JUDGMENT Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel for the State. 2. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order dated 20.12.2011 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bokaro, in S.T. No. 180 of 2011, whereby the application filed by the prosecution under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C., was allowed and the petitioners were summoned to face the trial for the offences under Sections 304B and 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. The petitioners are the father-in-law and the other in-laws of the deceased and the deceased informant had made allegations that her in-laws, including the petitioners, had put her to fire after pouring kerosene oil on her, due to which she was badly burnt and she was brought to the hospital. Subsequently, in course of the treatment she died. It appears that the case was investigated and after investigation, the Police had submitted the charge sheet against the husband only. The petitioners were not sent for trial. In course of the trial in the Court, in which, the husband of the deceased was facing trial, the evidence was adduced to show that there was dying declaration of the deceased which was supported by P.W. – 1, the father of the deceased, who had deposed that he was informed by his daughter while she was in injured condition that the petitioners also put her to fire. In view of the evidence, the petitioners were summoned to face the trial for the offences under Sections 304B and 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order passed by the Trial Court is absolutely illegal, in view of the fact that the trial was separated, in which, the husband of the deceased was ultimately acquitted by the Trial Court for the offences under sections 304B and 302 of the IPC, but he has been convicted and sentenced only for the offence under Section 498A of the IPC. Learned counsel for the petitioner has accordingly, submitted that on the same set of the evidence the conviction of the petitioners for the offence under Sections 304B and 302 of the IPC cannot be secured and the impugned order is fit to be set aside. Learned counsel for the petitioner has accordingly, submitted that on the same set of the evidence the conviction of the petitioners for the offence under Sections 304B and 302 of the IPC cannot be secured and the impugned order is fit to be set aside. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that even otherwise, there is no material to secure the conviction of the petitioners and as such the impugned order passed by the Court below is absolutely illegal and the same cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 5. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Lal Suraj @ Suraj Singh and Another Vs. State of Jharkhand, reported in (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 844, wherein where, the court had exercised the power under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C., on the basis of the evidence of a person who was not the eyewitness to the occurrence and other witnesses was only the hearsay witnesses, the Supreme Court in the facts of the case held that no evidence worth the name, had been brought on record to arrive at the satisfaction that there was a reasonable prospect of conviction of the appellants and accordingly, the impugned order was set aside. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed the reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Palanisamy Gounder & Anr. Vs. State Represented by Inspector of Police, reported in 2006 (3) East Cr C 205 (SC), wherein, also similar view was taken by the Apex Court holding that unless the Court is hopeful that there is reasonable prospect of the case against the newly added accused ending in their conviction for the offence concerned, the Court shall refrain from adding them as accused. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Sarabjit Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr., reported in 2009 (3) East Cr C 385 (SC), wherein, the is law laid down as follows:- “16. We have noticed herein before that Mohd. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Sarabjit Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr., reported in 2009 (3) East Cr C 385 (SC), wherein, the is law laid down as follows:- “16. We have noticed herein before that Mohd. Shafi (supra) has been explained in Lal Suraj (supra) holding that a power under Section 319 of the Code can be exercised only on the basis of fresh evidence brought before it and not on the basis of the materials which had been collected during investigation particularly when a final form was submitted and the same had been accepted by the Magistrate concerned. There is no gain-saying that the power under Section 319 of the Code is an extraordinary power which in terms of the decision of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra) is required to be exercised sparingly and if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against whom action has not been taken. 17. -------------An order under Section 319 of the Code, therefore, should not be passed only because the first informant or one of the witnesses seeks to implicate other person(s). Sufficient and cogent reasons are required to be assigned by the Court so as to satisfy the ingredients of the provisions. Mere ipse dixit would not serve the purpose. Such an evidence must be convincing one at least for the purpose of exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction. For the aforementioned purpose, the Courts are required to apply stringent tests; one of the tests being whether evidence on record is such which would reasonably lead to conviction of the person sought to be summoned.” 8. Placing reliance upon these decisions, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order passed by the Trial Court cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, in as much as, impugned order was passed only on the basis of the evidence of the father of the deceased, and the other witnesses examined had turned hostile and not supported the prosecution case. As such, there is no prospect at all of conviction of the petitioners. 9. Learned counsel for the State, on the other, has opposed the prayer. 10. As such, there is no prospect at all of conviction of the petitioners. 9. Learned counsel for the State, on the other, has opposed the prayer. 10. After having heard the learned counsels for both the sides, I find that the Court below has placed reliance on two materials for passing the order under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. The first material was the statement of the victim herself, in which, she had stated that her husband and in-laws, including these petitioners, had poured kerosene oil on her and put her to fire. This is also the dying declaration of the deceased. The second material is the evidence of the father of the informant, in which, he had stated that he was informed by his daughter while she was injured, that these petitioners and the other co-accused had poured kerosene oil and put her to fire. Both these evidences were corroborating each other and in my considered view, at that stage there was enough material before the Court below to project a reasonable prospect of conviction of the petitioners and accordingly, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned order summoning the petitioners to face the trial. 11. So far as the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the husband of the deceased has subsequently been acquitted of the said charges, is concerned, that is admittedly a subsequent event which could not be taken into consideration by the Court below, as the same was not available before the Court while issuing summons under Sections 319 of the Cr.P.C., against the petitioners. The legality or otherwise of an order can be judged only on the basis of the materials available at the time of issuance of the order and not on the basis of any subsequent event, which was not available at the time of issuance of the order. 12. Accordingly, I do not find any illegality and/or irregularity in the impugned order worth interference in the revisional jurisdiction. There is no merit in this application, which is accordingly, dismissed. 13. Consequently, the I.A. No. 2501 of 2013 filed by the petitioner No.1 for releasing him on bail, also stands dismissed. 14. 12. Accordingly, I do not find any illegality and/or irregularity in the impugned order worth interference in the revisional jurisdiction. There is no merit in this application, which is accordingly, dismissed. 13. Consequently, the I.A. No. 2501 of 2013 filed by the petitioner No.1 for releasing him on bail, also stands dismissed. 14. The petitioners may file appropriate application in the Court below bringing the subsequent event to the knowledge of the Court below, on which the appropriate decision shall be taken by the Court below in accordance with law.