in five different localities, any one of the courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become the place of trial for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. In other words, the complainant can choose any one of those courts having jurisdiction over any one of the local areas within the territorial limits of which any one of those five acts was done. 9. In other words, the complainant can choose any one of those courts having jurisdiction over any one of the local areas within the territorial limits of which any one of those five acts was done. 9. In ISHAR ALLOY STEELS LIMITED V. JAYASWALS NECO LIMITED ( (2001) 3 SCC 609 ), the Apex Court dealt with the issue as to the meaning of the words “a bank” and “the bank” as mentioned in section 138 of the Act. After referring to various provisions of the Act, the Apex Court held as under: “9. The use of the words "a bank" and "the bank" in the section is indicator of the intention of the Legislature. The former is indirect (sic indefinite) article and the latter is pre-fixed by direct (sic definite) article. If the Legislature intended to have the same meanings for "a bank" and "the bank", there was no cause or occasion for mentioning it distinctly and differently by using two different articles. It is worth noticing that the word "banker" in Section 3 of the Act is prefixed by the indefinite article "a" and the word "bank" where the cheque is intended to be presented under Section 138 is pre-fixed by the definite article "the". The same section permits a person to issue a cheque on an account maintained by him with "a bank" and makes him liable for criminal prosecution if it is returned by "the bank" unpaid. The payment of the cheque is contemplated by "the bank" meaning thereby where the person issuing the cheque has an account. "The" is the word used before nouns, with a specifying of particularising effect opposed to the indefinite or generalising force of "a" or "an". It determines what particular thing is meant; that is, what particular thing we are to assume to be meant. "The" is always mentioned to denote particular thing or a person. "The" would, therefore, refer implicitly to a specified bank and not any bank. "The bank" referred to in Clause (a) to the proviso to Section 138 of the Act would mean the drawee-bank on which the cheque is drawn and not all banks where the cheque is presented for collection including the bank of the payee, in whose favour the cheque is issued. 10. "The bank" referred to in Clause (a) to the proviso to Section 138 of the Act would mean the drawee-bank on which the cheque is drawn and not all banks where the cheque is presented for collection including the bank of the payee, in whose favour the cheque is issued. 10. It, however, does not mean that the cheque is always to be presented to the drawer's bank on which the cheque is issued. The payee of the cheque has the option to present the cheque in any bank including the collecting bank where he has his account but to attract the criminal liability of the drawer of the cheque such collecting bank is obliged to present the cheque in the drawee or payee bank on which the cheque is drawn within the period of six months from the date on which it is shown to have been issued. In other words a cheque issued by (A) in favour of (B) drawn in a bank named (C) where the drawer has an account can be presented by the payee to the bank upon which it is drawn i.e. (C) bank within a period of six months or present it to any other bank for collection of the cheque amount provided such other bank including the collecting bank presents the cheque for collection to the (C) bank. The non presentation of the cheque to the drawee-bank within the period specified in the Section would absolve the person issuing the cheque of his criminal liability under Section 138 of the Act, who shall otherwise may be liable to pay the cheque amount to the payee in a civil action initiated under the law. A combined reading of Sections 2, 72 and 138 of the Act would leave no doubt in our mind that the law mandates the cheque to be presented at the bank on which it is drawn if the drawer is to be held criminally liable. Such presentation is necessarily to be made within six months at the bank on which the cheque is drawn, whether presented personally or through another bank, namely, the collecting bank of the payee.” (Emphasis supplied).” 10. Such presentation is necessarily to be made within six months at the bank on which the cheque is drawn, whether presented personally or through another bank, namely, the collecting bank of the payee.” (Emphasis supplied).” 10. In SHAMSHAD BEGUM V. B.MOHAMMED (2009 CRL.L.J.1304(1)), initiation of proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in a court at Mangalore was the subject matter of challenge, on the ground that the Court at Mangalore has no jurisdiction to try the case. It was a case where the agreement between the parties was entered into at Bangalore; the cheque was returned from the Bank at Bangalore, but notice was issued from Mangalore as the party was residing in Mangalore at that time. Before the High Court, it was urged that the Mangalore Court has no jurisdiction to try the case. The High Court held that the Court at Mangalore has jurisdiction to try the case as one of the components of the offence ie., giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque emanated from Mangalore. The finding of the High Court was questioned before the Apex Court. While affirming the view expressed by the High Court of Karnataka, the Apex Court held as under: “It is not necessary that the above five acts should have been perpetrated at the same locality. It is possible that each of those five acts could be done at five different localities. But concatenation of all the above five is sine qua non for the completion of the offence under Section 138 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, the judgment of the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference.” 