Research › Search › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 573 (MP)

Gulab Bai v. Subhash Chandra

2013-04-29

Prakash Shrivastava, S.R.Waghmare, Shantanu Kemkar

body2013
ORDER Per Kemkar J. -- 1. This reference has been made before us vide order dated 7.9.2012 passed by the learned Single Judge of this High Court in Civil Revision No.71/2012 to answer the following question : “Whether section 23-J of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 covers within its ambit a retired employee of the Municipal Corporation to maintain application for eviction under Chapter III-A?” 2. Briefly stated, the respondent – a retired employee of the Indore Municipal Corporation filed an application before the Rent Controlling Authority (for short, RCA), Indore, under Section 23-A of the MP Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (in short, “the Act 1961”), seeking eviction of his tenant (applicants herein) for his bona fide requirement of the non-residential accommodation situated at Indore let out to them (claiming himself to be covered under the definition of ‘landlord’ given under section 23-J of the Act 1961). 3. The applicants in their reply denied the averments made by the respondent in his application. They raised a plea that the respondent is not covered under the Special Category of ‘landlord’ as defined in section 23-J of the Act 1961. 4. The RCA vide its order dated 24.2.2012 passed in Eviction Case No.A/90 (7) I-2010-11 allowed the application and ordered for eviction of applicants. It accepted the plea of the respondent that he is covered under the term ‘landlord’ defined under section 23-J of the Act 1961. The Authority while taking this view relied on the decision rendered by a learned Single Judge of this High Court in Civil Revision No.120/2011 (Ghanshyam s/o Champalal Soni v. Subhashchandra s/o Narendra Prasad Soni) decided on 24.08.2011 who, in turn, relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this High Court passed in the case of Ranjit Narayan Haksar v. Surendra Verma [ 1994 JLJ 740 = 1995 MPLJ 21 ]. The learned Single Judge in para 8 of the order held as under : “8. This Court is not impressed with this contention because learned Division Bench has clearly concluded that retired employee of Government owned or controlled statutory Corporation is a landlord as defined in section 23-J(ii) of the Act. Undoubtedly, Municipal Corporation is statutory Corporation on account of its constitution by virtue of section 7 of the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. Chapter XXXIV of the Act contains various provisions of the State Government for having control on it. Undoubtedly, Municipal Corporation is statutory Corporation on account of its constitution by virtue of section 7 of the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. Chapter XXXIV of the Act contains various provisions of the State Government for having control on it. Thus, it cannot be denied that the Municipal Corporation is statutory Corporation and is controlled by the State Government. This being so, it is held that retired employee of Municipal Corporation is a landlord as defined in section 23-J(ii) of the Act and law laid down by the Single Bench in the case of Mohan Das (supra), stands impliedly overruled in view of the aforesaid observation of division bench.” 5. The applicants challenged the order dated 24.2.2012 passed by the RCA, in Civil Revision No.71/2012 under section 23-E of the Act 1961 before this High Court. And during the course of its hearing the learned Single Judge, noticing the conflicting views having been taken by the different Benches, referred the aforesaid question for being decided by a Full Bench so that conflict may be resolved. 6. Before us, learned counsel for the parties and also the amicus curiae have agreed that a retired employee of the Municipal Corporation would not fall within the meaning of “retired servant of any Government” as stated in clause (i) of section 23-J of the Act 1961. They, therefore, confined their submissions only in respect to clause (ii) of section 23-J of the Act 1961; and as such, we are answering the question only to that extent. In the circumstances, reference about clause (i) of section 23-J is uncalled for, as none of the parties have placed reliance on clause (i), and therefore, the question about clause (i) of section 23-J does not arise. 7. Shri G.M. Chaphekar, learned amicus curiae and Shri S.K. Pawanekar, learned counsel for the applicants have argued that the Municipal Corporation cannot be said to be a company owned or controlled either by the Central or the State Government and, therefore, the respondent is not covered within the meaning of landlord as defined under section 23-J(ii) of the Act 1961. According to them, the respondent is not a retired servant of a company owned or controlled by the Central or the State Government. According to them, the respondent is not a retired servant of a company owned or controlled by the Central or the State Government. The learned counsel, in support of their submissions, have relied on the decisions Shiv Singh v. Krishna Gopal [1986 MPRCJ 341], and Subhash Kumar Malviya v. Shankar Lal Mohanlal Malviya [ 2000(3) MPLJ 609 ]. They have also argued that the law laid down by the Division Bench in the case of Ranjit Narayan Haksar (supra), will not be applicable to a retired employee of Municipal Corporation. According to them, the Municipal Corporation is constituted under section 7 of the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, and its composition, as provided under section 9, is by an elected body. Thus, it cannot be said to be owned or controlled by the Central or State Government. They have also contended that some control of the State Government on the Municipal Corporation as provided under the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 will not make it a “company” either owned or controlled by the State Government. 