JUDGMENT PER : M.R. SHAH, J.: 1.00. By way of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have prayed for appropriate writ, order and/or direction, completely and permanently prohibiting the respondents, their servants and agents from taking any action against the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 herein for recovering any amounts that may be due and payable to the Excise Department by M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. It is further prayed to issue appropriate writ, order and/or direction to completely and permanently prohibiting the respondents, their agents and servants from taking any action against the factory/property located at Plot Nos.548-549, GIDC, Waghodia, Vadodara purchased by the concerned petitioner in an auction from GIDC, as regards any due of M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. it is further prayed to issue appropriate writ, order and/or direction directing the respondents, their agents and servants to forthwith issue a Central Excise Registration as a manufacture in favour of the petitioner No.3 herein by quashing and setting aside the decision of the respondent No.2 herein conveyed to the petitioner No.3 herein vide letter F. No. (12)23/Reg/Ratnaveer/07-08 dtd. 22/10/2009. 2.00. Facts leading to the present Special Civil Application in nutshell are as under : 2.01. That at the relevant time, one M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. had obtained Central Excise Registration for the premises being Plot Nos.548 and 549, GIDC Estate, Vaghodia, Vadodara. That the duty liability came to be confirmed against the said M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. vide Order-in-Original dtd. 4/12/1997 and 23/3/2000 respectively. That the said unit came to be closed. According to the revenue, Central Excise dues amounting to more than Rs.37.12 Lacs are still due and recoverable from the said M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. along with interest leviable under the provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act” for short) and the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules” for short). It appears that there were dues of Gujarat Industrial Investment Corporation. Therefore, in exercise of the powers under section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, GIDC took possession of the land, building, plant and machinery of the said M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. and said properties of M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. were put to auction by the GIDC on “as is where is and what is basis”. Therefore, in exercise of the powers under section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, GIDC took possession of the land, building, plant and machinery of the said M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. and said properties of M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. were put to auction by the GIDC on “as is where is and what is basis”. That the auction came to be finalized in favour of one M/s. S.P. Enterprises, Ahmedabad and Board of Directors of the Corporation in its meeting held on 15/9/2000 accorded its approval to the sale of the assets viz. land, building, plant and machinery of M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. to M/s. S.P. Enterprises. That the said sale was made subject to observance of the conditions stipulated by the GIDC in its letter dtd. 9/10/2000 and also observance of general terms and conditions for sale of assets under section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951. It appears that the said M/s. S.P. Enterprises sold the said properties of M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. in favour of one M/s. Jagdish Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. in the month of February, 2001. That the petitioner No.1 – M/s. Jagdish Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. applied for Registration Certificate under the Act and the Rules and the Central Excise Department issued Registration Certificate in favour of M/s. Jagdish Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.-petitioner No.1 with respect to Plot Nos.548 and 549, GIDC Estate, Vaghodia, Vadodara somewhere in the month of February, 2001. It appears that thereafter, M/s. Jagdish Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. -petitioner No.1 gave on lease the aforesaid properties to one Ms. Balaji Metal Industries and said Ms. Balaji Metal Industries also applied for Registration Certificate under the Act and the Rules and the Excise Department issued Registration Certificate in favour of said Ms. Balaji Metal Industries in the month of July, 2003. It appears that thereafter the properties were given on lease by the petitioner No.1 – M/s. Jagdish Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. in favour of one M/s. Padmapriya Alloys Pvt. Ltd. somewhere in the month of October, 2004. It appears that thereafter the properties in question situated at Plot Nos.548 and 549, GIDC Estate, Vaghodia, Vadodara were given on lease in favour of petitioner No.3 – M/s. Ratnaveer Stainless Products Pvt. Ltd. somewhere in the month of January, 2008. It appears that thereafter the properties in question situated at Plot Nos.548 and 549, GIDC Estate, Vaghodia, Vadodara were given on lease in favour of petitioner No.3 – M/s. Ratnaveer Stainless Products Pvt. Ltd. somewhere in the month of January, 2008. That the said petitioner No.3 – M/s. Ratnaveer Stainless Products Pvt. Ltd. applied for registration under the Act and Rules on 28/1/2008, however, the said application of the petitioner No.3 for registration was not decided by the concerned authority and therefore, the petitioners preferred Special Civil Application No. 5923 of 2008 before this Court. In the said Special Civil Application, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appropriate authority made a statement that decision would be taken on the application within a period of four weeks, if not already taken, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. In view of the aforesaid statement, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners of the said Special Civil Application did not press the aforesaid Special Civil Application and consequently, this Court by order dtd. 30/9/2009 disposed of the said Special Civil Application. That thereafter vide communication dtd. 22/10/2009 (Annexure-J), the Assistant Commissioner has communicated to the petitioner that its application for the Central Excise Registration Certificate is rejected since M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. who was issued Registration for the same plots in question have not surrendered their registration nor the department has cancelled / de-registered the said registration because a huge amount of government dues are pending against M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. as on date. 2.02. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the impugned communication dtd. 22/10/2009 rejecting the application submitted by the petitioner No.3 – M/s. Ratnaveer Stainless Products Pvt. Ltd. for Central Excise Registration Certificate, the petitioners herein have preferred the present Special Civil Application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2.03. That vide communication dtd. 27/10/2010, Superintendence, Central Excise and Customs has called upon the petitioner No.1 – M/s. Jagdish Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. and its Managing Director – Mr. Prabhulal Badrilal Kabra to pay outstanding dues due and payable by erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. 2.04. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the impugned communication dtd. 2.03. That vide communication dtd. 27/10/2010, Superintendence, Central Excise and Customs has called upon the petitioner No.1 – M/s. Jagdish Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. and its Managing Director – Mr. Prabhulal Badrilal Kabra to pay outstanding dues due and payable by erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. 2.04. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the impugned communication dtd. 27/10/2010 issued by the Superintendence, Central Excise and Customs, Vaghodia Division, Vadodara-II, for initiating proceedings against the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 for outstanding dues of erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd., petitioners have preferred the present Special Civil Application for the aforesaid reliefs. 2.05. Thus, by way of present Special Civil Application, petitioners have prayed to quash and set aside the recovery proceedings initiated against the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 to recover the outstanding central excise duties, due and payable by erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. (towards excise duty dues with interest and penalty) and have also challenged the non-granting of the Central Excise Registration Certificate in favour of the petitioner No.3 – M/s. Ratnaveer Stainless Products Pvt. Ltd. with respect to property situated at Plot Nos.548 and 549, GIDC Estate, Vaghodia, Vadodara (hereinafter referred to as “the property in question”). 3.00. Mr. Paritosh Gupta, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners has vehemently submitted that as the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 have purchased the factory premises and the properties situated at Plot Nos.548 and 549, GIDC Estate, Vaghodia, Vadodara which was originally belonging to M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd., in a public auction held by the GIDC, the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 are not liable to clear/pay the Central Excise Dues of erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. It is submitted that properties of M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. were attached by GIDC for its dues and were put to auction in exercise of powers under section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 and therefore, considering the provisions of section 11 of the Act, which was prevailing at the relevant time, Central Excise dues cannot have a priority and therefore, recovery proceedings initiated against the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 for the Central Excise dues of erstwhile owner M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. is absolutely illegal and most arbitrary. It is submitted that considering the provisions of Section 11 which was prevailing at the relevant time, Central Excise dues were not having any priority and/or having first charge and therefore, GIDC sold the properties of erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. in a auction under section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951. Thereafter, it is not open for the respondents -department to initiate recovery proceedings to recover the dues of erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. 3.01. Mr. Paritosh Gupta, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners has heavily relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Sicom Ltd. reported in 2009 (233) ELT 433 (SC) as well as recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Rana Girders Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in 2013 (295) ELT 12 (SC) as well as decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of TATA Metaliks Ltd. Vs. Union of India, reported in 2010 (19) STR 449 (Bombay), in support of his above submissions. 3.02. Mr. Paritosh Gupta, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners has further submitted that even otherwise on the ground of delay and laches also, there cannot be any recovery proceedings against the petitioners for Central Excise dues of erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. which are of the year 1997 and 2000, respectively. It is submitted that nothing has come on record whether any recovery proceedings have been initiated against erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. in accordance with section 11 of the Central Excise Act. It is submitted that M/s. S.P. Enterprises, Ahmedabad, who subsequently transferred the properties in favour of the petitioner Nos.1 and 2, purchased the properties in a public auction held by the GIDC somewhere in the year 2001 and the impugned recovery proceedings have been initiated against the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 after a period of approximately 10 years, which is not permissible. 3.03. Mr. Paritosh Gupta, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners has heavily relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Valley Valvet P. Ltd. Vs. Union of India, reported in 2008 (222) ELT 352 (Gujarat); in the case of Ani Elastic Industries Vs. 3.03. Mr. Paritosh Gupta, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners has heavily relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Valley Valvet P. Ltd. Vs. Union of India, reported in 2008 (222) ELT 352 (Gujarat); in the case of Ani Elastic Industries Vs. Union of India, reported in 2008 (222) ELT 340 (Gujarat) as well as unreported decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Prelude Laminates Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Anr., rendered in Special Civil Application No. 11619 of 2000, in support of his above submissions. 