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2013 DIGILAW 576 (KER)

Vijayan v. State of Kerala

2013-07-10

B.KEMAL PASHA, K.T.SANKARAN

body2013
Judgment : Kemal Pasha, J. 1. The accused in S.C.No.123 of 2008 of the Kottayam Sessions Division, who stands convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, has come up in appeal. 2. The accusation against the appellant is one of uxoricide. The accused, a Carpenter by profession, had always suspected the infidelity of his wife, deceased Usha. There were frequent quarrels between the appellant and the deceased at their house. The deceased contacted her mother (PW 2) and brother (PW7) who are residing at Cherthala over the phone and complained them about the harassment meted out to her by the appellant and requested PW2 to reach their house immediately. PW 7 sent PW 2 over to the house of the appellant on 16.6.2005, a Thursday. On 17.6.2005 after having lunch, PW 2 went to the nearby house of the elder brother of the appellant to watch a movie in the television. By about 4.30 pm., on hearing a scream of a woman, PW 2 rushed back to the house of the appellant. On reaching the house, she could see the deceased lying in a pool of blood in the bedroom and the accused standing near her with MO1 chisel in his hand. On seeing PW 2, the appellant declared that he has done away with her, and by dropping MO1 chisel near the body of the deceased, he stepped out of the house. The cries of PW2 invited the attention of the neighbours. 3. Among the persons gathered there, one Punnackal Prasad was also there. He went to the road for hiring a vehicle to take the deceased to the hospital, and there he could see PW 1. PW 1 came to know about the incident from the said Punnackal Prasad. Both of them hired an ambassador taxi and came to the house of the appellant. PW 1 could see the deceased lying with a severe injury on her neck, at the southern bedroom of the house. As he could realise that the deceased was lying dead, she was not taken to the hospital. The matter was informed to the police over telephone and, in turn, PW11, the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police, and the police party swiftly reached the place. PW1 furnished Ext.P1 First Information Statement before PW11 near the place of occurrence. As he could realise that the deceased was lying dead, she was not taken to the hospital. The matter was informed to the police over telephone and, in turn, PW11, the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police, and the police party swiftly reached the place. PW1 furnished Ext.P1 First Information Statement before PW11 near the place of occurrence. PW11 returned to the police station, and registered Crime No.392 of 2005 of Vaikom Police Station for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, through Ext.P1(a) First Information Report. 4. The first part of the investigation was conducted by PW13 Sub Inspector of Police, Vaikom as the Circle Inspector of Police, Vaikom was on leave for two days. PW 13 reached the scene of occurrence on 17.6.2005 itself at 6 pm. and conducted the inquest of the dead body and prepared Ext.P3 inquest report. He seized MO1 chisel found near the dead body. He further seized MO2 to MO4 ornaments, MO7 bed sheet seen spread on the cot, MO5 wrist watch found in the room and MO6 and MO8 to MO10 dress worn by the deceased. On 17.6.2005 at 8 pm., as the appellant was seen in the neighbouring property, he placed the accused under arrest through Ext.P9 arrest memo and Ext.P10 custody memo. On 18.6.2005 at 10 am., he reached the scene of occurrence and prepared Ext.P2, scene mahazar. 5. The investigation was taken over by PW 12 Circle Inspector of Police, Vaikom. He verified the investigation conducted by PW 13. He continued the investigation. PW14 Circle Inspector of Police, Vaikom, who was the successor-in-office to PW12, completed the investigation, and laid the final report. 6. On the side of the prosecution, PW 1 to PW 14 were examined and Exts.P1 to P12 were marked. MO1 to MO11 were identified. On the side of the accused, Exts.D1 and D2 were marked as contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses. Ext.C1 was marked as Court exhibit. Ext.X1 was also marked. 7. When the accused was examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he has resorted to the following contentions: "He was not present at the scene of occurrence at the time of incident. On the date of incident at 4 pm., a vessel vendor had reached the house. All what was narrated by PW2 were false. 7. When the accused was examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he has resorted to the following contentions: "He was not present at the scene of occurrence at the time of incident. On the date of incident at 4 pm., a vessel vendor had reached the house. All what was narrated by PW2 were false. He had gone to Gulf by selling the property and gold. He is mentally ill. He returned from Gulf after five years. A portion of the money which he had obtained from Gulf was given to his brothers. Even prior to the incident, PW2 was in inimical terms with him. PW2 has not cared to stay in his house even for one day. The versions of PW 3 are also false. She has a boundary dispute with him. Every year she used to encroach into a portion of his property by shifting the fencing. She had cut and removed a valuable tree from the boundary of his property and due to the intervention of politicians, she was forced to give him half the market value of the tree. Thereafter, she was nurturing an ill-will towards him. She had uttered falsehood in Court in order to wreak vengeance on him. As her property is covered by an iron fencing, it is not possible to have an easy access from her property to his property. It would take 4-5 minutes to reach the house of the accused from the house of PW3. His brother's wife Rajamma (DW 1) and Punnackal Prasad had told the police that they had suspected the vessel vendor as the culprit. The police did not care to proceed with the investigation on the said line. Police had questioned Prasad for about half an hour. It is after questioning Prasad and DW1, they had obtained the statement of PW1. It was when he came to his house without knowing anything, he was placed under arrest by the police at the courtyard of his house. He is falsely implicated in the case and he is innocent." On the side of the accused, DW 1 and DW2 were examined and Exts.D3 and D4 series were marked. The court below found the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, convicted him thereunder and sentenced him as aforesaid. 