Judgment 1] Heard. Rule. Respondents waive service. By consent rule made returnable forthwith. 2] This civil revision application is filed by Khadi and Village Industries Commission, (KVIC) challenging the judgment and order dated 27th April 2012 of the Appellate Bench of Small Causes Court, Mumbai in Appeal No.15 of 2011 confirming the judgment and decree of the same court in T.E.& R Suit No.177/204 of 2007. 3] The suit was filed by the respondents original plaintiffs stating that they are landlords and owners of the property known as Dalmia Compound, situate at Plot No.67, 66, 65/2 and 65/3 off Dr.P.Mozes Road, Mahalaxmi, Mumbai 400 011 (said property for short). It is stated that the applicant before me, original defendant, is a monthly tenant in respect of a godown premises admeasuring about 9000 sft. situate in the said property and particularly described in the plaint, annexed as Annexure A to the plaint. Thus, the godown premises are the subject matter of the suit and described as the suit premises hereinafter. It is stated that the applicant was paying monthly rent of Rs.777.31. 4] It is stated that in or about 1988, the respondents and one Mrs.Ila Dalmia executed sale cum agreement deed whereby they assigned all their rights, title and interest in the suit premises in favour of M/s.Suresh Estates Pvt. Ltd. (Suresh Estates for short), having its office at 59 Sonawala Building, 2nd floor, Bombay Samachar Marg, Mumbai 400 023. An irrevocable power of attorney was also executed in their favour so as to enable them to take steps to manage the property. Ms.Ila Dalmia expired some time in August 2003 leaving behind her, original plaintiff Nos. 1 to 4 as her legal heirs and representatives who are entitled to all her right, interest in the suit premises. As authorised by the respondents, the applicants were paying rent to the said Suresh Estates. It is then alleged in the plaint that for the period 1997-98 there was no dispute raised by any party as to the right, title and entitlement of the said Suresh Estates to continue, possess and occupy the said premises. However, it appears that there was an objection in the form of a show cause notice by the Collector of Mumbai City. That show cause notice was dated 5th April 1997, which was duly replied by the said Suresh Estates. However, it appears that there was an objection in the form of a show cause notice by the Collector of Mumbai City. That show cause notice was dated 5th April 1997, which was duly replied by the said Suresh Estates. The Collector of Mumbai passed an order dated 18th August 1997 inter alia directing that the suit premises be re-entered and also directed the said Suresh Estates to deposit a sum of Rs.22 lakhs with interest at the rate of 15% from 19th July 1993. By that order, the Collector directed the sub-lease holders/ tenants of the property to deposit the rent in his office. The said M/s.Suresh Estates filed a Writ Petition No.1697 of 1997 in this Court. This Court directed parties to maintain status quo and permitted Suresh Estates to file an appeal under section 247 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966. Accordingly, M/s.Suresh Estates preferred an appeal before the Commissioner, Konkan Division. The appellate authority refused to entertain the appeal and dismissed it. Being aggrieved by that order dated 12th June 1998, M/s.Suresh Estates filed another appeal under section 248 of the Land Revenue Code, 1966 before the State Government. On 4th May 2000, the Revenue Minister of the State of Maharashtra was pleased to dismiss the appeal. M/s.Suresh Estates, therefore, had filed a Writ Petition No.1832 of 2000, challenging the order of Appellate Authority and Revenue Minister. The said M/s.Suresh Estates had also filed a petition being Writ Petition No.657 of 2002 against the order of the Collector, which is original order under show cause notice. This Court dismissed the Writ Petition No.1832 of 2000 and therefore the other petition being Writ Petition No.657 of 2002 was not pressed. Thereafter, an appeal before the Division Bench was filed by M/s.Suresh Estates and by an order passed on 5th April 2004, this Court reserved liberty to the said Suresh Estates to initiate proceedings by way of civil suit. This order is quoted in para 4 of the plaint and, therefore, it is submitted that Suresh Estates withdrew the petition and filed Civil Suit No.3154 of 2004 and moved a notice of motion being Notice of Motion No.3239 of 2004, therein. On 3rd October 2006, an order was passed in that notice of motion, granting liberty to the said Suresh Estates to approach State Government by way of an application. On 3rd October 2006, an order was passed in that notice of motion, granting liberty to the said Suresh Estates to approach State Government by way of an application. It appears that M/s.Suresh Estates filed an application to the State Government which was dealt with by the Minister of Revenue. He passed an order the5reon on 23rd April 2007 cancelling all prior orders and directing renewal of lease. Thereafter, it is stated that M/s.Suresh Estates complied with the conditional order of the Government and deposited several sums but all this has not affected the ownership rights of the respondents, original plaintiffs. It is stated that on 3rd January 2007, M/s.Suresh Estates terminated the tenancy of the applicant in respect of the suit premises and called upon them to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the same. The applicants received this notice and the same was replied by their Advocates' letter dated 30th January 2007 and they raised several contentions. It appears that the applicants filed a suit being S.C.Suit No.1877 of 2007 in the City Civil Court. 5] Therefore it is alleged that once the applicant is a Statutory Corporation/ Statutory Body under an Act of Parliament, its tenancy in respect of the suit premises is not protected by the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. Alleging further that once the notice terminates their right to occupy and use the suit premises, then, in compliance therewith, they must hand over vacant and peaceful possession thereof to the respondents. Equally, there is a further notice dated 15th June 2007 terminating the tenancy rights. 6] Upon these allegations and alleging that the applicants have no right now in the property that the suit was filed in the Court of Small Causes for possession against the applicant on 25th July 2007. 7] After respondents were served with the suit summons, they have filed a written statement denying the allegations made in the plaint and then submitting that M/s.Suresh Estates are asserting the right, title and interest in the property. Therefore, the respondents plaintiffs could not have terminated their rights. The applicants raised various contentions with regard to the validity of the notice in paras 4 to 8 of their written statement. Therefore, the respondents plaintiffs could not have terminated their rights. The applicants raised various contentions with regard to the validity of the notice in paras 4 to 8 of their written statement. It is alleged by the applicants that the State Government has accepted them as the tenant and, therefore, all such notices could not have been issued either by Suresh Estates or by the original plaintiffs. It is such a suit that the trial court framed four issues as under and answered them accordingly. “1. Do plaintiffs prove that the suit premises being open plot of land are exempted from the protection of provisions of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999? In Affirmative 2. Do the plaintiffs prove that they have legally and validly terminated the tenancy of defendants in respect of suit premises by their Advocates letter dt.15.6.2007? In Affirmative. 3. Do the defendants prove that they are the statutory commission and are in possession of suit premises since 01.01.1957 and they are protected tenants under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act? In Negative 4. Do the defendants prove that the Government who is owner of suit property has accepted the arrears of rent and is accepting rent from the defendants as such the defendants have become direct tenant of the government in respect of the said godown? In Negative.” 