JUDGMENT : Akil Kureshi, J. The applicant seeks condonation of delay of 576 days in filing Criminal Appeal No.587 of 2013. She claims her right to file appeal as a victim. In the appeal it is the judgment of the Sessions Court dated 24.6.2011 in Sessions Case No.79 of 2010 which is under challenge. Against in all seven accused, charge was framed for offences under sections 363, 366, 376, 147, 148, 325, 324, 504, 506(2) read with section 149 of the I.P.C. The Sessions Court convicted accused Nos.3 and 5 for offences punishable under sections 324 and 325 of the I.P.C. and acquitted the rest of the accused. Accused Nos.3 and 5 also were acquitted of more serious charges under sections 363, 366 and 376 of the I.P.C. 2. For explaining the delay of 576 days, the applicant has contended that on the date of the incident i.e. 5.5.2010, she was barely aged about 15 years. On the date of judgment thus she was yet a minor. She had in the meantime got married. Once she attained majority, she decided to prefer the appeal. She was greatly encouraged by her husband to do so. It is pointed out to us that the original complainant the mother of the victim has not preferred any appeal. In brief, the contention of counsel for the applicant is that there is sufficient cause shown for preferring appeal belatedly. Counsel referred to section 6 of the Limitation Act to contend that the principle contained therein may be applied in cases covered under section 5 of the said Act and may be treated as sufficient cause. 3. On the other hand, learned counsel Shri Shrimali for the accused opposed the delay condonation application contending that for such inordinate delay of 576 days there is no explanation. The trial Court had not believed that the victim was minor at the time of incident. Her explanation is thus even otherwise false. We have also heard learned A.P.P. Ms. Punani for the State. 4. Proviso to section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure inserted by virtue of Act 5 of 2009 with effect from 31.12.2009, provides that the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation. Punani for the State. 4. Proviso to section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure inserted by virtue of Act 5 of 2009 with effect from 31.12.2009, provides that the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation. Section 2(wa) of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines the term 'victim' as to mean a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged and the expression 'victim' includes his or her guardian or legal heir. The applicant, as alleged victim of rape is thus covered by the said definition of Section 2(wa) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In terms of proviso to section 372 she therefore, has a right to appeal against the acquittal. 5. We notice that under the Limitation Act, no period of limitation has been prescribed for the victim to prefer appeal against the judgment of acquittal in terms of proviso to section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The full bench of this Court in case of Bhavuben Dineshbhai Makwana v. State of Gujarat and Ors., reported in 2013(1) GLH 265 (FB), however held that such appeal should be preferred within reasonable time and bearing in mind the provisions corresponding to provisions for limitation to appeal against acquittal, it is further held that such period should be reckoned as 90 days. It was observed as under : "(2) However, if in a given situation, the victim is not the complainant, the appeal is although against the order of acquittal, he would not be required to follow the procedure of Section 378 as that Section requires filing of leave or special leave, as the case may be, only if the appellant comes within the purview of the relevant subsections mentioned therein. A victim, who is not a complainant, will not consequently fall within any of the subsections of Section 378. It appears that the legislature was quite conscious of the necessity of the taking leave and special leave as provided in Section 378; nevertheless, it decided not to make any amendment of Section 378 while conferring right of appeal against acquittal to the victims who are not complainant requiring them the necessity of taking special leave from this court. It appears that the legislature was quite conscious of the necessity of the taking leave and special leave as provided in Section 378; nevertheless, it decided not to make any amendment of Section 378 while conferring right of appeal against acquittal to the victims who are not complainant requiring them the necessity of taking special leave from this court. The period of limitation in such a case, although is not covered by any of the Articles of the Limitation Act, should be a reasonable period and in such a situation, in our opinion the period of 90 days as provided in Article 114(a) of the Limitation Act should be the reasonable period as the said period is the longest period of limitation for filing an appeal against the order of acquittal prescribed by the legislature." 6. Question is would her minority be a sufficient cause for condoning the delay when she has preferred the appeal after attaining majority? As we have noticed, the complainant, her mother has not preferred any independent appeal nor her father preferred appeal during her minority. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 pertains to extension of prescribed period in certain cases. It provides that any appeal or application other than those provided in Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. 7. In terms of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 thus, for admitting an appeal or an application beyond the period of limitation, the appellant or the applicant, as the case may be, has to satisfy the Court that there was sufficient cause for not preferring such proceedings within the period of limitation. The term 'sufficient cause' has not been defined, but has received judicial attention in plethora of judgments. What is sufficient cause cannot be put in straitjacket but must be ascertained in facts and circumstances of each case. Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963, pertains to legal disability. The term 'sufficient cause' has not been defined, but has received judicial attention in plethora of judgments. What is sufficient cause cannot be put in straitjacket but must be ascertained in facts and circumstances of each case. Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963, pertains to legal disability. Subsection(1) thereof provides that where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of decree is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefor in the Schedule. The effect of subsection(1) of section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963, therefore, is to extend the period of limitation for filing the suit or execution proceedings where the person entitled to institute such proceedings is under legal disability, such as, being a minor, insane or idiot. If such legal disability was existing, from the time the period of limitation was to be reckoned, he would get matching period after the disability ceases. The question is, can we import the principle of section 6 of the Limitation Act into section 5 and treat it as a sufficient cause for preferring an appeal or an application beyond the period of limitation? 