JUDGMENT : N.V. ANJARIA, J. Preferred by the original defendants, in the present civil revision application judgment and decree dated 24th January, 2013 passed by Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad in Civil Appeal NO.104 of 2001 is put under challenge. The Appellate Bench dismissed the appeal, and in turn, confirmed the judgment and decree dated 11th June, 2001 passed by Small Causes Court No.2, Ahmedabad in HRP Suit No.2590 of 1991. By virtue of the judgment and decree of the Courts below, applicants herein are facing decree of eviction under Section 13(1)(l) on the ground of acquisition of suitable alternative accommodation. 2. For assailing the impugned judgment and decree, power of this Court under Section 29(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short) are invoked. 3. Only the relevant facts, shorn off unnecessary details, may be stated. Tenement No.16 situated in Yamunanagar Society, Nr.Priya Talkies, Krishnanagar, Saijpur Bogha, Ahmedabad was the suit premise rented by the landlord at a monthly rent of Rs.450/-plus municipal taxes and other charges of society, etc. In the HRP Suit instituted by the respondents-landlord, it was the case that defendants had acquired suitable residence being B.K. Tenement No.1, Nr.Priya Talkies which was in the vicinity of the rented premises, and because of that the tenants were liable to be evicted from the rented one. It appeared that originally the Suit was instituted by arraigning defendant No.1-Jangbahadur Hanumansing Rajput showing him in capacity of tenant. A contention was raised by the said defendant No.1 in his written statement (Exh.21) that it was not he, but his wife was the tenant of the suit premise. In view of such contention being put-forth in the written statement, the landlord sought to join wife of original defendant No.1 named Santoshben Jangbahadur Rajput as defendant No.2. by filing application Exhibit 41, She was permitted to be joined by order dated passed below Exhibit 41. 3.1. Even after those developments, in order to set the controversy at rest, the Trial Court framed one of the issues at Exhibit 56 being issued No.2 as to who was the tenant of the suit premise. The other issues framed were whether the plaintiffs proved that the defendants had acquired suitable alternative accommodation. 3.1. Even after those developments, in order to set the controversy at rest, the Trial Court framed one of the issues at Exhibit 56 being issued No.2 as to who was the tenant of the suit premise. The other issues framed were whether the plaintiffs proved that the defendants had acquired suitable alternative accommodation. The Trial Court answered issue No.2 by holding that defendant No.1 was the tenant in the suit premise. It further held that the ground of tenant having acquired suitable residence was proved, and further recorded a finding that it was suitable accomodation as well. The Court passed decree for eviction on the said ground. As noted above, the lower appellate court concurred with the findings of the Trial Court and confirmed its judgment and decree. 4. Learned advocate Mr.Mehul S. Shah with learned advocate Mr.Paresh Darji for the applicants raised three folds contentions for assailing the judgment and decree of the Courts below. He firstly submitted that the landlord had by filing Exhibit 41 application accepted defendant No.2 as tenant. Learned advocate for the applicants emphasised the conduct of the defendants in filing application Exhibit 41, to submit that thereunder the plaintiff had admitted defendant No.2 to be the tenant in the premise. According to him, there was and admission of landlord to unconditionally accept her to be the tenant. Learned advocate for the applicants further submitted that in any case, once the defendant No.2 was accepted as tenant, burden would shift on the plaintiff. 4.1 It was secondly submitted that in that view the finding recorded by the Trial Court and confirmed by the lower appellate court that defendant No.1 was the tenant was not only misdirected but the same was not tenable at law. In furtherance, it was submitted that the acquisition of alternative accommodation was by defendant No.1. It could not be then termed to be the acquisition by the tenant even-though defendants No.1 and 2 were spouses, it was submitted. 4.2 Learned advocate for the applicants then proceeded to rely on the decision in Full Bench of this Court in Jayantilal Kanjibhai (since deceased) through heirs Lallubhai Vs Rameshchandra [ 2000 (3) GLH 76 ]. It could not be then termed to be the acquisition by the tenant even-though defendants No.1 and 2 were spouses, it was submitted. 4.2 Learned advocate for the applicants then proceeded to rely on the decision in Full Bench of this Court in Jayantilal Kanjibhai (since deceased) through heirs Lallubhai Vs Rameshchandra [ 2000 (3) GLH 76 ]. In that decision, it was held in the context of sec.13(1)(l) of the Act that from the scheme of the section it is clear that only when the tenant gets right to reside in the house other than demised premises, the landlord can seek eviction. It was further held that there is no law that husband and wife can be deemed to one person. It was further held that if tenant has no legal right in the property of the other spouse, such will not be altemative accommodation. On the basis of the said decision, it was vehemently submitted that its ratio applied to the facts of the case and the case of the tenant was squarely covered. 