3.04. Now, so far as challenge to the action of the respondents in rejecting the application of the petitioner No.3 for Registration Certificate under Central Excise Act and the rules framed thereunder, Mr. Paritosh Gupta, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners has heavily relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of TATA Metaliks Ltd. (supra) as well as unreported decision of this Court in the Surat Metallics Ltd and another Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, rendered in Special Civil Application No.8734 of 2010 as well as another decision of the Division Bench in the case of M/s. Jahaan Steel Ltd. Vs. Union of India, rendered in Special Civil Application No.5193 of 2009. It is submitted that the Bombay High Court in the case of TATA Metaliks Ltd. has specifically held that the authority is not justified in refusing to issue Registration Certificate in favour of subsequent purchaser solely on the ground that the person who has closed or sold the business or the premises has not applied for de-registration and/or earlier owner has defaulted in payment of excise duty. It is submitted that in the said decision the Bombay High Court has considered in detail the provisions of the Act and the rules, more particularly Section 6 of the Act and rule 9 of the Rules. It is submitted that in the said decision Bombay High Court has also considered the Notification issued under Rule 9. 3.05. Mr. Paritosh Gupta, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners has submitted that the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of TATA Metaliks Ltd. has been subsequently considered and followed by this Court in the case of Surat Metallics Ltd & Anr. (supra) and in the case of M/s. Jahaan Steel Ltd. (supra). 3.05. Mr. Paritosh Gupta, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners has submitted that the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of TATA Metaliks Ltd. has been subsequently considered and followed by this Court in the case of Surat Metallics Ltd & Anr. (supra) and in the case of M/s. Jahaan Steel Ltd. (supra). By making above submissions and relying upon above decisions, it is requested to allow the present Special Civil Application and grant the reliefs as prayed for. 4.00. Present petition is opposed by Mr. R.J. Oza, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. 4.01. Now, so far as the challenge to the recovery proceedings initiated against the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 for the dues of Central Excise of M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd., Mr. Oza, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has heavily relied upon the terms and conditions of the sale of assets of erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. and the terms and conditions on which the sale came to be confirmed in favour of M/s. S.P. Enterprises, Ahmedabad, from whom the properties have been transferred in favour of the petitioner Nos.1 and 2. It is submitted that as such there is no sale in favour of the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 and, in fact, the sale was confirmed in favour of M/s. S.P. Enterprises, Ahmedabad. However, at its request, the GIDC transferred the properties of M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. in favour of the petitioner Nos.1 and 2. It is submitted that, therefore, as such the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 are bound by the terms and conditions of the sale by GIDC in a public auction. It is submitted that as such the entire properties of M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. came to be sold in favour of M/s. S.P. Enterprises / petitioners on “as is where is and what is basis”. It is further submitted that as per condition No.14, the purchaser agreed for payment of due taxes etc. of the Central Government and Central Government’s departments and other local bodies. It is further submitted that as per condition No.14, the purchaser agreed for payment of due taxes etc. of the Central Government and Central Government’s departments and other local bodies. It is submitted that it has been specifically provided that sale of assets / properties shall be subject to rights of the Central Government to recover outstanding duty of excise in exercise of its power under section 11 of the Act or under any other enabling provisions in respect of the unit / person whose assets are under sale. It is submitted that, therefore, there will be a contractual obligation of the purchasers – petitioner Nos.1 and 2 to pay outstanding duty of excise of the erstwhile owner. It is submitted that therefore, in the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sicom Ltd. (supra) as well as recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Rana Girders Ltd. (supra) would not be applicable. It is submitted that in the aforesaid decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the statutory liability of the obligation and not contractual liabilities / obligation. It is submitted that para 23 of the decision in the case of M/s. Rana Girders Ltd (supra) makes the position very clear. It is submitted that in the case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, there was stipulation in the sale deed / agreement that “all these statutory liabilities arising out of land shall be borne by the purchaser in the sale deed” and “all these statutory liabilities arising out of the said properties shall be borne by the vendee and vendor shall not be responsible in the Agreement-for-sale”. It is submitted by Mr. Oza, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents that to the aforesaid, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the expression in the sale deed as well as in the Agreement-for-sale for purchase of the plant and machinery talks of statutory liability “arising out of the said properties”, and therefore, it is held that it is only statutory liability which arises out of the land and building or out of plant and machinery, which is to be discharged by the purchaser. It is observed that the excise duty are not statutory liabilities which arise out of the land and building or plant and machinery. It is observed that the excise duty are not statutory liabilities which arise out of the land and building or plant and machinery. It is submitted that, therefore, decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Rana Girders Ltd. (supra) would not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. 4.02. Mr. Oza, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has further submitted that similarly in view of the specific stipulations / conditions mentioned in clause 14 reproduced hereinabove, decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sicom Ltd. (supra) also would not be applicable. It is submitted that as such, the case would be governed by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Macson Marbles Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India, reported in 2003 (158) ELT 424 (SC). 