8. In case of Babu Ganesh Deshmukh and another v. Sitaram Martan Deshmukh, reported in AIR 1916 Bombay 153, Division Bench of Bombay High observed that the question whether sufficient cause is in the circumstances disclosed is primarily a question of discretion. In regard to the infant, there is no doubt the important consideration that the ought not, if he can be protected consistently with fairness to other people, to be pre-judicially affected by the negligence or omissions of his adult relatives. 9. In case of Mt. Umrao Begum and others v. Sheikh Rahmat Ilahi, reported in AIR 1939 Lahore 439, Division Bench observed that: "Though we consider that Section 6, Limitation Act, does not extend the period of making such applications till after minority has ceased, we consider that minority is a factor to be taken into account when considering circumstances which justify the application of Section 5, Limitation Act. We hold that application for the extension of time under Section 5 have to be more liberally construed in favour of minors than other litigants. If it were necessary therefore to invoke the provisions of Section 5 to allow time in favour of the minors, we would have no hesitation in doing so." 10. In case of Devaralinga Gowda and another v. Puttaswamy Gowda and others reported in AIR 1955 Mysore 133, it was observed that: "5. It is, however, necessary to bear in mind that when the delay affects the minors the penalty imposed is vicarious as the person in default is not the sufferer but the consequence of default is inflicted on the minors. For this reason Courts are less rigid in enforcing the bar of limitation and somewhat liberal in exercising power to condone delay when interests of minors are involved. This does not mean that such cases are exempt from the operation of law of limitation but does indicate the need to make a difference in considering delay which affects minors and adults." 11. In case of Ajit Kumar v. Narayanan and others reported in 1996 AIHC 1241, Kerala High Court observed as under: "6. Here in the present case the decree as granted was one for recovery of possession of the building and a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from trespassing into the property on which the building stood. There was some dispute regarding the ownership of the building as can be seen from the averments in the plaint, the written statement filed by the 3rd defendant and the additional written statement filed by the guardian of the minor on 13-5-1984. In the context of the case, it cannot be positively asserted that the minor would have gained nothing if the guardian had filed an appeal against the decree of the trail Court dated 21.6.1985 or that the appeal was a futile or hopeless one. Using only that yardstick and applying the principles of the decision referred to earlier and making a liberal approach to the interpretation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act with special reference to the disability of the appellant as a minor, I am of the view that this was a fit case where the lower appellate court ought to have condoned the delay in the appellant filing the appeal before that Court after attaining majority. As observed by the Supreme Court in Ramlal v. Newa Coal Fields Limited, AIR 1960 SC 261 approving the decision of the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan, (1890) ILR 13 Madras 269. Section 5 gives the Courts a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words sufficient cause receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial Justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant." Thus making a liberal approach to the interpretation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and bearing in mind that it is a quondam minor that is before the Court who in the light of the decisions referred to earlier deserves special consideration of the Court, I have no hesitation in holding that the appellant is entitled to have an opportunity to put forward his contention on merits before the lower appellate Court. In that view of the matter I set aside the order of the lower appellate Court in I.A. No.524 of 1988 and condone the delay in filling the appeal. In view of the fact that I have condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the lower Court, it is clear that the dismissal of the appeal A.S. No.82 of 1987 on the ground that is barred by limitation cannot be sustained. If so the dismissal of the appeal has also to be set aside. " 12. Few things emerge from the judicial trend noted above. The extension of period of limitation as provided in section 6 for filing the suit or execution proceedings is not strictly speaking applicable to section 5 of the Limitation Act. If the Legislature had intended to provide such absolute extension of time for filing appeals or applications, this could have been made clear in the provision itself. However, section 5 is very widely worded and permits the Court to admit the appeal or application beyond the period of limitation on sufficient cause being shown. What would be the sufficient cause must be judged in facts of each case. While doing so, it would always be open for the Court to be conscious of and alive to the philosophy contained in section 6 of the Limitation Act. What would be the sufficient cause must be judged in facts of each case. While doing so, it would always be open for the Court to be conscious of and alive to the philosophy contained in section 6 of the Limitation Act. In other words, though minority may not be a complete justification for condoning delay of inordinate period, nevertheless, can certainly be a factor which may weigh with the Court while considering the validity of the explanation rendered for making out sufficient cause for preferring the appeal beyond the period of limitation. In other words, it may not be possible as a straitjacket formula to lay down the principle that in every case, a minor after turning major may have a fresh lease of limitation for preferring appeal, nevertheless while examining the question of sufficient cause, the fact that the appellant was prevented by virtue of his or her minority to prefer appeal would certainly weigh with the Court. 13. In the present case, we notice that the allegations made in the complaint were serious, of having as many as 7 accused kidnapped and aided rape of a minor. The complainant, mother of the victim or father, if he was the guardian, did not prefer any appeal against the acquittal. Her explanation, therefore, that after attaining majority and with the encouragement of her husband, whom she married in the interregnum, she decided to prefer the appeal must form sufficient cause for not preferring appeal earlier. If we accept the contention of Shri Shrimali for the accused that as held by the trial Court she was major at the time of incident and that therefore, her explanation is false, we would be upholding the judgment of the trial Court before testing it on legal grounds. At this stage, therefore, we proceed on the basis that the applicant was a minor at the time of incident and on the date of the judgment under challenge as well. 14. Under the circumstances, delay is condoned. Rule made absolute. It is clarified that the acquittal appeal shall stand on its own merits and nothing stated in this order is meant to influence the outcome thereof. Rule made absolute.