JUDGMENT : 1. Since respondent No.1 is the main contesting party and learned advocate Mr. Mukesh Patel appearing for respondent No.1 has agreed for final disposal of the matter and since rest of the respondents are formal parties, the Court has taken up the matter for final disposal with consent of the learned advocate for the petitioner and learned advocate Mr. Patel for respondent No.1. Hence, RULE. Learned advocate Mr. Mukesh Patel waives service of Rule for respondent No.1. Rule is not required to be issued to the other respondents, who are formal parties. 2. The petitioner, by way of this petition, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has called in question the order dated 26.04.2013 passed by the Gujarat State Co-operative Tribunal, Ahmedabad in Miscellaneous Application No.38 of 2012, whereby the Tribunal rejected the said application preferred by the petitioner seeking leave to file appeal against the award made by the Board of Nominees in Lavad Suit No.217 of 2010. The Tribunal has rejected the said application on the ground that the said application was preferred by the petitioner after a delay of 23 days, for which the petitioner has not filed the application with the affidavit for condonation of delay and therefore, the appeal could be treated as time barred and required to be rejected. 3. The case of petitioner is that though the petitioner was not made party in Lavad Suit No.217 of 2010, his properties are sought to be attached and auctioned pursuant to the decision made in the said Lavad Suit. It is, therefore, his case that moment he came to know from the public advertisement issued by the Collector of Gandhinagar for auction of properties, including his plots, he filed an application for leave to appeal. 4. It is further case of the petitioner that he filed such application seeking leave to appeal, which was found delayed by 23 days and though the explanation for delay is provided in the application, since no separate application was made for condonation of delay of 23 days, the Tribunal rejected the application for leave to appeal. The Tribunal has thus committed grave error in rejecting the said application without permitting the petitioner to remove such defect. The Tribunal has thus committed grave error in rejecting the said application without permitting the petitioner to remove such defect. It is the case of the petitioner that considering the merits of the case and the little delay, the Tribunal ought to have entertained the application of the petitioner on merits. 5. The petition is opposed by the affidavit filed on behalf of Respondent No.1, alleging non maintainability of the appeal without application for delay condonation and also alleging fraudulent act on the part of the petitioner in entering into the transaction of sale of plots. Respondent No.1 has also pointed out deliberate action on the part of borrowers in not re-paying the due amount of loan and alleging collusion of petitioner with the borrowers of loan. 6. The petitioner has also filed rejoinder-affidavit to point out that he is bona-fide purchaser in the properties and his properties could not be made subject matter of attachment and auction proceedings pursuant to the decision made in the Lavad Suit. 7. I have heard learned advocates for the parties. 8. Learned advocate Mr. Padmraj K. Jadeja for the petitioner submitted that since the petitioner was not a party to the Lavad Suit and since the petitioner filed application seeking leave to appeal before the Tribunal from the date of the knowledge of the contents of the award of the Lavad Suit, the petitioner bonafidely believed and so stated in the application that the limitation would start from the date of the knowledge of the contents of the award and therefore, no separate application seeking condonation of delay was filed by the petitioner. Mr. Jadeja submitted that if the application of the petitioner was not to be treated within the time limit, the petitioner was required to be given an opportunity to remove defect of filing separate application seeking condonation of delay. Mr. Jadeja submitted that the Tribunal has otherwise jurisdiction to consider the application for leave to appeal within the time limit on being satisfied about the late filing of the application from the averments made in the application. Mr. Jadeja submitted that the Tribunal, however, rejected the application for leave to appeal as time barred and without giving any opportunity to the petitioner to remove the defect of filing the application for condonation of delay. Mr. Mr. Jadeja submitted that the Tribunal, however, rejected the application for leave to appeal as time barred and without giving any opportunity to the petitioner to remove the defect of filing the application for condonation of delay. Mr. Jadeja submitted that the decision of this Court in the case of Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Ltd.,Through Deputy Engineer Vs. Khemchand Nathabhai Gadhavi reported in 2011(2) GLH 90 has no application to the facts of the case. Mr. Jadeja submitted that since filing of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal is governed by the Gujarat Co-operative Tribunal Regulations, 1964 (‘The Regulations’ for short), which specifically provides for giving an opportunity to the applicant/ appellant for removal of the defect, the above-referred decision could not have been relied by the Tribunal while deciding the application of the petitioner. Mr. Jadeja submitted that the alleged delay was only of 23 days, for which the petitioner had provided explanation in the application as also in the appeal and therefore, the Tribunal ought to have decided the application for leave to appeal on its own merits instead of rejecting the same on the ground that no application was made for condonation of delay. He, therefore, urged to allow the petition. 9. On the other hand, learned advocate Mr. Mukesh Patel appearing for respondent No.1 Bank – plaintiff of the Lavad Suit, which is the main contesting party, submitted that the Tribunal has correctly followed the decision of this Court in the case of Paschim GujaratVijCompanyLtd.(supra). Mr. Patel submitted that when the Regulations provide for presentation of appeal and application so as to confirm with all requirements as regards stamp duty and delay in presentation of such application and appeal, and when the Tribunal found that the application for leave to appeal was filed after the prescribed time limit without any accompanying application for condonation of delay, the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the application for leave to appeal. Mr. Mr. Patel submitted that when the petitioner filed application for leave to appeal, it was clearly time barred and since the petitioner did not file any separate application for condonation of delay, the application of the petitioner for leave to appeal could not have been registered and in such circumstances, when it was placed before the Tribunal, the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the application for leave to appeal on the ground that there was no application made for condonation of delay. Mr. Patel submitted that in such approach of the Tribunal, which is supported by the view taken in the above-referred decision by this Court, no illegality could be found. He, thus urged to dismiss the petition. 10. Learned advocate Mr. Murli N. Devnani has appeared for respondent Nos.2/1 and 2/2 and assisted the Court by referring to the provisions of the Act. 11. Having heard learned advocates for the parties and having perused the record of the case, it appears that the petitioner who was not party in the Lavad Suit preferred by respondent No.1-Bank, filed the application for leave to appeal against the award passed in the Lavad Suit on 17.5.2012. Though the petitioner has stated in his application that the limitation for filing the application by him for leave to appeal would start from the date of the knowledge of the contents of the award, however, the Tribunal found that the delay of 23 days had occurred in filing the application for leave to appeal by the petitioner. Since no separate application was filed by the petitioner seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal, the Tribunal rejected the application for leave to appeal of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner has not filed separate application with affidavit seeking condonation of delay. For rejecting the application of the petitioner on the above-said ground, the Tribunal has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. (supra). It is required to be noted that this Court has taken a view that if there is no accompanying application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appeal is rendered time barred and is liable to be dismissed even in absence of the plea of limitation put forth in defence. Such view was taken by this Court in the context of the specific provisions of Rule 67(i) of Chapter-V of the Gujarat High Court Rules, which reads as under:- "67(i) When an appeal, application or memorandum of cross-objection is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation specified therefore, shall be accompanied by separate application for condonation of delay." 12. In the case of the petitioner, presentation of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal was governed by the Regulations. There is no Regulation like Rule No.67(i) of the Gujarat High Court Rules providing for filing of separate application for condonation of delay when appeal or application is presented after expiry of the period of limitation specified for filing the appeal or application under the provisions of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, (‘the Act’ the short). Regulation No.8 of the Regulations provides as under:- “8. Registration of appeals or applications.- (1) On receipt of an appeal or applications the Registrar shall endorse on it the date of its receipt and the mode of presentation. The Registrar, shall as soon as possible, examine it and on satisfying himself- (a) that the person presenting it has authority to do so, (b) that it is made within prescribed time if any, and (c) that it conforms to all the provisions of the Act, the Rules and these Regulations, he shall cause it to be registered in the appropriate register maintained under Regulation 9. (2) If the Registrar finds that the appeal or the application does not conform to any of the said provisions, he shall make a note on the appeal or the application to that effect and shall call upon the party concerned or his agent or pleader, if any,to remedy the defects within a period of ten days of the receipt of notice,to do so. The Registrar may, for good cause, extended the period for the purpose of remedying the defects,provided that if the extension of more than ten days in the aggregate is sought, the Registrar shall place the matter before the President and obtain his orders in that behalf. (3) If the defects are remedied within the period allowed under sub-regulation (2) the Registrar shall cause the appeal or the application, as the case may be, to be registered in the appropriate register. (3) If the defects are remedied within the period allowed under sub-regulation (2) the Registrar shall cause the appeal or the application, as the case may be, to be registered in the appropriate register. (4) If the party concerned or his agent or pleader fails to remedy the defects within the said period, the Registrar shall report to the President and with his approval fix a date for the hearing of which due notice shall be given to the party or his agent or pleader. (5) On the date so fixed the Tribunal shall go through the relevant papers, hear the party or his agent or pleader if present; and pass orders either directing that the appeal or application be registered or be rejected. Where the appeal or application is rejected, the Tribunal shall record its reasons for doing so. (6) When an appeal or application has been ordered to be registered under this regulation, the Registrar shall see that it is registered as soon as practicable and in case not later than seven days from the date of the order requiring it to be registered.” 13. In fact, as per the Regulation No.8, when the Registrar found that the application and the appeal filed by the petitioner did not conform to the provisions of the Regulations for presentation of the appeal and application, the Registrar was to make note of the same on the appeal or application and was to call upon the parties concerned or pleader to remedy the defects within a period of 10 days from such intimation. It is only thereafter, if the defects were not remedied, the Registrar was to make report to the President and with the approval of the President, date for hearing was to be given to the party concerned or pleader of such party and the Tribunal thereafter was to pass necessary orders either directing the appeal or application to be registered or to be rejected. 14. From the above Regulations, it clearly appears that the petitioner was entitled for an opportunity for removal of the defect of filing the application for condonation of delay. 