8] Issue No.3 is with regard to the protection that was claimed by the applicants under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. The trial court on scrutiny of the pleadings and on appraisal of the oral and documentary evidence on record arrived at the conclusion that the present applicant is a Corporation established under an Act of Parliament and is, therefore, covered by section 3(1)(b) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 and cannot seek protection thereof. It is clearly exempted and excluded from the purview of the said Act. 9] It is essentially this finding and the further finding of the trial court that the suit notice is valid, legal and proper, which are impugned in the present revision application by the applicants. 10] Needless to clarify that consistent with the findings on the above issues the suit filed by the respondents came to be decreed by the trial court and which decree stands confirmed by the lower appellate court. 10] Needless to clarify that consistent with the findings on the above issues the suit filed by the respondents came to be decreed by the trial court and which decree stands confirmed by the lower appellate court. 11] Mr.Dani learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant submitted that both the courts below have committed an error of law apparent on the face of record in arriving at the conclusion that the applicant is not entitled to the protection of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. Mr.Dani submits that the applicant is not an entity covered by Section 3(1)(b) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. Mr.Dani submits that the Act does not apply to any premises let or sub-let to banks or any public sector undertakings or any corporations established by or any of the Central or State Act or foreign missions, international agencies, multinational companies and private limited companies and public limited companies having a paid up share capital of more than Rs.1 Crore. Mr.Dani submits that the applicant is not a Corporation established by or under any Central Act or State Act. It is a commission established and constituted under the Khadi and Village Industries Commission Act, 1956 (Act 61 of 1956). Mr.Dani submits that the KVIC cannot be said to be a Corporation established by or under any Central or State Act. It is not a company either. It is a commission exclusively established and constituted by this Act. It is a unique institution inasmuch as the same is set up for the development of Khadi and Village Industries and for matters connected therewith. Mr. Dani submits that the Father of Nation Mahatma Gandhi had strongly advocated the use of Khadi. In his opinion if Khadi and Village Industries are encouraged that would make us truly independent and self-reliant. Mr. Dani submits that it is this dream of Mahatma Gandhi which was fulfilled by the Central Government and it set up a commission known as KVIC. It is established under section 4 of the Act. Mr. Dani submits that the word Khadi is defined in Section 2(d) to mean any cloth woven on handlooms in India from cotton yarn or woolen handspun in India or from mixture of any two or all such yarns. Mr. Dani emphasises the definition of the term “rural area” appearing in Section 2(ff) and the term “Village Industries” defined in Section 2(h). Mr. Dani emphasises the definition of the term “rural area” appearing in Section 2(ff) and the term “Village Industries” defined in Section 2(h). He submits that in this backdrop, if one notices the function of the Commission, as enumerated in section 15 of the Act, it would be at once clear that this institution which is named as a Commission cannot be termed as a Corporation established by or under any Central Act. Mr. Dani has laid special emphasis on sub-section 2 of Section 15 and he submits that KVIC is thus performing a social obligation and duty. It has to undertake and perform its functions so as to fulfill the constitutional mandate of social justice. Mr. Dani has relied upon Article 43 of the Constitution of India in this behalf. He submits that the State is obliged to promote cottage industries in urban and rural areas. Mr. Dani submits that this is in aid of the directive principles of the State policy and particularly Article 38 and 39 of the Constitution of India. It is the obligation of the State to direct its policy towards securing operation of the economic system in such a way that it does not result in concentration of wealth in few hands. It was envisaged that there will be no economic and social disparities when Indian gains freedom and independence. Mahatma Gandhi had dreamt of an India which is fully independent and governs itself by establishing a social order in which social economic and political justice is guaranteed. After independence, he had dreamt of a State which will minimize inequalities in income and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities not only amongst individuals but also amongst group of people residing in different areas or engaged in different vocations. Therefore, clauses A to L of subsection 2 of section 15 must be read in the backdrop of this Constitutional obligation and mandate. Mr. Dani, therefore, submits that to term such an institution as a Corporation and exclude it from a beneficial and social legislation like the Maharashtra Rent Control Act would be defeating and frustrating its object and purpose completely. He, therefore, submits that both orders, though, concurrent deserve to be quashed and set aside. 12] Mr. Dani then submits that the courts below have seriously erred in holding that the suit premises belonged to the respondents absolutely as claimed by them. He, therefore, submits that both orders, though, concurrent deserve to be quashed and set aside. 12] Mr. Dani then submits that the courts below have seriously erred in holding that the suit premises belonged to the respondents absolutely as claimed by them. The property on which the suit premises are situate and located is a land belonging to the State. Through the State a lease was claimed by the respondent plaintiffs. Then contrary to the terms and conditions of the lease inducted M/s. Suresh Estates. That was not accepted by the Collector and the State Government. The lease was, therefore, put an end to and parties like the present applicant chose to deal with the State Government directly. There is no privity of contract, then, left with the respondents. In such circumstances, both the decrees are vitiated in law and are untenable. They should be set aside. Mr. Dani has then questioned the power of the respondents to proceed against the applicants. He relies upon the observations of the lower appellate court in para 28 of its order. Mr. Dani submits that initial notice is of 3rd January 2007 and which is issued by an Advocate acting on behalf of M/s. Suresh Estates. The subsequent notice is dated 15th June 2007. Both notices have been replied by the applicant defendant. The power of attorney holder claimed under M/s. Suresh Estates could not have, therefore, proceeded to sue the applicants. The power of attorney contemplated in law is not that of the owners who were claiming as lessees of the State but those acting and claiming under the lessees. It is not, therefore, a case where the respondents were left with any rights in the property, once they plead the arrangement with M/s. Suresh Estates. In the event, the rights of M/s.Suresh Estates having not been recognized does not mean that there is a revival of the leasehold rights in favour of the respondents herein. In such circumstances and when the land belongs to the State and is a public property, then, putting up a structure thereon, inducting a party like applicant therein, but then, giving up rights in the property itself is something which could not be countenanced. He submits that this aspect has been taken lightly by the courts below. In such circumstances and when the land belongs to the State and is a public property, then, putting up a structure thereon, inducting a party like applicant therein, but then, giving up rights in the property itself is something which could not be countenanced. He submits that this aspect has been taken lightly by the courts below. It was a very serious aspect of the matter inasmuch as a public property cannot be allowed to be dealt with in this manner by the State. For all these reasons, he submits that the impugned decrees be quashed and set aside. 