JUDGMENT : K. Harilal, J. The revision petitioner is the accused in C.C. No. 572/05 on the files of the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court-I, Erattupetta, as well as the appellant in Crl. Appeal No. 106/07 on the files of the Additional Sessions Judge, Pala. He was prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short `the Act') on a complaint filed by the complainant/2nd respondent. After trial, the learned Magistrate found the revision petitioner guilty of the said offence and convicted thereunder. He was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and to pay a compensation of Rs.14,27,464/- to the complainant/2nd respondent under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. and in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. Though he had preferred an appeal, the appellate court also confirmed the conviction and sentence. This revision petition is filed challenging the concurrent findings of conviction and sentence entered on various grounds. 2. The case of the complainant is that towards the payment of the value of timber supplied, the accused issued Ext. P1 cheque dated 31/3/2005 for Rs.14,27,464/- to him. When he presented the cheque for encashment, the same was dishonoured for want of sufficient funds. Though he had issued statutory notice demanding the cheque amount, the revision petitioner had not paid the said amount; but sent a reply denying the said claim. Thus, the revision petitioner has committed the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. 3. The complainant's case, in brief, is as follows: The complainant is a merchant conducting the business of Timber and the accused is a customer by name "Shri. Chacko Mathew, Managing Director, PACT Rubber Wood & Allied Products Ltd., Kottayam". The accused is having a timber industry unit at Peruva, where the complainant had supplied timber logs to the accused worth Rs.14,27,464/-. In discharge of that liability, the accused came to his residence and issued the cheque dated 31.3.2005 for an amount of Rs.14,27,464/-. When he presented the cheque for encashment through his Bank, the same was dishonoured and returned for want of sufficient fund. Though he caused to issue Lawyer's notice demanding the cheque amount, the accused did not pay the cheque amount, but sent a reply denying the liability. Thus, the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Though he caused to issue Lawyer's notice demanding the cheque amount, the accused did not pay the cheque amount, but sent a reply denying the liability. Thus, the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. 4. Though this Revision Petition has been filed on various grounds, Sri. Bechu Kurian Thomas, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, focused on one point only at the time of argument. The learned counsel submits that the complaint is not maintainable for the reason that the company who had drawn the cheque has not been arraigned as an accused in the complaint. The Managing Director who had signed the cheque for and on behalf of the company alone was made an accused. The prosecution under Section 138 of the N.I. Act would not be maintainable unless the drawer of the cheque, the company, is made as an accused. The maintainability of the complaint for the above reason was one of the main contentions raised in the trial Court. But the learned Magistrate rejected the contention relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Anil Hada v. Indian Acrylic Ltd., [ (2000)1 SCC 1 ] and other decisions of this Court in Gracy Thomas v. State of Kerala, (2005(4) KLT SN 75) and N. Radhakrishnan v. A.C. Thomas, [2006(1) KLD (Cri) 352], which followed the above decision. In Anil Hada v. Indian Acrylic Ltd., the Supreme Court held that the prosecution of the Company is not sine qua non for prosecution of the other categories mentioned under Section 141 of the Act. In N. Radhakrishnan's case (cited supra) it was held that the Managing Partner who signed the cheque on behalf of the firm is the drawer of the cheque notwithstanding the fact that the account stands in the name of the firm. Now the Supreme Court overruled the above decision in Anil Hada's case (cited supra), settled the legal position in Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Private Ltd., 2012(5) SCC 661 and 3 other Criminal Appeals and held that the prosecution for an offence under Section 138 is not maintainable against the Managing Director or Directors of the company alone, unless the company is arraigned as an accused along with the Managing Director or Directors, as the case may be. Thus, this question challenging maintainability had been raised at the earliest opportunity; but the trial Court was not inclined to accept it. Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence, though an appeal had been filed and again raised the same contention, the Appellate Court also dismissed the Appeal relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Anil Hada's case (cited supra) and other decisions which followed the above decision. The counsel submits that now on a reference on the question of law, settled the legal position and accepted the point which the revision petitioner had raised before the trial Court and Appellate Court, after overruling the earlier decisions, on which the trial Court and Appellate Court had relied on. The learned counsel submits that in view of the decision in Aneeta Hada's case (cited supra), this Revision is liable to be allowed, as the complaint itself was not maintainable. 5. Though notice had been ordered and served on the 2nd respondent/complainant he did not appear before this Court to contest the Revision on merits. 