8. Shri B.L. Pavecha, learned amicus curiae and Shri A.K. Sethi, learned senior counsel, on the other hand, have argued that since the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Revision No.120/2011 has been upheld by the Supreme Court in SLP No.35277/2011 vide order dated 13.04.2012 with an observation that “we find no merit in the petition”, the question deserves to be answered in favour of the respondent. They have placed reliance on the judgment of the Division Bench of this High Court in Ranjit Narayan Haksar (supra), which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Surendra Verma v. Ranjit Narayan Haksar [ 1995 JLJ 460 ], and submitted that the Municipal Corporation would be included in the expression ‘company’ referred to in the definition of ‘landlord’ in section 23-J(ii) of the Act 1961. They have argued that as per Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition Vol.9 1201 as referred by the Division Bench, the Corporations may be Trading Corporations or Non-trading Corporations and Non-trading Corporations are illustrated by Municipal Corporations. Therefore, according to them, Municipal Corporation is also a Corporation, which will come within the sweep of word ‘company’ referred to in section 23-J(ii). Therefore, according to them, Municipal Corporation is also a Corporation, which will come within the sweep of word ‘company’ referred to in section 23-J(ii). In support of their contention that the Municipal Corporation is controlled by State Government, they placed reliance on sections 10, 80(5)(ii), 417, 421, 422, 425, 426-A, 427 and 430 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. They have also cited the decision Vipin v. Ranjit Narayan [1986 MPRCJ Note 11], Munnalal v. Kailash Chandra [1998 MPACJ 128], and Mohankrishna v. Bhau Sahab [ 2000(3) MPLJ 537 ]. 9. Before dealing with the question, we feel appropriate to reproduce Clause (ii) of section 23-J of the Act, 1961. It reads as under : “23-J Definition of landlord for the purposes of Chapter III-A. -- For the purpose of this Chapter ‘landlord’ means a landlord who is -- (ii) a retired servant of a company owned or controlled either by the Central or State Government.” 10. Few provisions of Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, which are relevant, are also extracted below : “7. Constitution of Municipal Corporation. –- (1) There shall be constituted a Municipal Corporation for a larger urban area in accordance with the provisions of this Act : Provided that a Corporation under this section may not be constituted in such urban area or part thereof as the Governor may, having regard to the size of the area and the municipal services being provided or proposed to be provided by an industrial establishment or a group of such establishments in that area and such other factors as he may deem fit, by public notification, specify to be an industrial township. (2) In this Section ‘a larger urban area’ means such area as the Governor may, having regard to the population of the area, the density of the population therein, the revenue generated for local administration, the percentage of employment in non-agricultural activities, the economic importance or such other factors as he may deem fit, specify by public notification for the purposes of this Act. (3) The Corporation shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal and shall by the said name sue and be sued. 9. Composition of Municipal Corporation. (3) The Corporation shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal and shall by the said name sue and be sued. 9. Composition of Municipal Corporation. – (1) A Municipal Corporation shall consist of – (a) a Mayor, that is Chairperson, elected by direct election from the Municipal area: (b) Councillors elected by direct election from the wards; (c) not more than six persons having special knowledge or experience in the Municipal administration, nominated by the State Government : Provided that only a person residing within the Municipal area and being otherwise not ineligible for election as a Councilor, may be nominated : (d) Members of the House of the People and the Members of the Legislative Assembly of the State representing constituencies which comprise wholly or partly the Municipal area ; (e) Members of the Council of States registered as electors within the municipal area : Provided that a member of the House of the People and a Member of the State Legislative Assembly as mentioned in clause (d) or a member of Council of States, as mentioned in clause (e) may nominate his representative, who possesses such qualifications as may be prescribed in this behalf to attend the meeting of the Corporation. (2) The persons nominated under clause (c) of sub-section (1) shall hold office during the pleasure of the State Government. (3) Persons referred to in sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be Councillors for all purposes of this Act but the persons referred to in clauses (c), (d) and (e) of sub-section (1) shall not have the right to vote in the meetings of the Corporation. (4) If any municipal area fails to elect a Mayor or any ward fails to elect a Councillor, fresh election proceedings shall be commenced for such municipal area or ward, as the case may be, within six months to fill the seat, and until the seat is filled it shall be treated as casual vacancy : Provided that proceedings of election of Speaker, or any of the Committee under the Act shall not be stayed, pending the election of such seat.” 11. Some more provisions of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, on which reliance has been placed by the respondent, we find that Section 10 confers upon the State Government the powers to determine the number and extent of the wards of the Corporation. Some more provisions of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, on which reliance has been placed by the respondent, we find that Section 10 confers upon the State Government the powers to determine the number and extent of the wards of the Corporation. Section 80(5) restricts the power of the Corporation to lease, sell or otherwise convey the property without previous sanction of the State Government. Section 405 confers power on the Governor to include or exclude any area from the limit of the Corporation. Chapter 26 by its title “control” includes several provisions which confer on the State Government powers of effective control over the corporation. Section 417 confers power on the Government to depute officers specified in the section to hold enquiry in to the affairs of any corporation or to have inspection or examination of any of its department, office or service. Section 421 confers power on the Government to suspend execution of any resolution or order of the corporation. And finally section 422 confers power on the Government to dissolve the corporation. Section 425 confers power on the Government to get its order enforced when the corporation defaults in carrying out the order passed by the Government. Section 425-A empowers the State Government to confer authority on officers of the Government to attend meetings of the Corporation and address it. Section 426 empowers the Government to make rules authorizing the inspection of the institutions and works which are under the management and control of the corporation. While section 426-A empowers the Government to issue orders for removal of difficulties, section 427 authorizes the corporation to frame by-laws. Section 430 provides that by-laws framed by the Corporation shall have no validity unless they are confirmed by the Government. This section further provides that the Government may modify the by-laws passed by the corporation and may also cancel its confirmation rendering such by-laws to be ineffective. 12. Section 430 provides that by-laws framed by the Corporation shall have no validity unless they are confirmed by the Government. This section further provides that the Government may modify the by-laws passed by the corporation and may also cancel its confirmation rendering such by-laws to be ineffective. 12. True it is that the decision of the Single Judge of this High Court in Civil Revision No.120/2011 (Ghanshyam s/o Champalal Soni) (supra), related to the same landlord was assailed before the Supreme Court and the SLP was dismissed on a finding that it had no merit, but the fact remains that the Supreme Court has not dealt with the question as to whether a retired servant of Municipal Corporation shall fall within the meaning of ‘landlord’ as defined under section 23-J of the Act of 1961. The order of dismissal of SLP by the Supreme Court is too brief an order to be treated as law declared under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. 13. In the case of Ranjit Nayaran Haksar (supra), which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court and on which strong reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondent, the Division Bench has held that a retired employee of a Government owned or controlled statutory corporation is a ‘landlord’ under section 23-J(ii) of the Act of 1961. The Division Bench while taking this view has considered all the decisions of different Single Benches, which have also been referred before us, as would be clear from the following paragraph 5 of the order : “5. We will first advert to the conflicting decision referred to by the learned Single Judge. In Vipin v. Ranajitnarayan and others [1986 MPRCJ Note No. 11], Mulye, J. held that a retired employee of the M. P. State Road Transport Corporation is governed by section 23-J(ii) of the Act on the ground that the petitioner’s counsel was unable to point out that the Corporation was not controlled by the State Government. The next decision is Shiv Singh v. Krishan Gopal [1986 MPRCJ 341], in which Shrivastava, J. held that the employee of a Municipality is not an employee of a Company. The next decision is Shiv Singh v. Krishan Gopal [1986 MPRCJ 341], in which Shrivastava, J. held that the employee of a Municipality is not an employee of a Company. In Sobhagyamal v. Prakash Pharmaceuticals, Indore [ AIR 1990 MP 345 ], Dube, J. held that a retired employee of LIC is not covered under section 23-J(ii) of the Act, and cannot invoke the provisions of Chapter IIIA of the Act. The learned Judge indicated that the expression ‘Company’ has to be understood as company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act and as defined in the provisions of that Act. In Mohandas v. Deven Das [ 1994(1) MPJR 259 ], Issarani, J. held that Municipal Corporation is not a company and retired servant of the Municipal Corporation is not a ‘landlord’ under Section 23-J(ii) of the Act. A reading of these decisions shows that direct conflict exists only between Vipin v. Ranajitnarayan [1986 MPRCJ Note 11], and Sobhagyamal v. Prakash Pharmaceuticals, Indore [ AIR 1990 M.P. 345 ]. The other decisions deal with Municipality or Municipal Corporation.” 