ORDER 1. By Court Seeking quashing of order dated 18.5.1999 as contained in Memo No. 363 and the Appellate Order dated 15.1.2005, whereby the order of discharge from service has been affirmed, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. 2. The brief facts of the case are that, the petitioner was appointed on 4.11.1988 as Home Guard and was posted at Bokaro Steel City. On 11.09.1998 the petitioner was served a Charge Memo on the allegation that he obstructed the official work. By order dated 18.5.1999, the petitioner was discharged from the service. The petitioner preferred appeal before the Additional Director General-cum-Commandant General, Bihar Home Guards, and by order dated 30.7.1999 the order of discharge from service was set-aside. However, by order dated 22.8.1999, the Appellate Order was stayed. The petitioner made representation before the authorities and finally moved the High Court in C.W.J.C. 3259 of 2000 challenging the validity of order dated 22.08.1999. The writ petition was allowed by order dated 15.5.2002 against which Letters Patent Appeal was preferred which was also dismissed by order dated 9.9.2002. Thereafter, Civil Review No. 91 of 2002 was filed which was allowed and again the L.P.A. No. 358 of 2002, was heard by a Division Bench. The said L.P.A. was allowed vide order dated 17.9.2003 directing the Commandant-General, Home Guards, Jharkhand to decide the appeal of the petitioner. The petitioner moved the Supreme Court in C.C. No. 3169 of 2004 which was dismissed on 12.4.2004. The petitioner again approached this Court by filing Cont. Case (C) No. 1115 of 2004 which was disposed of by order dated 18.3.2005. In the mean-time by order dated 15.1.2005 the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 18.5.1999 whereby, he was discharged from service, was decided by the Commandant-General, Home Guards, Jharkhand. In these facts, the petitioner has approached this Court again. 3. A counter-affidavit has been filed taking a stand that the petitioner was appointed as Home Guard and he was a volunteer and therefore, the service conditions governing Government employees are not applicable to him. The order of discharge dated 18.5.1999 has been passed as the explanation submitted by the petitioner was not found satisfactory, however, during enquiry he was afforded full opportunity . The enquiry was not lacking in observance of the principle of natural justice. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record. 5. The order of discharge dated 18.5.1999 has been passed as the explanation submitted by the petitioner was not found satisfactory, however, during enquiry he was afforded full opportunity . The enquiry was not lacking in observance of the principle of natural justice. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record. 5. This is a matter of record that the petitioner was appointed as Home Guard and he was not a Government employee rather, he was merely a volunteer. The respondents have asserted that Home Guard volunteer can be removed/terminated from service whenever his service is found not satisfactory or against the discipline of Home Guard. A full fledged departmental proceeding is not required to be initiated against the Home Guard Volunteer. A perusal of order dated 17.9. 2003 passed in L.P.A. No. 358 of 2002 would also reveal that the respondents took a similar stand before the Division Bench contending that the writ petitioner was mere volunteer. He was holding no post and as such there was no need for holding an enquiry before passing order of discharge of the petitioner. A decision of this Court in " Jharkahnd Grih Raksha Vahini Swayam Sevak Sangh through its Deputy Chairman, Sri Karunakar Dubey Vs. State of Jharkahnd and Others," reported in 2001(2) J.C.R. 69 has been relied upon by the counsel for the respondents to substantiate the contention that the petitioner was mere volunteer therefore, he is not entitled for relief. I further find that the petitioner in reply to show-cause notice dated 11.9.1998 has admitted that he participated in the boycott though, he has denied that he obstructed the process of nomination of Home Guards. A perusal of appellate order dated 15.1.2005 discloses that it is a well considered order. The appellate authority has dealt with all the contentions of the petitioner and by a reasoned order the appeal has been dismissed affirming the order of discharge from service dated 18.5.1999. I find that in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with respect to power of the High Court in interfering with a full fledged enquiry, this is not a case which requires interference by this Court. 6. In “State of Andhra Pradesh and others Vs. I find that in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with respect to power of the High Court in interfering with a full fledged enquiry, this is not a case which requires interference by this Court. 6. In “State of Andhra Pradesh and others Vs. S. Sree Rama Rao” reported in AIR 1963 SC 1723 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court while holding that the High Court has no power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the findings recorded in departmental enquiry, has held, 7.”The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 7. In “The State of Orissa and another Vs. Murlidhar Jena” reported in AIR 1963 SC 404 , it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the High Court has no power to re-appreciate evidence and findings recorded in the departmental enquiry. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under, 14. “This observation clearly indicates that the High Court was attempting to appreciate evidence. The judgment of the Tribunal shows that it considered several facts and circumstances in dealing with the question about the identity of the individual indicated by the expression “ Chatrapur Saheb.” Whether or not the evidence on which the Tribunal relied was satisfactory and sufficient for justifying its conclusion would not fall to be considered in a writ petition. That in effect is the approach initially adopted by the High Court at the beginning of its judgment. However, in the subsequent part of the judgment the High Court appears to have been persuaded to appreciate the evidence for itself and that, in our opinion, is not reasonable or legitimate.” 8. In “State of Andhra Pradesh and others Vs. Chitra Venkata Rao “ reported in (1975) 2 SCC 557 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the departmental authorities are the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226. 9. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition and accordingly, it is hereby dismissed. However, it is made clear that this order would not be treated as any expression of opinion by this Court on the conduct of the petitioner and it would not come in the way of any future employment of the petitioner.