8. He is falsely implicated in the case and he is innocent." On the side of the accused, DW 1 and DW2 were examined and Exts.D3 and D4 series were marked. The court below found the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, convicted him thereunder and sentenced him as aforesaid. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant has strangely resorted to contradictory arguments in this case. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, it was a vessel vendor who has committed the offence, and the present appellant is falsely implicated in the case as the police could not trace out the said vessel vendor. A further case was forwarded by the learned counsel for the appellant that the deceased was mentally ill and the death was suicidal as the deceased herself cut her neck with MO1 chisel. Another case forwarded by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the accused is suffering from mental disorder and thereby he is entitled to the protection of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code as he was suffering from legal insanity at the time of incident. During the close of the arguments, when the learned counsel for the appellant could realise that all these arguments could not go together, the learned counsel for the appellant has confined his arguments to the protection under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code alone by leaving all his other arguments. 9. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, there is gross illegality in the prosecution case as such as the very inception of the case through Ext.P1(a) was illegal. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, PW11 who was the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police was not empowered to record Ext.P1 and to register Ext.P1(a) as he was not an officer in charge of the police station. When PW11 was examined, apart from putting certain questions relating to the contents of Ext.P1, no other questions challenging the power or authority of PW11 to record Ext.P1 or to register Ext.P1(a) were put to him. When PW11 had recorded Ext.P1, it has to be noted that either he was an officer in charge of the police station at that time or he had done it as authorised by PW13. The fact that PW12 was on leave for two days has not been challenged at all. When PW11 had recorded Ext.P1, it has to be noted that either he was an officer in charge of the police station at that time or he had done it as authorised by PW13. The fact that PW12 was on leave for two days has not been challenged at all. When PW 12 who was the Circle Inspector of Police was on leave, PW13 was in additional charge of PW 12. On going through Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it can be noted that there is no impediment at all on the part of PW11 in recording Ext.P1 and in registering Ext.P1(a). We do not find any illegality in the registration of Ext.P1(a) by PW11. 10. Another argument resorted to by the learned counsel for the appellant is that PW13 could not have conducted any investigation in the matter as it is a grave crime. It has come out that PW 12 Circle Inspector of Police was on leave for two days and that was why PW13 had to step in to conduct the inquest, to arrest the appellant and to prepare the scene mahazar. We do not find any illegality or irregularity in the said acts of PW13 in conducting the first part of the investigation in this case. 11. There is no dispute or challenge with regard to the cause of death of the deceased. PW 10 while working as Assistant Professor in Forensic Medicine at the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam conducted the autopsy of the deceased on 18.6.2005 and prepared and issued Ext.P6 postmortem certificate. He noted the following antemortem injuries on the body of the deceased: "1. Incised gaping wound 15x2.5 to 5 cms oblique on the back of neck 6cm below external occipital protuberance. Right end of the wound 5 cm below right ear and left end 3 cm below and in front of left ear. The wound cut the muscle, blood vessels and vertebral column and spinal cord at the level between 1st and 2nd cervical vertebra. 2. Incised wound 2.5x 1 cm oblique involving only upper layers of skin on the inner side of left forearm 10 cm above the elbow." His opinion as to the cause of death is that the deceased died due to the injury sustained to neck. According to PW10, injury No.1 noted in Ext.P6 is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. According to PW10, injury No.1 noted in Ext.P6 is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Further, PW10 has stated in evidence that injury No.1 could be caused by using MO1 chisel and that injury No.2 also could be caused by coming into contact with a weapon like MO1. According to him, the deceased died due to injury No.1. In cross examination, he has clearly deposed that there is only a remote possibility of self infliction of the said injury as there were no signs of hesitation cuts. He has given clear evidence that, in his opinion, injury No.1 is homicidal and not suicidal. Even without any expert opinion, on a perusal of the nature of injury No.1 noted in Ext.P6, it can be seen that it is not at all possible to cause the said injury by the deceased herself for the commission of suicide. 