11. In HARMAN ELECTRONICS (P) LTD V. NATIONAL PANASONIC INDIA (P) LTD (2009) 1 SCC 720 ), a similar question came up for consideration before the Apex Court. It was a case where, the appellant and the respondent entered into a business transaction at Chandigarh. The cheque in question was issued at Chandigarh, but there was a dispute as to whether the said cheque was sent for collection to Delhi. The cheque which was presented at Chandigarh was also dishonoured at Chandigarh. However, the respondent-complainant issued a notice from Delhi calling upon the appellant to pay the amount and the said notice was served on the respondent at Chandigarh. The cheque which was presented at Chandigarh was also dishonoured at Chandigarh. However, the respondent-complainant issued a notice from Delhi calling upon the appellant to pay the amount and the said notice was served on the respondent at Chandigarh. As the amount was not paid within the period contemplated under the Act, a private complaint came to be filed at Delhi. The question before the High Court of Delhi was whether the Court at Delhi would get jurisdiction to try the case. On dismissal of the appeal, the appellant filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. The issue before the Apex Court was whether sending of notice from Delhi itself would give rise to a cause of action for taking cognizance under the Act. The Apex Court held that “it is one thing to say that sending of a notice is one of the ingredients for maintaining the complaint but it is another thing to say that dishonour of a cheque by itself constitutes an offence. ………….As it is only on receipt of the notice the accused at his own peril may refuse to pay the amount. Clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Section 138 therefore must be read together. Issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action but communication of the notice would.” The Apex Court further held that issuance of a notice by the holder of a negotiable instrument is necessary, service thereof is also imperative. Only on a service of such notice and failure on the part of the accused to pay the demanded amount within a period of 15 days thereafter, commission of an completes. Giving of notice, therefore, cannot have any precedent over the service.” Therefore, the Apex Court held that Court in Delhi has no jurisdiction to try the case and as such the said case was transferred to the Court of competent jurisdiction at Chandigarh. 12. In SANTHI LAKSHMI (1 supra), a learned single Judge of this Court was dealing with a situation where the accused who joined as a subscriber in one of the chits of the 2nd respondent/Complainant, at Nellore, became a successful bidder of the chit having agreed to forgo certain amount and received the prized amount. She issued an account payee cheque bearing No.205379 dt. 10-10-2008 drawn on Indus Ind Bank Limited, Nellore Branch, towards arrears of chit amount. She issued an account payee cheque bearing No.205379 dt. 10-10-2008 drawn on Indus Ind Bank Limited, Nellore Branch, towards arrears of chit amount. The said cheque when presented at Union Bank of India, AS Rao Nagar, Hyderabad Branch, for collection was returned on 2-12-2008 with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. As the legal notice to the accused calling upon him to pay the amount covered under the cheque in question proved futile, a complaint came to be filed, in the Court of X Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad, at Malkajgiri, Ranaga Reddy District. The learned single Judge relying upon the judgments of the Apex Court in ISHAR ALLOYS (3 supra), held that no part of cause of action can be said to have arisen within the local area of X Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad at Malkajgiri, Ranga Reddy District and accordingly quashed the proceedings. 13. In V. SURESH REDDY V. E. SURYA PRAKASH GOUD AND ANOTHER (2013(1) ALD (CRL) 116 (AP)), a learned single Judge of this Court while dealing with the case where the accused borrowed an amount of Rs.4,50,000/- from the complainant on 5-4-2009 agreeing to repay the same with interest and executed a promissory note in his favour. On the same day, the accused issued a cheque drawn on Andhra Bank, Apollo Hospital, Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad, towards discharge of the pronote debt. The cheque was presented on 18-9-2009 at State Bank of Hyderabad, Yerraguntla village, Kadapa District. The same was returned on 23-9-2009 on the ground of ‘insufficient funds’. After issuing a statutory notice, a complaint came to be filed in the court of Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kamalapuram, Kadapa District. One of the contentions before the learned single Judge was that the court at Kamalapuram has no jurisdiction to try the case and the complaint has to be filed in the court having jurisdiction over the drawee bank. After referring to Sections 177, 178 and 179 of the Code and also referring to the judgment of K.BHASKARAN (2 supra), this Court held that since the pronote as well as the cheque were issued at Yerraguntla, the argument that the court at Kamalapuram has no jurisdiction was rejected. 14. After referring to Sections 177, 178 and 179 of the Code and also referring to the judgment of K.BHASKARAN (2 supra), this Court held that since the pronote as well as the cheque were issued at Yerraguntla, the argument that the court at Kamalapuram has no jurisdiction was rejected. 