6. In view of the argument advanced by the learned counsel in the light of legal positions settled in Aneeta Hada's case (cited supra) the only question to be considered is whether the decision referred above is applicable to the instant case? 7. The question before three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court was that whether a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act read with Section 141 thereof against a Director or Managing Director as authorised signatory of a cheque is maintainable without arraying the company as an accused. 8. In the Supreme Court, initially Aneeta Hada's case has come up before a two Judge Bench, which due to divergence of opinion between the two-Judges by its order in Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Private Ltd., [ (2008)13 SCC 703 ] had referred to three-Judge Bench. 9. Answering in the negative a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held as follows :- "58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the considered opinion that commission of offence by the company is an express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. 9. Answering in the negative a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held as follows :- "58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the considered opinion that commission of offence by the company is an express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words "as well as the company" appearing in the section make it absolutely unmistakably clear that when the company can be prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof. One cannot be obvious of the fact that the company is a juristic person and it has its own respectability. If a finding is recorded against it, it would create a concavity in its reputation. There can be situations when the corporate reputation is affected when a Director is indicted. 59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the drag-net on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. We say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh 17 which is a three-Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal 16 does not correctly lay down the law and, accordingly, is hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada 18 is overruled with the qualifier as stated in para 51. The decision in Modi Distillery has to be treated to be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove. 17- State of Madras v. C.V. Parekh, ( 1970 (3) SCC 491 ) 16- Sheoratan Agarwal v. State of M.P.,( (1984) 4 SCC 352 ): (1984 SCC (Cri)620) 18- Anil Hada v. Indian Acrylic Ltd., ( (2000)1 SCC 1 ) 14- Pollution Control Board v. Modi Distillery, ( 1987(3) SCC 684 ) The interpretation of Section 141 of the N.I. Act made by the Supreme Court is as follows :- 32. We have referred to the aforesaid authorities to highlight that the company can have criminal liability and further, if a group of persons that guide the business of the companies have the criminal intent, that would be imputed to the body corporate. In this backdrop, Section 141 of the Act has to be understood. The said provision clearly stipulates that when a person which is a company commits an offence, then certain categories of persons in charge as well as the company would be deemed to be liable for the offences under Section 138. thus, the statutory intendment is absolutely plain. As is perceptible, the provision makes the functionaries and the companies to be liable and that is by deeming fiction. A deeming fiction has its own signification. 10. Indisputably in the instant case the cheque was one issued from the account maintained by the company, namely, "PACT Rubber Wood & Allied Products Limited" in which the accused is the Managing Director. The accused had signed the cheque as Managing Director for and on behalf of PACT Rubber Wood & Allied Products Ltd. But PACT Rubber Wood & Allied Products Ltd., the company is not arraigned as an accused. These are admitted facts. 11. When this question was considered at the time of trial, the decision of the Supreme Court in Anil Hada v. Indian Acrylic Ltd., [ 2000 (1) SCC 1 ] was the law on this point. Relying on this decision subsequent decisions were held in this line, following the same, in Gracy Thomas's case and in N. Radhakrishnan's case, (cited supra), wherein it was held that the Managing Partner who signed the cheque on behalf of the firm is the drawer of the cheque notwithstanding the fact that the account stand in the name of the firm. Later, the liability of the Managing Director of a company under Section 141 of the N.I. Act has been discussed elaborately by the Supreme Court in SMG Pharmaceutical Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, [2005(4) KLT 250 (SC)] and relying on Anil Hada's case (cited supra) it was held that the Managing Director would be admittedly in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business and that the signatory of the cheque is clearly responsible under Section 141 of the Act. 12. 12. But now on a reference, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court declared the legal position and partly overruled the decision in Anil Hada v. Indian Acrylic Ltd., [ (2000)1 SCC 1 ]. Thus, the basic decision, on which other decisions placed reliance, now stands overruled and thereby these decisions also rendered themselves inapplicable as not the correct law. 13. Thus, the Law as on today is the decision in Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Private Ltd., [ (2012)5 SCC 661 ]. So, I am inclined to set aside the Judgment under challenge and allow the Revision Petition and I do so. This Revision is allowed.