12. Even though the learned counsel for the appellant has resorted to a contention at the beginning that the deceased was mentally ill, later such a contention has been withdrawn. Even otherwise, there is no evidence to substantiate such a contention that the deceased was mentally ill. From the evidence discussed above, it has come out that the death of the deceased is clearly homicidal and not suicidal. 13. On going through the evidence of PW2, it can be seen that she was the first person who reached the scene of occurrence on hearing the screaming sound of the deceased. According to PW2, the appellant had always suspected infidelity on the part of the deceased. On the previous day to the death of the deceased, the deceased had contacted PW2 over the phone and complained her that the accused was quarrelling with her and requested for her presence at the house. By about noon on the previous day to the incident, PW 2 reached the house of the appellant. The appellant was engaged in his carpentry works, at the house. PW2 stayed there in the house and on the date of incident, they had breakfast and also lunch from the house. After that, PW 2 went to the neighbouring house of the brother of the appellant for watching a movie in the television as there was no cable connection to the television at the house of the appellant. PW2 stayed there in the house and on the date of incident, they had breakfast and also lunch from the house. After that, PW 2 went to the neighbouring house of the brother of the appellant for watching a movie in the television as there was no cable connection to the television at the house of the appellant. While so, she heard the scream of a woman and immediately she rushed back to the house of the appellant. She could not see the appellant at the place where he was sitting and working. She entered inside the house, and then she could see the deceased lying in a pool of blood and the accused was standing near the deceased by holding MO1 chisel. Immediately the accused told PW2 that he had done away with her. By telling that, he dropped the bloodstained MO1 chisel near the deceased, and went out. PW2 identified MO1 chisel. 14. PW1 who came to know about the incident from Punnackal Prasad reached the house of the appellant and there he could see the deceased lying dead with injury on her neck in the southern bedroom of the house. He also could see the bloodstained chisel laying near the cot on the floor. 15. PW 3 is one Bhageerathiyamma who is the immediate neighbour of the appellant. On hearing the cry of a woman, she rushed to the house of the appellant, on the date of incident. When she reached the house, she could see the appellant coming out of the house. When she asked him as to what was the reason for the cry, he told PW3 that he had murdered Usha (deceased). Further, he directed PW3 to go and telephone to the police. As she became frightened, she rushed back to her house. According to PW 3 also, the accused is a carpenter by profession. In cross examination, PW3 has answered that the cry she heard was that of PW2. On going through the evidence of PW 2 and PW 3, we do not find any reason to discredit their versions. It has clearly come out that when PW2 reached the house on hearing the screaming sound of the deceased, she could see the deceased lying in a pool of blood and the appellant standing near her with MO1 bloodstained chisel. It has clearly come out that when PW2 reached the house on hearing the screaming sound of the deceased, she could see the deceased lying in a pool of blood and the appellant standing near her with MO1 bloodstained chisel. Even without asking anything, spontaneously the appellant told PW2 that he had done away with her. The said evidence is clearly admissible in evidence as res gestae as per Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act. Further, when PW3 reached the spot, she could see the accused coming out of the house. Even though he had answered that he had murdered the deceased, it seems that the said answer was given when PW 3 asked him as to what was the cry that was heard. In such a case, the said evidence of PW3 cannot be considered as res gestae within the meaning of Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act. At the same time, it is clearly admissible in evidence as an extra judicial confession by the accused. The versions of the accused both to PW2 and PW3 by admitting that he had done away with the deceased, are clearly extra judicial confessions which are admissible in evidence. 16. Even though the learned counsel for the appellant has argued that PW 2 had never stayed at the house of the accused, the evidence of PW 7, who is the son of PW 2 and the brother of the deceased, clearly reveal that PW7 had sent PW2 to the house of the appellant on the previous day to the incident. According to PW7, the appellant suspected the chastity of the deceased. As requested by the deceased, he sent PW2 to the house of the appellant on Thursday, i.e., the previous day to the incident. There is absolutely no reason to disbelieve the consistent versions of PW 2 and PW 7 on that aspect. 17. PW4 is the son of the appellant. According to him, he along with his sister and their parents, who are none other than the accused and the deceased, were residing together at the house in question. During the period of incident, PW4 was a 9th standard student. According to him, there occurred frequent quarrels between the appellant and the deceased and that the appellant had always suspected the deceased. During the period of incident, PW4 was a 9th standard student. According to him, there occurred frequent quarrels between the appellant and the deceased and that the appellant had always suspected the deceased. It was while he was attending the tuition class around 4.45 pm., he came to know about the incident. He identified MO1 chisel as the one that was being used by the appellant for his carpentry works. He has clearly given evidence that on the date of incident, the accused, the deceased and his grandmother (PW2) were present at the house. It seems that the said versions regarding the presence of PW 2 at the house of the appellant on the date of incident as spoken to by PW4 and PW7 have not been challenged in cross examination. 