14. In PATIALA CASTING P. LTD V. BHUSHAN STEEL LTD (2001 CRL.L.J. 757), a learned single Judge of Delhi High Court was dealing with a case where cheque was presented at Delhi sent to Punjab for collection and a notice came to be issued from Delhi. The accused therein raised an objection with regard to maintainability of the complaint at Delhi on the ground that the term “the bank” as referred to in Section 138 proviso (a) of the Act would mean drawee bank and not the drawers bank. It was also contended that issuance of notice from Delhi would also not give jurisdiction to courts at Delhi since the respondent was served with the notice in Punjab. The learned single Judge after referring to all the judgments of the Apex Court and also the Judgment of Bombay High Court held that the Court at Delhi hasrightly entertained the complaint under section 138 of the Act as the cheque for encashment is deposited by the complainant at Delhi, and notice of demand was issued from Delhi. 15. The controversy involved in this regard was set at rest by the Apex Court in NISHANT AGGARWAL V. KAILASH KUMAR SHARMA (2013 (1) Decisions Today (SC) 271). The question before the Apex Court was whether the Court in whose jurisdiction the cheque is deposited for collection alone would have territorial jurisdiction to try the accused for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 or would it be only in the Court exercising territorial jurisdiction over the drawee bank? In the said case, the appellant therein issued a post dated cheque drawn on Standard Chartered Bank, Guwahati for Rs.28,62,700/- in favour of the respondent therein. As the said cheque was found missing, the appellant wrote a letter to the Bank as well as to the Dispur Police Station, Guwahati, regarding missing of cheque and also gave instructions to the Bank for stop payment. When the said cheque was presented for collection through Canara Bank, Bhiwani, Haryana, it was returned unpaid due to stop payment instructions given by the appellant. When the said cheque was presented for collection through Canara Bank, Bhiwani, Haryana, it was returned unpaid due to stop payment instructions given by the appellant. On instructions, the said cheque was re-presented, but the same was again returned unpaid. A legal notice was sent to the appellant calling upon him to pay the said amount, failing which, a complaint would be lodged before the Court of J.M.I.C. Bhiwani. The Judicial Magistrate at Bhiwani held that the court has no jurisdiction and returned the complainant for presentation before the proper Court having jurisdiction. Dissatisfied with the order, the respondent filed Criminal Revision Petition before the Court of Additional Sessions Judge IV, Bhiwani. The learned Sessions Judge set aside the order of the Judicial Magistrate and allowed the revision. The High Court upheld the order of the learned Sessions Judge. Against which, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Apex Court. Earlier judgments relating to the said issue came up for consideration before the Apex Court. Relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in ISHAR ALLOY STEELS (3 supra), the counsel therein argued that the court at Bhiwani would not get jurisdiction to try the offence. While referring to ISHAR ALLOY STEELS (3 supra), the Apex Court held that though the case relates to an offence under the Act, the issue of territorial jurisdiction was not the subject matter thereof. The court held that ISHAR ALLOY STEELS (3 supra) dealt with interpretation relating to filing of complaint within the statutory time period of six months. In the said circumstances, the Apex Court was of the view that the reliance on the law laid down in ISHAR ALLOY STEELS (3 supra) has no relevance as far as the present case is concerned. In categorical terms, the Apex Court held that the definition of the term “the bank” as interpreted in ISHAR ALLOY STEELS (3 supra)cannot be employed to decide the jurisdictional aspect and dilute the ratio of the judgment in K. Bhaskaran(2 supra). In other words, it is held that the judgment laid down in ISHAR ALLOY STEELS (3 supra)does not affect the ratio of the judgment in K.BHASARAN(2 supra)which provides for jurisdiction at theplace of residence of the payer and the payee. 16. In other words, it is held that the judgment laid down in ISHAR ALLOY STEELS (3 supra)does not affect the ratio of the judgment in K.BHASARAN(2 supra)which provides for jurisdiction at theplace of residence of the payer and the payee. 16. The Supreme Court in NISHANT AGGARWAL (8 supra), while referring to HARMAN ELECTRONICS (5 supra) held that HARMAN ELECTRONICS’s case (5 supra) is only an authority on the question where a court will have jurisdiction because only notice is issued from the place which falls within its jurisdiction and it does not deviate from the other principles laid down in K.BHASKARAN (2 supra). Ultimately, the Apex Court in NISHANT AGGARWAL (8 supra) held that K.BHASKARAN’s case (2 supra) still holds the field and complaint can be filed at five places mentioned in the said case. 17. In the instant case, payment of amount as hand loan, issuance of cheque in discharge of debt, and legal notice calling upon the accused to pay the amount within the period stipulated under the Act, took place within the jurisdiction of the Court at Ongole. The Apex Court in NISHANT AGGARWAL’s case (8 supra) after referring to the observation made in K. BHASKARAN (2 supra) observed that section 178 of the Code has widened the scope of jurisdiction of a criminal court and section 179 of the Code has stretched it to still a wider horizon. The Court reiterated that the judgment in ISHAR ALLOY (3 supra) does not affect the ratio laid down in K.BHASKARAN (2 supra), which provides jurisdiction at the place of residence of the payer and the payee. 18. Accordingly, the present Criminal Petition filed seeking quashing of proceedings in CC No.39/2011 on the file of III Additional Munsif Magistrate, Ongole, Prakasham District is hereby dismissed. Miscellaneous petition, if any, shall stand closed.