Order Other defect ignored except maintainability. Heard counsel for the parties. 2. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred under clause 10 of the Letters Patent as well as under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, for which office has raised objection about the maintainability of this L.P.A. because of the reason that the appellants have challenged the order dated 7.1.2013, by which in the contempt proceedings initiated suo motu by the Court, order was passed for issuance of warrant of arrest (non-bailable) against the contemnor, Shree Prakash Singh @ Shree Babu and same order was also passed for the appellant no. 2, Shekhar Singh. In addition to the above, further direction was issued that contemnor no. 2, Shekhar Singh, was evading his presence, process under section 82 Cr.PC be initiated and thereafter process under section 83 Cr.P.C. be issued. 3. Learned counsel for the State also vehemently submitted that this L.P.A. is not maintainable, in view of various judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is also pointed out that the Registrar General of the High Court has wrongly been added as respondent no. 1. It has further been submitted that the L.P.A. is not supported by any affidavit of the appellants but an affidavit has been filed by one, Reshma Singh, daughter of one of the appellants and therefore, it is also clear that the L.P.A. is not maintainable. 4. Learned counsel for the State relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of Midnapore Peoples' Co-Op. Bank Ltd. & Ors. VS. Chunilal Nanda & Ors. reported in (2006)5 SCC 399, wherein the issues have been considered in detail and specifically it has been held that neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt, nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt, nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appeal-able under section 19 and in special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. It is specifically held that an appeal under section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. It is specifically held that an appeal under section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. The same view had been taken earlier also in various judgments by Hon'ble Supreme Court including the judgments delivered in cases of State of Maharashtra vs. Mahboob S. Allibhoy & Anr. reported in AIR 1996 SC 2131 and of J.S. Parihar vs. Ganpat Duggar & Ors. reported in (1996)6 SCC 291 . Division Bench of this Court also followed the same view in the case of Bashisth Narayan @ Bashisth Narain Prasad VS. Sri A.K. Upadhyaya reported in [2005(1) JCR 466 (Jhr.)] [: 2004(1) JLJR 389 ]. 5. Learned counsel for the State further vehemently submitted that respondent-appellants have committed grave contempt on the face of the Court before the learned single Judge and therefore, the Court had no option but to initiate contempt proceedings suo motu and the conduct of the appellants is glaring that they evaded their appearance soon after the order of initiation of contempt proceeding was passed by the learned single Judge and before that, they physically appeared before the Court. Learned counsel for the State further submitted that appellants in para 4 of the L.P.A. stated absolutely wrong facts that appellant no. 1, grandfather of the children of Shekhar Singh and Nidhi Singh, had no concern with custody and guardianship of the children, which is, according to the learned counsel for the State, just contrary to the stand taken by the appellants in criminal writ petition and before the learned Single Judge. It is also submitted that false facts have been stated in para G of the grounds taken in memo of appeal. It is also submitted that for this, further contempt can be initiated against the appellants. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants, in reply to the office objection and objection raised by the learned counsel for the State, vehemently submitted that writ petitioner filed a criminal writ petition being W.P.(Cr.) No. 230/2011, to challenge the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bokaro, whereby C.J.M., Bokaro, directed for issuance of search warrant under Section 97 Cr.P.C. in respect of three children who were born on 15.12.2005, 25.7.2007 and 3.11.2009 out of the wedlock of the son of the petitioner. Learned C.J.M. further directed to hand over minor children to the respondent-mother of the children. That criminal writ petition is still pending. However, during the pendency of criminal writ petition, this proceeding was initiated. By the order dated 8th November, 2012, it is submitted that in fact, it is nothing but execution of the order passed by the C.J.M. by way of initiation of contempt proceeding. It is also submitted that the procedures, as prescribed under High Court of Jharkhand Rules, 2001 pertaining to the proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, have not been followed and the appellants already appeared through counsel but that appearance has not been accepted by the learned Single Judge for no valid reasons. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that the appellant no. 1 is suffering from kidney problems and for one day had been admitted to hospital also. However, it is not in dispute that the appellant no. 1 on earlier occasion physically appeared before the learned single Judge in Court during the course of hearing of the criminal writ petition filed by the appellants. However, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that learned single Judge should have heard the contempt proceeding as in the contempt proceeding, the appellants are appearing through their Advocate and had put their case before the learned single Judge. It is also submitted that learned single Judge committed grave error of law in directing for issuance of processes under section 82 and further under section 83 Cr.PC. Learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of R.N. Dey & Ors. vs. Bhagyabati Pramanik & Ors. reported in (2000)4 SCC 400 , wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that when the Court either suo motu or on a motion or a reference, decides to take action and initiate proceedings for contempt, it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt and the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt and if the order is passed not discharging the rule issued in contempt proceedings, it would be an order or decision in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt and therefore, according to the learned counsel for the appellants, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the appeal would be maintainable in such circumstances. 7. 7. We considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the facts of the case. We need to recapitulate all the facts leading to this unfortunate controversy and that too, where three minor children are affected parties. The C.J.M. passed the order as back as on 1st August, 2011 and directed to hand over the minor children to the mother. That order was under challenge before the Learned single Judge in W.P.(Cr.) No. 230/ 2011. That matter was heard by learned single Judge and the order was pronounced on 31st October, 2012, wherein itself learned single Judge held that the Court is not inclined to set aside the impugned order but latter part of the order whereby the lower court has decided about the custody of the children is set aside. However, learned single Judge was of the view that since the petition has been preferred before the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court feels in the interest and welfare of those three children that they shall be given in the custody of the mother till the issue of guardianship is decided by a competent of court of law. The appellants, Shree Prakash Singh @ Shree Babu and Shekhar Singh are grandfather and father respectively of the three children and they were directed to produce all three children before the Court in order to hand over the children to their mother with liberty to the grandfather and father to visit the place of stay of the children at an interval of two months, preferably on the weekend and thereafter, the Court put the matter to see compliance of the order passed by it and posted it on 7th November, 2012. The order dated 31st October, 2012 is not interim order and has not been challenged and it has attained the finality. 8. Therefore, submission of learned counsel for the appellants that criminal writ petition, W.P. (Cr.) No. 230/2011, is still pending is factually wrong. The order dated 31st October, 2012 is not interim order and has not been challenged and it has attained the finality. 8. Therefore, submission of learned counsel for the appellants that criminal writ petition, W.P. (Cr.) No. 230/2011, is still pending is factually wrong. On 8th November, 2012, the matter was taken up by learned single Judge upon filing of L.A. No.1653/2012, which was filed by the mother of the children stating therein that the writ petitioner is intentionally disobeying the order of the Court dated 31st October, 2012 and has illegally and wrongfully confined the three children in their custody and therefore, warrant of arrest be issued for compliance of the order dated 31st October, 2012 passed in writ jurisdiction. By filing reply to the said I.A. the writ petitioner, now contemnor, had shown willingness to produce their children and indicated that reservation was not available and therefore, two children were not produced and the girl child was ill. The Court took note of the fact in the order dated 8th November, 2012 that on earlier occasion, the writ petitioner, now contemnor, had shown air tickets as to how the children are being taken care of and what sorts of communication and facilities is being given to them but at present they have shown their inability to produce the children because they could not get reservation. Learned single Judge in the order dated 8th November, 2012 observed as under:- “...I had experienced, while hearing aforesaid application, the attitude and tendency of the petitioner and his family members who were always appearing to the Court either in person or through the lawyer with an intention to flouting the Court's order by one way or the other, by one means or the other and to some extent till the date they have succeeded in their mission....” Thereafter, learned single Judge further observed as under:- “.... It is another unfortunate incident which occurred yesterday when the conducting counsel did not appear rather, another counsel from Patna namely Shri Bhshnu Shankar Prasad came and submitted that the petitioner wants to prefer Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Apex Court for which time may be allowed. It is another unfortunate incident which occurred yesterday when the conducting counsel did not appear rather, another counsel from Patna namely Shri Bhshnu Shankar Prasad came and submitted that the petitioner wants to prefer Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Apex Court for which time may be allowed. Again in the open Court, it was directed to comply order dated 31.10.2012 and the learned counsel who was present yesterday assured the Court that the three children will be produced by today and on his prayer, this case was fixed under the heading for 'Orders' and put at 3.00 p.m. Learned counsel appearing from Patna is present today but he has no explanation as to why the Order dated 31.10.2012 has not been complied with or as to what happened to the assurances given by him yesterday.....” 9. After observing so, learned single Judge found that it is a fit case in which suo motu contempt proceeding should be initiated against the petitioner, who has, knowing fully well, intentionally avoided to comply the order and as a result, contempt notices be issued as per Rule 397 of the High Court of Jharkhand Rules, 2001. In addition to the above, search warrant was issued with direction to be executed by the D.G.P. of the State, who may communicate it to the S.P. concerned and it was ordered that warrant must be communicated to the Court even during (winter) vacation at the place of stay of the learned Judge. Thereafter, yet another order dated 21st December, 2012 was passed, in which it has been taken note of the fact by the learned single Judge that contemnor, Shree Prakash Singh @ Shree Babu, has filed show cause through his counsel stating therein that children are not with him and therefore, he is unable to comply the order. That statement was given through counsel but the appellant, Shree Prakash Singh @ Shree Babu, did not physically appear in the Court in spite of notice of his personal appearance. That statement was given through counsel but the appellant, Shree Prakash Singh @ Shree Babu, did not physically appear in the Court in spite of notice of his personal appearance. Learned single Judge, therefore, in the facts of the case, which may be because of the reason that on earlier occasion that may be the stand of the said Shree Prakash Singh @ Shree Babu that children were with him, ordered that his physical presence is necessary For the reasons stated in the order dated 21st December, 2012, order for appearance of the appellant, Shekhar Singh, was also passed. In the order dated 21st December, 2012, learned single Judge again observed that "I have already observed in the contempt proceeding that the contemnors are flouting the Court's order and they are thinking that they are above the law and they can do anything which they want". Further facts are also mentioned in the order dated 21st December, 2012. The matter was taken up on 4th January, 2013, and learned single Judge made it clear that this is not a criminal contempt proceeding but it is a civil contempt proceeding and therefore, the matter be registered as civil contempt proceeding. On 4th January, 2013, again learned single Judge observed that the order has not been complied with and none appeared in Court in person. However, the matter was adjourned. 10. In the backdrop of these facts, the impugned order dated 7.1.2013 has been passed. We have gone into the detailed facts because of the reason that learned counsel for the appellants insisted that the proceedings initiated are absolutely illegal or procedures have not been followed and therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to correct that error of law by exercising jurisdiction under clause 10 of the Letters Patent or under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 11. We are, thus, of the considered opinion that this is an order simpliciter directing the contemnors to appear before the Court in person and therefore, this is an interlocutory order also and the facts, which have been pointed out above, clearly indicate that in the facts and circumstances of the case, such order was passed by the learned single Judge for securing the physical attendance of the contemnors in the contempt proceeding. So far as the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of R.N. Dey & Ors. So far as the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of R.N. Dey & Ors. (supra), which has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants, is concerned, the facts of that case is entirely different. In the case of R.N. Dey & Ors. (supra), one First Appeal No. 232/1988 was pending before the Court and there was no specific order staying the judgment and award passed by the Land Acquisition Judge. In that matter, instead of executing decree passed on an acquisition case, contempt proceeding was initiated. In the backdrop of those facts, the judgment was rendered in the case of R.N. Dey & Ors. and in paragraph no. 13, it has been specifically observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court that “in the present proceedings the question whether appeal under Section 19 is maintainable or not is not required to be decided finally as, in our view, facts of this case are grossly inadequate and the contempt proceedings were not required to be initiated at all. In any case, the unconditional apology tendered could have been accepted and further proceedings dropped and the rule ought to have been discharged”. Therefore, the above judgment cannot be read in the above context and has no application to the facts of this case because of the reason that here in this case, High Court passed the order of delivery of the children to the children's mother, which has not been obeyed and therefore, contempt proceeding was initiated and it is not an execution of the order passed by the C.J.M. and particularly it has been made clear by the learned single Judge in the order passed in W.P.(Cr.) No. 230/2011 itself whereby learned single Judge set aside the order of the C.J.M. with respect to the custody of children and passed the order of delivery of custody of children in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution as an interim measure. Therefore, the order under challenge is neither appeal-able under section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, nor under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, which view finds support from the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Midnapore Peoples' Co-Op. Bank Ltd. & Ors. (supra). Therefore, the order under challenge is neither appeal-able under section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, nor under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, which view finds support from the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Midnapore Peoples' Co-Op. Bank Ltd. & Ors. (supra). It will be appropriate to incorporate the questions formulated by Hon'ble Supreme Court and their answer, which are as follows- “Questions :-(i) Where the High Court, in a contempt proceeding, renders a decision on the merits of a dispute between the parties, either by an interlocutory order or final judgment, whether the same is appeal-able under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971? If not, what is the remedy of the person aggrieved? (ii) Where such a decision on merits is rendered by an interlocutory order of a learned single Judge, whether an intra-court appeal is available under clause 15 of the Letters Patent? (iii) Whether in the present contempt proceedings the Court could direct (a) that the employer should reinstate the employee forthwith; (b) that the employee should not be prevented from discharging his duties in any manner; (c) that the employee should be paid all arrears of salary; (d) that the enquiry officer should cease to be the enquiry officer and the employer should appoint a fresh enquiry officer; and (e) that the suspension should be deemed to have been revoked? Answer: -(I) An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. (II) Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt, nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt, nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appeal-able under Section 19. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. (III) In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court was committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. (III) In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court was committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. (IV) Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of "jurisdiction to punish for contempt" and, therefore, not appeal-able under Section 19. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. (V) If the High Court decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in a contempt proceedings the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a Single Judge and there was a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution (in other cases).” 12. Not only section 19(1) is very clear, but in consonance with section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the same provision has been made in the High Court of Jharkhand Rules, 2001 as Rule 404, which clearly provides that "an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt.” Therefore, we need not to refer other judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the State. The issue has already been considered in the case of Midnapore Peoples Co-Op. Bank Ltd. & Ors. (supra). The issue has already been considered in the case of Midnapore Peoples Co-Op. Bank Ltd. & Ors. (supra). We are, thus, of the considered opinion that once a specific provision has been made in a specific Act as to when appeal shall lie and here in this base, when it has been specifically provided as to when appeal shall lie against one specific nature of order and not allowed appeal when an order is not of such nature as mentioned in the statute, then by implication it is made clear by the Legislature that no appeal shall lie against any order passed in that proceeding which is not of such nature. As the order is in a matter of issuance of warrant of arrest for securing the attendance of the contemnors, this Court is not inclined to entertain this L.PA. 13. In view of the above reasons, this L.P.A. is dismissed being not maintainable. However, it is made clear that none of our observations shall mean any comment on the entitlement of the custody of the children in any regular proceedings.