14. From the reading of above quoted paragraph, it is apparent that the Division Bench, after considering all the decisions, as referred to in paragraph No.5, noticed that the conflict exists only between Vipin v. Ranjitnarayan [1986 MPRCJ Note 11], and Sobhagyamal v. Prakash Pharmaceuticals, Indore [ 1990(I) MPWN 6 = AIR 1990 M.P. 345 ]. The Division Bench has further observed that the other decisions deal with the Municipality or the Municipal Corporation; meaning thereby that while deciding the issue before it, the Division Bench excluded from its consideration the cases relating to Municipality or the Municipal Corporation. From paragraph 3 of the order of the Division Bench, it is also very clear that it was not disputed before the Division Bench that M.P. State Road Transport Corporation is a statutory body, which came into existence under the provisions of Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 and the same is owned, if not controlled by the State Government (Emphasis supplied). In that context, the Division Bench simply proceeded to examine whether the Government owned Corporation would be covered within the meaning of word ‘company’, as referred to in the definition of ‘landlord’ in section 23-J(ii) of the Act of 1961. In that context, the Division Bench simply proceeded to examine whether the Government owned Corporation would be covered within the meaning of word ‘company’, as referred to in the definition of ‘landlord’ in section 23-J(ii) of the Act of 1961. The Division Bench has held that the expression ‘company’ referred to in the definition of ‘landlord’ under section 23-J(ii) of the Act of 1961 is not restricted to company incorporated under the Companies Act but has to be understood in the general legal sense and takes in Government owned or controlled statutory corporations. 15. It is, thus, clear that the decision of the Division Bench in Ranjit Narayan Haksar v. Surendra Verma (supra), which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court, was relating to the Corporation owned by the State Government and the question of Municipal Corporation or Municipality was not before it. The reliance of the learned counsel for the respondent on the passage quoted by the Division Bench from Halsboury’s law of England (supra) is misconceived as non-trading corporations may include Municipal Corporations but it has never been held that the Municipal Corporation will be a company that too government owned or controlled. As already observed, the MPSRTC is wholly owned by the State Government and it carries on business of transport. Whereas the Municipal Corporation is an elected body and its object is not to carry any business, but to administer a particular area from where its members are elected. Also, ‘company’ is an association of a member of individuals for the purpose of carrying on trade, or other legitimate business (See Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edition 2005, p.912). The Municipal Corporation cannot be said to be an association of a number of individuals for the purpose of carrying out any trade or business, whereas MPSRTC carries on business. 16. Thus, from the above analysis, it is clear that the judgment of Division Bench in the case of Ranjit Narayan Haksar v. Surendra Verma (supra), was on a totally different footing, as in that case, the landlord was a retired employee of Government owned Corporation and in the said judgment, the question relating to Municipality or Municipal Corporation was not considered. However, the present case relates to a retired employee of Municipal Corporation, which is constituted under section 7 of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. However, the present case relates to a retired employee of Municipal Corporation, which is constituted under section 7 of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. The composition of Municipal Corporation is as per section 9 of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. The Municipal Corporation consists of Mayor as well as Concillors elected by the direct election from the wards. Thus, it cannot be held to be company owned or to be controlled by the State Government. It being a local elected body having its own independent existence, it can never be regarded as a ‘company’ or a ‘statutory corporation’. It is an entity separate from the Government. On the basis of the provisions contained in ections 10, 80(5), 405, 417, 422, 425, 425-A, 426, 426-A, 427 and 430 of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, it cannot be construed that the Municipal Corporation is owned or is controlled by the State Government as a “Government Company” or “statutory corporation” owned or controlled by the Government. 