14. From the above Regulations, it clearly appears that the petitioner was entitled for an opportunity for removal of the defect of filing the application for condonation of delay. In fact, when the application and the appeal of the petitioner were placed before the Tribunal, it was within the power of the Tribunal to order registration of the application and appeal after permitting the petitioner to remove the defect of filing the application for condonation of delay. However, neither the Registrar nor the Tribunal provided any opportunity to the petitioner. By not permitting the petitioner to remove the defect of filing the application for condonation of delay, it could be said that the Tribunal has failed to exercise its jurisdiction vested with it and rejected the application of the petitioner for leave to appeal on the ground not available under the provisions of the Act and the Regulations. In fact, when the Regulations do not specifically provide for filing separate application for condonation of delay, the Tribunal could have exercised its power available under the Regulations to condone the delay if the Tribunal was otherwise satisfied from the averments made by the petitioner in his application seeking leave to appeal. However, the Tribunal has rejected the application of the petitioner for leave to appeal simply relying upon the judgment delivered by this Court in the case of Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. (supra). Since the said judgment in the case of Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. (supra) has got no application to the case of the petitioner, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal cannot stand scrutiny of law. 15. In the case of the State of M.P. And Another Vs. Pradeep Kumar and Another reported in (2000)7 SCC 372 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para 10,11,12 and 19 as under:- “10. What is the consequence if such an appeal is not accompanied by an application mentioned in sub-rule (1) of Rule 3-A? It must be noted that the Code indicates in the immediately preceding rule that the consequence of not complying with the requirements in Rule 1 would include rejection of the memorandum of appeal. Even so, another option is given to the court by the said rule and that is to return the memorandum of appeal to the appellant for amending it within a specified time or then and there. Even so, another option is given to the court by the said rule and that is to return the memorandum of appeal to the appellant for amending it within a specified time or then and there. It is to be noted that there is no such rule prescribing for rejection of memorandum of appeal in a case where the appeal is not accompanied by an application for condoning the delay. If the memorandum of appeal is filed in such appeal without accompanying the application to condone delay the consequence cannot be fatal. The court can regard in such a case that there was no valid presentation of the appeal. In turn, it means that if the appellant subsequently files an application to condone the delay before the appeal is rejected the same should be taken up along with the already filed memorandum of appeal. Only then the court can treat the appeal as lawfully presented. There is nothing wrong if the court returns the memorandum of appeal (which was not accompanied by an application explaining the delay) as defective. Such defect can be cured by the party concerned and present the appeal without further delay. 11. No doubt sub-rule (1) of Rule 3-A has used the word "shall". It was contended that employment of the word "shall" would clearly indicate that the requirement is peremptory in tone. But such peremptoriness does not foreclose a chance for the appellant to rectify the mistake, either on his own or being pointed out by the court. The word "shall" in the context need be interpreted as an obligation case on the appellant. Why should a more restrictive interpretation be placed on the sub-rule? The rule cannot be interpreted very harshly and make the non-compliance punitive to appellant. It can happen that due to some mistake or lapse an appellant may omit to file the application (explaining the delay) along with the appeal. 12. It is true that the pristine maxim "Vigilantibus Non Dormientiobus Jura Subveniunt" (Law assists those who are vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights). But even a vigilant litigant is prone to commit mistakes. As the aphorism "to err is human" is more a practical notion of human behaviour than an abstract philosophy, the unintentional lapse on the part of a litigant should not normally cause the doors of the judicature permanently closed before him. But even a vigilant litigant is prone to commit mistakes. As the aphorism "to err is human" is more a practical notion of human behaviour than an abstract philosophy, the unintentional lapse on the part of a litigant should not normally cause the doors of the judicature permanently closed before him. The effort of the Court should not be one of finding means to pull down the shutters of adjudicatory jurisdiction before a party who seeks justice, on account of any mistake committed by him, but to see whether it is possible to entertain his grievance if it is genuine. 19. The object of enacting Rule 3-A in Order 41 of the Code seems to be twofold. First is, to inform the appellant himself who filed a time barred appeal that it would not be entertained unless it is accompanied by an application explaining the delay. Second is, to communicate to the respondent a message that it may not be necessary for him to get ready to meet the grounds taken up in the memorandum of appeal because the court has to deal with application for condonation of delay as a condition precedent. Barring the above objects, we cannot find out from the rule that it is intended to operate as unremediably or irredeemably fatal against the appellant if the memorandum is not accompanied by any such application at the first instance. In our view, the deficiency is a curable defect, and if the required application is filed subsequently the appeal can be treated as presented in accordance with the requirement contained in Rule 3-A of Order 41 of the Code.” 16. In light of the above and in view of the Regulations, since the decision in the case of Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. (supra), of this Court has got no application to the case of the petitioner, the impugned order dated 26.4.2013 passed by the Tribunal in Misc. Application No.38 of 2012 preferred by the petitioner is quashed and set aside and the matter is remanded to the Tribunal to hear and decide the said application afresh after giving opportunity to the petitioner to file application for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal against the award made by the learned Board of Nominees in Lavad Suit filed by respondent No.1. The petitioner is permitted to move such application within a period of FIFTEEN days from the date of receipt of this order and on making such application by the petitioner for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal before the Tribunal, the Tribunal shall consider such application and pass appropriate order thereupon. Rule is made absolute to the extent stated above.