4.03. Now, so far as the challenge to the action of the respondents in rejecting the application of the petitioner No.3 for Registration Certificate is concerned, it is submitted by Mr. Oza, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents that Registration Certificate issued in favour of M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. with respect to the very premises in question i.e. Plot Nos.548 and 549, GIDC Estate, Vaghodia, Vadodara, is yet not cancelled and/or there is no de-registration of the said Registration Certificate issued in favour of M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. and therefore, second Registration Certificate with respect to the very property cannot be issued and therefore, the authority is justified in rejecting the application of the respondent No.3 for Registration Certificate. 4.04. Mr. Oza, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has heavily relied upon the decision of Bombay High Court in the case of Manibhadra Processors Vs. Additional Commissioner, reported in 2005 (184) ELT 13 (Bombay) and relying upon the said decision, it is requested to uphold the action of the respondents in rejecting the application of the petitioner No.3 for Registration Certificate and consequently to dismiss the present Special Civil Application. 5.00. Heard the learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length. Additional Commissioner, reported in 2005 (184) ELT 13 (Bombay) and relying upon the said decision, it is requested to uphold the action of the respondents in rejecting the application of the petitioner No.3 for Registration Certificate and consequently to dismiss the present Special Civil Application. 5.00. Heard the learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length. As stated hereinabove, in the present Special Civil Application, petitioners have prayed for two reliefs, one, challenging the action of the respondents in initiating recovery proceedings against the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 to recover Central Excise dues of erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. and another, challenging the action of the respondents / appropriate authority in rejecting the application of the petitioner No.3 for issuance of the Registration Certificate under the Act and the Rules, on the ground that the Registration Certificate issued in favour of erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. has yet not been de-registered and/or cancelled and there are dues / liabilities of erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. 5.01. Now, so far as the challenge to the action of the respondents in initiating recovery proceedings against the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 for recovery of Central Excise dues of the erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. is concerned, number of submissions have been made by the learned advocates appearing on behalf of both the parties. The learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners has heavily relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sicom Ltd. (supra) as well as in the case of M/s. Rana Girders Ltd. (supra) and it is the case on behalf of the petitioners that the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 have purchased the property of the erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. in a public auction held by GIDC, held under section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act and therefore, subsequent purchasers are not liable to pay outstanding Central Excise dues of the erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. On the other hand, it is the case on behalf of the respondents – department that the aforesaid decision relied upon by the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners are only with respect to statutory liabilities and not with respect to contractual obligation / liabilities, as in the present case and therefore, the aforesaid decision would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. It is also the case on behalf of the respondents that as per the terms and conditions of the sale, more particularly condition No.14, sale in favour of the purchasers was subject to rights of the Central Government to recover outstanding duties of excise and therefore, there is a contractual obligation of the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 to clear / pay the outstanding Central Excise duties and therefore, the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 are liable to pay outstanding Central Excise duties of the erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. It is also the case on behalf of the petitioners that even otherwise on the ground of delay and laches, since the recovery proceedings are not initiated within a reasonable period, now it is not open for the respondents to initiate recovery proceedings against the subsequent purchasers -petitioner Nos.1 and 2 after a period of about 10 years to recover the outstanding Central Excise duties of the erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. 5.02. Having heard the learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties and for the reasons stated hereinbelow, present petition is required to be allowed with respect to the recovery proceedings initiated against the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 for the outstanding Central Excise dues of erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd., on the ground that the recovery proceedings have been initiated belatedly and after unreasonable period, we do not propose to enter into the larger question with respect to contractual obligation / liabilities of the subsequent purchaser considering Clause Nos.1 and 14 of the sale and whether in light of Clause Nos.1 and 14 of the sale / auction, decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Rana Girders Ltd (supra) and Macson Marbles Pvt. Ltd. (supra) would be applicable or not and the aforesaid question is kept open. It is not in dispute that Orders-in-Original against the erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. on the basis of which recovery proceedings are initiated, have been passed in the year 1996 and 2000, respectively and the impugned recovery proceedings have been initiated against the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 – subsequent purchasers in the year 2010-2011 i.e. after a period of almost 10 years. Nothing has come on record whether any recovery proceedings have been initiated against the erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. under the provisions of section 11 of the Central Excise Act, which was prevailing at the relevant time. It is true that as such there is no specific limitation provided for initiating recovery proceedings, however, the question which is posed for consideration is, whether the respondents-department can initiate recovery proceedings to recover the dues of erstwhile unit from the subsequent purchasers after a delay of almost 10 years?. 