18. The accused has examined his elder brother's wife Rajamma as DW 1. According to her, by about 3.30 pm., a vessel vendor had reached her house and she bought an aluminium vessel from him. Thereafter, the said vessel vendor went to the house of Jayakumar and then to the house of Appukuttan. Thereafter, the said vessel vendor went to the house of the appellant. According to her, by about 4.30 pm., she went to the house of the appellant to ask the deceased as to what was the vessel purchased by her. Then she could see the deceased lying dead on the cot. She cried aloud and then Punnackal Prasad rushed there and then he went out for procuring a car. The matter was informed to the police and they reached there by about 4.50 pm. She along with PW1 told the police that they suspected the vessel vendor. According to her, with a view to trapping the appellant, the police have not cared to take down their versions. According to her, the accused had some mental illness. But, he used to go for work. The illness was that he used to laugh much. The accused had consulted Dr.Pisharadi eight years back. During that period, the illness of the accused became cured. Even though a medicine was given by the Doctor by prescribing that he should continuously take the medicine, he discontinued it. 19. Either in the scene mahazar or in the plan prepared by the Village Officer in this case, the house of DW1 cannot be seen. During that period, the illness of the accused became cured. Even though a medicine was given by the Doctor by prescribing that he should continuously take the medicine, he discontinued it. 19. Either in the scene mahazar or in the plan prepared by the Village Officer in this case, the house of DW1 cannot be seen. All the neighbouring houses to that of the house of the appellant are shown in the scene mahazar as well as in the sketch prepared by the Village Officer. It seems that the house of DW1 is situated far away from the house of the appellant. In cross examination, she admitted that the house at the eastern side of the house of the appellant is that of Appukuttan. The house situated at the eastern side of the house of Appukuttan is that of Jayakumar. Her house is situated at the eastern side of the house of Jayakumar. The story narrated by DW 1 is not believable. 20. The accused examined one Dr.Ravipisharadi, a Consultant Psychiatrist, as DW2. According to him, he was working as the Consultant Psychiatrist in the R.C.M. Hospital, Thrippunithura on 11.12.2001. On that day, he examined the accused and found that he was suffering from delusion of infidelity. He has clearly admitted that the accused had not taken any treatment from him. The accused was brought by his brother and his wife and that medicine was given to his wife. According to him, on 17.12.2001, the brother of the accused had reported that the accused was not taking any medicine. He produced the case record which was marked as Ext.X1. In cross examination, he has clearly admitted that he has not shown any of the identification marks of the accused in Ext.X1. On a mere perusal of Ext.X1, it can be seen that the same was subsequently tampered with by somebody. Even though DW 2 has admitted that the accused had not taken any treatment from him apart from consultation, it seems that in a different ink the name of a medicine has been subsequently entered in it as against the name of the accused. It seems that a prescription of a medicine given to the deceased is incorporated in Ext.X1. Normally when such a prescription was given to a patient, it could not come back to the hospital records as the prescription was meant for purchasing medicine. It seems that a prescription of a medicine given to the deceased is incorporated in Ext.X1. Normally when such a prescription was given to a patient, it could not come back to the hospital records as the prescription was meant for purchasing medicine. The explanation given by DW2 regarding it is that it was brought back by the brother of the accused on 20.12.2005. According to him, the medicine prescribed in the said small paper is meant for hypertension. On a careful scrutiny of the evidence of DW1 and DW 2, there is absolutely nothing to show that the accused was suffering from any severe mental disorder. It is the admitted case of DW 2 that the accused had not taken any treatment from him. Further, DW1 has categorically admitted that the illness of the accused was cured during eight years back. Legal insanity is totally different from Mental insanity. The accused has failed to adduce any evidence to substantiate that he was incapable of knowing the nature and consequences of his acts at the time of incident. Even if it is admitted that eight years back he had some mental abrasion, the same is not sufficient to bring out legal insanity within the meaning of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code. 21. On an appreciation of the entire evidence in this case, it can be seen that the prosecution has clearly made out the following circumstances: (1) On the date of incident, the accused, the deceased and PW 2 were present at the house. (2) After having lunch, PW 2 went to the neighbouring house of the elder brother of the accused for watching a movie in the television. (3) While so, PW 2 heard the screaming sound of the deceased and thereby she rushed back to the house. (4) She could see the deceased lying in a pool of blood and the accused standing near her by holding MO1 bloodstained chisel. (5) MO1 chisel belongs to the accused. (6) The accused had suspected the chastity of the deceased and thereby there occurred frequent quarrels at the house. (7) On seeing PW 2, the accused told PW 2 that he has done away with her, which statement of the accused is admissible in evidence under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act as res gestae, and also as extra judicial confession. (7) On seeing PW 2, the accused told PW 2 that he has done away with her, which statement of the accused is admissible in evidence under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act as res gestae, and also as extra judicial confession. (8) After making the aforesaid statement, the accused dropped MO1 chisel there and went out of the room.