JUDGMENT Hon’ble A.P. Sahi, J.—Heard Sri M.A. Qadeer, learned senior counsel, for the petitioners and Sri Ashok Khare, learned senior counsel, for the respondent Nos. 5 to 12 and learned standing counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 4. 2. Learned counsel for the parties agree that the matter be disposed of finally at this stage itself as the learned counsel for the respondents including the learned standing counsel do not propose to file any counter-affidavit. 3. The order impugned is an outcome of the directions issued by this Court on 13.12.2012 and on 6.12.2012 in two writ petitions filed by employees of a Madarsa where a direction was issued to decide the status of those employees, including the Head of the Institution who are stated to have been appointed by the alleged former management of which the respondent No. 5, Idrish Khan was the Manager. This direction was issued in view of the past litigation between the parties that related to the dispute of control of management over Madarsa Rizviya Ahle Sunnat Rustampur, Sanichara Bazar, District Sant Kabir Nagar. 4. Sri Qadeer submits that the impugned order proceeds on erroneous assumptions of facts and irrelevant considerations by bifurcating the employees in two sections for the purpose of acknowledging their status and entitlement to receive salary and it ignores the impact of the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 6th June, 2011. He further contends that the orders of the Apex Court as well as of this Court, as passed from time to time, have been completely misconstrued so as to find partial favour in relation to the contesting respondents treating them to have been validly appointed employees as they had been appointed prior to the final decision of the Apex Court on 25.7.2012. His contention is that there is absolutely no rational nexus which can be located to justify this finding in the impugned order. 5. He further contends that not only this, the Registrar/Inspector of Arabic Madarsas does not have any such power and he has acted beyond his jurisdiction keeping in view the provisions of Clause 34 of the U.P. Arabic and Farsi Madaras Niyamawali-1987. He, therefore, contends that on none of the counts can the impugned order be sustained and the same deserves to be set aside. 6. He, therefore, contends that on none of the counts can the impugned order be sustained and the same deserves to be set aside. 6. Sri Khare, on the other hand, contends that the Committee of Management of Sri Idrish Khan remained through out in effective control till fresh elections were held and this fact stands recognised by virtue of two orders dated 22.5.2012 and 21.11.2012 which orders have not been challenged. He, therefore, contends that since the de facto status of the said committee had been acknowledged, then the appointments said to have been made on 15.11.2010, were very much valid and that the Inspector Arabic Madarasa has committed a manifest error by partially annulling the claim of those employees who were appointed subsequent to the interim orders passed by the Apex Court. Sri Khare submits that the impugned order is, therefore, partially invalid in view of his submissions to the extent it disallows the claim of some of the employees. Sri Khare submits that as a matter of fact such employees are intending to file a writ petition challenging the same order impugned herein to the aforesaid extent. 7. Sri Khare further submits that so far as the jurisdiction part, as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners, is concerned, the same does not hold any water inasmuch as the orders were passed by this Court in compliance whereof the Inspector has proceeded to pass the order and even otherwise the factual basis for the passing of this order was clearly dependent upon the status of the management which was entitled to make the appointments and, therefore, the order is not without jurisdiction. 8. Explaining the orders passed by the Apex Court including the order dated 15.11.2012, Sri Khare submits that once the Apex Court had directed the maintenance of status quo then the actions taken by the former committee that had already been recognized in the year 2009 stood saved and, therefore, the Inspector ought to have saved all the appointments instead of having partially done so. 9. Learned counsel for either of the parties have relied on several judgments to substantiate their submissions. 10. I have also heard learned standing counsel who has supported the impugned order on the basis of the directions issued by the Supreme Court. 11. 9. Learned counsel for either of the parties have relied on several judgments to substantiate their submissions. 10. I have also heard learned standing counsel who has supported the impugned order on the basis of the directions issued by the Supreme Court. 11. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and in view of the submissions raised, it is evident that the order dated 6th June, 2011 passed by the prescribed authority in proceedings under Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act remains intact and has not been diluted. The impact of the said order has not been appreciated by the Inspector, Madaras and, therefore, in the absence of any cogent finding to that effect, the order appears to be deficient on that count. 12. Apart from this, as urged by Sri Khare, learned counsel for the respondents, the impugned order, according to him, also is partially incorrect insofar as it denies the benefit to some of the teachers. 13. It is, therefore, clear that according to both the parties the impugned order is unsustainable, may be on different grounds.The impugned order is one of appointment of benefits for which there is no legal basis. The partition of the employees in two parts does not stand supported by any logical reasoning which deserves some further indepth consideration. The fractured verdit by drawing a Rad Cliffe Line should be sustainable in law. 14. The question, therefore, which has to be addressed to is as to which was the validly constituted committee entitled in law to make appointments or infact was otherwise entitled to make appointments under the orders of this Court or of the Apex Court, but the same has to be adjudicated keeping in view the status of the committees as adjudicated in the order dated 6.6.2011 which order has become final. 15. The Inspector has completely overlooked this aspect of the matter. 16. The issue relating to receipt of salary from the State funds would be dependent upon the status of the appointment. From the background of the case the disbursement of the grant-in-aid received from the State Government was also noticed by the Apex Court while passing the interim orders in order to ensure that the funds are disbursed in an appropriate manner. From the background of the case the disbursement of the grant-in-aid received from the State Government was also noticed by the Apex Court while passing the interim orders in order to ensure that the funds are disbursed in an appropriate manner. The disbursal of the said funds, therefore, was subject to the orders that was passed from time to time by the Apex Court or by this Court. 17. The petitioner-Committee of Management, therefore, is entitled to raise these issues and the employees can also stake their claim with regard to their status of employment on the basis of the proceedings dated 15.11.2010 that may have a valid or otherwise status keeping in view the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case which have to be gone into by the Inspector in the light of the observations made hereinabove. 18. The Inspector having not done so, will also further address himself the issue of jurisdiction which has been raised by the parties keeping in view the decisions that have been relied upon by them. This issue, therefore, also will have to be addressed by the Inspector who shall proceed to pass an order accordingly. 19. The writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 30.1.2013 is set aside. The Registrar shall proceed to decide the matter in the light of the observations made hereinabove. 20. The Inspector shall decide the matter within two months from today. Neither of the parties shall take any further action with regard to any appointment which might have been made during the interregnum period till final orders are passed by the Inspector. ——————