13] Mr. Dani has relied upon the judgment in the case of Lilabai Pansare Vs. Oriental Insurance reported in 2008 (9) S.C.C. 270. 14] This judgment is relied upon by Mr. Dani in support of his submission that the test of economic capacity and financial capability as devised in this decision is qua public sector companies and public sector organisations which are undertaking business, trade and commercial activities in general for a profit and monetary gain. These will not be the governing tests for cases like the Applicants before this court. Therefore, when these tests are not applicable, then, the Act would apply to the bodies and institutions like the applicants. 15] On the other hand, Mr. Dada, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that this is a civil revision application invoking section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. This civil revision application cannot be entertained because the applicants are requesting this Court to reappraise and re-appreciate the oral and documentary evidence on record. That is impermissible. The revisional jurisdiction is extremely limited and restricted. It can be exercised only if there is error ofjurisdiction or the trial court has acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. Thus, clear and established injustice only will enable this Court to interfere in revisional jurisdiction. That has not been demonstrated at all. Firstly, the applicants themselves have addressed letters and in this behalf, Mr. Dada has invited my attention to the discussion on Point Nos. 2 and 3 in the trial court's judgment. If the suit premises are a building and structure and the tenancy is in relation thereto, then, it is that tenancy which has been terminated under the general law. Firstly, the applicants themselves have addressed letters and in this behalf, Mr. Dada has invited my attention to the discussion on Point Nos. 2 and 3 in the trial court's judgment. If the suit premises are a building and structure and the tenancy is in relation thereto, then, it is that tenancy which has been terminated under the general law. The applicants cannot claim protection of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act by virtue of Section 3(1)(b). All facts and circumstances narrated by Mr. Dani are in relation to the lease hold rights in the land. That the structure or the building belongs to the respondents and that M/s. Suresh Estates, at some point of time, claimed rights in relation thereto but those rights were not recognised and accepted by State Government. Therefore, the property as also the Structure belongs to and continues to belong to the respondents. That is not disputed by the applicants. In these circumstances, there is a clear finding of fact, which is not vitiated by any perversity. Hence, the judgments of the courts below be upheld. There is a privity of contract between parties. Further, the applicants are prevented from questioning the title of the respondents original plaintiffs. This is an attempt at denying the title. Lastly, Mr. Dada submits that if the oral and documentary evidence on record have been appraised and appreciated and a view has been taken by both the courts, which cannot be said to be wholly illegal or perverse, then, the revision application deserves to be dismissed. 16] Mr. Dada has laid special emphasis on the provisions of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 particularly section 3(1)(b) and has urged that the provisions cannot be read to exclude the institutions like KVIC. Mr. Dada has submitted that if the entire KVIC Act is perused, it would be apparent that the Central Government has absolute control over the affairs of the KVIC. Chapter IV of the Act is entitled “Finance, Accounts, Audit and Reports”. The payment to the Commission is made by the Central Government. The Commission also receives grants from the Government or any other person. That is for development of Khadi. The word “Funds of the Commission” include the Khadi Fund, the Village Industries Fund and General and Miscellaneous Fund. Chapter IV of the Act is entitled “Finance, Accounts, Audit and Reports”. The payment to the Commission is made by the Central Government. The Commission also receives grants from the Government or any other person. That is for development of Khadi. The word “Funds of the Commission” include the Khadi Fund, the Village Industries Fund and General and Miscellaneous Fund. If the amount available in any of the funds is in excess of the requirement of that fund, then, approval is to be sought from the Central Government. All monies belonging to the fund have to be deposited with the Reserve Bank of India and they have to be invested in such securities as may be approved by the Central Government. There is a budget of the Commission and which has to be forwarded to the Central Government. My attention is invited by Mr. Dada to sections 19, 19A, 19B and 20 to 23 of the Act and he submits that KVIC is a Corporation established by and constituted by the Central Government. In such circumstances and on account of its all pervasive and over all control, a conclusion is irresistable that the KVIC falls under and is covered by Section 3 (1)(b) of the Act. For these reasons revision application be dismissed. 17] To my mind, the two contentions of Mr. Dani on facts need not detain me. The applicants received a notice from M/s. Negandhi Shah & Himayatullah dated 3rd January 2007 on behalf of their clients M/s. Suresh Estates, informing them that they are tenants of the said M/s. Suresh Estates and that their tenancy is terminated and they were called upon to quit, vacate and deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises. 18] The applicants had also received a notice dated 15th June 2007 from the same Advocates acting on behalf of Smt. Saraswati Ramkrishna Dalmia, Mr. Gunnidhi Ramkrishna Dalmia and Vidyanidhi Dalmia represented by their constituted attorney M/s. Suresh Estates, terminating their tenancy rights and in that what has been stated is as under:- “... By a notice dated 3rd January 2007, M/s. Suresh Estate Private Limited continued attorney of Smt.Saraswati Ramkrishna Dalmia, Smt.Gunnidhi Dalmia and Smt. Vidyanidhi Dalmia terminated your tenancy in respect of the said godown premises and called upon you to hand over quiet, vacant and peaceful possession thereof. By a notice dated 3rd January 2007, M/s. Suresh Estate Private Limited continued attorney of Smt.Saraswati Ramkrishna Dalmia, Smt.Gunnidhi Dalmia and Smt. Vidyanidhi Dalmia terminated your tenancy in respect of the said godown premises and called upon you to hand over quiet, vacant and peaceful possession thereof. Please note that M/s.Suresh Estate Private Limited is our clients Constituted Attorney. However, for the reasons best known to you, you have raised various false contentions in reply to the said notice dated 3rd January 2007 and in subsequent correspondence thereto also you have raised several false contentions for the reasons best known to you. You have also dragged the said M/s. Suresh Estate Pvt. Ltd. into vexatious litigations by filing false and bogus suit before the City Civil Court at Mumbai. You are also aware that during the course of the hearing of the above suit, the order dated 23rd April, 2007 passed by the Hon'ble Revenue Minister was tendered before the City Civil Court was pleased to decline any reliefs to you. However, to avoid any technicality, we have been instructed by our clients to give fresh notice for termination which we hereby do.” 19] The