(9) PW 3, the immediate neighbour, on hearing the cry of PW2 rushed to the spot and saw the accused coming out of the house. (10) On seeing PW 3, the accused told her that he had done away with Usha (deceased), when PW 3 asked him as to what was the reason for the cry. The said statement furnished by the accused is admissible in evidence as an extra judicial confession. (11) The accused has resorted to a false contention of alibi. He contended that he was not present at the scene of occurrence at the time of incident and only when he came later without knowing the incident that had occurred at the house, he was placed under arrest by the police in the courtyard of the house. (12) The deceased sustained a fatal injury on the back of her neck and the death was proved to be homicidal. (13) Injury No.1 which has resulted in the death of the deceased could be caused by using MO1 chisel. (14) The accused was arrested from the neighbouring property at 8 pm. on the date of incident itself by PW 13. 22. In Kusuma Ankama Rao v. State of A.P (2008 CRI. L.J. 3502) it was held as follows: -"The conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are: (1)the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. 22. In Kusuma Ankama Rao v. State of A.P (2008 CRI. L.J. 3502) it was held as follows: -"The conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are: (1)the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned `must' or `should' and not `may be' established; (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) The circumstances should be of conclusive nature and tendency; (4) They should exclude every other hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused an must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused." These very same principles were enunciated in Paragraph 153 of the decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. state of Maharashtra reported in 1984 SCC (Cri) 487 = AIR 1984 SC1622. 23. As held in Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of Madhya Pradesh ( AIR 1989 SC 1890 ), when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests:-1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; 2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; 3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else, and; 4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation on any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. In Vithal Tukaram Mure and others v. State of Maharashtra[(2002) 7 Supreme Court Cases 20] it was held as follows: -"The essential ingredients to prove the guilt of an accused by circumstantial evidence are:-a) the circumstances from which the conclusion is drawn should be fully proved; b) the circumstances should be conclusive in nature; c) all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt and inconsistent with innocence; d) the circumstances should to a moral certainty, exclude the possibility of guilt of any person other than the accused." 24. All the said circumstances are fully and cogently established and the said circumstances form a complete chain. Apart from it, the false contention of alibi resorted to by the accused and other false contentions taken by him clearly constitute additional links in the chain of circumstances. 25. It stands clearly proved that the contentions resorted to by the accused were false and such false contentions were deliberately resorted to by the accused. It has to be noted that when examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C, the accused has resorted to a false plea of total denial, and has also resorted to a false contention that the deceased was done away with by a vessel vendor. To all the questions relating to the aforementioned proved circumstances in this case, the accused has deliberately chosen to give the answer as, "It is not correct" or "false". 26. In Tanviben Pankajkumar Divetia v. State of Gujarat (1997 SCC(Cri) 1030), it was held in paragraph 44 as follows:-"The Court has drawn adverse inference against the accused for making false statement as recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In view of our findings, it cannot be held that the accused made false statements. Even if it is assumed that the accused had made false statements when examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the law is well settled that the falsity of the defence cannot take the place of proof of facts which the prosecution has to establish in order to succeed. A false plea may be considered as an additional circumstance if other circumstances proved and established point out the guilt of the accused. 27. A false plea may be considered as an additional circumstance if other circumstances proved and established point out the guilt of the accused. 27. In Shankaralal v. Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1981 SC 765 ), it was held in Paragraph 30 as follows:-"The last circumstance relied on by the prosecution is that the total ignorance of the incident pleaded by the appellant is false, and would itself furnish a link in the chain of causation. We have come to the conclusion that the appellant was not present in the house at the time when Sunita's dead body was discovered. That makes it impossible to hold that the appellant's plea is false. Besides, falsity of defence cannot take the place of proof of facts which the prosecution has to establish in order to succeed. A false plea can at best be considered as an additional circumstance, if other circumstances point unfailingly to the guilt of the accused". 