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2013 DIGILAW 579 (KER)

Shaji v. State of Kerala

2013-07-10

ANTONY DOMINIC, P.D.RAJAN

body2013
JUDGMENT : Antony Dominic, J. The detention of one 'Pranav' under Section 3 of the Kerala Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act' for short) is challenged in this writ petition. 2. Facts of the case are that the 'Pranav' (hereinafter referred to as the 'detenu') is an accused in eight criminal cases of Anchalumoodu Police Station. Therefore, the 3rd respondent, an officer competent under Section 3(1) of the Act, submitted Ext.P5 report dated 30.11.2012 to the 2nd respondent, the detaining authority. Subsequently, the 3rd respondent made further reports dated 22.1.2013 and 8.2.2013. On that basis, on 16.2.2013, the 2nd respondent passed Ext.P1, ordering the detention of the detenu. 3. Accordingly, the detenu was arrested on 26.2.2013. By Ext.P24 order dated 7.3.2013, the Government approved the detention as provided under Section 3(3) of the Act. Thereafter, on 12.3.2013, the Government referred the matter to the Advisory Board as provided under Section 9 of the Act and the Advisory Board heard the detenu on 21.3.2013 when the detenu submitted a representation to the Board. After considering the matter and hearing the detenu, the Advisory Board submitted its report under Section 10(1) of the Act with its opinion that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the detenu. On that basis, the Government passed order dated 5.4.2013 confirming the detention as provided in Section 10(4) of the Act. 4. In the meanwhile, on 2.4.2013, the detenu submitted a representation to the jail authorities and the jail authorities forwarded the representation to the Government under cover of their letter dated 2.4.2013 and the Government received the representation on 9.4.2013. That representation was considered and was rejected by the Government by its order dated 11.4.2013. It is in the aforesaid circumstances, the petitioner, who claims to be a friend of the detenu, has filed this writ petition seeking to challenge Ext.P1 and to set the detenu at liberty by issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that none of the offences allegedly committed by the detenu are those affecting "public order" to be relied on to order detention of the detenu and that if at all the detenu is to be prevented from continuing any anti-social activities, the proceedings under the ordinary laws of the land would have been sufficient. According to him, the grounds relied on in Ext.P1 order are extraneous, invalid and vague. He also argued that Ext.P1 order of detention was not approved by the Government within the time specified in Section 3(3) of the Act and that there was delay in forwarding the representation submitted by him on 2.4.2013 to the Government. He contended that the representation was not properly considered, that the order if any passed on his representation, was not served on him and that all the documents relied on by the detaining authority were not served on the detenu. According to him, there was a long gap between the last prejudicial act and the detention order, as a result the link between the two has been snapped, rendering the detention unconstitutional and illegal. 6. Referring to the counter affidavit filed and the relevant files, the learned Government Pleader contradicted each of the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner and according to her, the order of detention is validly passed in compliance with all statutory formalities prescribed under the Act. 7. We have considered the submissions made by the counsel for the parties. 8. The first contention raised is that the offences allegedly committed by the detenu were not those affecting "public order" and therefore could not have been relied on to order his detention. Insofar as this case concerned, the detenu is an accused in eight criminal cases of the Anchalumoodu Police Station, Kollam District. However, in Ext.P1 order of detention, Crime Nos.994/2010, 799/2011, 1289/11 and 751/2012 alone were relied on to classify him as a ‘known rowdy’. Insofar as Crime No.994/2010 is concerned, the incident therein occurred on 12.9.2010 and the offences alleged are under Sections 143, 147, 341, 323, 324, 308 and 149 of IPC. This case was charge sheeted and is pending before the trial Court as S.C.No.2132/2011. The second case that is relied on is Crime No.799/2011, where the occurrence in question was on 8.7.2011 and after investigation, this case was also charge sheeted for offences under Sections 323, 324, 294(b) and 506(ii) of IPC and the case is now pending before the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court, Kollam as C.C.No.738/2012. The third case is C.C.No.216/2012 pending before the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court, Kollam, which was registered as Crime No.1289/2011. The third case is C.C.No.216/2012 pending before the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court, Kollam, which was registered as Crime No.1289/2011. The occurrence in relation to this case was on 17.11.2011 and the offences alleged are under Sections 294(b), 341, 323 and 34 of IPC. The fourth case charge sheeted before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Kollam is in relation to Crime No.751/2012, where the occurrence was on 19.7.2012 and the offences alleged are under Sections 294(b) and 506 (ii), 341 and 34 of IPC. ' 9. In addition to the aforesaid four cases, the detaining authority has also referred to the pendency of Crime Nos.115/2012, 976/2012, 1210/2012, involving offences under IPC, and 1098/2010 (under Section 107 of the Cr.P. C.), in which also, the detenu is an accused. It is taking note of the facts in all these criminal cases the detaining authority declared the detenu a ‘known rowdy’ as defined in Section 2(p) of the Act and issued Ext.P1, detaining him under Section 3(2) of the Act, in order to prevent him from continuing his anti- social activities. 10. Insofar as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the offences alleged against the detenu did not affect "public order" and therefore, could not have been relied on to order his detention is concerned, the concept of "public order" should be understood in the context of the judgments of the Apex Court, where the said expression came up for consideration. Although there are numerous judgments on the subject, which are relevant, since most of the relevant precedents have been referred to in K.K. Saravana Babu v. State of Tamil Nadu and another( (2008) 9 SCC 89 ), we would confine our examination to the principles laid down in that judgment, where it has been held thus in paragraph 15 to 31. 15. This court on several occasions examined the concepts of "law and order" and "public Order". Immediately after the Constitution came into force, a Constitution Bench of this court in Brij Bhushan and Another v. The State of Delhi (1950) SCR 605 dealt with a case pertaining to public order. The court observed that "public order" may well be paraphrased in the context as "public tranquillity". 16. Another celebrated Constitution Bench judgment of this court is in the case of Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras (1950) SCR 594. The court observed that "public order" may well be paraphrased in the context as "public tranquillity". 16. Another celebrated Constitution Bench judgment of this court is in the case of Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras (1950) SCR 594. In this case, Romesh Thappar, a printer, publisher and editor of weekly journal in English called Cross Roads printed and published in Bombay was detained under the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949. The detention order was challenged directly in the Supreme Court of India by filing a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. The allegation was that the detenu circulated documents to disturb the public tranquillity and to create disturbance of public order and tranquillity. The court observed :- (AIR p.127, para7) "7... 'Public order' is an expression of wide connotation and signifies that state of tranquillity which prevails among the members of a political society as a result of internal regulations enforced by the Government which they have established .......it must be taken that 'public safety' is used as a part of the wider concept of public order....." 7. The distinction between "public order" and "law and order" has been carefully defined in a Constitution Bench judgment of this court in Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar and Others (1966) 1 SCR 709 . In this judgment, Hidayatullah, J. by giving various illustrations clearly defined the "public order" and "law and order". Relevant portion of the judgment reads thus : (AIR pp.758-59, paras 51-52) "51....Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of disorder or only some? The answer to this serves to distinguish "public order" from "law and order" because the latter undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal passions. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be imagined. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal passions. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be imagined. The contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which subvert the public order are. A District Magistrate is entitled to take action under Rule 30(1)(b) to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances. 52. It will thus appear that just as "public order" in the rulings of this Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity than those affecting "security of State", "law and order" also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting "public order". One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order but not security of the State...." 18. In Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal (1970) 1 SCC 98 , Hidayatullah, J. again had an occasion to deal with the question of "public order" and "law and order". In this judgment, by giving various illustrations, very serious effort has been made to explain the basic distinction between "public order" and "law and order". The relevant portion reads as under : (SCC pp.99-100, para 3) "3...Public order was said to embrace more of the community than law and order. Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquillity. Public order is the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general disturbance of public tranquillity. It is the degree of disturbance and its affect upon the life of the community in a locality which determines whether the disturbance amounts only to a breach of law and order. Take for instance, a man stabs another. People may be shocked and even disturbed, but the life of the community keeps moving at an even tempo, however much one may dislike the act. Take another case of a town where there is communal tension. A man stabs a member of the other community. This is an act of a very different sort. Its implications are deeper and it affects the even tempo of life and public order is jeopardized because the repercussions of the act embrace large sections of the community and incite them to make further breaches of the law and order and to subvert the public order. An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another, but in its potentiality it may be very different. Take the case of assault on girls. A guest at a hotel may kiss or make advances to half a dozen chamber maids. He may annoy them and also the management but he does not cause disturbance of public order. He may even have a fracas with the friends of one of the girls but even then it would be a case of breach of law and order only. Take another case of a man who molests women in lonely places. As a result of his activities girls going to colleges and schools are in constant danger and fear. Women going for their ordinary business are afraid of being waylaid and assaulted. The activity of this man in its essential quality is not different from the act of the other man but in its potentiality and in its effect upon the public tranquillity there is a vast difference. The act of the man who molests the girls in lonely places causes a disturbance in the even tempo of living which is the first requirement of public order. The act of the man who molests the girls in lonely places causes a disturbance in the even tempo of living which is the first requirement of public order. He disturbs the society and the community. His act makes all the women apprehensive of their honour and he can be said to be causing disturbance of public order and not merely committing individual actions which may be taken note of by the criminal prosecution agencies. It means therefore that the question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society..." 19. The concept of 'public order' and 'law and order' has been dealt with in the case of Pushkar Mukherjee and Others v. The State of West Bengal, ( AIR 1970 SC 852 ). In this case, the Court had relied on the important work of Dr. Allen on 'Legal Duties' and spelled out the distinction between 'public' and 'private' crimes in the realm of jurisprudence. In considering the material elements of crime, the historic tests which each community applies are intrinsic wrongfulness and social expediency which are the two most important factors which have led to the designation of certain conduct as criminal. Dr. Allen has distinguished 'public' and 'private' crimes in the sense that some offences primarily injure specific persons and only secondarily the public interest, while others directly injure the public interest and affect individuals only remotely. There is a broad distinction along these lines, but differences naturally arise in the application of any such test. 20. This court in Babul Mitra alias Anil Mitra v. State of West Bengal and Others ( (1973) 1 SCC 393 ) had an occasion to deal with the question of "public order" and "law and order". The court observed that the true distinction between the areas of "law and order" and "public Order" is one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in question upon society. The court pointed out that the act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ but in its potentiality it may be very different. 21. The court pointed out that the act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ but in its potentiality it may be very different. 21. In Dipak Bose alias Naripada v. State of West Bengal (1973) 4 SCC 43 , a three-Judge Bench of this court explained the distinction between "law and order" and "public order" by giving illustrations. Relevant portion reads as under : "4. Every assault in a public place like a public road and terminating in the death of a victim is likely to cause horror and even panic and terror in those who are the spectators. But that does not mean that all of such incidents do necessarily cause disturbance or dislocation of the community life of the localities in which they are committed. There is nothing in the two incidents set out in the grounds in the present case to suggest that either of them was of that kind and gravity which would jeopardise the maintenance of public order. No doubt bombs were said to have been carried by those who are alleged to have committed the two acts stated in the grounds. Possibly that was done to terrify the respective victims and prevent them from offering resistance. But it is not alleged in the grounds that they were exploded to cause terror in the locality so that those living there would be prevented from following their usual avocations of life. The two incidents alleged against the petitioner, thus, pertained to specific individuals, and therefore, related to and fell within the area of law and order. In respect of such acts the drastic provisions of the Act are not contemplated to be resorted to and the ordinary provisions of our penal laws would be sufficient to cope with them." 22. In Kuso Sah v. The State of Bihar and Others (1974) 1 SCC 185 , this court had also considered the issue of "public order". The court observed thus: "4.These acts may raise problems of law and order but we find it impossible to see their impact on public order. The two concepts have well defined contours, it being well established that stray and unorganised crimes of theft and assault are not matters of public order since they do not tend to affect the even flow of public life. The two concepts have well defined contours, it being well established that stray and unorganised crimes of theft and assault are not matters of public order since they do not tend to affect the even flow of public life. Infractions of law are bound in some measure to lead to disorder but every infraction of law does not necessarily result in public disorder...." 23. This court in another important case Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration and Others (1982) 2 SCC 403 clearly spelled out a distinction between 'law and order' and 'public order'. In this case, the court observed as under :- "13. The true distinction between the areas of "public order" and "law and order" lies not in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction between the two concepts of "law and order" and "public order" is a fine one but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping. Acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of law and order, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself therefore is not detrimental of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order...." 24. It has to be seen whether the detenu's activity had any impact on the local community or to put it in the words of Hidayatullah, J., had the act of the detenu disturbed the even tempo of the life of the community of that specified locality? 25. Mr. Ahmadi, learned counsel for the detenu submitted that the detenu was in jail at the time when the detention order was passed. His three bail applications were rejected. Since there was no bail application pending, therefore, there was no imminent possibility of his being released by the court. The detenu's coming out on bail was merely ipse dixit of the detaining authority unsupported by any material whatsoever. There was no cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which the detaining authority could be satisfied that the detenu was likely to be released on bail. The detenu's coming out on bail was merely ipse dixit of the detaining authority unsupported by any material whatsoever. There was no cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which the detaining authority could be satisfied that the detenu was likely to be released on bail. In absence of any such material on record, the mere ipse dixit of the detaining authority is not sufficient to sustain the order of detention. 26.The learned counsel for the detenu also placed reliance on Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah and Others (1985) 4 SCC 232 . In this case the court observed as under :- "6. The order of detention was passed as the detaining authority was apprehensive that in case the detenu was released on bail he would again carry on his criminal activities in the area. If the apprehension of the detaining authority was true, the bail application had to be opposed and in case bail was granted, challenge against that order in the higher forum had to be raised. Merely on the ground that an accused in detention as an under-trial prisoner was likely to get bail an order of detention under the National Security Act should not ordinarily be passed. We are inclined to agree with counsel for the petitioner that the order of detention in the circumstances is not sustainable and is contrary to the well settled principles indicated by this Court in a series of cases relating to preventive detention. The impugned order, therefore, has to be quashed." 27. Mr. Ahmadi, the learned counsel further placed reliance on Binod Singh v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, Bihar and Others (1986) 4 SCC 416 . In this case, the court observed as follows :-(SCC pp.420-21, para 7) "7. It is well settled in our constitutional framework that the power of directing preventive detention given to the appropriate authorities must be exercised in exceptional cases as contemplated by the various provisions of the different statutes dealing with preventive detention and should be used with great deal of circumspection. There must be awareness of the facts necessitating preventive custody of a person for social defence. If a man is in custody and there is no imminent possibility of his being released, the power of preventive detention should not be exercised. There must be awareness of the facts necessitating preventive custody of a person for social defence. If a man is in custody and there is no imminent possibility of his being released, the power of preventive detention should not be exercised. In the instant case when the actual order of detention was served upon the detenu, the detenu was in jail. There is no indication that this factor or the question that the said detenu might be released or that there was such a possibility of his release, was taken into consideration by the detaining authority properly and seriously before the service of the order. A bald statement is merely an ipse dixit of the officer. If there were cogent materials for thinking that the detenu might be released then these should have been made apparent. Eternal vigilance on the part of the authority charged with both law and order and public order is the price which the democracy in this country extracts from the public officials in order to protect the fundamental freedoms of our citizens. In the affidavits on behalf of the detaining authority though there are indications that transfer of the detenu from one prison to another was considered but the need to serve the detention order while he was in custody was not properly considered by the detaining authority in the light of the relevant factors. At least the records of the case do not indicate that. If that is the position, then however disreputable the antecedents of a person might have been, without consideration of all the aforesaid relevant factors, the detenu could not have been put into preventive custody. Therefore, though the order of preventive detention when it was passed was not invalid and on relevant considerations, the service of the order was not on proper consideration." 28. In Commissioner of Police and Others v. C. Anita (Smt.) (2004) 7 SCC 467 , this court again examined the issue of "public order" and "law and order" and observed thus : (SCC pp.471-72, para 7 "7.....The crucial issue is whether the activities of the detenu were prejudicial to public order. While the expression "law and order" is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order, "public order" has a narrower ambit, and public order could be affected by only such contravention which affects the community or the public at large. While the expression "law and order" is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order, "public order" has a narrower ambit, and public order could be affected by only such contravention which affects the community or the public at large. Public order is the even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. The distinction between the areas of "law and order" and "public order" is one of the degree and extent of the reach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. If a contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of the public, it could raise problem of law and order only. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps to distinguish it as an act affecting "public order" from that concerning "law and order". The question to ask is : "Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of the society undisturbed?" This question has to be faced in every case on its facts." 29. In R. Kalavathi v. State of Tamil Nadu ( (2006) 6 SCC 14 ), this court while dealing with the case affecting the public order observed that even a single act which has the propensity of affecting the even tempo of life and public tranquillity would be sufficient for detention. 30. Mr. Ahmadi, the learned counsel for the detenu placed reliance on T.V. Saravanan alias S.A.R. Prasana Venkatachaariar Chaturvedi v. State through Secretary and Another (2006) 2 SCC 664 . In this case the court observed that when the detenu was already in custody, there was no imminent possibility of his being released. In that event it would not be appropriate to pass order of detention against him. In this case the court observed that when the detenu was already in custody, there was no imminent possibility of his being released. In that event it would not be appropriate to pass order of detention against him. This proposition of law also seems to be well-settled, but in view of the fact that the detenu succeeded in his threshold submission that the detention order passed against him was arbitrary, illegal and unsustainable because even assuming the allegation in both the cases relied on by the detaining authority are correct then also no case of disturbance of public order is made out. 31. We have tried to deal with the important cases dealing with the question of "law and order" and "public order" right from the case of Romesh Thappar (supra) to the latest case of R. Kalavathi (supra). This court has been consistent in its approach while deciding the distinction between 'law and order' and 'public order'. According to the crystallized legal position, cases affecting the public order are those which have great potentiality to disturb peace and tranquillity of a particular locality or in the words of Hidayatullah, J. disturb the even tempo of the life of the community of that specified locality." 11. Principles laid down in the aforesaid judgment shows that "public order" is distinct and different from "law and order" and the Apex Court has consciously observed that "public order" may well be paraphrased in the context of legislations such as the Act as "public tranquillity". Therefore, any act, which adversely affects the public tranquillity of an area is an act affecting public order of the area. Insofar as this case is concerned, the facts narrated in Ext.P1 order itself would show that various crimes have been allegedly committed by the detenu, in public places and in day light and as a result, the people in the locality are terrorized and that because of these acts, tranquillity in the area is affected. This certainly shows that the acts allegedly committed by the detenu, irrespective of its gravity, are those, which disturbed the even tempo of life of the community, which undoubtedly are acts prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order, the maintenance of which, is essential for the orderly life in the society. This certainly shows that the acts allegedly committed by the detenu, irrespective of its gravity, are those, which disturbed the even tempo of life of the community, which undoubtedly are acts prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order, the maintenance of which, is essential for the orderly life in the society. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the offences alleged against the detenu are not those which threatened the public order to invite an order of preventive detention. 12. Even otherwise, this argument deserves to be rejected, in view of the principles laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in Shruthi v. State of Kerala ( 2009 (4) KLT 893 ). In that judgment, referring to the provisions of the Act and rejecting similar contentions, this Court held thus: 20. But we are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner in the challenge raised by him on ground No.II that even while considering whether a person is a rowdy under S.2(t) or whether he is consequently a goonda under S.2(j) and known goonda or known rowdy under Ss.2(o) and 2(p) , the acts alleged must reveal organised criminal activity and must threaten public order and not merely law and order. 21. The scheme of the Act must be borne in mind. Undoubtedly to constitute anti-social activity under S.2(a) and to come within the purview of the descriptive former part of the definition of goonda in S.2(j), the acts alleged must threaten maintenance of public order. But the language of S.2(t) which we have extracted above does not at all import the requirement that the offences specified therein must also threaten maintenance of public order and not merely law and order. The language does not at all insist that the offences under S.2(t) must be offences committed by a person as part of organised criminal activity. The plain language of S.2(t) does not permit us to insist on such a requirement. Consequently a 'rowdy' who gets included in the definition of 'goonda' in 2(j) by operation of the latter inclusive (deeming) part of the definition cannot insist that he is not a 'rowdy' or 'goonda' for the reason that any or all the offences alleged against him referred to in S.2(t) do not refer to organised criminal activity or do not threaten maintenance of public order. A detenu - either a known goonda or known rowdy cannot validly urge that he is not a known goonda or known rowdy for the reason that the cases relied on against him under S.2(t), 2(p) or 2(o) are cases which do not reveal commission of organised crime and they do not pose any threat to public order. That does not appear to be the scheme of the Act at all. Initial threshold satisfaction that a person is a known goonda or a known rowdy must certainly be entertained by the detaining authority. To entertain that, the detenu need only satisfy the definition of goonda and known goonda or rowdy and known rowdy. The definitions of these expressions in 2(j) (inclusive latter part) and 2(o) as also 2(t) and 2(p) do not at all demand that the offences referred to therein must also be instances of organised crime or that they must threaten public order. Such a requirement cannot be read into the definition of 'rowdy' in S.2(t) or known rowdy in 2(p) or even the definition of goonda in S.2(j) (inclusive latter half) and known goonda in 2(o). Of course, we repeat that while considering the latter subjective satisfaction, it will certainly have to be considered whether the subjective satisfaction of the need to preventively detain the detenu is entertained on grounds/past conduct which are likely to threaten public order in future. For the aforesaid reasons, the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is liable to be rejected and we do so. 13. The second contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that Ext.P1 order does not state why the ordinary penal laws of the land would not suffice to prevent the detenu and that therefore, his detention is illegal. This argument was raised mainly on the ground that in Crime No.108/2010, proceedings have been initiated against the detenu under Section 107 of the Cr.P.C. and that therefore, the authorities should have concluded those proceedings rather than detaining him under the Act. However, a reading of Ext.P1 order itself show that though the proceedings under Section 107 were initiated on 8.10.2010, even after lapse of almost 3 years since then, there has not been any progress in the matter. The detenu also did not have a case ohterwise. However, a reading of Ext.P1 order itself show that though the proceedings under Section 107 were initiated on 8.10.2010, even after lapse of almost 3 years since then, there has not been any progress in the matter. The detenu also did not have a case ohterwise. Therefore, on account of the lethargy on the part of the respondents in concluding the proceedings under Section 107 proceedings of Cr.P.C., the detenu had the opportunity to continue his anti-social activities. Therefore, if the respondents are to wait for the conclusion of the Section 107 proceedings, until such time, the society will be exposed to the danger caused by the detenu. Although the rights of the detenu are precious for him, the Society is also entitled to be safeguarded from the anti-social activities of the persons like the detenu as well. In such circumstances, in our view, the fact that proceedings under Section 107 initiated against him are pending without any progress, is of no avail to the detenu, at least in the facts of this case. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner then contended that the grounds relied on are extraneous, invalid and vague and that therefore, the order of detention is illegal. The expression ‘known rowdy’ and 'rowdy' are defined in Section 2(p) and 2(t) of the Act respectively. Section 2(t), which defines ‘rowdy' specifies the types of offences, which can be reckoned to classify a person as ‘rowdy' and Section 2(p) specifies the number of cases etc required to classify a 'rowdy' as a ‘known rowdy’. Petitioner has no case that the offences, which are alleged against him in the four crimes relied on against him, do not fall under the provisions, which are specified in Section 2 (t) of the Act. Once that legislative specification is satisfied, a detenu cannot argue that in his view the offences are not grave enough and therefore, are extraneous and invalid to render his detention illegal and unconstitutional. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner then contended that Ext.P1 order of detention was not approved by the Government in time and that therefore, his continued detention was unconstitutional. The provision for approval of detention is contained in Section 3(3) of the Act, which reads thus: "3. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner then contended that Ext.P1 order of detention was not approved by the Government in time and that therefore, his continued detention was unconstitutional. The provision for approval of detention is contained in Section 3(3) of the Act, which reads thus: "3. Power to make orders for detaining Known Goondas and Known Rowdies.- (1) xx xx xx (2) xx xx xx (3) When any order is made under this section by the authorised officer under sub-section (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the Government and the Director General of Police, Kerala, together with a copy of the order and supporting records which, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter and no such order shall remain in force for more than 12 days, excluding public holidays, from the date of detention of such Known Goonda or Known Rowdy, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the Government or by the Secretary, Home Department if generally so authorised in this regard by the Government." Reading of this Section shows that when an order of detention is made by the authorised officer under Section 3(2) of the Act, he shall forthwith report the fact to the Government and to the other authorities mentioned therein, together with a copy of the order and supporting records, which, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter and that such order shall not remain in force for more than 12 days, excluding public holidays, from the date of detention, unless, in the meantime, the order has been approved by the Government or by the Secretary, Home Department, if generally so authorized in this regard by the Government. Therefore, an order of detention should be approved by the Government within 12 days of its execution, excluding the public holidays. 16. Insofar as this case is concerned, Ext.P1 order of detention was issued on 16.2.2013 and Exts.P3 and P4 are the communications issued by the detaining authority to the Commissioner of Police and to the Superintendent of Central Prison. In this order, the detaining authority has stated that unless the order of approval is received within 12 days, the detention will not be valid after the said 12 days. In this order, the detaining authority has stated that unless the order of approval is received within 12 days, the detention will not be valid after the said 12 days. He further stated that if no order from the appropriate authority approving the detention is received before the end of 12 days, the detenu shall be set free. According to the petitioner, on the strength of Ext.P1 order, he was arrested on 26.2.2013 and Ext.P24 order of approval was received in the jail only on 21.3.2013. On this basis, it is contended that the detention order was not approved within 12 days as provided under Section 3(3) of the Act and therefore, on the expiry of the 12th day, the detenu should have been set at liberty. 17. Admittedly, Ext.P24 is the order issued by the Government approving the detention as provided under Section 3(3) of the Act. That order is dated 7.3.2013. Evidently, therefore, Government by order dated 7.3.2013, approved the detention as provided under the Act. This means that by issuing this order on 7.3.2013, the Government discharged their duty under Section 3(3) of the Act and this was done within 12 days from 26.2.2013 when the detenu was detained. The contention of delay is raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the basis that Ext.P24 order was received by the jail authorities only on 21.3.2013. In this context we should state that we have not been shown any authority to take the view that the Government is also required to communicate its order to the detenu, within the 12 days specified. If that be so, since approval has already been accorded by the Government on 7.3.2013, what happened subsequent thereto, at best, is only the delay in communicating the order and that delay cannot have any impact on the legality of the approval already granted by the Government. From the files produced by the learned Government Pleader, we also found that even though Ext.P24 was received by the jail authorities only on 21.3.2013, a copy of Ext.P24 order was served on the detenu and he acknowledged the same by affixing his signature on 12.3.2013 itself. In such circumstances, we are not impressed by the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 18. In such circumstances, we are not impressed by the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 18. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that since it was stated in Exts.P3 and P4 that if order of approval was not received within 12 days of detention, on the expiry of the 12th day, the detenu should be set at liberty, the detenu should not have been detained beyond the 12th day. In our view, this contention has no factual basis for the reason that the Government had accorded its approval within the 12 days period specified in Section 3(3) of the Act. Further, the Act does not provide that if order of approval is not communicated within 12 days of detention, the detenu should be set free. Therefore, the statement to that effect contained in Exts.P3 and P4, are ultra vires the statutory provisions and hence, are inconsequential. For that reason also, we are unable to accept this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner then contended that there was delay in forwarding his representation to the Government. According to him, the detenu submitted representation dated 2.4.2013 to the jail authorities and the Government received the representation only on 9.4.2013. It is stated that before the receipt of his representation, the Government issued order dated 5.4.2013 confirming the detention as provided under Section 10(4) of the Act. On this factual basis, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was two fold. According to him, firstly, there was delay in forwarding his representation to the Government and secondly, the confirmation order was issued without considering the grounds urged by him in his representation. Section 7 of the Act provides that the grounds of detention should be disclosed to the detenu. Section 7(2) provides that the ground of detention with copies of relevant documents, as far as practicable, shall be furnished to the detenu, as soon as possible and in any case within 5 days of detention and ‘he shall also be informed in writing, under acknowledgment, of his right to represent to the Government and before the Advisory Board against the arrest and detention'. Section 9 provides for reference to the Advisory Board and as per this Section, in every case, where a detention order has been made under the Act, the Government shall, within three weeks from the date of detention of a person, place before the Advisory Board "the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected, and, in case where the order has been made by an authorized officer, the report of such officer under Section 3(3)". Section 10 deals with the procedure of the Advisory Board and further action. As per this provision, once the reference is received by the Board, it shall after considering the reference and the materials placed before it and after calling for such further information as it may deem necessary from the Government or from any other person and after hearing the detenu, if he so desires, prepare its report in the manner as provided therein as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned. It shall thereupon submit its report to the Government within nine weeks from the date of detention. Sub Section 4 provides that in every case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit and that in case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its opinion, no sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned, the Government shall revoke the detention order and release the person forthwith. 20. A combined reading of Sections 7, 9 and 10 of the Act would therefore, show that the constitutional right of a person detained on the strength of an order for his preventive detention, under Article 22(5) is statutorily recognised in Section 7(2) of the Act. However, the legislature has imposed a reasonable restriction on such right by specifying the stage at which such right to make representation is to be exercised by the detenu. This has been done by providing in Section 9 that while making reference to the Advisory Board, the Government shall also forward the representation, if any, made to it by the person affected. This has been done by providing in Section 9 that while making reference to the Advisory Board, the Government shall also forward the representation, if any, made to it by the person affected. In other words, the representation, which a detenu is entitled to make to the Government under Section 7(2) of the Act has to be made by him before the Government refers the matter to the Advisory Board for its opinion under Section 10 of the Act. 21. Insofar as this case is concerned, from the sequence of events, which we have narrated in the earlier part of this judgment, it can be seen that, by Ext.P24 order dated 7.3.2013, the Government approved the detention order. Thereafter, reference to the Advisory Board was made on 12.3.2013 and the Board heard the detenu on 21.3.2013 when, in exercise of his right under Section 7(2) of the Act, he made a representation to the Board. It is long thereafter that the detenu submitted representation dated 2.4.2013, which was received by the Government on 9.4.2013. Obviously, therefore, the representation was made after reference was made by the Government and long after the report was made by the Advisory Board on 23.3.2013. In such a situation, the representation in question made on 21.4.13, in our view, was not only belated, but was also one bereft of any statutory flavour under Section 7(2) of the Act and therefore, the delay, if any, in its communication or receipt by the Government cannot invalidate the order of detention. 22. In view of the above conclusion that we have reached, we do not think that it is necessary to deal with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Government did not explain the delay in receiving the representation nor do we think it necessary to deal with the judgments in Siji Martin v. State of Kerala ( 2012 (3) KLT 536 ) and Pebam Ningol Mikoi Devi v. State of Manipur( (2010) 9 SCC 618 ) relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this context. 23. It was then contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that even the representation dated 2.4.13, which was rejected by order dated 11.4.13 did not receive a proper consideration. 23. It was then contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that even the representation dated 2.4.13, which was rejected by order dated 11.4.13 did not receive a proper consideration. Counsel relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Babu M v. State of Kerala and Others ( 2010(1) KHC 214 ) to impress upon us the nature of consideration that a representation made by the detenu in a case of preventive detention should receive. We have considered this contention of the learned counsel. We do agree that as held by the Apex Court that representation made by a detenu in a case of preventive detention should have a real and proper consideration although the order that is to be passed by the authority concerned need not be a speaking order. However, this contention of the learned counsel can be answered only with reference to the relevant averments in the counter affidavit and the order dated 11.4.13 passed by the Government. 24. The file containing order dated 11.4.13 was made available by the learned Government Pleader. It is revealed that the order was issued by the Principal Secretary, Home Department, which shows that the representation was considered by the Principal Secretary and that on examination he found that the cases in which the detenu is involved satisfied the requirements of Section 2(p)(iii) of the Act and on that basis, he was satisfied that the materials relied on qualified the detenu to be a 'known rowdy'. On verification of the records, he was also satisfied that for maintenance of public order and law and order, it was necessary to detain the detenu. On that basis, he has concluded the detention order to be a legal one. The Government therefore shows that although the representation dated 2.4.13 made by the detenu was not a statutory one, still that did get a real and proper consideration at the hands of the Government. This stand of the Government is reiterated in para 9 of the counter affidavit filed by the 1st respondent also. Therefore, we are not persuaded to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the representation dated 2.4.13 was not properly considered. 25. This stand of the Government is reiterated in para 9 of the counter affidavit filed by the 1st respondent also. Therefore, we are not persuaded to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the representation dated 2.4.13 was not properly considered. 25. The next contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the first paragraph of Ext.P1 detention order stated that after Ext.P5 report was made by the sponsoring authority, he made further reports dated 22.1.13 and 8.2.13 and according to the learned counsel, copies of these further reports were not furnished to the alleged detenu. Therefore, he argued that documents relied on were not supplied to the alleged detenu and that vitiated the detention order illegal. It was in this context that the counsel relied on para 29 of the Apex Court judgment in Thahira Haris v. Government of Karnataka ((2009) 11 SC 438) which reads thus; "There were several grounds on which the detention of the detenu was challenged in these appeals but it is not necessary to refer to all the grounds since on the ground of not supplying the relied upon document, continued detention of the detenu becomes illegal and the detention order has to be quashed on that ground alone." 26. This judgment reiterates the requirement of serving on the detenu the documents that are relied on against him. However, the question is whether there is any violation of that principle in so far as this case is concerned. 27. This contention is belied by the list of the documents supplied to the alleged detenu, which has been produced by the petitioner himself along with his reply affidavit. From the contents of this list, it is seen that the subsequent two reports of the sponsoring authority were given to the detenu and are included at Sl.Nos.4 and 5 of the list. 28. In this context, counsel also contended that documents in relation to Section 107 Cr.P.C proceedings were also relied on in Ext.P1 order and that it was not served on the detenu. 28. In this context, counsel also contended that documents in relation to Section 107 Cr.P.C proceedings were also relied on in Ext.P1 order and that it was not served on the detenu. In Ext.P1 order what is stated by the detaining authority is that though Section 107 proceedings have been initiated against the detenu on 18.7.2010 and are pending before Sub Divisional Magistrate, Kollam, there has not been any progress in the matter and it was therefore that he was satisfied that in spite of the above, the detenu should be detained under the Act. This therefore means that the detaining authority did not rely on the 107 Cr.P.C proceedings and only if the detaining authority had relied on such proceedings, detaining authority would have been obliged to supply the documents in relation thereto to the detenu in compliance with the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the judgment referred to above. Further, if the document in relation to Crime No.1098/10 was of any advantage to the detenu and if he wanted to rely on the same, it was for him to have made a request to the detaining authority or the Government to supply him those documents, which also was not done. Therefore, we are not prepared to accept the case of the petitioner on this count also. 29. The last contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the last prejudicial act alleged against the detenu was on 23.10.12 and the detention order having been passed only on 16.2.13, the line between the last prejudicial act and the detention order is snapped and therefore the detention order is vitiated. Here again, if one is to straight away accept the contention of the counsel without going into the details, it would appear that there is substance in what is contended, particularly having regard to the principles laid down by this Court in para 13 of the judgment in Jimesh Jose v. State of Kerala and Others, 2013(1) KHC 49 . 30. However, the materials before this Court show that following the last prejudicial act which took place on 23.10.12, Ext.P5 report was made by the sponsoring authority on 30.11.12 and further reports were made by him on 22.1.13 and 8.2.13. It was thereafter that the detention order was passed on 16.2.13. 30. However, the materials before this Court show that following the last prejudicial act which took place on 23.10.12, Ext.P5 report was made by the sponsoring authority on 30.11.12 and further reports were made by him on 22.1.13 and 8.2.13. It was thereafter that the detention order was passed on 16.2.13. Further the affidavit filed by the 1st respondent shows that it took time for the authority to apply his mind to all relevant aspects of the matter and pass an order. Therefore, we are of the view that the delay, if at all, stands explained in this case and for that reason, this contention does not merit acceptance. 31. In the result, we are unable to accept the case of the petitioner that Ext.P1 order is vitiated on any one of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Resultantly, writ petition will stand dismissed.