applicants replied to these notices and what they stated is that there is no lease deed executed in favour of the parties who had addressed these notices. It was stated that the right and entitlement to the land and the premises does not lie with either Dalmia's or M/s. Suresh Estates. In any event, M/s. Suresh Estates could not have addressed the notice as they are not landlords. If that was the claim raised earlier, then, the later version that M/s. Suresh Estates are power of attorney holders of Dalmias also cannot be accepted. From these materials what is apparent is that the power of attorney which is placed on record has been executed by the widow and daughters of Late Ramkrishna Dalmia, all residents of 27, Akbar Road, New Delhi and Executrix of the estate of the late Ramkrishna Dalmia, appointing Mr. T. Mathews, Director of M/s. Suresh Estates. He has been authorised on their behalf to execute the acts, deeds and things in relation to the property and this power of attorney is dated 26th August 1982. Even the applicants have paid rent by forwarding letters, annexing cheques therewith, addressed to the Directors of Suresh Estates. T. Mathews, Director of M/s. Suresh Estates. He has been authorised on their behalf to execute the acts, deeds and things in relation to the property and this power of attorney is dated 26th August 1982. Even the applicants have paid rent by forwarding letters, annexing cheques therewith, addressed to the Directors of Suresh Estates. Several such letters of 1994-95 and 1996 are on record. Therefore, it is too late in the day to urge that there was no power of attorney in favour of M/s.Suresh Estates or that the said Suresh Estates could not have addressed the suit notices. In any event, notices have also been addressed independently by the landlords and about that there cannot be any dispute raised by the applicants. If there was any dispute, then, there was no occasion for them to forward the rent in relation to the suit premises to either M/s. Suresh Estates or Dalmias. There is no substance in the contention of Mr. Dalmia that M/s. Suresh Estates could not have represented the respondents in any manner. The reliance that is placed on the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors of M/s. Suresh Estates held on 23rd April 2008 would thus go to show that, that private limited company has in turn authorised the companies' officers to commence, institute or prosecute legal proceedings in relation to the suit property. It is not as if the company had in any manner committed an act which can be said to be contrary to the authorisation in its favour under the power of attorney, executed by the Dalmias. That was a very wide power and under that wide power, they could have delegated some of the functions and which has been done by them. They have retained their possession as power of attorney holder and merely authorised one of its officials to perform certain acts as officers of M/s.Suresh Estates. 20] Mr. Dani has relied upon the cross examination of the official of M/s. Suresh Estates, Devika Yagnik. She fairly stated that she works as Legal Executive with M/s. Suresh Estates and not for the plaintiffs in the suit. Her statement in the cross examination and which have been relied upon by Mr. 20] Mr. Dani has relied upon the cross examination of the official of M/s. Suresh Estates, Devika Yagnik. She fairly stated that she works as Legal Executive with M/s. Suresh Estates and not for the plaintiffs in the suit. Her statement in the cross examination and which have been relied upon by Mr. Dani does not take the Applicants' case further inasmuch as the suit is filed by the original landlords themselves and in relation to the suit premises which constitute the warehouse/ storage space/godown. The right of these owners could not have been disputed and denied by the applicants, then, it is futile to urge that the suit has not been filed by a duly authorised and designated person but by a stranger M/s. Suresh Estates. 21] Mr. Dani relied upon an order passed by this Court in C.R.A. No.641 of 2011 dated 22nd December 2011. However, that order also does not help and assist the applicants because all that the order records is the statement of the respondents to produce the original power of attorney, to which reference has been made in paras 20 and 21 of the earlier judgment of the lower appellate court. They produced and proved the original power of attorney in terms of the liberty given by this Court. Therefore, it is now not open for the petitioners to urge that either the tenancy has not been validly terminated or that the power of attorney cannot be relied upon. I agree with the findings of the lower appellate court on point Nos. 2 and 3. 22] Now coming to the main point namely, Whether the premises occupied by the applicants are exempted from the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. Section 3(1)(b) of the same is heavily relied upon by Mr. Dani, which reads thus:- “3(1): This Act shall not apply – (b) to any premises let or sub-let to banks, or any public sector undertakings or any corporation established by or under any Central or State Act, or foreign missions, international agencies, multinational companies, and private limited companies and public limited companies having a paid up share capital of rupees one crore or more” 23] A bare perusal thereof would indicate that the Maharashtra Rent Control Act will not apply to any premises let or sub-let to any Corporation established by or under Central or any State Act. The only argument of Mr. The only argument of Mr. Dani is that the applicant is not a Corporation as understood by this clause but it is a commission and, therefore, the Maharashtra Rent Control Act will apply to its premises. 24] It is not possible to accept this contention. The KVIC Act, 1956 has been carefully perused by me. True it is that the Central Government constituted the earlier Board called Khadi and Village Industries Board and vested it with powers to prepare and organise programmes for the protection and development of Khadi and Village Industries and deal with other matters incidental thereto. However, later on it was found in actual practice that the work of the Board was hampered by certain procedural and functional difficulties. That could be removed by setting up a Commission by law. Therefore, it was proposed to set up a commission called all India Khadi and Village Industries Commission, which will be vested with powers, executive as well as administrative, for the proper development of Khadi and Village Industries. Then, there are amendments to this Act and the latest being to bring within its purview all the functions of the Village Industries. The definition of that term was proposed to be amended. Then, the Commission was strengthened by increasing its maximum membership and to include expert members so that gains of science and technology are made available to the rural area. There are various other recommendations of the Public Accounts Committee which have been incorporated and these proposed amendments were then approved by the Parliament and the Act came to be amended. 25] Mr. Dani's argument that the applicant is a Commission and not a Corporation overlooks the fact that the Act itself is providing for establishment of a Commission for the development of Khadi and Village Industries and for matters connected therewith. True it is that the dream of Father of Nation to make India fully self-reliant and independent can be fulfilled by encouraging Khadi and Village Industries. Khadi was not just a piece of cloth but was a movement by itself. It established and proves the fact that Indians can manufacture cloth and garments without any assistance of any foreign power and by utilising their own resources. Khadi was thus a symbol of true strength and independence. It is a symbol of “Swadeshi” and real “Swaraj”. Khadi was not just a piece of cloth but was a movement by itself. It established and proves the fact that Indians can manufacture cloth and garments without any assistance of any foreign power and by utilising their own resources. Khadi was thus a symbol of true strength and independence. It is a symbol of “Swadeshi” and real “Swaraj”. A piece of cloth woven on the “Charkha” symbolised the importance of physical labour and effort of the weaver. Every Indian was expected to participate in this movement. Similarly, Rural and Village Economy need not be dependent on cities and towns and restricted to agriculture. The natural resources and wealth if tapped and used collectively not only generates employment but gives confidence and power. No Indian living in a village is then forced to seek opportunity to earn his livelihood in cities and towns and particularly by working in industries, which represent and are instruments of exploitation. Thus, freedom by inculcating and nurturing right moral and social values and creating awareness regarding the obligation and duty to one's own motherland is a foundation in the schemes for village development. 26] Thus, KVIC and the Government carried forward the message of Mahatma to the remotest corners of India, particularly, that villages need not be depending upon the urban population and urban centres including cities. There can be a village economy and fully developed, provided every one works and utilises his own skill, potential and expertise to the fullest and maximum. It is not, therefore, just a means of employment and earning but a larger idea which was being implemented and executed as a homage to the Father of Nation and respecting his ideals and wishes truly. However, this role of the Commission cannot be of any assistance in understanding and particularly as to whether it is a statutory Corporation within the meaning of Section 3(1)(b) of the Act. If one peruses Chapter II and particularly section 4 which provides for establishment and constitution of the Commission, it would be abundantly clear that it is the Central Government by notification in the official gazette establishing the Commission to be called “Khadi and Village Industries Commission”, which shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with power to acquire, hold and dispose of properties and to contract and may by the said name sue and be sued. Section 4 reads as under:- “4. Establishment and constitution of the Commission:- (1) With effect from such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official gazette, fix in this behalf, there shall be established a Commission to be called the Khadi and Village Industries Commission which shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to acquire, hold and dispose of property and to contract, and may by the said name sue and be sued. (2) The Commission shall consist of the following members appointed by the Central Government, namely:- (a) six non-official members having specialized knowledge and experience of Khadi and village industries and representing such six geographical zones of the country, as may be prescribed; (b) two non-official members having expert knowledge and experience in one or more of the following disciplines, namely:- Economics, Planning, Rural Development, Science and Technology or Technical Education and Training; (c) one Financial Adviser, who shall also be the Chief Accounts Officer of the Commission, ex – officio; and (d) a Chief Executive Officer, ex officio; Provided that the ex-officio members shall not have the right to vote in any of the matters discussed at a meeting of the Commission. (3) The Central Government may appoint one of the members appointed under clause (a) of sub-section (2) to be the Chairman who shall be a fulltime member.” 27] Then section 5 provides for power and functions of the Chief Executive Officer. Section 5A provides for powers and functions of the Financial Advisors. The duties of the Chief Executive Officer and Financial Advisor are also referred to in this very provision. Then comes the disqualification for membership of the Commission. The Commission has a Chairman, Member and they are appointed by the Central Government. That is an aspect dealt with by section 6, 6A and 7 to 9. Then comes Section 10 which reads as under:- “10. Then comes the disqualification for membership of the Commission. The Commission has a Chairman, Member and they are appointed by the Central Government. That is an aspect dealt with by section 6, 6A and 7 to 9. Then comes Section 10 which reads as under:- “10. Constitution of the Board:- For the purpose of assisting the Commission in the discharge of its functions under this Act, the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute a Board to be called the Khadi and Village Industries Board consisting of a Chairman and such number of other members as the Central Government think fit, chosen from among persons who, in the opinion of the Central Government, are qualified as having had experience, and shown capacity, in matters relating to the development of Khadi and Village industries.” 28] Thus, a Board is carved out for development of Khadi and Village Industries and the Board has to be constituted by the Commission. Then, what is provided is meeting of the Commission and the term of office and conditions of service of Chairman and other members. That is an aspect dealt with by sections 12 to 14 which also provides for officers and servants of the Commission. Then comes section 15 which reads as under:- “15. Functions of the Commission:- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the functions of the Commission shall generally be to plan, promote, organise and assist in the establishment and development of Khadi and Village industries in the rural area in co-ordination with other agencies engaged in rural development wherever necessary. Then comes section 15 which reads as under:- “15. Functions of the Commission:- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the functions of the Commission shall generally be to plan, promote, organise and assist in the establishment and development of Khadi and Village industries in the rural area in co-ordination with other agencies engaged in rural development wherever necessary. (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, the Commission may take such other steps as it may think fit:- (a) to plan and organise training of persons employed or desirous of seeking employment in Khadi and village industries; (b) to build up reserves of raw materials and implements and supply them to persons engaged or likely to be engaged in production of handspun yarn or khadi or village industries at such rates as the Commission may decide; (c) to encourage and assist in the creation of common service facilities for the processing of raw materials or semi-finished goods and for otherwise facilitating production and marketing of Khadi or products of village industries; (d) to promote the sale and marketing of Khadi or products of village industries or handicrafts and for this purpose forge links with established marketing agencies wherever necessary and feasible; (e) to encourage and promote research in the technology used in khadi and village industries, including the use of non-conventional energy and electric power with a view to increasing productivity, eliminating drudgery and otherwise enhancing their competitive capacity and to arrange for dissemination of salient results obtained from such research; (f) to undertake directly or through other agencies studies of the problems of Khadi or village industries; (g) to provide financial assistance to institution or persons engaged in the development and operation of Khadi or village industries and guide them through supply of designs, prototypes and other technical information for the purpose of producing goods and services for which there is effective demand in the opinion of the Commission; (h) to undertake experiments or pilot projects which in the opinion of the Commission are necessary for the development of Khadi and village industries; (i) to establish and maintain separate organisations for the purpose of carrying out any or all of the above matters; (j) to promote and encourage co-operative efforts among the manufacturers of Khadi or persons engaged in village industries; (k) to ensure genuineness and to set up standards of quality and ensure that products of khadi and village industries do conform to the said standards, including issue of certificates or letters of recognition to the concerned persons; and (l) to carry out any other matters incidental to the above.” 