28. In Geetha v. State of Karnataka ( AIR 2000 SC 3475 ), it was held in paragraph No.8 as follows:-"W hen all these incriminating circumstances were put to the appellant in her examination u/S. 313 Cr.P.C she merely stated that they were false and failed to give any other explanation. The prosecution evidence which has been found reliable proves that the answers given by the appellant in her 313 statement were really false. The appellant did not explain how the dead body and articles belonging to the deceased were found from her house. She denied that they were found from her house. This being the case of circumstantial evidence, this false denial assumes importance as it would supply a missing link in the chain of circumstances." 29. This being a case based on circumstantial evidence, the aforesaid false denials and false explanations resorted to by the accused assume much importance as the same would supply missing links, if any, in the chain of circumstances. It seems that the court below has considered and appreciated the entire evidence in its correct perspective and arrived at the correct finding. There is absolutely nothing to show that the deceased was mentally ill. Further, there is absolutely nothing to show that the accused was incapable of knowing the nature and consequences of his acts due to any legal insanity, at the time of incident. There is absolutely nothing to show that the deceased was mentally ill. Further, there is absolutely nothing to show that the accused was incapable of knowing the nature and consequences of his acts due to any legal insanity, at the time of incident. It has clearly come out that it was the accused and none else who caused injury No.1 found on the neck of the deceased which resulted in her death. There is evidence of sufficient motive on the part of the accused. There is absolutely no hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused. 30. It stands proved that all the circumstances are incompatible with the innocence of the accused. It stands proved that the accused has caused the death of the deceased with the intention of causing her death. Moreover, the nature of injury No.1 inflicted on the neck of the deceased clearly depicts the intention on the part of the accused in causing that bodily injury as is likely to cause the death of the deceased, with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death. Even otherwise, the said injury was intentionally inflicted and the same was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Matters being so, the finding of guilt and conclusion entered by the court below are not liable to be interfered with. 31. Regarding the sentence also, it seems that the court below has chosen the minimum prescribed under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, which is also not liable to be interfered with. This appeal is devoid of merits, and it is only to be dismissed. Per K.T.Sankaran, J. (concurring) 32. I concur with the reasoning and conclusion arrived at by Brother Justice B.Kemal Pasha. However, I think it would not be inappropriate to add a few words in order to deal with the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that the recording of the First Information Statement and registration of the First Information Report were illegal. 33. In the present case, the First Information Statement of PW 1 was recorded by PW 11, the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police. He rushed to the place of occurrence by about 4.30 pm. on 17.6.2005, on getting telephonic information in the police station about the incident. 33. In the present case, the First Information Statement of PW 1 was recorded by PW 11, the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police. He rushed to the place of occurrence by about 4.30 pm. on 17.6.2005, on getting telephonic information in the police station about the incident. At the place of occurrence, the First Information Statement was given by Satheesan, who was later examined as PW 1 in the case. The Assistant Sub Inspector of Police registered the First Information Report at 5.45 pm. on 17.6.2005, after reaching the police station. 34. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Station House Officer at Vaikom was the Circle Inspector of Police and, therefore, the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police was not empowered to register the First Information Report. It has come out in evidence of PW 12 (Circle Inspector of Police) and PW13 (Sub Inspector of Police) that the Circle Inspector of Police, Vaikom was on leave on the relevant date. PW 13, the Sub Inspector of Police, stated in cross examination that he was having the charge of the Circle Inspector of Police. PW 12 stated in cross examination that the First Information Statement should be recorded by the Station House Officer, provided he is available in the police station. PW 11 stated in the chief examination that he went to the spot on getting telephonic information. He also stated that the investigation was later conducted by the Sub Inspector of Police. 35. To comprehend the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, it would be apposite to extract the relevant portion of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (1) of Section 154 and the first proviso therein read as follows: "154. He also stated that the investigation was later conducted by the Sub Inspector of Police. 35. To comprehend the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, it would be apposite to extract the relevant portion of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (1) of Section 154 and the first proviso therein read as follows: "154. Information in cognizable cases.-- (1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf: Provided that if the information is given by the woman against whom an offence under section 326A, section 326B, section 354, section 354A, section 354B, section 354C, section 354D, section 376, section 376A, section 376B, section 376C, section 376D, section 376E or section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is alleged to have been committed or attempted, then such information shall be recorded, by a woman police officer or any woman officer:" 36. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in R.P.Kapur and others v. Sardar Pratap Singh Kairon and others ( AIR 1961 SC 1117 ) held thus: "10. We are unable to accept these contentions as correct. First of all, S. 154, Code of Criminal Procedure, does not say that an information of a cognizable offence can only be made to an officer in charge of a police station. That section merely lays down, inter alia, that every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information shall be signed by the person giving it and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in that behalf. ....." 37. ....." 37. In the case of R.P.Kapur referred to above, the petitioners who filed the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India before the Supreme Court contended that there was violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India since the cases were initiated on a petition filed before the Chief Minister of the State which was sent to the Additional Inspector General of Police, who, in turn, sent it to the Deputy Superintendent of Police C.I.D.. It was contended that adopting such a procedure was unknown to law and there was even unequal treatment so as to attract Article 14 of the Constitution of India. While dealing with that contention, the Supreme Court held as extracted above. 38. It is true that the Supreme Court took note of Section 551 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908 (which corresponds to Section 36 of the 1973 Code) which empowers the police officers superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station to exercise the same powers, throughout the local area to which they are appointed, as may be exercised by such officer within the limits of his station. 39. In Dasu and others v. State of Maharashtra (1985 CRL.L.J. 1933), a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held: "Under the provisions of S.154 Cr.P.C. it is not incumbent that the Station House Officer himself should record the F.I.R. It can be written by him or by any other officer under his direction. Consequently, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel that as the report was not reduced to writing by the Station House Officer it could not be admitted in evidence as F.I.R." 40. Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure mandates that every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction. The thrust is on the duty cast on the police officer to reduce to writing every information given to him, relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. The thrust is not on the competency or otherwise of the police officer to record the First Information Statement. The thrust is on the duty cast on the police officer to reduce to writing every information given to him, relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. The thrust is not on the competency or otherwise of the police officer to record the First Information Statement. That it is so clear from sub-section (3) of Section 154 which permits any person, aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in charge of a police station to record the information referred to in sub-section (1), to send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police. The first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 154, which was inserted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, would also lend support to the aforesaid conclusion. The first proviso stipulates that a woman police officer shall record the information given by a woman against whom an offence specified under the first proviso is alleged to have been committed. On a reading of the proviso, it is clear that such woman police officer need not necessarily be the Station House Officer. 41. The expression "Station House Officer" is defined in Section 2(o) of the Code of Criminal Procedure asfollows: "'Officer in charge of a police station' includes, when the officer in charge of the police station is absent from the station-house or unable from illness or other cause to perform his duties, the police officer present at the station- house who is next in rank to such officer and is above the rank of constable or, when the State Government so directs, any other police officer so present." The definition in clause (o) of Section 2 is an inclusive definition. It includes the police officer present at the station house who is next in rank to the officer in charge of the police station. The First Information Report in the present case contains a note made by the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police that he got information about the incident and at that time he was in charge of the police station. It is also recorded that he went to the spot and recorded the First Information Statement of PW 1. Thereafter, on reaching the police station, he registered the First Information Report. It is also recorded that he went to the spot and recorded the First Information Statement of PW 1. Thereafter, on reaching the police station, he registered the First Information Report. The note made in the First Information Report that the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police was in charge of the Police Station was not challenged in cross examination of PW 11, PW12 or PW 13. 42. For the aforesaid reasons, we reject the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. Order of Court: For the aforesaid reasons, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed.