Order: Orders of attachment under Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Protection of Depositors of Financial Establishments Act, 1999 (for short ‘the Act’), under the various Government Orders are under challenge in these writ petitions. As the questions involved are identical, they are being disposed of by this common order. 2. The petitioners contended that a reading of Section 3 of the Act discloses the power of the State Government to be confined to an order of attachment only in respect of the properties owned by the financial establishments and not beyond. The petitioners claim that the respective properties ordered to be attached by G.O.Ms.No.212, Home (General-B) Department, dated 22.09.2001 and G.O.Ms.No.259, Home (General-B) Department, dated 19.11.2001 respectively were purchased by them under registered Sale Deeds as specified in the writ affidavits and the petitioners, who purchased the properties for valuable consideration bona fide were not shown to be in any way connected with the financial establishment and no enquiry was conducted before the proposed attachments and no notice was issued to the petitioners. Relying on MADANAPALLE HOSPITALS (P) LTD., MADANAPALLE VS. GOVERNMENT OF A.P. AND OTHERS ( 2009 (4) ALD 185 / AIR 2009 AP 153 ), the petitioners desire the orders of attachment issued by the first respondent to be declared illegal and unlawful and to be set aside. The petitioner in W.P.No.32814 of 2010 traces her title to Ac. 10.96 cents in Sy.Nos.24/1 and 26/2A of Morpapudi Village, Krishna District, through a registered Sale Deed, dated 27.06.2001, in favour of her deceased husband, on whose death in 2007 the petitioner claims to be in possession and enjoyment. The petitioner in W.P.No.32815 of 2010 traces his ownership over Ac. 2.58 cents in Sy.Nos.760/1, 2 and Ac. 0.31 cents in Sy.No.762/3 of Ventrapragada Village, Krishna District, through a registered Sale Deed, dated 13.07.2000. The petitioner in W.P.No.32816 of 2010 traces her title to Ac. 12.14 cents in Sy.Nos.24/1, 14, 23 and 15 of Morpudi Village, Krishna District, through a registered Sale Deed, dated 27.06.2001. The petitioner in W.P.No.32817 of 2010 traces his title to Ac. 14.88 cents in Sy.Nos.25/1, 29/3, 26/2 and 24 of Morpudi Village, Nuzvidu Mandal, Krishna District, through a registered Sale Deed, dated 26.06.2001. The petitioners claim that they had nothing to do with the financial establishment - Krushi Co-operative Urban Bank Limited. 3. The petitioner in W.P.No.32817 of 2010 traces his title to Ac. 14.88 cents in Sy.Nos.25/1, 29/3, 26/2 and 24 of Morpudi Village, Nuzvidu Mandal, Krishna District, through a registered Sale Deed, dated 26.06.2001. The petitioners claim that they had nothing to do with the financial establishment - Krushi Co-operative Urban Bank Limited. 3. In the counter affidavits of the second respondent, it was contended that on the complaint of one Dr. M.V. Kumar and other depositors on 15.08.2011 about nonpayment of their matured fixed deposits by the management, Chairman, Vice Chairman, Directors and staff of Krushi Co-operative Urban Bank Limited, Ranigunj, Secunderabad, in spite of demands by the depositors, a case under Crime No.156 of 2001 under Section 5 of the Act was registered against the accused in respect of amounts running to Rs.31 crores. The investigation was handed over to the Crime Investigation Department and during the course of investigation, it was disclosed that due amounts were failed to be repaid to the depositors and there were no chances of return of the amounts to the depositors. Then the Additional Director General of Police, CID, Hyderabad, addressed the State Government to pass an ad-interim order under Section 3 of the Act for attachment of properties of the financial establishment and consequently, the relevant Government Orders were passed. Later, a charge sheet was also filed before the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Nampally, Hyderabad, in C.C.No.7 of 2001. The Metropolitan Sessions Court, Nampally, Hyderabad, also made the ad-interim attachment absolute in the respective petitions filed before that Court for the purpose and the Court also ordered in respect of specified items disposal of the properties by the official liquidator by sale by public auction and deposit of the sale proceeds into Court, etc. Under the circumstances, the second respondent desired the writ petitions to be dismissed. 4. The petitioners claimed in reply that the petitions in respect of making the ad-interim attachment absolute in respect of the properties of the petitioners are still pending and they contended that the orders passed by the Metropolitan Sessions Court in various petitions are not connected with them. 5. Heard Sri P. Badrinath and Sri C. Tulasi Krishna, learned counsel representing Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners and Smt. T. Sunitha, learning counsel representing the learned Government Pleader for Home for the respondents. 6. 5. Heard Sri P. Badrinath and Sri C. Tulasi Krishna, learned counsel representing Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners and Smt. T. Sunitha, learning counsel representing the learned Government Pleader for Home for the respondents. 6. In G.O.Ms.No.212, Home (General-B) Department, dated 22.09.2001, after referring to the circumstances under which Crime No.156 of 2001 was registered and the request of the Additional Director General of Police, CID, Hyderabad, for passing an ad-interim order under Section 3 of the Act, the first respondent has stated about passing the ad-interim order under Section 3 of the Act for attachment of the properties of Krushi Cooperative Urban Bank Limited, Ranigunj, Secunderabad, as detailed in Annexures 1 to 10 of the order, after careful examination. G.O.Ms.No.259, Home (General-B) Department, dated 19.11.2001, which is under challenge in W.P.No.32815 of 2010, was also identically worded. 