17. Having regard to the aforesaid, we answer the reference in favour of the applicants and against the respondent landlord by holding that a retired employee of a Municipal Corporation will not be covered under section 23-J(ii) of the Act to maintain application for eviction under Chapter III-A of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. 18. Matter be now placed before the appropriate bench for deciding the civil revision on merits. Per Smt. Waghmare, J. -- 1. Whereas the judgment passed by Hon’ble Shri Justice S. Kemkar presiding the Full Bench constituted to answer the reference in the present revision; has been put up before me for consideration; and in my humble opinion, I find that I do not agree with the view taken by His Lordship and answer the referred question in the affirmative that “A retired employee of the Municipal Corporation would be covered under section 23-J of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 and shall be eligible to maintain the application for eviction under Chapter III-A of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act 1961.” 2. The point of reference has settled to the question whether a retired employee of the Municipal Corporation would be covered under section 23-J(ii) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 and plunging straight into the controversy, I find that it is an admitted fact that the Municipal Corporation is creation of a statute i.e. the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 and that several provisions of Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 confer the power on the State Government regarding control over the Municipal Corporation, such as : Under section 7 the constitution of the Municipal Corporation is constituted only by act of public notification by the Governor, who having regard to the size of the area and the municipal services being provided or proposed to be provided; by public notification, specifies the area. The composition of the Municipal Corporation is decided under section 9 of the Act and several persons in the Government are nominated in the Corporation by the State Government such as members of the House of the People and the Members of the Legislative Assembly of the State etc. and that the number of other members of the Corporation is also decided by the said provisions. 3. The other important provisions of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, on which reliance has been placed by the respondent, are already enumerated by His Lordship in the present judgment (they are reproduced here for convenience). Section 10 confers upon the State Government the powers to determine the number and extent of the wards of the Corporation. Section 80(5) restricts the power of the Corporation to lease, sell or otherwise convey the property without previous sanction of the State Government. Section 405 confers power on the Governor to include or exclude any area from the limit of the Corporation. Chapter 26 by its title “control” includes several provisions which confer on the State Government powers of effective control over the corporation. Section 417 confers power on the Government to depute officers specified in the section to hold enquiry into the affairs of any Corporation or to have inspection or examination of any of its department, office or service. Section 421 confers power on the Government to suspend execution of any resolution or order of the Corporation. And finally section 422 even confers power on the Government to dissolve the Corporation. Section 421 confers power on the Government to suspend execution of any resolution or order of the Corporation. And finally section 422 even confers power on the Government to dissolve the Corporation. Section 425 confers power on the Government to get its order enforced when the Corporation defaults in carrying out the order passed by the Government. Section 425-A empowers the State Government to confer authority on officers of the Government to attend meetings of the Corporation and address it. Section 426 empowers the Government to make rules authorizing the inspection of the institutions and works which are under the management and control of the Corporation. While section 426-A empowers the Government to issue orders for removal of difficulties, section 427 authorizes the Corporation to frame by-laws. Section 430 provides that by-laws framed by the Corporation shall have no validity unless they are confirmed by the Government. This section further provides that the Government may modify the by-laws passed by the Corporation and may also cancel its confirmation rendering such by-laws to be ineffective. 4. These provisions thus indicate thereby that there is effective control over the Municipal Corporation by the State Government and hence I find that the conclusion is inevitable that the ‘Municipal Corporation’ is drawn within the vortex and ambit of the term “Corporation controlled” by the State Government. However, the special class of landlords as categorized in sub-section (ii) of section 23-J of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act actually reads as under : “(ii) a retired servant of a company owned or controlled either by the Central or State Government.” And this naturally leads me to the reference in the matter of Ranjit Narayan Haksar vs. Surendra Verma [ 1994 JLJ 740 = 1995 MPLJ 21 ]. This judgment has also been referred to by Hon’ble Shri Justice S. Kemkar in some detail. The Division Bench of this Court in the said case had categorically held that : “There is nothing in the language or context of section 23-J(ii) indicating any intention to give a restricted meaning to the expression ‘company’. The legislature did not refer to the Companies Act in section 23-J(ii) and did not specifically exclude statutory corporation. The expression ‘company’ has been used in its general legal sense and takes in Government owned or controlled statutory Corporations. The legislature did not refer to the Companies Act in section 23-J(ii) and did not specifically exclude statutory corporation. The expression ‘company’ has been used in its general legal sense and takes in Government owned or controlled statutory Corporations. We hold that retired employee of a Government owned or controlled statutory corporation is a landlord as defined in section 23-J(ii) of the Act.” 5. In the SLP filed consequently challenging this judgment of the High Court, the apex Court has categorically held that : “We agree with the view taken by the Division Bench that the word ‘company’ in section 23-J(ii) would include ‘Corporation’ created under the special Statute which is owned or controlled by the Central or the State Government. Hence, the SLP is dismissed.” {Surendra Verma vs. Ranjeet Narayan Haksar [ 1995 JLJ 460 ]}. 6. Therefore, I find that the question was not open to this Court to decide whether the Municipal Corporation was a ‘company’ or not? The point has been settled categorically by the apex Court with reference to section 23-J of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act itself. It is in this light essential to refer to the contentions raised by Shri B.L. Pavecha, learned senior counsel and Amicus Curiae that the judicial interpretation was required to interpret the word ‘Corporation’ as used in section 23-J(ii) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act since the term ‘corporation’ being a company pertained to the M.P. State Road Transport Corporation in the matter of Ranjit Narayan Haksar (supra). Considering the term ‘employee’ in context of Corporation controlled and owned by Government, it is to be interpreted to mean that the municipal employee, would be an employee of the Government. Considering the term ‘employee’ in context of Corporation controlled and owned by Government, it is to be interpreted to mean that the municipal employee, would be an employee of the Government. However, he clarified upon query by placing reliance on Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh in 5th Edition pages 181 and 182 Chapter 4 that : “(However), it is not a sound principle of construction to interpret expressions used in one Act with reference to their use in another Act, and decisions rendered with reference to construction of one Act cannot be applied with reference to the provisions of another Act, when the two Acts are not in pari materia.” And thus, he pacified the anxiety that an employee of the Corporation is not to be termed as a “Government servant” generally, for the purpose of all or any other Acts, but to be so interpreted for the purposes of the term landlord as used in section 23-J(ii) of the M.P. Accommodation Act, only since the matter had been successfully concluded by the apex Court in the matter of Surendra Verma vs. Ranjeet Narayan Haksar [ 1995 JLJ 460 ] (supra). 7. He also further urged that the word ‘Government’ is to be interpreted in a wider amplitude since section 23-J(i) refers to “any” Government and could mean local self Government in reference to a Municipal Corporation. 8. I find that considering the term ‘Municipality’ as defined in Webster’s New Dictionary it is termed as, ‘a town, city or borough which has local self-Government’. In Black’s Law Dictionary it is extended to ‘legally incorporated or duly authorized association of inhabitants of limited area for local Government or other public purposes. A body created by the incorporation of the people of a prescribed locality invested with the subordinate powers of legislation to assist the civil Government of the State and to regulate and administer local and internal affairs of the community”. The word ‘Municipality’ thus has a wide connotation. The Constitution of India also now understands it in a broad sense. The newly introduced Chapter IX- A and the Constitution (seventy fourth Amendment) Act, 1992 which received the assent of the President on 20th April, 1993 deals with the Municipalities. Clause(e) of Article 243P defines Municipality to mean ‘an institution of self-Government constituted under Article 243Q’. The Constitution of India also now understands it in a broad sense. The newly introduced Chapter IX- A and the Constitution (seventy fourth Amendment) Act, 1992 which received the assent of the President on 20th April, 1993 deals with the Municipalities. Clause(e) of Article 243P defines Municipality to mean ‘an institution of self-Government constituted under Article 243Q’. Whereas Article 243Q indicates that a Corporation of a Municipal Council or a Nagar Panchayat is constituted on the strength of population and the area or place where it is constituted, namely rural or urban. But all the three are deemed to be municipality. A Municipal Corporation with a larger area is as much a municipality as a council with smaller area. The expression ‘Municipality in the State’ has to be read in a broad and larger sense. The constitution of such Municipalities is the mandate of the Constitution and does not depend on any law made by the Legislature. And it is in this regard that I disagree with the conclusion drawn by Hon’ble Justice S. Kemkar that the Municipal Corporation cannot be said to be an association of a number of individuals for the purpose of carrying out any trade or business, whereas MPSRTC carries on business of transport the Municipal Corporation also carries on several businesses some even for gain and profit and it is the business of the Corporation to carry on a local self-Government and other public purposes. 