Judgment :- K.M. Joseph, J. 1. One Jithu, aged 22 years, while travelling on the Manglore Mail on 12.11.2008 met with an untimely death as a result of his falling from the train. There is no dispute that he was sitting on the footboard of the train and the door of the coach hit the deceased as a result of which he fell down, sustained serious injuries and died. The appellants are his father and sister who is described as an unmarried sister. They claimed compensation on the basis that Jithu died as a result of the untoward incident within the meaning of Section 124 A of the Railways Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the `Act'). The respondents filed counter affidavit. They have inter alia stated that the relatives of the deceased have given a statement that the deceased was travelling sitting near the door. Such travel is dangerous and a reckless act and therefore his fall was due to his own willful act for which Railway is exempted from paying compensation under Section 124A(b) of the Act. They also denied that the deceased was a bonafide passenger and denied all other claims putting the applicants to strict proof. 2. The Tribunal raised the following issues: 7 1. Whether the deceased was a bonafide passenger, as alleged? 7 2. Whether the deceased died due to an untoward incident as alleged? 7 3. Whether the applicants are the only dependants of the deceased? 7 4. Whether the respondent is liable to pay compensation, If so, what amount? 7 5. Reliefs and costs? 3. Issue No.1 was answered in favour of the appellants. As far as issue No.2 is concerned, the Tribunal found that there is no doubt that the deceased had fallen from the train near Lakkidi railway station. It is also found that there is no dispute that the deceased was sitting near the door when he fell down from the train. It is further found that it is clear that there is no reason for him to sit near the door as his father, appellant No.1, claims that they were all sitting inside the coach in seats. The Tribunal also would state that the younger sister, namely, the second appellant says that, his father asked him to come back, but the deceased persisted in sitting near the door. The Tribunal also would state that the younger sister, namely, the second appellant says that, his father asked him to come back, but the deceased persisted in sitting near the door. The Tribunal further reasoned that sitting near the door is a dangerous and reckless way of travel and therefore the respondents are not liable to pay compensation and that the injuries sustained as a result of such travel is to be treated as `self inflicted injury'. It is found that, open door, as claimed by the appellants can suddenly close due to braking or acceleration which is the alleged reason for the accidental fall. It is further found that the first appellant is also aware of the danger of such travel and had, as the second appellant says, asked him to return to his seat. Yet the deceased had persisted in sitting near the door. There is no need to travel in such a manner as the deceased and the rest of the family had seats to travel. The method of travelling was found to be dangerous and his youth made him reckless. The travelling is found to be clearly adventurous and not necessary on that day. Injuries resulting from such behavior therefore have to be treated as self inflicted injuries. Thus the issue was answered against the appellants. 4. As far as issue Nos. 3 and 4 are concerned, the Tribunal did not answer the said issues as the issues were no longer relevant . Consequently, issue No.5 was also answered against the appellants and the O.A. was dismissed. 5. We heard Adv. Ms.Lakshmi Rajan, learned counsel for the appellants and Adv.Sri.James Kurian, the learned Standing Counsel for the Railways. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the approach of the Tribunal cannot be supported. It is submitted that this is not a case where there is a 'self inflicted injury' within the meaning of Section 124A of the Act. It is submitted that the words 'self inflicted injury' is not defined. She would draw our attention to the judgment of the Apex Court in Jameela v. Union of India ( 2010 ACJ 2453 ). In the said case, there was an accident, in that the deceased fell from the train. It is submitted that the words 'self inflicted injury' is not defined. She would draw our attention to the judgment of the Apex Court in Jameela v. Union of India ( 2010 ACJ 2453 ). In the said case, there was an accident, in that the deceased fell from the train. The contention of the Railway was that the deceased was standing at the open door of the train compartment from where he fell down and the Railway treated it as negligence. The Apex Court dealing with the said argument held as follows: "9. The manner in which the accident is sought to be reconstructed by the Railways, the deceased was standing at the open door of the train compartment from where he fell down, is called by the Railways itself as negligence. Now negligence of this kind which is not very uncommon on Indian trains is not the same thing as a criminal act mentioned in clause ) to the proviso to section 124-A. A criminal act envisaged under clause ) must have an element of malicious intent or mens rea. Standing at the open doors of the compartment of a running train may be a negligent act, even a rash act but, without anything else, it is certainly not a criminal act. Thus, the case of the Railways must fail even after assuming everything in its favour." 6. Now, we may notice that the court notes that it is not the case of the Railways that the death of Hafeez (the deceased in the said case) is a case of suicide or as a result of self inflicted injury. It is also not its case that he died due to his own criminal act or any criminal act committed by him in a state of intoxication or insanity or died due to any natural cause. The court found that the falling down of the deceased in the said case was clearly accidental. 7. In Section 123 of the Act accident is defined as meaning as accident of the nature described in Section 124. Untoward incident is defined in Section 123 ( c). It includes accidental falling of any passenger from a train carrying passengers. Thereafter, Section 124-A provides for compensation on account of untoward incident. 7. In Section 123 of the Act accident is defined as meaning as accident of the nature described in Section 124. Untoward incident is defined in Section 123 ( c). It includes accidental falling of any passenger from a train carrying passengers. Thereafter, Section 124-A provides for compensation on account of untoward incident. The proviso, however, declares that no compensation shall be payable inter alia if the passenger dies or suffers injury due to (b) self-inflicted injury, (c) his own criminal act. We are not concerned with the other exceptions. 8. We are of the view that the finding of the Tribunal that the deceased in this case is guilty of an act which can be treated as self inflicted injury is not correct. There is no dispute in this case that the deceased was travelling in the train. It is also not in dispute that the deceased fell from the train. It is also beyond dispute that he was sitting on the footboard of the train and apparently the door moved and collided against him resulting in his being thrown out of the train and his unfortunate death. We have already taken note of the principle laid down by the Apex Court in a case where the deceased was standing at the open door of the train compartment from where he fell down. The court took the view that even though the said act, namely, standing on the open door is negligence, the said negligence would not amount to criminal act within the meaning of clause (c). In this context, we may advert to Section 156 of the Act. Section 156 of the Act reads as follows: "156.Travelling on roof, step or engine of a train.--If any passenger or any other person, after being warned by a railway servant to desist, persists in travelling on the roof, step or footboard of any carriage or on an engine, or in any other part of a train not intended for the use of passengers, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both and may be removed from the railway by any railway servant." 9. There is no case for the respondents that the deceased was warned by the railway servant to desist from travelling on the step or footboard and still the deceased persisted in flouting the direction of the railway servant. Therefore, we can safely proceed on the footing that the deceased could not be accused of a criminal act as such. 10. It was held by this Court in Joji C.John v. Union of India ( 2002 (1) KLT 678 ) as follows: "W hen there is 'untoward incident' even when no negligence is proved on the part of Railway Officers, Railway is liable to pay compensation as prescribed in the schedule. See S.124A and 123 ( c) of the Railways Act, 1989 as amended by Railways (Amendment) Act, 28 of 1994. Even if there is no negligence on the part of the Railway employees, it cannot be presumed that injuries caused to the victim of the accident are self inflicted injuries so as to deny compensation as provided under Railway Accidents and Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules, 1990. In the above circumstances, the burden is on the Railway to prove that claimant is not a bonafide passenger. Claimant was a teacher. She sustained injuries due to fall from the train accidentally and finding of the Tribunal otherwise is perverse and set aside. Merely because she lost the ticket during the accident by which she became unconscious, she cannot be labelled as "not a bonafide passenger". Railway failed to prove that she was not a bonafide passenger when other incidents like her accident are not disputed." 11. No doubt, just like the travelling in front of the open door of a moving train, sitting down on the footboard and travelling is not to be encouraged. The fact that it is not safe is sufficiently articulated in Section 156 of the Act which we have already adverted to. We expect that whenever the officers of the Railway come across any activity which is mentioned in Section 156 of the Act they will warn at least and take action in appropriate cases. The fact that it is not safe is sufficiently articulated in Section 156 of the Act which we have already adverted to. We expect that whenever the officers of the Railway come across any activity which is mentioned in Section 156 of the Act they will warn at least and take action in appropriate cases. Suffice, it is, for the purpose of this case, that though we may be inclined to hold that there was negligence on the part of the deceased Jithu and we are even prepared to say that it was a rash act on his part particularly when there was request made by the first appellant, his father to return to his seat, neither can it be treated as a criminal act nor can it be treated as falling under clause 'b', namely, self inflicted injury. In the said circumstances, we vacate the finding of the Tribunal that the appellants are not entitled to compensation on account of the ground that the death of the deceased in this case was due to the self inflicted injury of the deceased. We have already stated that the Tribunal has not rendered any finding on the other issues. 12. We notice that the first appellant is the father and second appellant is the unmarried sister of the deceased. Section 123 defines dependants as follows: "Section 123 (b). "dependent" means any of the following relatives of a deceased passenger, namely:- (i) the wife, husband, son and daughter, and in case the deceased passenger is unmarried or is a minor, his parent; (ii) the parent, minor brother or unmarried sister, widowed sister, widowed daughter- in-law and a minor child of a pre-deceased son, if dependant wholly or partly on the deceased passenger; (iii) a minor child of a pre-deceased daughter, if wholly dependant on the deceased passenger; (iv) the paternal grandparent wholly dependant on the deceased passenger." 13. We notice that as far as clause (i) is concerned, dependants are stated to be wife, husband, son and daughter. If the deceased passenger is unmarried or if he is a minor then his parent becomes the dependant. However, as far as clause (ii) is concerned, we notice the presence of the word parent. It is followed by minor brother, unmarried sister, widowed sister, widowed daughter-in-law and minor child of the pre-deceased son. If the deceased passenger is unmarried or if he is a minor then his parent becomes the dependant. However, as far as clause (ii) is concerned, we notice the presence of the word parent. It is followed by minor brother, unmarried sister, widowed sister, widowed daughter-in-law and minor child of the pre-deceased son. As far as clause (ii) is concerned, under which section the second appellant apparently falls, the condition to be satisfied is that, the person concerned must be dependant wholly or partly on the deceased passenger. As far as the parent is concerned, even if he is not dependant on the deceased passenger if the deceased passenger is unmarried or is a minor the parent can claim compensation under clause (i). But, when it come to clause (ii) the parent becomes a dependant only if he was dependant wholly or partly on the deceased passenger. Clause (ii) apparently deals with the case of a deceased passenger who was married and without leaving behind him/her the spouse, son or daughter who are covered under clause (i). 14. We would think that the issues which remains to be answered must be gone into by the Tribunal. In fact, we notice that there is no averment as such that the second appellant is dependant partly or wholly on the deceased. There is no evidence also tendered on those lines either. We notice legal heirship certificate is not produced. We also notice that Ext.A9 relationship certificate is produced in which it is stated that the mother is missing for a period of 7 years. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The order of the Tribunal is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Tribunal. The parties shall appear before the Tribunal on 12.8.2013 and the Tribunal will take a decision on the remaining issues with opportunity to the parties within a period of three months from 12.8.2013.