7. The registered Sale Deeds filed by the respective petitioners, of course, do not ex facie refer to the financial establishment in question as being involved in any manner in the acquisition of the respective properties now claimed by the petitioners and Annexure 4 of G.O.Ms.No.212, Home (General-B) Department, dated 22.09.2001, and Item III of G.O.Ms.No.259, Home (General-B) Department, dated 19.11.2001, are the subject matter of these writ petitions, which are claimed by the official respondents to be the properties of the financial establishment itself though standing in the names of the petitioners respectively. 8. The Andhra Pradesh Protection of Depositors of Financial Establishments Act, 1999, in its statement of objects and reasons, made it clear that the law was intended to protect the interests of the depositors of financial establishments in the State and the State Government coming to know of a number of unscrupulous financial establishments cheating innocent and gullible depositors leading to the depositors being put to grave hardship by losing their hard-earned savings was referred to. Section 3 of the Act provided for the Government passing an ad-interim order attaching the money or other property alleged to have been procured either in the name of the financial establishment or “in the name of any other person” from and out of the deposits collected by the financial establishment, if the Government is satisfied that such financial establishment is not likely to return the deposits in cash or kind after maturity. This action was intended to protect the interests of the depositors of such financial establishment and after receipt of the orders of the Government under Section 3 of the Act, the competent Authority shall apply to the Special Court within 15 days from the receipt of the orders of the Government under Section 3 of the Act to make the ad-interim order of attachment absolute. Section 7 of the Act provides for the powers of the Special Court regarding the attachment and the procedure prescribed included any person claiming an interest in the property attached or any portion thereof making an objection before the Special Court even in the absence of any notice, at any time before making the attachment absolute or varying the attachment or cancelling the attachment under Sub-sections 4 and 6. This claim of an interest by such person under Sub-section 3 was directed to be investigated by Sub-section 5 by following the procedure of a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in hearing a suit. The person making an objection is required by the provision to adduce evidence to show that he had some interest in the property attached at the date of the attachment. Even without an objection by such person, Subsection 2 of Section 7 of the Act also provided for the Special Court itself issuing such notices to all persons who are likely to claim any interest or title in the property to make any objections, if they so desire. The Act overrides any other law for the time being in force by virtue of Section 14 of the Act to the extent of any inconsistency and Section 11 of the Act provides for any person including the competent Authority to prefer an appeal to the High Court for any order of the Special Court with which he may be aggrieved. The Andhra Pradesh Protection of Depositors of Financial Establishments Rules, 1999 (for short, ‘the Rules’), provided in Rule 3 for the competent Authority examining the complainant or any other person who will be able to give any information on receiving the orders of ad-interim attachment under Section 3 of the Act and, thus, the Act and the Rules themselves provide a self-contained procedure for making an ad-interim attachment under Section 3 of the Act, an enquiry by the competent Authority into the same after receipt of the orders of the Government, an application by the competent Authority before the Special Court to make the attachment absolute and the right of any other person interested in the property to make objections before the Special Court against the attachment, which objections will be investigated into as if the Special Court is a civil Court exercising its powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The person claiming an interest was also given the right to adduce evidence of his interest in the property attached. While no material has been placed before this Court as to any further proceedings taken under Sections 4 and 7 of the Act and Rule 3 of the Rules in pursuance of the attachment ordered under G.O.Ms.No.212, Home (General-B) Department, dated 22.09.2001, and G.O.Ms.No.259, Home (General-B) Department, dated 19.11.2001, the petitioners straight away approached this Court with these writ petitions to have the order of ad-interim attachment nullified. 9. The petitioners placed reliance on MADANAPALLE HOSPITALS (P) LTD.’s Case (1 Supra) in support of their contentions. The learned Judge was considering the provisions of the Act, more particularly, Sections 3 and 8 thereof. As Section 8 of the Act also refers to attachment of property of certain transferees, the learned Judge opined that the power under Section 3 of the Act is confined only to the properties that are owned by the financial establishments as on the date of attachment, whereas Section 8 of the Act empowers attachment of the properties which are in the hands of transferees from financial establishments. The learned Judge observed that recourse can be had to Section 8 of the Act, if it is found that the properties, which are attached from the financial establishments, are not sufficient to meet the liability towards the depositors or the chit subscribers. The learned Judge observed that recourse can be had to Section 8 of the Act, if it is found that the properties, which are attached from the financial establishments, are not sufficient to meet the liability towards the depositors or the chit subscribers. The learned Judge found a significant difference between Section 3 of the Act on the one hand and Section 8 of the Act on the other, which is that the power to effect attachment under the former is conferred upon the Government, whereas in the case of the latter, the power is conferred upon the Special Court constituted under Section 6 of the Act. The learned Judge also observed that further, before any property, which is in the hands of transferee is attached, the Special Court is required to issue notice to the affected parties and it is only when a finding is recorded by the Special Court that the transfer was made, otherwise than in good faith, and not for valuable consideration that the attachment under Section 8 of the Act can be ordered. In the case before his Lordship, as the petitioner was a transferee from the financial establishment, the learned Judge opined that action/steps would have to be taken only under Section 8 of the Act under which the Special Court alone is conferred with the power and not the Government. 10. It is true that Section 8 of the Act refers to attachment of property of certain transferees, but invocation of Section 8 of the Act arises only where the assets available for attachment of the financial establishment or other person referred to in Section 3 of the Act are found to be less than the amount or value which such financial establishment is required to repay to the depositors. That stage had not arisen in the present cases where the petitioners invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at the very threshold of the Government ordering an ad-interim attachment of the properties in question under Section 3 of the Act. That stage had not arisen in the present cases where the petitioners invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at the very threshold of the Government ordering an ad-interim attachment of the properties in question under Section 3 of the Act. The application under Section 8 of the Act is also where the Special Court is satisfied by affidavit or otherwise that there is a reasonable cause for believing that the said financial establishment has transferred whether before or after the commencement of the Act any property otherwise than in good faith and for valuable consideration, but in the present cases, the acquisition of the properties was admittedly never in the name of the financial establishment but in the names of the petitioners themselves (except in one case in the name of the petitioner’s husband). As seen from the impugned Government Orders, the allegation is about the properties standing in the name of the petitioners being really belonging to the financial establishment itself subject to attachment under Section 3 of the Act but not about petitioners being transferees of such properties either directly or indirectly from the financial establishment. The question whether the properties really belonged to the financial establishment and acquired in the name of the petitioners is a question that has to be gone into in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Sections 4 and 7 of the Act and Rule 3 of the Rules but not with reference to Section 8 of the Act and the attachment orders per se cannot be considered to be beyond the power of the State Government under Section 3 of the Act as being exercised in respect of a property in the name of a transferee governed by Section 8 of the Act, invocation of which is possible only in the event of attached properties under Section 3 of the Act being found to be insufficient to answer the rights of the depositors. The case before his Lordship in MADANAPALLE HOSPITALS (P) LTD.’s Case (1 Supra) is a case where the financial establishment transferred the properties in favour of the transferee/the third party much before the proceedings under the Act were initiated consequently making Section 3 of the Act inapplicable and Section 8 of the Act the more appropriate provision to be applied. The case before his Lordship in MADANAPALLE HOSPITALS (P) LTD.’s Case (1 Supra) is a case where the financial establishment transferred the properties in favour of the transferee/the third party much before the proceedings under the Act were initiated consequently making Section 3 of the Act inapplicable and Section 8 of the Act the more appropriate provision to be applied. While the import of the words “or in the name of any other person” used in Section 3 of the Act was not the subject of consideration before his Lordship, in any view the principle laid down about the jurisdiction of the Special Court alone in respect of a property in the hands of a transferee has no application to the facts of the present cases where the acquisition in the names of the petitioners (in one case, the petitioner’s husband) was itself claimed to be obviously for the financial establishment itself. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioners also referred to WHIRLPOOL CORPORATOIN VS. REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS, MUMBAI AND OTHERS (1998) 8 Supreme Court Cases 1)for the proposition that an alternative remedy will not operate as a bar for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 at least in three contingencies, namely where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are only without jurisdiction or the vires of the Act is challenged. In the present cases, the vires of the Act is not under challenge and as already stated, the jurisdiction of the Government under Section 3 of the Act cannot be considered to be totally absent on the allegation that the properties in question belonged to the financial establishment itself though in the name of some other persons, which allegation, of course, is subject to being disproved in the proceedings under Section 7 of the Act or Rule 3 of the Rules. The question of any enforcement of any fundamental right does not arise, the right to property now being out of the ambit of fundamental rights nor can any principle of natural justice be considered violated, as the petitioners, who came to know about the ad-interim order of attachment, of course, without any notice or enquiry as per their version, are protected by the procedure prescribed by Section 7(3) and (5) of the Act in having their interest in the properties safeguarded, if they are entitled to do so. When the statute has provided by Section 7 of the Act an efficacious alternative remedy in which alone disputed questions of fact can be gone into, such a remedy has to certainly operate as a bar against taking recourse to the extraordinary summary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226, in which necessarily disputed questions of fact will not normally be gone into. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioners also referred to TEJ BAHADUR DUBE (DEAD BY LRS VS. FOREST RANGE OFFICER F.S. (S.W.), HYDERABAD (2003) 3 Supreme Court Cases 122),wherein it was laid down that the provisions of a penal statute cannot be presumed to include something on the mere likelihood of the evasion of the provision and where the rules do not specifically require or contemplate a particular situation, the same cannot be a matter of inference. It is difficult to comprehend as to how any such principle can be considered to have been violated by the ad-interim orders of attachment herein which were based on the premise that the properties standing in the name of the petitioners were in reality the properties of the financial establishment itself, which suspicion or allegation is, of course, subject to being negatived by positive evidence for the petitioners in proceedings under Section 7(5) of the Act. An adequate alternative legal remedy is always a deterrent in taking recourse to Article 226 unless there are absolutely no grounds therefor and while the jurisdiction under Article 226 is not effected merely because of an alternative statutory remedy, taking recourse to such jurisdiction in the face of an alternative statutory remedy is not the rule but an exception. 13. The decision in REGIONAL PROVIDENT FUND COMMISSIONER VS. 13. The decision in REGIONAL PROVIDENT FUND COMMISSIONER VS. HOOGHLY MILLS COMPANY LIMITED AND OTHERS (2012) 2 Supreme Court Cases 489)also relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners is also to the effect that a penal statute should be strictly construed, while the normal cannon of interpretation was that a remedial statute receives liberal construction. In the case of penal statute, any doubt has to be normally resolved in favour of the alleged offender is the principle laid down and the decision also incidentally opined that in a situation as the one before their Lordships, normally the statutory remedy of appeal should be availed and in that case, their Lordships refused to decide the controversy on that question in view of the lapse of eight years since the remedy of appeal was not availed. Thus, if the exercise of judicial discretion to refer back the petitioners to the statutory remedy under Section 7 of the Act cannot be considered to be not a correct exercise, the petitioners should be referred to such statutory remedy without invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court and though the provisions of Sections 3 to 8 of the Act involve penal consequences, which should be resolved in favour of the petitioners in case of any doubt, no such doubt can be considered to exist when the plain and grammatical language of the provisions do not give scope for any such doubt. Section 3 of the Act in positive terms applies to properties in the name of the financial establishment or “in the name of any other person” also, the only requirement to be satisfied being the existence of an allegation of such property being procured from and out of the deposits collected by the financial establishment. Any person who is likely to claim an interest or title in such property is given the liberty to make objections under Sub-section 3 of Section 7 of the Act and the Special Court was made obliged to give notice to such persons by Sub-section 2 and such objections will be investigated into in detail by following the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, as if the Special Court were a civil Court with every liberty to the objector to produce whatever evidence he has in support of his claim. Section 8 of the Act comes into play at a subsequent stage of such properties attached under Section 3 of the Act being found to be insufficient for the purpose and the financial establishment transferring its properties in the name of others without good faith and without valuable consideration. 14. While the further proceedings in pursuance of the Government Orders in question under Sections 4 and 7 of the Act would or should have followed the ad-interim attachment under Section 3 of the Act, whether the competent Authority had taken any such action under Section 4 of the Act and Rule 3 of the Rules or not, the petitioners, if they are interested in the properties ordered to be attached, hav e every right to approach the Special Court under Sub-section 3 of Section 7 of the Act with their objections having to be enquired into in the manner provided by Sub-section 5 of Section 7 of the Act. The questions involved being disputed questions of fact as to whether the properties standing in the name of the petitioners actually belong to the financial establishment itself or not have to be referred to such proceedings undertaken in accordance with the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, under Section 7(5) of the Act rather than attempting to decide such disputed questions of fact in a writ proceeding. The impugned Government Orders cannot be considered illegal and unlawful ex facie when there was an allegation of procurement of such properties in the name of the petitioners from and out of the deposits collected by the financial establishment. While no expression of opinion is being made on the merits of the claims of the petitioners or the official respondents in this regard, the writ petitions have to, therefore, fail with liberty to the petitioners to pursue their remedies provided by law in this regard. 15. Therefore, the Writ Petitions are dismissed without costs, while the petitioners are at liberty to pursue their remedies available to them under the Andhra Pradesh Protection of Depositors of Financial Establishments Act, 1999, and the Rules made thereunder or otherwise and if they take recourse to any such remedies, they shall be decided on their own merits, in accordance with law, uninfluenced by these proceedings or the observations in this order.