9. Indeed learned senior counsel Shri G.M. Chaphekar, Amicus Curiae taking a different view stated that although section 23-J(ii) contained the word “company” owned or controlled by the State Government and either of the words was not to be considered to the exclusion of the other and both drew color from each other, and it would not suffice if the ‘Corporation’ was exclusively owned by a private entity and controlled by the State and vice versa owned by the State and controlled by another agency. He submitted that both these conditions had to co-exist. He also vehemently urged that these provisions in the Municipal Corporation Act cited above are in the nature of checks and not in nature of control and that they are only corrective measures. I find that it would be futile to make such a distinction since there is not much of a difference in the two words. He also vehemently urged that these provisions in the Municipal Corporation Act cited above are in the nature of checks and not in nature of control and that they are only corrective measures. I find that it would be futile to make such a distinction since there is not much of a difference in the two words. However, the word “control” might be considered in contrast to “ownership”. In my humble opinion interpretation word ‘or’ is used specifically in section 23-J(ii) to mean that the Corporation can either be owned or controlled by the Government. Undoubtedly the Municipal Corporation is not a State owned Corporation, but as stated above the 74th Constitutional amendment was effected with a view to organize the lowest level units of self governing and administrative units of the Government. Article 243Q of the Constitution of India provides for the constitution of a Nagar Panchayat, a Municipal Council and a Municipal Corporation. 10. Thus there is no getting away from the fact that undoubtedly the Municipal Corporation is an instrumentality of the State and the State Government exercises control not only over its Constitution, but also in its conduct of business and can even dissolve the Corporation i.e., it comes into existence and can be extinguished at the will of the State Government. 11. Finally, I find substance in the contentions put forth by the Senior Counsel Shri P.K. Saxena that the aims and objectives in introducing section 23-J(ii) of the M.P. Accommodation Act should not be lost sight of. He has however, interpreted the legislative intent to facilitate the recovery of accommodation on the grounds of bona fide requirement from the civil Court or the Rent Controlling Authority by providing summary procedure since the special class of landlords are entitled to acquire the possession speedily, to mean, only such retired Government employee who wants to return his own premises after retirement. According to him, such a retired employee should not face hardship and hence welfare legislature was introduced in favour of the landlords, who were transfered to distinct places and on their return home should be rightly granted the accommodation which they had owned. He however, stressed the fact that the employees of the Municipal Corporation are generally not transferred out of the district; and hence, these provisions not meant for the benefit of retired employee of the Municipal Corporation. He however, stressed the fact that the employees of the Municipal Corporation are generally not transferred out of the district; and hence, these provisions not meant for the benefit of retired employee of the Municipal Corporation. And in this sense he agreed with the contention put for by the learned senior counsel Shri G.M. Chaphekar. 12. In my humble opinion since the provisions of section 23-J(ii) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act are meant for a special class of landlords such as a retired employees and the controversy has been set to rest in the matter of Surendra Verma vs. Ranjeet Narayan Haksar [ 1995 JLJ 460 ] (supra), regarding retired employees of the Municipal Corporation being included in the special category of under section23-J(ii) and the judgment of the apex Court had attained finality in the year 1995 itself. This judgment has not been set aside or distinguished and still holds the field and I find that the question is therefore, not justiciable whether a retired employee of the Municipal Corporation would be a retired government servant also. 13. Consequently I have already stated that I have answered the reference in the affirmative and do hereby reiterate that a retired employee of the Municipal Corporation would be eligible to make an application for eviction under Chapter III-A of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. .............