4.3 In the third place, it was submitted that the aspect of suitability was an essential ingredient and therefore, even if an accommodation was alternatively acquired by the tenant, the same was not suitable in the facts of the case. He submitted that not only the newly acquired accommodation was insufficient to house all the members of his family, which comprised of tenant, tenant's brother, brother's wife and children including the parents. In his submission, the Trial Court went wrong in deciding the suitability aspect and the lower appellate court totally disregarded the same. To buttress the submission on the aspect of suitability, learned advocate relied on decision of this Court in case of Soni Jagjivan Narsi Vs Manchhaben Odhavji [ 1975 GLR 991 ]. 4.4 On the other hand, learned senior counsel Mr.Dhaval Dave assisted by learned advocate Mr.Jigar M. Patel supported the judgment and decree of both the Courts below and submitted that Trial Court came to conclusion after considering the evidence that defendant No.1 was tenant and the said finding of fact stood the test of scrutiny also of the lower appellate court. That being so, he submitted that the case was clear in as much as defendant No.1 tenant had acquired alternative accommodation and had thus incurred liability for eviction. That being so, he submitted that the case was clear in as much as defendant No.1 tenant had acquired alternative accommodation and had thus incurred liability for eviction. In that view, he further submitted that reliance placed by the other side on the decision in Jayantilal (supra) was wholly misplaced. It was submitted that there was no need to refer to and seek assistance of Jayantilal (supra) considering the facts involved in the present case. He submitted that the finding that defendant No.1 was the tenant in the premises was one of the fact arrived at after appreciation of evidence and may not be interfered with in the revisional jurisdiction. He next submitted that even otherwise, decision in Jayantilal (supra) was based on different set of facts. He further relied on another decision in Dayaben Durlabhji Davda wd/o. Durlabhji Davda and others Vs Chandreshkumar Pramodrai [ 2010 (3) GLR 2218 ] to contra-distinguish the ratio Jayantilal (supra) and to submit that the said decision of Full Bench stood true on its own facts only, reiterating that it would not apply in the case on hands. In that regard, he relied on decision in Jayalaxmi T. Pandya Vs Shantilal C. Modi [ 1995 (2) GLH 806 ]. 4.5. Countering the contentions on suitability factor of the newly acquired premises, learned senior counsel for the respondents submitted that both the Courts have appreciated the said aspect and held in favour of the tenant. He took the Court through the discussion and reasoning of the Courts below in respect of those findings. 5. Proceeding to consider the controversy and the contentions canvassed, it was true that originally the suit was instituted against defendant No.1 styling him as tenant and defendant No.2 was subsequently impleaded by filing application below Exhibit 41, which was filed after in the written statement defendant No.1 disclaimed that he was a tenant, stating that his wife – defendant No.2 was the tenant in the premises. The Trial Court further considered the question as to who was the tenant with reference to issue framed. There was no rent note executed. Hence the trial court rightly proceeded to consider the issue on the basis of preponderance of probability supported by evidence on record.It deserves to be mentioned that defendant Nos.1 and 2 were husband and wife staying together living a happy matrimony in the rented premises. 5.1. There was no rent note executed. Hence the trial court rightly proceeded to consider the issue on the basis of preponderance of probability supported by evidence on record.It deserves to be mentioned that defendant Nos.1 and 2 were husband and wife staying together living a happy matrimony in the rented premises. 5.1. In paragraph 19 and 20 of the judgment, the Trial Court considered the evidence and the circumstances with regard the issue. Upon consideration and appreciation of the evidence in form of municipality tax bills etc., it was concluded that those evidences were not credible to establish the tenancy of defendant No.2. Ultimately, the Trial Court held on appreciation of evidence that premises was rented to defendant No.1 and not to defendant No.2. When such is a finding arrived at on the basis of evidence which was concurred by the lower appellate court, and when the same was on proper appreciation of evidence, nothing emerged, nor anything could be pointed out to upset the same in this revision application. 5.2. As noted above, application Exhibit 41 was required to be moved upon a contention raised by the defendant No.1 that his wife was the tenant. On perusal of Exhibit 41, copy of which was made available by learned advocate for the applicants for perusal in course of hearing, it appeared that though defendant No.2 was accepted to be the tenant by landlord, it was by seeking her impleadment along with and in addition to defendant No.1. It was specifically averred that the said application was filed in view of the contention taken in written statement and to avoid any technical difficulty and defendant No.2 was proposed to be joined. 