5.03. Identical question came to be considered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Valley Valvet P. Ltd. (supra), wherein recovery proceedings were initiated against subsequent purchaser to recover dues of erstwhile owner after almost 10 years from the date of purchase of the unit by the subsequent purchaser and in the said decision, the Division Bench has quashed and set aside the recovery proceedings initiated against the subsequent purchaser after a period of 10 years by observing in para 14 to 17 as under : “14. It is settled legal position that when no time limit is prescribed for exercise of a power under a statute, it does not mean that it can be exercised at any time; such power has to be exercised within a reasonable time. That any power conferred under a statute is required to be exercised in a reasonable manner which inheres the concept of its exercise within a reasonable time. 15. The Apex Court, in the case of Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy, [2003] 7 SCC 667, in the context of exercise of suo motu powers, has laid down as follows: “Exercise of suo motu power “at any time” only means that no specific period such as days, months or years are not prescribed reckoning from a particular date. But that does to mean that “at any time” should be unguided and arbitrary. In this view, “at any time” must be understood as within a reasonable time depending on the facts and circumstances of each case in the absence of prescribed period of limitation.” 16. But that does to mean that “at any time” should be unguided and arbitrary. In this view, “at any time” must be understood as within a reasonable time depending on the facts and circumstances of each case in the absence of prescribed period of limitation.” 16. This Court, by a decision rendered on 16th December 2005, in the case of Ani Elastic Industries v. Union of India, Special Civil Application No.20528 of 2005, wherein a similar issue was involved, has held as follows : “It is a settled legal position that when a power is conferred by a statute without mentioning the period within which it could be invoked, the same has to be done within a reasonable period, as all powers must be exercised reasonably, and exercise of the same within a reasonable period would be a facet of reasonableness. In the present case, assuming that it is permissible for the respondents to take action under the proviso of Section 11 of the Act in respect of dues which have crystallized prior to the introduction of the proviso to Section 11 of the Act vide the Finance Act, 2004, even then as held by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions such action has to be taken within a reasonable time. In the case of State of Gujarat Vs. Patil Raghav Natha (supra) the Apex Court has held that when there is no period of limitation prescribed, the power must be exercised within reasonable time. In the said case the power exercised beyond a period of one year was held to have been exercised beyond a reasonable time. In the circumstances, this Court is not satisfied that the respondents have exercised powers under Section 11 of the Act within a reasonable period of time. The lapse of a period of five years in seeking to recover the dues of the erstwhile unit from the auction purchaser, namely, the petitioner, is certainly not a reasonable time for exercise of power, even if it is not hedged in by a period of limitation. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be permitted to stand.” 17. In the facts of the present case, admittedly, the respondents have sought to initiate recovery of the dues of the erstwhile unit from the petitioners after a delay of almost 10 years. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be permitted to stand.” 17. In the facts of the present case, admittedly, the respondents have sought to initiate recovery of the dues of the erstwhile unit from the petitioners after a delay of almost 10 years. The respondents cannot sit on the fence and allow equities to be created in favour of the third parties and then, seek to recover the excise duty liabilities of the erstwhile unit from the unwary, unsuspecting buyer, as otherwise it would be putting premium on their own default. The authorities cannot be permitted to wake up from their slumber and take shelter behind the amended provision of the Act, that too, an amendment which has been brought on the statute book, several years after the assets in question have been transferred. More so in the facts of the case. After the petitioners purchased the properties in auction, they sought registration under the very Act for the purposes of manufacturing the goods by using the same properties, including the machineries. It is not even the case of respondent authorities that any fraud was committed while seeking registration. Considering the principles enunciated in the aforesaid decisions, the action of the respondents in seeking to recover the central excise dues of the erstwhile unit from the petitioners is hopelessly time barred.” 5.04. Similar view has been taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ani Elastic Industries (supra) wherein the Division Bench has quashed and set aside the recovery proceedings initiated against subsequent purchaser to recover the dues of erstwhile unit, initiated after a period of 10 years, by observing in para 14 as under :- “14. It is an admitted position that the petitioner has purchased the manufacturing unit belonging to erstwhile M/s. Urmi Enterprise in an auction held by the respondent No.5 in the year 1999. The impugned order bears out the fact that the dues of M/s. Urmi Enterprise have arisen by virtue of an Order-in-Original dated 8th January, 1998, i.e. more than one and a half year prior to the purchase of the unit by the petitioner. Action has been initiated for recovery of the dues of M/s. Urmi Enterprise from the petitioner by a notice dated 11th October, 2004 which is beyond a period of five years from the date of purchase of the unit by the petitioner. Action has been initiated for recovery of the dues of M/s. Urmi Enterprise from the petitioner by a notice dated 11th October, 2004 which is beyond a period of five years from the date of purchase of the unit by the petitioner. It is a settled legal position that when a power is conferred by a statute without mentioning the period within which it could be invoked, the same has to be done within a reasonable period, as all powers must be exercised reasonably, and exercise of the same within a reasonable period would be a facet of reasonableness. In the present case, assuming that it is permissible for the respondents to take action under the proviso of Section 11 of the Act in respect of dues which have crystallized prior to the introduction of the proviso to Section 11 of the Act vide the Finance Act, 2004, even then as held by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions such action has to be taken within a reasonable time. In the case of State of Gujarat Vs. Patil Raghav Natha (supra) the Apex Court has held that when there is no period of limitation prescribed, the power must be exercised within reasonable time. In the said case the power exercised beyond a period of one year was held to have been exercised beyond a reasonable time. In the circumstances, this Court is not satisfied that the respondents have exercised under Section 11 of the Act within a reasonable period of time. The lapse of a period of five years in seeking to recover the dues of the erstwhile unit from the auction purchaser, namely, the petitioner, is certainly not a reasonable time for exercise of power, even if it is not hedged in by a period of limitation. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be permitted to stand.” 5.05. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench in the case of Valley Valvet P. Ltd. (supra) and Ani Elastic Industries (supra). Therefore, the impugned order cannot be permitted to stand.” 5.05. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench in the case of Valley Valvet P. Ltd. (supra) and Ani Elastic Industries (supra). In the present case, as the Central Excise dues of the erstwhile owner of the year 1996 and 2000, respectively have been sought to be recovered from the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 who have purchased the property of the erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. in a public auction in the year 2000, i.e. after unreasonable period of 10 years, the impugned action of the respondents in initiating recovery proceedings against the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 – subsequent purchasers, to recover Central Excise dues of the erstwhile owners -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd., cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. 5.06. Now, so far as the action of the respondents – authority in denying the Registration Certificate to the petitioner No.3 on the ground that Registration Certificate with respect to the very property in question being Plot Nos.548 and 549, GIDC Estate, Vaghodia, Vadodara issued in favour of erstwhile owner -Plot Nos.548 and 549, GIDC Estate, Vaghodia, Vadodara, is still not cancelled and/or de-registered and there are Central Excise dues of the erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd. and therefore, Registration Certificate cannot be granted in favour of the petitioner No.3 subsequent purchaser for the very property, is concerned as such the said issue is squarely covered by the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of TATA Metalinks Ltd. (supra) and unreported decision of this court in the case of Surat Metallics Ltd. (supra) and in the matter of M/s. Jahaan Steel Ltd. (supra) and decision in the case of Prelude Laminates Pvt. Ltd. in Special Civil Application No. 11619 of 2000. In the case of TATA Metalinks Ltd. (supra), Bombay High Court has distinguished the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Manibhadra Processors (supra), the decision relied upon by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents and the Bombay High Court in the case of TATA Metalinks Ltd. (supra) in para 5 and 6 has considered and dealt with in extenso Section 6 of the Central Excise Act and Rule 9 of the Central Excise Rules, by observing in para 5 and 6 as under :- “5. We shall first consider the issues in Writ Petition No. 759 of 2006 in the matter of registration of the establishment of the Petitioners. Section 6 of the Central Excise Act reads as under: “6. Registration of certain persons -Any prescribed person who is engaged in - (a) the production of manufacture or any process of production or manufacture of any specified goods included in the First Schedule and the Second Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of 1986) or (b) the wholesale purchase or sale (whether on his own account or as a broker or commission agent) or the storage of any specified goods included in the First Schedule and the Second Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of 1986).” In terms of the Act therefore, a person who is engaged in the occupation or manufacture or in the process of production of specified goods included in the first schedule and second schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 or the wholesale Purchase or sale (whether on his own account or as a broker or commission agent) or the storage of any specified goods included in the first schedule and the Second Schedule) the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of 1986), must get himself registered with the proper officer. The next relevant provision is Rule 9 of the Central Excise Rules which reads as under: “Rule 9. Registration -(1) Every person, who produces, manufactures, carries on trade, holds private storeroom or warehouse or otherwise uses excisable goods, shall get registered; Provided that a registration obtained under Rule 174 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 or Rule 9 of the Central Excise (No. 2) Rules, 2001 shall be deemed to be as valid as the registration made under this sub-rule for the purpose of these Rules. (2) The Board may by notification and subject to such conditions or limitations as may be specified in such notification, specify person or class of persons who may not require such registration. (3) The registration under Sub-rule (1) shall be subject to such conditions, safeguards and procedure as maybe specified by notification by the Board.” Sub-rule (3) of Rule (9) contemplates that the registration shall be subject to the conditions as specified by Notification by the Board. The Board has issued notification under Rule 9. (3) The registration under Sub-rule (1) shall be subject to such conditions, safeguards and procedure as maybe specified by notification by the Board.” Sub-rule (3) of Rule (9) contemplates that the registration shall be subject to the conditions as specified by Notification by the Board. The Board has issued notification under Rule 9. The perusal of the said notification, requires compliance of the following: (a) An application by every person specified under Sub-rule (1) of Rule (9) for registration. (b) If the person has more than one premises requiring registration, separate registration certificate shall be obtained for each of such premises. (c) Where a registered person transfers his business to another person, the transferee shall get himself registered afresh. (Emphasis supplied) (d) Every registered person, who ceases to carry on the operation for which he is registered, shall deregister himself by making a declaration in the form specified in Annexure III and depositing his registration certificate with the Superintendent of Central Excise. These are some of the requirements as set out under the rules. 6. A combined reading therefore, of Section 6 of the Act read with Rule 9 as also the notification shows that the registration must be by the "Person". Our attention is however, invited to the judgment of this Court in Manibhadra Processors v. Additional Commissioner of C. Ex.0 2005 (184) 13 (Bom.) to contend that if there be an earlier holder of the registration certificate who has not paid the outstanding excise duties and fails to surrender registration certificate with respect to the same factory premises, no other unit in the same premises can be registered under the Rules unless earlier registration is deregistered or cancelled or surrendered by such registrant and all excise dues are cleared. On behalf of the Revenue, the learned Counsel has relied on this judgment to contend that in the instant case, there is a subsisting registration in favour of Respondent No. 7, Usha Ispat and once there be registration in their favour, the Registrar was right in rejecting or returning the application for registration made by the Petitioner herein. Let us consider the ratio of the said judgment. On a reading of the said judgment, the following facts emerge. There was a company known as Ludhiana Woolen and Silk Mills Pvt. Ltd. who were owners of the premises. Let us consider the ratio of the said judgment. On a reading of the said judgment, the following facts emerge. There was a company known as Ludhiana Woolen and Silk Mills Pvt. Ltd. who were owners of the premises. They firstly leased out the premises on rent to M/s. Swastik Dyeing and Printing Mills Limited who had obtained excise registration on 1/10/1996 and failed to clear their dues. Subsequent thereto, M/s. Ludhiana Woolen and Silk Mills Pvt. Ltd. leased out the very same premises to M/s. Jagruti Textile Processors who also defaulted in payment of dues and did not surrender the registration certificate. The application of Manibhadra Processors was refused on the ground that Jagruti Textiles have not paid their outstanding dues and failed to surrender their registration certificate. It appears as per the facts on record that Ludhiana Woolen and Silk Mills Pvt. Ltd. has been indulging in the act of systematic induction of difference licensees in the very premises and helping them to defraud the central excise dues. It is on these facts, that the learned Bench of this Court was pleased to hold that if one person is having more than one premises, considering the language of the rule and the notification, then he must obtain separate registration certificate for each premises and as such the registration is always in respect of "particular premises" and not with respect to a particular person. Relying on the notification issued by the Board, the court held that the intention appears to be to prevent successive registration in respect of the same premises. If that be so, one and the same premises cannot be registered in the name of two different persons. The court proceeded to hold that the person holding earlier registration certificate must surrender registration certificates in respect of that premises, then only a new person can get registration in respect of that premises. From the facts, it will be clear that earlier though M/s. Swastik were in arrears fresh registration was granted in favour of M/s. Jagruti Textile Processors. The court found on the facts therein that there was a systematic attempt to evade tax dues and it is in these circumstances that the court was pleased to take the view which it has is taken. The person who owned the premises was the same but was inducting various licencees who had defaulted in payment of their dues. The court found on the facts therein that there was a systematic attempt to evade tax dues and it is in these circumstances that the court was pleased to take the view which it has is taken. The person who owned the premises was the same but was inducting various licencees who had defaulted in payment of their dues. The judgment will have to be restricted to the facts of that case.” 5.07. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Surat Metallics Ltd. (supra) had an occasion to consider the similar issue with respect to non-issuance of Registration Certificate in favour of subsequent purchaser and had occasion to consider the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of TATA Metalinks Ltd. (supra) and the Division Bench in the case of Surat Metallics Ltd. (supra) in para 28 and 29 has observed and held as under :- “28. Though not expressly stated in the order refusing registration, before the Court, on behalf of the respondent No.1, it has been contended that premises can be registered under the Central Excise Act only in relation to one person; that the defaulter M/s. Veenutex Dyeing & Printing Mills Pvt. Ltd. having already been registered in relation to the subject premises, unless such registration is revoked and cancelled, registration cannot be granted to the petitioners in relation to the said property. Attention was invited to notification No.35/2001 C.E. (N.T.) dated 26th June, 2001 as amended from time to time, issued in exercise of powers under rule 9 of the Central Excise Rules, 2001 which provides for the conditions, safeguards and procedures for registration and exemption in specified cases. Attention was invited to notification No.35/2001 C.E. (N.T.) dated 26th June, 2001 as amended from time to time, issued in exercise of powers under rule 9 of the Central Excise Rules, 2001 which provides for the conditions, safeguards and procedures for registration and exemption in specified cases. Reference was made to clause (2) thereof which says that if the person has more than one premises requiring registration, separate registration certificate shall be obtained for each of such premises; clause (4) thereof which says that where a registered person transfers his business to another person, the transferee shall get himself registered afresh as well as clauses (6) and (7) thereof which provide for de-registration and revocation or suspension of registration, to submit that on a conjoint reading of the said clauses it is apparent that unless registration in relation to the same premises granted to another person is revoked, no registration can be granted to another person in respect of the same unit as two persons cannot be simultaneously registered in respect of the same premises. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel had placed reliance upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Manibhadra Processors vs. Additional Commissioner of Central Excise (supra) wherein it has been held that one and the same premises cannot be registered in the name of two different persons. That person holding earlier registration certificate must surrender registration certificate in respect of that premises, then only can a new person get registered in respect of that premises. However, on behalf of the petitioners, reliance had been placed upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Tata Metalliks Ltd. vs. Union of India and others, 2009 (234) E.L.T. 596 (Bom.) wherein the Court after considering the provisions of section 6 of the Act, Rule 9 of the Central Excise Rules, and the notification issued thereunder, has inter alia held thus: “7. A perusal of Section 6 makes it absolutely clear that who has to be registered is the prescribed person. Under the rules also, it is the person who has to get registered. The notification in Clause (2) only sets out that if such registered person has more than one premises, then each of such separate premises would require registration certificate for each of such premises. Under the rules also, it is the person who has to get registered. The notification in Clause (2) only sets out that if such registered person has more than one premises, then each of such separate premises would require registration certificate for each of such premises. In other words, it is the person who has to obtain separate registration certificate for each of the said premises. It is open to a person who has ceased to carry on the business to apply for deregistration. Would that mean in the absence of the person who has closed or sold the business or premises, applying for deregistration, there is no jurisdiction to grant another person registration of the premises as in the case of a bona fide transferee for value or for that to the owner of the premises whose lessee has defaulted in payment of excise dues. Section 6 and Rule 9 and the notification contemplates that it is the person who must be registered. Neither Section 6 nor Rule 9 and the Notification is a provision for enforcing the claim for dues of the department. That is contained in different provisions. An immovable property by itself cannot be sold unless the owner of the premises is defaulter and that too under a certificate as arrears of land revenue. That sale would be subject to the priority of claims. In case of a lease hold property given for a particular period, there would be no question of sale of the property except the limited interest. In our opinion, the case of bona fide transferee was not in issue in the case of M/s. Manibhadra Processors (supra) or the instances we have cited above. The Respondent No. 3 has therefore, clearly acted without jurisdiction in refusing to grant registration on the specious plea that M/s. Usha Ispat whose assets has been sold and purchased by the Petitioners has not applied for deregistration. In the absence of a specific power to deny registration, the alternate would be whether there would be implied power. Neither Section 6 or Rule 9 or for that matter the notification confers such power. The right of revenue however, would subsist for recovery of dues both against the defaulter or the transferee if the predicates for recovery are met. In the absence of a specific power to deny registration, the alternate would be whether there would be implied power. Neither Section 6 or Rule 9 or for that matter the notification confers such power. The right of revenue however, would subsist for recovery of dues both against the defaulter or the transferee if the predicates for recovery are met. An incidental aspect of the matter would be if the licence is for a particular period, on expiry of that period, the registration certificate would cease to be operative. In such cases, there would be no question of cancelling the certificate of registration.” 29. This Court is in agreement with the aforesaid view expressed by the Bombay High Court and as such, is of the opinion that merely because the defaulter unit, though it had ceased to carry on business on the premises in question, had failed to apply for de-registration, the same should not, in any manner, come in the way of the petitioners in obtaining central excise registration in respect of the premises in question. The stand adopted by the respondent authority that in respect of the same premises, two persons cannot be registered being contrary to the provisions of law, cannot be accepted.” 5.08. The aforesaid decision of the Division Bench in the case of Surat Metallics Ltd. (supra) has been subsequently followed by anther Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s. Jahaan Steel Ltd. (supra) and a similar view has been taken. 5.09. The aforesaid decision of the Division Bench in the case of Surat Metallics Ltd. (supra) has been subsequently followed by anther Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s. Jahaan Steel Ltd. (supra) and a similar view has been taken. 5.09. Considering section 6 of the Central Excise Act and Rule 9 of the Central Excise Rules, we are in complete agreement with the view taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of TATA Metalinks Ltd. (supra) and view taken by the Division Bench in the case of Surat Metallics Ltd. as well as in the case of M/s. Jahaan Steel Ltd. (supra) and we are also of the view / opinion that merely because erstwhile owner though it had ceased to carry on business on the premises in question, had failed to apply for de-registration and/or cancellation of the Registration Certificate and/or the department has not de-registered and/or cancelled the Registration Certificate issued in favour of the erstwhile owner, the same is no ground to deny Central Excise Registration to the subsequent purchaser – lessees in respect of premises in question as neither under Section 6 of the Act nor under Rule 9 of the Rules nor under any Notification, Central Excise Registration cannot be refused on the aforesaid ground. Under the circumstances, the action of the respondents – authority in refusing to grant Central Excise Registration in favour of he petitioner No.3 on the aforesaid ground, cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. 6.00. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, present petition succeeds. The impugned communication / order dtd. 22/10/2009 (Annexure-J) is hereby quashed and set aside and the respondents authorities are hereby permanently restrained from initiating recovery proceedings against the respondent Nos.1 and 2 for recovery of the Central Excise dues of the erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat Ltd., solely on the ground of initiating recovery proceedings after unreasonable period. However, the same shall be without prejudice to the rights of the respondents – authorities to initiate proceedings for recovery of the Central Excise dues from the erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat, after following due procedure and in accordance with law. However, the same shall be without prejudice to the rights of the respondents – authorities to initiate proceedings for recovery of the Central Excise dues from the erstwhile owner -M/s. Jem Ispat, after following due procedure and in accordance with law. The action of the respondents -authority in not issuing Central Excise Registration in favour of the petitioner No.3 is also quashed and set aside and the concerned respondent appropriate authority is hereby directed to issue Central Excise Registration Certificate in favour of the petitioner No.3 – M/s. Ratnaveer Stainless Products Pvt. Ltd. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Rule absolute.