JUDGMENT : 1. The captioned three petitions are filed by original accused persons by invoking provisions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The petitioners – original accused persons have prayed that the impugned complaint which is registered as Criminal Inquiry No.10 of 2010 may be quashed for the reasons mentioned in the petitions. 2. The petitioner in Criminal Misc. Application No.5472 of 2012 is the original accused No.6 and he has prayed, inter alia, that: “12(B) Your Lordships be pleased to quashed and set aside the Criminal Inquiry No.10 of 2010 registered with the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surat qua the present applicant.” 2.1 The petition being Criminal Misc. Application No.6452 of 2012 is preferred by three petitioners who are original accused Nos.3, 4 and 5 and they have prayed, inter alia, that: “7b. This Hon'ble Court be pleased to quash and set aside the complaint filed before Ld. Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Surat vide Inquiry Case No.10 of 2010 along with all the subsequent proceedings thereto qua present applicant.” 2.2 The petition being Criminal Misc. Application No.5935 of 2012 is preferred by original accused No.1 and he has prayed, inter alia, that: “10(a)To quash and set aside the complaint being Criminal Inquiry No.10/2010 and the order dated 18/04/2012 passed therein qua the present petitioner and to pass all incidental and consequential orders as may be deemed fit and proper; 2.3 In all petitions, the petitioners have challenged the same complaint, i.e. Criminal Inquiry Case No.10 of 2010 which is filed by present respondent No.2, alleging offence punishable under Sections 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 114 and 120B of IPC. 3. So far as factual background of the impugned complaint is concerned, the petitioners have, inter alia, averred that the grandfather of the complainant had purchased the land in question somewhere in August, 1970. It is further claimed that the grandfather of the complainant executed a power of attorney in September, 1986. It appears that on strength of the said power of attorney, in July 1989, accused No.1 sold the land in question to three persons by way of registered sale deed. It appears that subsequently, father and uncle of the complainant challenged the revenue entry which was mutated in favour of the three persons to whom the land in question was sold by accused No.1 in July, 1989. It appears that subsequently, father and uncle of the complainant challenged the revenue entry which was mutated in favour of the three persons to whom the land in question was sold by accused No.1 in July, 1989. It appears that the revenue entry was cancelled. Subsequently, somewhere in 2002, the said order was challenged before the competent authority. According to the claim of the petitioners, the said subsequent challenge in 2002 has given rise to the impugned complaint. Accused No.1 has claimed that in March, 2005, a confirmation/ratification deed was executed stating, inter alia, that the grandfather of the complainant had received sale consideration in 1989 in his presence and the sale deed dated 3.7.1989 was executed. Accused No.1 has also claimed that subsequently in November, 2006, the father and brother of present complainant executed registered confirmation deed in light of which Civil Suit No.670 of 2005 came to be unconditionally withdrawn. It appears that after considering the allegations in the complaint, learned Magistrate considered it appropriate to pass order dated 18.4.2012 directing investigation under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) and called for report. The accused persons, i.e. all petitioners in three petitions are aggrieved by the said complaint, i.e. Inquiry Case No.10 of 2010 and the order dated 18.4.2012 directing investigation. 4. Mr.Nanavati, learned senior counsel has appeared for accused No.6, Mr.Dave, learned advocate has appeared for accused Nos.3, 4 and 5 and Mr.Raju, learned advocate has appeared for accused No.1, i.e. petitioner in Criminal Misc. Application No.5935 of 2012. The respondent – complainant is represented by Mr.K.S. Shah, learned advocate. 5. The complaint challenged in all three cases is common and the complainant – private respondent in all three cases is also common. The allegations against the petitioners in these petitions are to be found in the same complaint and learned counsel for the petitioners have, having regard to the common subject matter of the petitions, made similar and common submissions except so far as alleged individual roles are concerned. The learned counsel for the respondent has also made common submissions in respect of all three petitions. Therefore, the said three petitions are heard together and decided by this common order. The learned counsel for the respondent has also made common submissions in respect of all three petitions. Therefore, the said three petitions are heard together and decided by this common order. The focal point of the challenge against the impugned complaint is gross delay in filing the complaint, intention of harassment and taking undue benefit of huge rise in price of land in question, civil nature of the dispute and the rounds of civil litigation and revenue proceedings some of which have concluded and some are pending. On the said grounds, it is claimed and contended that the impugned complaint is an afterthought and abuse of process and does not make out any ingredient of alleged offence against the accused persons. 5.1 The petitions are opposed by learned counsel for respondent who contended that merely because some delay is caused in lodging the complaint, it does not justify the request to quash the complaint without investigation. It is also contended that while it is true that the dispute in question is, to an extent, in nature of civil dispute, however, the dispute also has ingredients of criminal offence and therefore, merely because the complaint discloses some civil dispute, it does not deserve to be set aside because it also contains allegations about criminal offence. 