6. The case and the contention of the applicants-tenants may be tested demurrer on their own argument. It was the contention of the applicants that defendant No.2 having been accepted as tenant, decision of the Full Bench in case of Jayantilal (supra), would apply to cover their case against landlord. It was submitted that the true ratio of the said judgment was that husband and wife could not be considered as one person in eye of law. It was the contention of the applicants that defendant No.2 having been accepted as tenant, decision of the Full Bench in case of Jayantilal (supra), would apply to cover their case against landlord. It was submitted that the true ratio of the said judgment was that husband and wife could not be considered as one person in eye of law. It was contended further that the correct position spelt out is that where a wife or a husband acquires a property and other spouse if he/she is a tenant, has a legal right by virtue of such acquisition and to stay there, then only can such acquisition or allotment of the premises would disentitle the tenant of the rented premises. It was submitted that proposition of law was laid down by the Full Bench in paragraph 10 of the said judgment. 6.1 The falsity of the contention of the learned advocate for the applicants would become clear once the decision of Full Bench in Jayantilal (supra) is examined in proper perspective of facts of that case juxtaposing the facts involved in the present case. It was held in Jayantilal (supra) that unless it is shown that tenant had legal right to stay in the alternatively acquired premises, landlord is not entitled to decree on that ground. It was ruled that it is got to be established that tenant, even if the spouse, has a domain over the newly acquired premises. 6.2 The facts on the basis of which the Full Bench decision rested was that in that case, wife of the tenant-husband had purchased a bungalow out of her own source of income. After purchasing bungalow, the same was let-out to another tenant and the plaintiff had no right, title or interest in the said bungalow. The bungalow was thus purchased not by the plaintiff himself, but by the wife of the plaintiff, who claimed that it was out of her own source of income. In that context, the Full Bench considered the issue to conclude that the plaintiff had no domain over the bungalow acquired. The crux of the distinction between the facts of Jayantilal (supra) vis-a-vis the facts obtained in the case on hand, is gatherable from paragraph 12 of Jayantilal (supra), in which following are the relevant observations: “The Premises in question which the wife of the opponent has acquired, is indisputably not matrimonial home. The crux of the distinction between the facts of Jayantilal (supra) vis-a-vis the facts obtained in the case on hand, is gatherable from paragraph 12 of Jayantilal (supra), in which following are the relevant observations: “The Premises in question which the wife of the opponent has acquired, is indisputably not matrimonial home. The opponent, therefore, would not have any statutory or legal right against wife to use and enjoy the acquired premises. It is relevant to note that Trial Court has in terms held that “the wife of the opponent is the exclusive owner of bungalow No.7 situated in Ravindra Park Co.Op. Housing Society and the opponent has no right, title or interest in that bungalow.” This finding has been upheld by the District Court, which is the final Court so far as facts are considered. In our considered opinion, therefore, it cannot be said that the opponent acquired suitable alternative accommodation after coming into force of the Act. The Trial Court as well as the District Court were, therefore, justified in dismissing the suit for eviction which was filed under S. 13(1)(l) of the Act.” 7. Reverting again to the facts of the present case, which is undisputed, it was never the case of the defendant No.2-wife that she had no right to stay and reside in the tenement acquired by defendant No.1. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 in capacity of husband and wife had been residing together without any interruption since the date of marriage and were still residing so. The alternative accommodation acquired by the defendant No.1 was a matrimonial house of defendant No.2. The defendant No.2 had not only a domain over the acquired house, but she enjoyed a clear right in law to stay there and exercise such right irresistibly for her. There was a domain over the premises in capacity of wife of the husband-tenant living with him. Once this was the position obtained that defendant No. 2 had a clear domain over the alternatively acquired premises to be able to and entitled to stay therein, it hardly mattered that it was acquired by defendant No.1 husband. Thus, even by going with the contention of learned advocate for the applicants, for the sake of deciding it, decision of Full Bench in Jayantilal (supra) has no application and it did not make any headway for the applicants-tenants. 7.1. Thus, even by going with the contention of learned advocate for the applicants, for the sake of deciding it, decision of Full Bench in Jayantilal (supra) has no application and it did not make any headway for the applicants-tenants. 7.1. In the above view, the contention about shifting of burden on the plaintiff becomes inconsequential. What is essential is the exercisability of domain over alternatively acquired premise. Once it is established on the basis of the facts of the case and plea of the defendants-tenants themselves that defendant No.2 was able to stay with defendant No.1 in the alternative premises, she had acquired right to reside therein. 