29] Section 16 gives power to the Central Government to give directions to the Commission. In 1995 Labour and Industrial Cases 1513, (Nand Kishore Jain Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Delhi and Ors.), the Honourable Delhi High Court had an occasion to consider as to what is the nature of the Activities of the Commission and in that behalf, it held as under:- “12. The Commission is established under Section 4, of the Act as a body corporate having perpetual succession with power to acquire, hold and dispose of properly and to contract, and may by the said name sue and be sued. Section 15, of the Act, inter alia, stipulates the functions of the Commission and lays down that the functions of the Commission shall generally be to plan, organise and implement programmes for the development of Khadi & Village industries, which include the sale and marketing of khadi or all products of village industries. Section 17A, enables the Commissions to receive gifts, grants donations or benefactions from the government or any other person for the purpose of development of village industries. Section 19, provides that the Commission shall have power to spend such sums as it thinks fit on purposes authorised by the Act. Section 21, clothes the Commission with the power to borrow on the security of the khadi fund or the village industries fund or any other asset for any purposes for which such funds may be applied. Section 22, lays down that all liabilities incurred by and all contracts entered into with and all matters and things engaged to be done by it or for the Central Government in connection with the development of Khadi or Village industries at any time after January 14, 1953, and before the commencement, of the Act, shall, after such commencement be deemed to have been incurred by, entered into with or engaged to be done by or for the Commission. 13. …...... 14. In the instant case, the grounds forming basis of learned Labour Court's findings, pointed out above, are strict Administrative and Financial Control, in that the Commission is a creation of the statute, the Central Government nominates its top ranking functionaries, provides funds and exercises control on finances, nonetheless, the Commission has power to hold and dispose of property, can enter into contract, and has to perform and delves in commercial activities, which it has to do as statutory body on its own. 15. 15. It is no doubt true that under Section 16, the Commission has been enjoined to be bound by the directions of the Central Government but the provisions of Section 22, make it clear that all liabilities incurred by on all contracts entered into and all matters relating to and in connection with the development of Khadi and Village industries by the Central Government shall be deemed, after the commencement of the Act, to have been incurred by, entered into with, or done by the Commission itself (emphasis added). The Commission, a body corporate Acts on its own behalf and carries on commercial activities, like any other commercial establishment, which are necessary for the promotion and development of Khadi and Village Industries and whatever liabilities it incurs in connection therewith are incurred by it on its own behalf and the Central Government is not liable for the same despite the fact that all its activities may be supervised by the Central Government. The Commission is performing commercial functions and not carrying on any sovereign functions of the Central Government. As is clear from various provisions of the Act, briefly referred to above, it is commercial establishment like any other commercial corporation carrying on purely Commercial activities for the promotion of Khadi and Village Industries. So is Khadi Gramodyog Bhawan. That being so, neither the Commission nor Khadi Gramodhyog Bhawan could be said to be agent, wing or a part of the Central Government, however, pervasive the control of the Central Government might be in its management. The Commission carries on business or industry not on behalf of the Central Government but on its own behalf.” 30] Chapter IV of the Act deals with Finance and Accounts, Audit and Reports and thereunder section 17 to 24 are appearing. 31] Then comes Chapter V which provides for miscellaneous. Mr. Dani relies upon section 24A which gives exemption to Commission from liability to pay Income Tax. That the Commission has been given such an exemption, according to Mr. Dani, would make its position unique and it cannot be equated with any other commercial or industrial, leave alone, financial activity undertaken by several other Corporations established by or under a law by the Central or the State Government. These provisions cannot be read in isolation as suggested and together with section 15. Dani, would make its position unique and it cannot be equated with any other commercial or industrial, leave alone, financial activity undertaken by several other Corporations established by or under a law by the Central or the State Government. These provisions cannot be read in isolation as suggested and together with section 15. It is no doubt true that the functions of the Commission are not on par with an entity like a company or a Corporation, which is established or constituted by the State for the purpose of undertaking overall development particularly of Infrastructure, heavy industries, preserving natural resources, transport by setting up establishments such as Railways and Civil Aviation etc.. However, if other provisions and particularly Sections 25, 26 and 27 are noticed, it would become at once clear that the KVIC cannot but be said to be a Corporation. 32] The term “Corporation” has been defined in the Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha, 3rd Edn. reprint 2007 as under:- “An entity (usually a business) having authority under law to act as a single person distinct from the shareholders who own it and having rights to issue stock and exist indefinitely; a group or succession of persons established in accordance with legal rules into a legal or juristic person that has legal personality distinct from the natural persons who make it up, exists indefinitely apart from them, and has the legal powers that its constitution gives it.-Also termed corporation aggregate; aggregate corporation; body corporate; corporate body. A Corporation may be defined as a body of persons (in case of a corporation aggregate) or an office (in the case of a corporation sole) which is recognised by the law as having a personality which is distinct from the separate personalities of the members of the body or the personality of the individual holder for the time being of the office, in question, HALSBURY, 4th Edn., Vol. 9, para 1201. A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. . . . It possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it.: Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 US (4 Wheat) 518 636 (1819) (MARSHALL, J).(Black, 7th Edn., 1999).” 33] Similarly in the case of S.P.Mittal Vs. A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. . . . It possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it.: Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 US (4 Wheat) 518 636 (1819) (MARSHALL, J).(Black, 7th Edn., 1999).” 33] Similarly in the case of S.P.Mittal Vs. Union of India, reported in A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 1, in the context of the essential element in the legal concept of a Corporation, this is what the Supreme Court has observed:- “65. For the petitioners, however, it was urged that the registration of the Society under the West Bengal Act does not make it a corporation. Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 9, p. 4, deals with corporations in the following terms: "A corporation aggregate has been defined as a collection of individuals united into one body under a special denomination, having perpetual succession under an artificial form, and vested by the policy of the law with the capacity of acting in several respects as an individual, particularly of taking and granting property, of contracting obligations and of suing and being sued, of enjoying privileges and immunities in common, and of exercising a variety of political rights, more or less extensive, according to the design of the institution or the powers conferred upon it, either at the time of the creation or at any subsequent period of its existence." 66. A corporation has, therefore, only one capacity, namely, the corporate capacity. On an analysis it would appear that the essential elements in the legal concept of a corporation are :- (1) a continuous identity, i.e. the original member or members or his or their successors are one, (2) the persons to be incorporated, (3) the name by which the persons are incorporated, (4) a place, and (5) words sufficient in law to show incorporation. In law the individual incorporators are members of which it is composed or something wholly different from the corporation itself, for a corporation is a legal person just as much as an individual. A corporation aggregate can express its will by deed under a common seal.” 34] If these tests and elements are taken into consideration, then, I have no doubt in my mind that the applicant is a Corporation. A corporation aggregate can express its will by deed under a common seal.” 34] If these tests and elements are taken into consideration, then, I have no doubt in my mind that the applicant is a Corporation. In this behalf, a useful reference can be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kesari Commissariat & Ors. Vs. Ministry of Food and Civil Supplies, Govt. of Maharashtra and Anr., reported in A.I.R. 2012 S.C. 1271. The Supreme Court noticed section 3 in para 19 and held as under:- 19. …........... From the aforesaid provisions, it is quite plain that the Act does not apply to Government or a local authority or to any premises let or sub-let to a bank or any public sector undertaking or any corporation established by or under any Central or State Act, public limited companies and some other categories. The exception that has been carved out is that it shall apply in respect of premises let or given in licence to the Government or a local authority or taken on behalf of the Government on such basis by or in the name of such officer. In the case on hand, the trust has let out the premises to the Insurance Company. 20. In Leelabai Gajanan Pansare and Others v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and Others, question arose whether a Government Company falls within the compendious expression `any public sector undertaking’ or `corporation’ established by or under any Central or State Act enshrined under Section 7 (1) of the 1999 Act. The respondent in the said case who was noticed was Oriental Insurance Company Limited. It was contended before the two-Judge Bench that the concept of a Government Company is not a part of Section 3(1)(a) and in the absence of the word 'Government’ and the presence of other expressions in Section 3(1)(b), it is to be construed that the Government Companies are not entitled to receive the protection of the Rent Act. It was contended on behalf of the respondent company that a Government Company is sui generis in structure and in statutory treatment thereof and, therefore, it does not fall within the compendious expression and the exclusion clause which applies to public sector undertakings established by or under any Central or State Act does not apply to a Government Company like Oriental Insurance Company. 21. …...... 22. 21. …...... 22. From the aforesaid it is graphically clear that an Insurance Company is not protected under the 1999 Act. Once it is held that defendant No.1, the New India Assurance Company, the original tenant, is not protected, the question would be whether a subtenant can be protected under the Act. In the case of Bhatia Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. ( AIR 1953 SC 16 ) (supra), it has been clearly laid down that Section 4(1) of the 1947 Act applies to premises and not to parties or their relationship. Section 3 uses the term ‘premises’. The provision commences with the non-obstante clause that the Act does not apply to any premises belonging to the Government or a local authority. Sub-section 3(1)(b) makes it clear that the Act does not apply to any bank, public sector undertaking or certain other categories of tenants. The Insurance Company is covered under Section 3(1)(b). Thus, as a logical corollary, the Act does not apply to the premises held by the Insurance Company who is a tenant. 23. The learned Single Judge has allowed protection to the Government Department on the foundation that it has become a tenant. We are disposed to think that the analysis is fundamentally erroneous. When the Act does not cover the tenant, namely, the Insurance Company as basically the exemption applies only to premises and not to any relationship, the subtenant who becomes a deemed tenant cannot enjoy a better protection or privilege by ostracizing the concept of premises which is the spine of the provision.” 35] Similarly in a prior decision reported in A.I.R. 2012 S.C. 264, with regard to the Status of National Textile Corporation Ltd., the Supreme Court held thus:- “16. To perform the functions, the Government has its various departments and to facilitate its working, the Government itself may be divided into various Sections. To carry out the commercial activities by the State, the Corporations have been established by enactment of Statutes and the "power to charter Corporations is incidental to or in aid of Governmental functions." Such Corporations would ex-hypothesis be agencies of the Government. (Vide : Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi & Anr., AIR 1975 SC 1331 ; and Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 1628 ). 17. (Vide : Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi & Anr., AIR 1975 SC 1331 ; and Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 1628 ). 17. Banks and Financial institutions carrying out financial transactions, are independent to do business subject to the regulatory laws made by the legislature. They are not under the direct executive control of the government. They are profit and loss earning organisations coupled with all connected financial and economic activities. They are a body corporate with a limited role to play and do not "govern" people as understood by governance. (See: Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 4325 ). 18. In State of Punjab & Ors. v. Raja Ram & Ors., AIR 1981 SC 1694 , this Court considered the provisions of the Food Corporation Act, 1964 and held that Food Corporation of India was not a Government department but a Government Company. The Court observed: "A Government department has to be an organisation which is not only completely controlled and financed by the Government but has also no identity of its own. The money earned by such a department goes to the exchequer of the Government and losses incurred by the department are losses of the Government. The Corporation, on the other hand, is an autonomous body capable of acquiring, holding and disposing of property and having the power to contract. It may also sue or be sued by its own name and the Government does not figure in any litigation to which it is a party. (See also: The State of Bihar v. The Union of India & Anr., AIR 1970 SC 1446 ; S.S. Dhanoa v. Municipal Corporation Delhi & Ors., AIR 1981 SC 1395 ; K. Jayamohan v. State of Kerala & Anr., (1997) 5 SCC 170 : ( AIR 1997 SC 2619 ); Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. v. State of Kerala & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2275 ; Mohd. Hadi Raja v. State of Bihar & Anr., AIR 1998 SC 1945; and State through Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kulwant Singh, AIR 2003 SC 1599 ).” 36] Thus, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Leelabai Gajanan Pansare and Ors. Vs. Hadi Raja v. State of Bihar & Anr., AIR 1998 SC 1945; and State through Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kulwant Singh, AIR 2003 SC 1599 ).” 36] Thus, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Leelabai Gajanan Pansare and Ors. Vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and Ors., reported in (2008) 9 S.C.C. 720, and followed later has been understood in a manner held as above and not as contended by Mr. Dani. It has been explained and held in terms hereinabove. 37] It is not possible to agree with Mr. Dani that the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Leelabai Pansare (supra) is restricted to those Corporations which are akin to Public Sector Undertakings. Mr. Dani has relied upon paras 70 to 73 of the judgment in that case. However, even if that judgment holds that the golden thread which runs through section 3(1)(b) is test of financial capability that can safely be applied to the case of KVIC. It is not the object and purpose for which the Corporation has been established which is relevant but it is its financial capacity and capability and whether it needs protection of a social and beneficial Legislation like Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. If it is found to be not just cash rich but able to afford payment of rent at market rate because of its financial capability, then, merely because KVIC is named as a “Commission” does not mean that it is not a Corporation established by or under a law by the Central or State Government. In this case on scanning of the provisions of KVIC Act it becomes apparent that it is a Corporation established under the KVIC Act, 1961. If it is so and its role has to be seen in the backdrop of its setting, its functions, its powers and equally its finances, then, the general perspective or definition of the term “Mission” will not be decisive. Mr. Dani relied upon the definition of the term “Mission”. Mr. Dani submits that the “Mission” means an important assignment or a organisation or institution involved in a long term assignment, such as vocation of a religious organisation to spread its faith and equally he relies upon the definition of the term “Commission”. Mr. Dani relied upon the definition of the term “Mission”. Mr. Dani submits that the “Mission” means an important assignment or a organisation or institution involved in a long term assignment, such as vocation of a religious organisation to spread its faith and equally he relies upon the definition of the term “Commission”. Mr.Dani submits that the Commission is a term understood and defined as an authority to perform a task and not just a sum paid for a financial transaction. It is the broader and wider meaning of the term “Commission” namely an instruction or command to design or create or an authority to perform, which is what differentiates and distinguishes KVIC from a statutory Corporation as understood by section 3(1)(b). However, Mr. Dada contends that the Applicants' contentions are an afterthought. They never proclaimed before the Courts below that the aim and object of establishing KVIC is so laudable and they are deviating from their stand as set out in the memo of Appeal at paragraph 1. That reads as under:- “1. …. The Appellants are running departmental trading activity from the suit premises since last about 50 years through the Directorate of Handmade Paper & Fibre Industry. It is a department of the Appellants. The Appellants are a Statutory Body created by an Act of Parliament (No.61 of 1956) and as amended by (Act No.12/1987 and Act No.10/2006) for the development of Khadi and Village Industries and for the matters related thereto. …...” 38] Mr. Dada submits that they are a Statutory Body carrying on business and trading activities. The cherished ideals of the freedom struggle and principles so also the message of the Father of the Nation is long forgotten by such entities and all those Trusts, Authorities and Organizations formed and set up in the name of Gandhi. Mr.Dada laments that commerce has replaced charity and compassion, power and property has displaced philanthropy in all of them. It is surprising, according to him, that these Institutions and bodies have all the qualities and attributes of a business enterprise. They may not be earning profits but their endeavour is working for gain and building finances. Therefore, Shri Dani's arguments be rejected outright. It is surprising, according to him, that these Institutions and bodies have all the qualities and attributes of a business enterprise. They may not be earning profits but their endeavour is working for gain and building finances. Therefore, Shri Dani's arguments be rejected outright. 39] I have merely noted the Respondents' stand and which shows that the bitterness is to this extent that at one stage the parties tried to find out a amicable solution but the Respondents are agitated by the fact that instead of vacating the premises voluntarily after a reasonable period, the Applicants are indulging in litigation. It was said that if they truly and genuinely respected Gandhi, they (KVIC) ought to have avoided fighting in Courts as the Father of the Nation advocated “Adalat Mukti” (Freedom from Courts). It is urged that Mahatma Gandhi emphasised that true source of rights is duty and that is overlooked by KVIC. I refrain from expressing any opinion on Mr. Dada's arguments noted above, lest I may be misunderstood. I only hope that all concerned learn a lesson and expeditiously so that public trust and public interest is sub-served. 40] Though the dictionary meanings can be pressed into service but their application will depend upon the context in which the word has been used and the word “Commission” here has been used as nothing but another name for a Corporation established or constituted by the Central Act, then, it is clear that the applicant cannot claim protection of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act. It falls outside its purview. Once it is not covered and has no protection of a rent control legislation, then, its rights as a lessee or tenant are governed by the general law. That general law is Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and in that enactment, it is possible for the lessor to terminate rights of lessee by issuing notice under section 106 thereof. Once that is issued and the right is terminated, then, the lessee has to surrender possession by vacating and handing over the leased premises to the lessor. If that requisition is not complied with, then, the lessor can file a suit for possession and it is precisely done in this case. Once that is issued and the right is terminated, then, the lessee has to surrender possession by vacating and handing over the leased premises to the lessor. If that requisition is not complied with, then, the lessor can file a suit for possession and it is precisely done in this case. 41] If the recourse to filing a suit in this case in the Court of Small Causes has been taken by virtue of section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882, then, the suit was squarely maintainable. The Court had jurisdiction to pass a decree for possession and it cannot be faulted at all. 42] As a result of the above discussion, the Revision applications fails. Rule is discharged. No costs. 43] At this stage, Mr. Patil appearing on behalf of the applicants prays that the ad-interim order passed by this Court be continued for a period of twelve weeks from today. Mr. Dada appearing on behalf of the respondents/ original plaintiffs opposes this request. 44] After hearing both Counsel on this point, I am of the opinion that since there is an ad-interim protection against eviction of the applicant on 27th July 2012 and the same is continued till date, interest of justice would be served if the same is continued for a period of eight weeks from today. However, this continuation is without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties.