1. The petitioner, who was working as Commandant, 163 Battalion, Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF for short), has sought quashment of order dated 13th July, 2012, whereby he came to be compulsorily retired from service. The petitioner has also sought quashment of departmental inquiry initiated against him and entire proceedings alongwith the inquiry report, on the grounds taken in the memo of writ petition. 2. The writ petition was considered and admitted to hearing on 04.01.2013 by one of the coordinate benches of this Court. The respondents have filed their reply and have resisted the writ petition on the averments made therein. The petitioner in response has filed a rejoinder affidavit. Therefore, the pleadings are complete. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, examined the material on record and considered the matter. 4. The grounds for passing the impugned order of compulsory retirement against the petitioner are founded on the allegation that he sent a cherry box through his security aide to Smt. Harsimrat Kour, wife of Dr. Jaswinder Singh, who was working as SMO in the same Battalion at the relevant point of time. It is stated that wife of Dr. Jaswinder Singh filed a complaint against the petitioner and reported the matter to the higher authorities. The said complaint was referred for inquiry to Shri A. K. Sharma, DIG, Baramulla, who, after inquiring into the same, found the complaint as baseless. Another inquiry on the very same complaint was conducted by the Shri K. M. lyer, Inspector General, CRPF, and he, too, found that the complaint was unfounded and absolutely baseless. It is stated by the petitioner that the matter was enquired into four times and it was on the basis of the report on the 4th inquiry that departmental inquiry was ordered and initiated against the petitioner in terms of order dated 29.08.2008. It is further stated that vide order dated 30.10.2008, one Shri S. S. Dogra, was appointed as Inquiry Officer and Shri V. K. Bisht was appointed as Presenting Officer, who was later changed vide order dated 25.01.2010 and substituted by Shri Ram Krishen. It is stated that the memorandum of charges was issued on 29.08.2008 by the Additional DIGP. The petitioner responded to the said charge sheet and denied the allegations made therein. 5. It is stated that the memorandum of charges was issued on 29.08.2008 by the Additional DIGP. The petitioner responded to the said charge sheet and denied the allegations made therein. 5. The petitioner invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court by medium of writ petition bearing SWP No. 1516/2012, wherein he challenged the entire inquiry proceedings against him. It is stated that when the writ petition was listed for consideration, counsel for the respondents submitted a photocopy of order dated 13th July, 2012, wherefrom the petitioner came to know that the respondents have awarded a major penalty of compulsory retirement of the petitioner. Noticing the order aforementioned, this Court, while disposing of the writ petition, gave liberty to the petitioner to challenge the order of compulsory retirement and that is how he has filed the writ petition at hand. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Dar, vehemently contended that the inquiry conducted by Shri S.S. Dogra, was not in accordance with the procedure as established by the law/rules and that the petitioner was not heard at all by the inquiry officer, muchless providing him adequate opportunity to explain his case. It is also contended that the respondents have not examined the findings made by the earlier inquiry officers. It was argued that it was just to cut short the career of the petitioner and to malign his image that the enquiry was conducted in a slipshod manner. It is denied by the petitioner that he had made several phone calls to Smt. Harsimrat Kour, wife of Dr. Jaswinder Singh, with ulterior motives, the charges on which the petitioner was shown door from the services. 7. It was also submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that it is the positive case of the petitioner that no sufficient opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to defend himself in the departmental proceedings and finally he was informed that he was found guilty and an order of compulsory retirement from service was passed. It was further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that it is not known why the respondents were not satisfied with the findings of the enquiry recorded by the first inquiry officer and what prompted the respondents to initiate a fresh inquiry. 8. It was further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that it is not known why the respondents were not satisfied with the findings of the enquiry recorded by the first inquiry officer and what prompted the respondents to initiate a fresh inquiry. 8. The respondents have resisted the writ petition and averred that the first fact finding inquiry was conducted by Shri A. K. Sharma, DIG (Ops), Baramulla, which as per the version of the respondents was not conducted in accordance with the procedure because there were many lacunae in the enquiry report submitted by him. Therefore, it is averred that ADIGP, O/O IGP, CRPF, Srinagar, was asked by the IGP, CRPF, Srinagar, to conduct a further discreet inquiry. It is further averred that the officer in his report came to the conclusion that there was some prima facie evidence against the petitioner. It is further averred that the matter was examined in the Directorate of CRPF and considering the gravity of allegations, a proposal for initiation of enquiry was recommended. The competent authority as averred desired to conduct a preliminary inquiry based on the complaint before initiating a formal Departmental Enquiry. It is further averred that the departmental enquiry was initiated and conducted against the petitioner. It is further averred that imposition of major penalty of compulsory retirement has been made only after finalization of departmental enquiry which was conducted in accordance with the laid down rules/ procedure. 9. Perusal of the record produced reveals that the petitioner has not earned any bad remark till the date of the impugned order. APRs of the petitioner bear out his proficiency and good conduct. The only incident quoted is the subject matter of the enquiry. Coming to the present enquiry, it may be observed that at the first instance, when the enquiry was conducted, the enquiry officer has not proved any charges against the petitioner. However, second enquiry officer has recorded a finding stating that charges leveled against the petitioner are proved. It is not forth coming from the record what were the reasons for conducting the second enquiry against the petitioner. What is revealed further is that neither the second enquiry officer nor competent authorities have taken into consideration the earlier enquiry report submitted by none other than the DIG of the CRPF. 10. It is not forth coming from the record what were the reasons for conducting the second enquiry against the petitioner. What is revealed further is that neither the second enquiry officer nor competent authorities have taken into consideration the earlier enquiry report submitted by none other than the DIG of the CRPF. 10. It is settled law that when the charges / allegations are dropped after conducting an enquiry, the second enquiry cannot be held on the same set of charges / allegations, Reference in this regard may be had to the apex Court judgment in Anand Kumar Verma v. State of Jharkhand, (2012) 3 SCC 580 , wherein it has been held that initiation of second enquiry tantamount to harassment. The relevant paragraph of the judgment is quoted hereunder: ".....Therefore, in these circumstances, there is no justification for conducting a second enquiry on the very charges, which have been dropped earlier. Even though the principle of double jeopardy is not applicable, the law permits only disciplinary proceedings and not harassment. Allowing such practice is not in the interest of public service. In the circumstance, we cannot sustain the impugned order reverting the appellant to the lower post." 11. It may be observed here that in the aforesaid judgment, the apex Court took note of its earlier, various judgments passed from time to time on the subject of compulsory retirement and recorded the object and scope of compulsory retirement from service. I deem it appropriate to reproduce paragraphs 34, 36 and 40 of the judgment hereunder: "34. It is also well settled that the formation of opinion for compulsory retirement is based on the subjective satisfaction of the concerned authority but such satisfaction must be based on a valid material. It is permissible for the Courts to ascertain whether a valid material exists or otherwise, on which the subjective satisfaction of the administrative authority is based. In the present matter, what we see is that the High Court, while holding that the track record and service record of the appellant was unsatisfactory, has selectively taken into consideration the service record for certain years only while making extracts of those contents of the ACR's. There appears to be some discrepancy. In the present matter, what we see is that the High Court, while holding that the track record and service record of the appellant was unsatisfactory, has selectively taken into consideration the service record for certain years only while making extracts of those contents of the ACR's. There appears to be some discrepancy. We , say so for the reason that the appellant has produced the copies of the ACR's which were obtained by him from the High Court under the Right to Information Act, 2005 and a comparison of these two would positively indicate that the High Court has not faithfully extracted the contents of the ACRs. 36. The material on which the decision of the Compulsory retirement was based, as extracted by the High Court in the impugned judgment, and material furnished by the appellant would reflect that totality of relevant materials were not considered or completely ignored by the High Court. This leads to only one conclusion that the subjective satisfaction of the High Court was not based on the sufficient or relevant material. In this view of the matter, we cannot say that the service record of the appellant was unsatisfactory which would warrant premature retirement from service. Therefore, there was no justification to retire the appellant compulsorily from service. 40. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in sustaining the orders passed by the Full Court of the same High Court. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the orders passed by the High Court." 12. This Court also in a case titled Muzaffar Ahmad Khan v. State and others, 2011 (2) JKJ [HC] 590, of which, incidentally, I am the author, has dealt with the question as to how and under what circumstances the compulsory retirement can be made. That judgment has been upheld by the Division Bench of this Court as also by the Supreme Court. It would be profitable to extract paragraph (2) of the judgment, which reads as under: 2. The question which arises for decision is as to whether the aforementioned impugned compulsory retirement order is legally correct? That judgment has been upheld by the Division Bench of this Court as also by the Supreme Court. It would be profitable to extract paragraph (2) of the judgment, which reads as under: 2. The question which arises for decision is as to whether the aforementioned impugned compulsory retirement order is legally correct? The Apex Court and this Court in various cases reported as Baldev Raj Chandra v. Union of India, 1980(4) SCC 321 , Baldev Raj Chandra v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 70 , H.C. Gagri v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 65 , Brij Mohan Singh Chopra v. State of Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 948 , Baidyanath Mahapatra v. State of Orissa, AIR 1979 SC 2218, Ram Ekbal Sharma v. State of Bihar, 1990(3) SCC 504 , Union of India v. Dulal Dutt, 1993 (2) SCC 179 , S. Ramachandra Raju v. State of Orissa, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 424, State of J&K v. Jia Lal Gupta, 1994 SLJ 24, Chief General Manager, SBI v. Suresh Chandra Behera, AIR 1995 SCC 1745, K.K.Kandaswamy v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 277 , Allahabad Bank Officers Association v. Allahabad Bank, 1996 (4) SCC 504 , M.S. Bindra v. Union of India, 1998 (7) SCC 310 , M.S. Bindra v. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 3058 , State of Gujarat v. Suryakant Chunilal Shah, 1999 (1) SCC 529 , State of Gujarat v. Umedbhai M. Patel, AIR 2001 SC 1109 , State of U.P v. Chater Sen, 2005 (9) SCC 592 , Pritam Singh v. Union of India, 2005 (9) SCC 748 , Ashok Kumar Jain v. State of J&K & Ors. 2005 (4) JKJ 116-HC LPA Nos. 2005 (4) JKJ 116-HC LPA Nos. 27J and 28J of 2005 decided on 5-8-2005, Mohammad Mehraj-ud-Din Khan v. State of J&K & Ors., 2006 (3) JKJ (HC) 240, Shah Latief v. State of J & K & Ors., 2006 (1) JKJ HC (DB) 486, Rajesh Gupta v. State of J & K & Ors., 2008 (1) JKJ [HC] 573 and SWP No. 828 and other bunch of petitions titled Zareena Banoo & connected matters V. State and others, 2008 (3) JKJ HC-106 date of decision 6-6-2008; Janak Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir reported in 2009 (1) JKJ [HC] 588 and SWP 530/2005 titled Ram Dass v. State and others, have discussed in the detail the principles in order to test whether the order of compulsory retirement is legally tenable or otherwise." 13. The apex Court in a recent pronouncement in case titled Rajesh Gupta v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (2013) 3 SCC 514 , has also laid down the law as to under what circumstances the compulsory retirement of a person can be initiated and ordered. 14. In the aforementioned backdrop, applying the ratio and tests of the cases referred to above to the facts and circumstances of the instant case, I am of the considered view that the principles laid down in the cases supra are wanting in the case at hand. The impugned order has been passed without application of mind and, thus, arbitrarily. In the given situation, writ petition merits to be allowed, as the impugned order does not stand the scrutiny of law. 15. Accordingly, while allowing the writ petition, the impugned order dated 13th July, 2012, whereby the petitioner has been compulsorily retired from service, is quashed. As a corollary, the second departmental inquiry as also the entire proceedings relating thereto alongwith inquiry report thereon, besides the orders dated 29.08.2008 and 30.10.2008, are also quashed. 16. The connected CMP(s) shall abide the decision in the main petition. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 17. The records produced by the respondents for perusal of the Court are returned to them in the open Court. 18. Disposed of alongwith CMP(s).