8. Turning to the third contention about the suitability of the acquired premises, premises which was rented consisted of 1 Bedroom, Hall and Kitchen. B.K. Tenement which is alternative is also having, indisputably, same number of rooms and accommodation. It was sought to be submitted, however, by the learned advocate for the applicants that new premise was insufficient in area. Learned advocate for the applicants wanted to highlight that in addition to the defendants-tenants, brother of defendant No.1, his wife and children with parents were the members, who are to be accommodated in the newly acquired premises. It was submitted that considering the size of the family and number of persons to stay in the newly acquired premises, premises could not be considered as suitable and therefore, decree under Section 13(1)(l) could not have been passed. It was submitted that the lower appellate court totally overlooked this aspect. 8.1 Neither of the submissions of learned advocate for the applicants could be accepted. Taking the second aspect first, the Trial Court has in its judgment with due application of mind considered the suitability aspect. Members of the family including brother of defendant No.1 were staying together even in the rented premises. The Trial Court while considering the contention of the defendant-tenant regarding suitability, observed inter alia that the defendants did not chose to examine his brother- Ranjitsinh for whom right was claimed and with reference to whom non-suitability was asserted. The Court found that defendant No.1 admitted in his evidence that his brother Ranjitsinh was not dependent on him and all sisters were married, who were residing at their matrimonial homes. The Court found that defendant No.1 admitted in his evidence that his brother Ranjitsinh was not dependent on him and all sisters were married, who were residing at their matrimonial homes. The reasoning of the Trial Court was unexceptionable that simply because the sisters' visit the family of the defendant-tenant occasionally, the same was not to be the consideration for deciding the suitability of the acquired premises. 8.2 Once it was found that brother and his family were residing since inception with defendants in the suit premises, it could have been urged on the basis that brother would also be staying in the alternative premises, that the same would be unsuitable for a family. As noted above, suit premises and the alternatively acquired tenement, when compared in terms of area and facility, were virtually having similar accommodative facility and the area. It could also not be countenanced when it was submitted that the lower appellate court had ignored the said aspect was not acceptable. The findings on the issue of acquisition of alternative accommodation and suitability thereof were arrived at by the Trial Court in eminently just manner. The Appellate court considered the said issue decided by the Trial Court and confirmed those findings. The contention therefore could not be countenanced that the lower appellate court had not considered the suitability aspect. The suitability aspect was an inbuilt facet of the ground of alternative accommodation held proved by the Trial Court and endorsed to in its totality by the lower appellate court. 8.3. As far as suitability aspect is concerned, the same is not to be equated with luxury in the alternatively acquired accommodation. In Amarjit Singh Vs Smt.Khatoon Quamarain [ (1986) 4 SCC 736 ], the Apex Court observed that reasonably suitable residential accommodation has to be considered from the angle of providing habitat only and not from the standpoint of assessing comfort and luxury of the landlord. Therefore, perception of the landlord that alternatively acquired accommodation is not comfortable as per his expectation and does not have the luxury of his liking, is of no avail. Once it is a fact obtained that alternative accommodation is acquired by the tenant and which has the same housing facilities making habitat of the tenant possible in the same way the tenant was staying in the rented premises, the alternatively acquired premises would be treated as suitable alternative house. Once it is a fact obtained that alternative accommodation is acquired by the tenant and which has the same housing facilities making habitat of the tenant possible in the same way the tenant was staying in the rented premises, the alternatively acquired premises would be treated as suitable alternative house. Indeed, in contending that the alternatively acquired house was not suitable even when there was nothing to show that it was less convenient in any manner, the tenant was really pitching his case to the ground of comparative hardship which was an aspect known to ground under Section 13(1)(g) and not under Section 13(1)(l) of the Act. 9. In the aforesaid view, no ground is made out for interference of this Court in the impugned judgment and decree passed with concurrent detail by both the Courts below, while exercising revisional powers under Section 29(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. For the foregoing reasons and discussions, there is no merit in the present civil revision application and the same stands dismissed. 10. At this stage, learned advocate Mr.Paresh Darji for the applicants requests for stay of the present order for six weeks so as to enable the applicants, as stay has operated in the matter all throughout during the pendency of the suit as well as appeal before the Appellate Bench of Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad. 10.1 In the facts and circumstances of the case, the judgment and decree passed and confirmed as above shall not take effect for six weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of the present order. Application dismissed.