5.2 Learned counsel for the contesting parties have referred to the document being confirmation / ratification deed dated 28.3.2005, affidavit dated 28.3.2005 made by Mr.Mohanbhai D. Patel, copy of the plaint of Regular Civil Suit No.670 of 2005, withdrawal purshis filed in the said Regular Civil Suit No.670 of 2005, deed of confirmation dated 19.10.2006, the plaint of Civil Suit No.371 of 2007 and the order dated 28.3.2011 passed below Exh.5 in Special Civil Suit No.371 of 2007 and the plaint of Special Civil Suit No.153 of 2008 which is filed by original complainant, i.e. present respondent No.2. 5.3 I have heard learned counsel for the contesting parties and learned APP and considered the submissions. I have also considered the material on record. 6. At the outset, it is relevant and appropriate to note that the learned trial Court has passed a detailed and reasoned order on 18.4.2012 and has recorded satisfaction as well as supporting reasons for satisfaction to issue direction for investigation under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) of the Code. 7. I have also considered the material on record. 6. At the outset, it is relevant and appropriate to note that the learned trial Court has passed a detailed and reasoned order on 18.4.2012 and has recorded satisfaction as well as supporting reasons for satisfaction to issue direction for investigation under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) of the Code. 7. On perusal of the complaint, it appears that the complainant has alleged that the socalled power of attorney is forged and the alleged or socalled Will is also forged and fabricated by the accused persons. The complainant has also alleged that the accused persons surreptitiously got signatures of complainant’s father and uncle on the notice issued under Section 135(d) of Bombay Land Revenue Code which came to the notice of the complainant’s father and uncle and therefore, they initiated proceedings before the Revenue Authority who, after considering the objections, set aside the entries made in revenue record on strength of such forged power of attorney and will. 8. So far as the gross delay in filing the complaint is concerned, the complainant has tried to explain it, by claiming that accused No.6 had kidnapped complainant’s uncle and there was threat to the life of complainant’s father and uncle. 9. In the order dated 18.4.2012, learned Magistrate has recorded that report was called for which came to be produced at Exh.9. The police authority submitted the progress report dated 8.7.2010 suggesting that any case was not made out and the complaint appears to have been filed with a view to extracting money from the accused persons. 9.1 The learned Magistrate has recorded that the documents were forwarded to the handwriting expert with specimen signature and the handwriting expert appears to have submitted report / opinion dated 5.3.2012 that the signature on the power of attorney dated 18.9.1986 does not appear to be genuine. The learned Magistrate has also referred to the decision, reported in 2001 GLHEL SC 18093. 10. The complainant is not owner of the land. The complainant is married granddaughter of the original owner of the land. The original owner of the land died in 1991. The learned Magistrate has also referred to the decision, reported in 2001 GLHEL SC 18093. 10. The complainant is not owner of the land. The complainant is married granddaughter of the original owner of the land. The original owner of the land died in 1991. The land in question was allegedly sold way back in 1989 on the strength of power of attorney allegedly executed in 1986 by the original owner, i.e. the grandfather of present complainant and now in 2010, granddaughter of the original owner claims that the said power of attorney is a forged and fabricated document. 11. So as to consider the request made by the petitioners in captioned three petitions, it is profitable to take into consideration observations by the Hon’ble Apex Court in recent decision in case between Rajiv Thapar vs. Madan Lal Kapoor [ (2013) 3 SCC 330 ]. 11.1 In the said decision, Hon'ble Apex Court has also explained the steps and stages at which, and the manner in which the powers under Section 482 of the Code should be and can be, or should not be, exercised. The Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that: “28. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, must make a just and rightful choice. This is not a stage of evaluating the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant against the accused. Likewise, it is not a stage for determining how weighty the defences raised on behalf of the accused are. Even if the accused is successful in showing some suspicion or doubt, in the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, it would be impermissible to discharge the accused before trial. This is so because it would result in giving finality to the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without allowing the prosecution or the complainant to adduce evidence to substantiate the same. The converse is, however, not true, because even if trial is proceeded with, the accused is not subjected to any irreparable consequences. The accused would still be in a position to succeed by establishing his defences by producing evidence in accordance with law. The converse is, however, not true, because even if trial is proceeded with, the accused is not subjected to any irreparable consequences. The accused would still be in a position to succeed by establishing his defences by producing evidence in accordance with law. There is an endless list of judgments rendered by this Court declaring the legal position that in a case where the prosecution/complainant has levelled allegations bringing out all ingredients of the charge(s) levelled, and have placed material before the Court, prima facie evidencing the truthfulness of the allegations levelled, trial must be held. 29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have farreaching consequences inasmuch as it would negate the prosecution's case without allowing the prosecution/ complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution / complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiable refuted, being material of sterling impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiable refuted, being material of sterling impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC: 30.1 Step one: whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2 Step two: whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false? 30.3 Step three: whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution / complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution / complainant? 30.4 Step four: whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. 30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arising therefrom) specially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.” 11.2 What emerges from the principle explained by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the abovequoted observations is that it would not be proper for the Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, to enter into the process of determining how weighty the defence raised on behalf of the accused is or evaluating the allegations. 11.3 Otherwise, it would result in giving finality to the allegations levelled by the complainant without allowing opportunity to the prosecution / complainant to lead evidence and substantiate the allegations. 11.4 The powers vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Code, when exercised, have far reaching consequences, most important being the consequence that it would negate the prosecution's / complainant's case without allowing the prosecution / complainant to lead evidence and that, therefore, the exercise of the said powers should be with utmost caution, care and circumspection. 11.5 The material relied on by the accused to justify the request should be such which would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused and it should be based on indubitable facts and should be of such character which would overrule the veracity of the allegations levelled by the complainant/prosecution and should be sufficient to reject and discard the accusation without necessity of recording any evidence. 12. When the said principles are kept in focus and are applied in present case, then it emerges, as can be seen from following discussion, that the facts and circumstances of the case presented by the petitioner to justify the request that the complaint may be quashed, are not such which would persuade the Court to terminate the investigation at its threshold and quash the complaint without allowing the investigation to be concluded. 13. 13. The impugned complaint is filed in 2010 with regard to a power of attorney allegedly executed in September, 1986 (i.e. before 24 years) and it is alleged that on the strength of the said power of attorney dated 18.9.1986, accused No.1 sold certain parcel of land which complainant’s grandfather had purchased in March, 1970. The complainant has also alleged that the said power of attorney is a forged document and is fabricated by accused No.1 who, with knowledge that the said power of attorney is a forged document, sold the land in question in July, 1989. 13.1 After examining the said complaint, the learned trial Court has passed order dated 18.4.2012 directing the inquiry / investigation under Section 154(1) and Section 154(3). 14. By present petition, the petitioners seek that the said complaint may be quashed. The request made in the petition, if granted, would nullify the direction passed by the learned trial Court by reasoned order dated 18.4.2012. While passing the said order, the Court considered the allegations in the complaint as well as the progress report submitted by the Police Station and has directed inquiry / investigation under Section 154(1) and (3). The proceedings in connection with the said complaint are brought under challenge. 14.1 The petitioners have relied on confirmation / ratification deed allegedly executed by uncle of the complainant, wherein uncle of the complainant has stated that the amount of sale consideration was received by the complainant’s grandfather and the sale was genuine. 15. The other aspect on which the petitioners have heavily relied on, is the submission that after the said sale (which is now alleged to have been executed with help of allegedly forged power of attorney), the land in question has been resold three times by the concerned owners. The subject/impugned complaint is not a belatedly filed suit proceedings for recovery of possession of property and that, therefore, the said aspect, even if true, will not help the petitioners at this stage in getting the complaint quashed. 15.1 The petitioners have also claimed that even the father of the complainant had filed a civil suit against accused No.1, i.e. father of present applicant (who is accused No.6 in the complaint), which was registered as Civil Suit No.670 of 2005. 15.1 The petitioners have also claimed that even the father of the complainant had filed a civil suit against accused No.1, i.e. father of present applicant (who is accused No.6 in the complaint), which was registered as Civil Suit No.670 of 2005. The accused – petitioners have also claimed that in the said suit proceedings, the plaintiff, i.e. the father of present complainant and the defendants, i.e. accused Nos.1 and 6 in the impugned complaint and other defendants had jointly submitted an application stating, inter alia, that a settlement was arrived at between the parties. 15.2 It is pertinent that the said application / purshis was submitted before the Court during Lok Adalat and having regard to the purshis / application stating that the case was settled, the Court disposed of the said Civil Suit No.760 of 2005 as withdrawn, vide order dated 10.12.2006. 15.3 Thus, while it is true that said the Civil Suit No.760 of 2005 stands disposed of as withdrawn, at the same time, the fact remains that the issue about veracity and genuineness of the documents in question was not tried and decided before the learned Civil Court and the Court did not record any conclusion with regard to the disputed documents and the veracity of the document is not tested/examined by the Court at any point of time and any conclusion on merits is, until now, not recorded. 15.4 If any decision on merits regarding veracity and genuineness of the documents had been pronounced by the learned Civil Court, then the situation would have different complexion, however, when one suit filed by the complainant and another suit filed by the complainant's brother are still pending and it would be premature for this Court to terminate the proceedings on the said ground. 16. It is true that the confirmation/ratification deed is allegedly executed, however, it is equally true that the issues related to the said confirmation/ratification deed e.g. whether it is executed voluntarily and/or in absence of any type of influence or under coercion and the genuineness of the veracity of the said documents, etc. are matter of disputes and therefore matter of investigation and evidence. 17. are matter of disputes and therefore matter of investigation and evidence. 17. The complainant has raised doubts and allegations about genuineness of the documents as well as about genuineness of signatures/thumb impressions and about absence of any type of influence or coercion in executing the document and the allegations also include allegations about cheating and forgery and that, therefore, the allegations have ingredients or elements or traits of criminal offence in the dispute. 18. As observed by Hon'ble Apex Court, there could be civil disputes/cases which inherently may also have characteristics of criminal offence. 18.1 In view of this Court, in such cases, it would be improper and premature for this Court to not even allow investigation officer to conclude the investigation. 18.2 If the investigation is not interfered with by the Court in exercise of powers under Section 482, then after collecting sufficient and relevant material, the investigation officer may file appropriate report, including 'C' summary or 'B' summary, in the event any material to support the allegations do not surface during the investigation. 18.3 However, to terminate the investigation before the said stage is reached, would not be justified in the facts of present case. 19. In this context, reference may be made to the observations by Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision in case of Kamladevi Agarwal vs. State of West Bengal [ (2002) 1 SCC 555 ]. In the said decision in paragraph Nos.9, 11 and 12, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under: “11. In Lalmuni Devi (Smt.) v. State of Bihar (2001) 2 SCC 17 this Court held : "There could be no dispute to the proposition that if the complaint does not make out an offence it can be quashed. However, it is also settled law that facts may give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence. Merely because a civil claim is maintainable does not mean that the criminal complaint cannot be maintained. In this case, on the facts, it cannot be stated, at this prima facie stage, that this is a frivolous complaint. The High Court does not state that on facts no offence is made out. If that be so, then merely on the ground that it was a civil wrong the criminal prosecution could not have been quashed." 12. In this case, on the facts, it cannot be stated, at this prima facie stage, that this is a frivolous complaint. The High Court does not state that on facts no offence is made out. If that be so, then merely on the ground that it was a civil wrong the criminal prosecution could not have been quashed." 12. Again in M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh (Criminal Appeal No. 1028 of 2001 decided on 11-10-2001) this Court held that while exercising powers under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court should be slow in interfering with the proceedings at the initial stage and that merely because the nature of the dispute is primarily of a civil nature, the criminal prosecution cannot be quashed because in cases of forgery and fraud there is always some element of civil nature. In a case where the accused alleged that the transaction between the parties are of a civil nature and the criminal court cannot proceed with the complaint because the factum of document being forged was pending in the civil Court, the Court observed: "Accepting such a general proposition would be against the provisions of law inasmuch as in all cases of cheating and fraud, in the whole transaction, there is generally some element of civil nature. However, in this case, the allegations were regarding the forging of the documents and acquiring gains on the basis of such forged documents. The proceedings could not be quashed only because the respondents had filed a civil suit with respect to the aforesaid documents. In a criminal Court the allegations made in the complaint have to be established independently, notwithstanding the adjudication by a civil Court. Had the complainant failed to prove the allegations made by him in the complaint, the respondents were entitled to discharge or acquittal but not otherwise. If mere pendency of a suit is made a ground for quashing the criminal proceedings, the unscrupulous litigants, apprehending criminal action against them, would be encouraged to frustrate the course of justice and law by filing suits with respect to the documents intended to be used against them after the initiation of criminal proceedings or in anticipation of such proceedings. Such a course cannot be the mandate of law. Civil proceedings, as distinguished from the criminal action, have to be adjudicated and concluded by adopting separate yardsticks. Such a course cannot be the mandate of law. Civil proceedings, as distinguished from the criminal action, have to be adjudicated and concluded by adopting separate yardsticks. The onus of proving the allegations beyond reasonable doubt, in criminal case, is not applicable in the civil proceedings which can be decided merely on the basis of the probabilities with respect to the acts complained of." (Emphasis supplied) 19.1 In this context, reference may also be made to the observations by Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph No.9 in the decision in the case of Mahesh Choudhary vs. State of Rajasthan [(2008) 4 Scale 85, which reads thus: “9. Propositions of law which emerge from the said decision are: (1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a First Information Report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence. (2) For the said purpose, the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any document relied upon by the defence. (3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus. (4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue.” (Emphasis supplied) 20. There could be cases and cases related to civil dispute which may simultaneously and inherently also have ingredients and elements of criminal offence. Instances of such cases can be found where the dispute arise from commercial transactions which are assailed on ground of fraud or cheating or in cases of sale of immovable property (e.g. land, residential premises, commercial premises, etc.) and in some cases family disputes related to ancestral properties or family business, etc. In such cases, there would be elements of civil nature and ingredients of offence as well, e.g. criminal breach of trust, criminal trespass, forged/fabricated documents, such as sale deed or power of attorney or any other deed/agreement so as to earn undue gain. In such cases, there would be elements of civil nature and ingredients of offence as well, e.g. criminal breach of trust, criminal trespass, forged/fabricated documents, such as sale deed or power of attorney or any other deed/agreement so as to earn undue gain. In such cases, allegations of civil dispute and criminal offence would run parallel and simultaneous and when such cases are brought before the Court with a prayer to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code and quash the complaint, then merely because the allegations involve and reflect dispute of civil nature, the ingredients or traits or elements of criminal offence cannot be overlooked or ignored and only on that ground, the complaint/FIR cannot be quashed, without any other strong supervening facts and circumstances which may exfacie demonstrate that the alleged offence is not made out. 20.1 In this context, useful reference may also be made to the observations by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M. Krishnan vs. Vijay Singh [ AIR 2001 SC 3014 ], which reads thus: “5. Accepting such a general proposition would be against the provisions of law inasmuch as in all cases of cheating and fraud, in the whole transaction, there is generally some element of civil nature. However, in this case the allegations were regarding the forging of the documents and acquiring gains on the basis of such forged documents. The proceedings could not be quashed only because the respondents had filed a civil suit with respect to the aforesaid documents. In a criminal court the allegations made in the complaint have to be established independently, notwithstanding the adjudication by a civil Court. Had the complainant failed to prove the allegations made by him the complaint, the respondents were entitled to discharge or acquittal but not otherwise. If mere pendency of a suit is made a ground for quashing the criminal proceedings, the unscrupulous litigants, apprehending criminal action against them, would be encouraged to frustrate the course of justice and law by filing suits with respect to the documents intended to be used against them after the initiation of criminal proceedings or in anticipation of such proceedings. Such a course cannot be the mandate of law. Civil proceedings, as distinguished from the criminal action, have to be adjudicated and concluded by adopting separate yardsticks. Such a course cannot be the mandate of law. Civil proceedings, as distinguished from the criminal action, have to be adjudicated and concluded by adopting separate yardsticks. The onus of proving the allegations beyond reasonable doubt, in criminal case, is not applicable in the civil proceedings which can be decided merely on the basis of the probabilities with respect to the acts complained of. The High Court was not, in any way, justified to observe : "In my view, unless and until the civil Court decides the question whether the documents are genuine or forged, no criminal action can be initiated against the petitioners and in view of the same, the present criminal proceedings and taking cognizance and issue of process are clearly erroneous." 6. Where factual foundations for the offences have been laid down in the complaint, the High court should not hasten to quash criminal proceedings merely in the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated with the details or that the facts narrated reveal the existence of commercial or money transaction between the parties. 7. This Court in Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi (2) JT 1999 SC 112 observed : "It may be that the facts stated narrated in the present complaint would as well reveal a commercial transaction or money transaction. But that is hardly a reason for holding that the offence of cheating would elude from such a transaction. In fact, many a cheatings were committed in the course of commercial and also money transactions. One of the illustrations set out under Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code (illustrations "f") is worthy of notice now : "(f) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means to repay any money that Z may lend to him and thereby dishonestly induces Z to lend him money, A not intending to repay it. A cheats." The crux of the postulate is the intention of the person who induces the victim of his representation and not the nature of the transaction which would become decisive in discerning whether there was commission of offence or not. The complainant has stated in the body of the complaint that he was induced to believe that respondent would honour payment on receipt of invoices, and that the complainant realised later that the intentions of the respondent were not clear. The complainant has stated in the body of the complaint that he was induced to believe that respondent would honour payment on receipt of invoices, and that the complainant realised later that the intentions of the respondent were not clear. He also mentioned that respondent after receiving the goods have sold them to other and still he did not pay the money. Such averments would prima facie make out a case for investigation by the authorities." (Emphasis supplied) 20.2 In this context, useful reference may also be made to the observations by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Lee Kun Hee vs. State of U.P. [ AIR 2012 SC 1007 ], which reads thus: “26. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the last contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellants. We are of the considered view, that in offences of the nature contemplated under the summoning order, there can be civil liability coupled with criminal culpability. What a party has been deprived of by an act of cheating, can be claimed through a civil action. The same deprivation based on denial by way of deception, emerging from an act of cheating, would also attract criminal liability. In the course of criminal prosecution, a complainant cannot seek a reciprocal relief, for the actions of the accused. As in the instant case, the monetary consideration under the bill of exchange dated 1.2.2001, cannot be claimed in the criminal proceedings, for that relief the remedy would be only through a civil suit. It is therefore not possible for us to accept, that since a civil claim has been raised by the complainant - JCE Consultancy, based on the alleged reach of the agreement dated 1.12.2001, it can be prevented from initiating proceedings for penal consequences for the alleged offences committed by the accused under the Indian Penal Code. It would not be appropriate for us, to delve into the culpability of the appellants at the present juncture, on the basis of the factual position projected by the rival parties before us. The culpability (if at all) would emerge only after evidence is adduced by the rival parties before the trial court. It would not be appropriate for us, to delve into the culpability of the appellants at the present juncture, on the basis of the factual position projected by the rival parties before us. The culpability (if at all) would emerge only after evidence is adduced by the rival parties before the trial court. The only conclusion that needs to be drawn, at the present juncture is, that even on the basis of the last submission canvassed on behalf of the appellants, it is not possible to quash the summoning order at this stage. In the aforesaid view of the matter, it is left open to the appellants to raise their objections, if they are so advised, before the trial court. The trial court shall, as it ought to, adjudicate upon the same in consonance with law, after allowing the rival parties to lead evidence to substantiate their respective positions.” (Emphasis supplied) 20.3 In this view of the matter, this Court is not inclined to terminate the investigation at this stage on ground of institution and/or pendency of civil proceedings since alleged offence contains ingredients and elements of offence as well. 21. The accused persons – petitioners have also claimed that even the paternal brother of the complainant has filed a civil suit in 2007 which was registered as Special Civil Suit No.371 of 2007 and interim relief application, i.e. Exh.5 in the said suit has been rejected by the Civil Court. However, it is also a fact that the said suit is pending before the learned Civil Court and mere rejection of Exh.5 application cannot be a ground for terminating investigation and/or quashing the complaint. 21.1 The complainant has also alleged that accused No.1 also forged and fabricated a will and with help of the said forged and fabricated document got certain entries made in the revenue record. On such allegations, the complainant has lodged the impugned complaint in 2010. 22. Now, in light of the details related to the said civil proceedings and the confirmation / ratification deed allegedly made by uncle of the complainant, the applicant – accused No.6 – claims that the granddaughter of the original land owner has filed impugned complaint because her family members have not succeeded in civil proceedings. 22. Now, in light of the details related to the said civil proceedings and the confirmation / ratification deed allegedly made by uncle of the complainant, the applicant – accused No.6 – claims that the granddaughter of the original land owner has filed impugned complaint because her family members have not succeeded in civil proceedings. 22.1 In this regard, it is necessary to note that the suit filed by complainant’s brother, i.e. Special Civil Suit No.371 of 2007 is pending and is not decided and rejected on merits. Merely because the Court has not entertained application for interim relief, it cannot be concluded that the plaintiff has failed in the suit on merits. 22.2 Besides this, so far as the confirmation / ratification deed said to have been made, is concerned, it is noticed that the said document is allegedly executed on 28.3.2005 on a stamp paper which appears to have been purchased on 3.12.2004. It does not come out from the record that any dispute with regard to the said confirmation / ratification deed is raised and is pending or not or any decision in connection with the said document is made by any competent authority or not. 22.3 Moreover, at this stage, it is also not clear before this Court as to whether any verification of the signatures on the said document has been carried out by investigation officer or not. 22.4 The complainant also appears to have filed a suit being Civil Suit No.153 of 2008, wherein the complainant has prayed for various declarations, including declaration against the disputed sale. The said suit is also pending. 22.5 In these circumstances, would it proper to terminate the investigation/the criminal inquiry case instituted by the respondent – complainant. 23. So as to examine the said aspect, it would be useful and appropriate to take into consideration the observations by Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision in case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Goloconda Linga Swamy and another [ AIR 2004 SC 3967 ], wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court observed in paragraph No.8 that: ”8. As noted above the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. As noted above the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint / F.I.R. has to be read as a whole. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint / F.I.R. has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant or disclosed in the F.I.R. that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint/F.I.R. is mala fide , frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceeding.” (Emphasis supplied) 24. The Hon'ble Apex Court has always put a word of caution with regard to any intervention or interference in the process of investigation. In this regard reference may be made to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sanapareddy Maheedhar Seshagiri & anr vs. State of Andra Pradesh and anr. ( AIR 2008 SC 787 ) which read thus: 30.....In dealing with such cases, the High Court has to bear in mind that judicial intervention at the threshold of the legal process initiated against a person accused of committing offence is highly detrimental to the larger public and societal interest. The people and the society have a legitimate expectation that those committing offences either against an individual or the society are expeditiously brought to trial and, if found guilty, adequately punished. Therefore, while deciding a petition filed for quashing the FIR or complaint or restraining the competent authority from investigating the allegations contained in the FIR or complaint or for stalling the trial of the case, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect. Therefore, while deciding a petition filed for quashing the FIR or complaint or restraining the competent authority from investigating the allegations contained in the FIR or complaint or for stalling the trial of the case, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect. If the allegations contained in the FIR or complaint discloses commission of some crime, then the High Court must keep its hands off and allow the investigating agency to complete the investigation without any fetter and also refrain from passing order which may impede the trial. The High Court should not go into the merits and demerits of the allegations simply because the petitioner alleges malus animus against the author of the FIR or the complainant. The High Court must also refrain from making imaginary journey in the realm of possible harassment which may be caused to the petitioner on account of investigation of the FIR or complaint. Such a course will result in miscarriage of justice and would encourage those accused of committing crimes to repeat the same. However, if the High Court is satisfied that the complaint does not disclose commission of any offence or prosecution is barred by limitation or that the proceedings of criminal case would result in failure of justice, then it may exercise inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.” (Emphasis supplied) 25. When the submissions with reference to the report/opinion of handwriting expert are considered and examined in light of the abovequoted observations by Hon'ble Apex Court, then it becomes clear that this Court cannot pronounce or record any opinion on that count at this stage and the said report justifies the need for investigation and persuades the Court to not interfere under Section 482 of the Code, with the investigation or the proceedings, at this stage. In view of this Court, this is not a fit case to exercise the said inherent power to scuttle investigation as directed by the learned Magistrate vide order dated 18.4.2012 and/or to embark upon the process of analyzing the case of the complainant in light of all probabilities or to examine whether the disputed documents, viz. power of attorney and/or the will, are forged/fabricated or not and the quality of the evidence cannot be tested by this Court at this stage. This Court has to refrain from entering into examination of merits and demerits of the allegations. 26. power of attorney and/or the will, are forged/fabricated or not and the quality of the evidence cannot be tested by this Court at this stage. This Court has to refrain from entering into examination of merits and demerits of the allegations. 26. Since the petitioners have also raised objection about the order dated 18.4.2012, it is relevant to take into consideration the following observations by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Smt. Nagawwa vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi [ AIR 1976 SC 1947 ]: “6. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case it seems to us that the present case is not one in which the High Court should have quashed the proceedings. To begin with, the order of the Magistrate dated February 11, 1975 issuing process against respondents 1 and 2 is a very well reasoned one which takes into consideration the allegations in the complaint as also the evidence adduced in support of it. The Magistrate clearly applied his mind and has analysed the evidence into three categories (I) those witnesses who have deposed as eyewitnesses regarding the actual occurrence and the part attributed to respondents 1 and 2. The Magistrate then refers to other witnesses who corroborated the evidence of the complainant; and thirdly the Magistrate relied on the evidence of witnesses who were admittedly signatories to the dying declaration and had clearly stated on oath that the names of respondents 1 and 2 were mentioned in their presence by the deceased but were not recorded by the Police Patel in the dying declaration and in spite of the protest by the witnesses they were made to sign the dying declaration as attesting witnesses under threat and duress. On a consideration of this evidence the Magistrate was satisfied that a prima facie case against respondents 1 and 2 was made out and he accordingly issued process against them. It was not a case where the Magistrate had passed an order issuing process in a mechanical manner or just by way of routine. On a consideration of this evidence the Magistrate was satisfied that a prima facie case against respondents 1 and 2 was made out and he accordingly issued process against them. It was not a case where the Magistrate had passed an order issuing process in a mechanical manner or just by way of routine. The High Court appears to have gone into the whole history of the case, examined the merits of the evidence, the contradictions and what it called the improbabilities and after a detailed discussion not only of the materials produced before the Magistrate but also of the documents which had been filed by the defence and which should not have been looked into at the stage when the mater was pending under Section 202, has held that the order of the Magistrate was illegal and was fit to be quashed. In the first place the High Court ought not to have considered the documents filed by respondents 1 and 2 in the previous revision without obtaining the permission of the Court and particularly when the High Court itself gave no directions whatsoever to the Magistrate to consider these documents. In fact the Magistrate considering the question as to whether process should be issued against the accused or not cannot go into the materials placed by the accused and therefore the High Court could not have given any such directions while disposing of the previous revision. The impugned order of the High Court proceeds on the basis that it was incumbent on the Magistrate to have considered the documents and their effect on the truth or falsehood of the allegations made by the complainant. This was an entirely wrong approach. As we are clearly of the opinion that the Magistrate was fully justified in completely excluding the documents from consideration, we refrain from making any observation regarding the effect of those documents. In fact the documents filed and they were, therefore, not admissible. At any rate, at the stage of Section 202 or Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the accused had no locus standi the Magistrate had absolutely no jurisdiction to go into any materials or evidence which may be produced by the accused who could be present only to watch the proceedings and not to participate in them. At any rate, at the stage of Section 202 or Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the accused had no locus standi the Magistrate had absolutely no jurisdiction to go into any materials or evidence which may be produced by the accused who could be present only to watch the proceedings and not to participate in them. Indeed if the documents or the evidence produced by the accused is allowed to be taken by the Magistrate then an inquiry under Section 202 would have to be converted into a fulldress trial defeating the very object for which this section has been engrafted. The High Court in quashing the order of the Magistrate completely failed to consider the limited scope of an inquiry under Section 202. Having gone through the order of the Magistrate we do not find any error of law committed by him. The Magistrate has exercised his discretion and has given cogent reasons for his conclusion. Whether the reasons were good or bad, sufficient or insufficient, is not a mater which could have been examined by the High Court in revision. We are constrained to observe that the High Court went out of its way to write a laboured judgment highlighting certain aspects of the case of the accused of the case of the accused as appearing from the documents filed by them which they were not entitled to file and which were not entitled in law to be considered.” (Emphasis supplied) 27. When the said observations by Hon'ble Apex Court and principals emerging therefrom are applied to the facts and circumstances of this case and the aspects which have emerged from the foregoing discussion, it leads the Court to the view that this is not a fit case to stifle the investigation or quash the prosecution/proceedings at it threshold, i.e. at the stage of investigation on ground of delay and/or on the ground that civil litigation is pending. The order dated 18.4.2012 records cogent reasons to support and justify the directions and it would not be for this Court at this stage, and in this proceedings to examine whether the reasons are bad or insufficient. In this view of the matter, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the order dated 18.4.2012. The Court does not consider that the said order is defective and unsustainable and/or that it is passed mechanically. In this view of the matter, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the order dated 18.4.2012. The Court does not consider that the said order is defective and unsustainable and/or that it is passed mechanically. It is not for this Court to examine at this stage, the character and/or quality of evidence or sufficiency of evidence. 27.1 In the result, in view of the foregoing discussion and for the abovementioned reasons, this Court is of the view that the relief prayed for in the petitions do not deserve to be granted and petitions deserve to be disposed of without any relief as prayed for. Consequently, the petitions are not entertained and disposed of. Rule is discharged. However, there shall be no costs. At this stage, learned advocate for the petitioners have prayed that interim relief, which has remained in operation until now, may be continued for some more time so as to enable the petitioners to take out appropriate proceedings before the Apex Court. The request is not opposed by learned advocate for the respondent and learned APP. In view of the said request, it is directed that the interim relief, which has remained in operation until now, shall continue till 5.10.2013 Petitions dismissed.