JUDGMENT 1. - This is plaintiffs second appeal directed against judgment of the learned Additional District Judge No. 5, Jaipur City, Jaipur, dated 10.2.1999 in Civil Regular Appeal No. 93/1998, who thereby dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment and decree passed by learned Additional Munsiff Magistrate No. 2, Jaipur City, Jaipur, in Civil Suit No. 1327/1988, who dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. 2. Factual matrix of the case is that plaintiff-appellant was appointed on permanent post of conductor with the respondent Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, on regular basis. A charge-sheet was served upon the plaintiff, on the basis of which, he was dismissed from service. According to plaintiff-appellant, the order removing him from service was passed without compliance of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as he was not supplied copies of relevant documents during the course of disciplinary enquiry. Statements of witnesses were also not recorded in his presence. He was not given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses nor was he given opportunity to lead his evidence. The enquiry was conducted on a single day. On completion of the enquiry, copy of the report was also not supplied to the plaintiff. He was also not heard on the quantum of punishment. The plaintiff was removed from service on 7.6.1979. Severe punishment of removal was awarded to him without following the provisions contained in the standing order. The plaintiff filed departmental appeal against the order of removal. The appellate authority, vide order dated 25.2.1982, without giving him any opportunity of hearing, dismissed the appeal. The appellant authority did not provide the copy of order dismissing the departmental appeal. The plaintiff thereupon filed review petition before the respondent no. 4 - the Chairman, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur, which was also dismissed by the respondent no. 4 vide order dated 10.10.1985. 3. In the written statement, the defendant-respondents denied the fact that the plaintiff was appointed on the post of conductor on regular basis. It was pleaded that the departmental enquiry was conducted in accordance with the provisions of law and plaintiff was given opportunity to adduce his evidence and cross-examine the witnesses and also to produce his evidence. Copy of the enquiry-report was also made available to the plaintiff. A notice was given to the plaintiff on the quantum of punishment. The civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 4. Copy of the enquiry-report was also made available to the plaintiff. A notice was given to the plaintiff on the quantum of punishment. The civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 4. This court admitted this appeal on 26.7.1999 on the question "whether the appellate court, during the hearing of the appeal, can formulate a new question of law without there being an application to that effect by either of them?" 5. It may, at the out-set, be noted that while formulation of a question of law is a sine qua non for maintainability of second appeal, but at the same time it is also equally well settled that if a second appeal is admitted on substantial question of law, the High Court, while hearing it finally, can reframe substantial question of law or frame substantial question of law afresh or even hold that no substantial question of law is involved but reversal of the judgment and decree passed in appeal by a court subordinate to it in exercise of jurisdiction under section 100 of the code, is impermissible without formulating a substantial question of law. Reference in this connection may be made to the following observation of the Supreme Court in Umerkhan v. Bismillabi (2011) 9 SCC 684 . : 11. In our view, the very jurisdiction of the High Court in hearing a second appeal is founded on the formulation of a substantial question of law. The judgment of the High Court is rendered patently illegal, if a second appeal is heard and judgment and decree appealed against is reversed without formulating a substantial question of law. The second appellate jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 is not akin to the appellate jurisdiction under Section 96 of the Code; it is restricted to such substantial question or questions of law that may arise from the judgment and decree appealed against. As a matter of law, a second appeal is entertain able by the High Court only upon its satisfaction that a substantial question of law is involved in the matter and its formulation thereof. Section 100 of the Code provides that the second appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated. As a matter of law, a second appeal is entertain able by the High Court only upon its satisfaction that a substantial question of law is involved in the matter and its formulation thereof. Section 100 of the Code provides that the second appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated. It is, however, open to the High Court to reframe substantial question of law or frame substantial question of law afresh or hold that no substantial question of law is involved at the time of hearing the second appeal but reversal of the judgment and decree passed in appeal by a court subordinate to it exercise of jurisdiction under Section 400 of the Code is impermissible without formulating substantial question of law and a decision on such question." 6. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties and keeping in view the law enunciated by the Supreme Court in Umerkhan, supra, we are of the view that the question of law, referred to above, requires to be reformulated and the question of law that actually involved in the present matter is drawn as under: What would be the starting point for counting limitation to assail the order of removal and whether the suit seeking declaration regarding illegality of removal can be filed within three years from the date of dismissal of review petition, upholding the order of the appellate authority affirming such order of removal? 7. Shri Babu Lal Gupta, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, has argued that learned first appellate court has committed a serious error of law in deciding the Question No. 3, newly formulated by it, against the plaintiff-appellant, which was to the effect - whether the suit was not filed within the period of limitation? Burden of proof of that issue was on the defendant-respondents, which they failed to discharge. The defendant-respondents failed to refute the evidence led by the plaintiff-appellant. The learned first appellate court has erred in law in holding that the suit was not filed within the period of limitation. It was argued that the court below has failed to truly appreciate the documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff in its correct perspective. The plaintiff-appellant stated on oath that the review petition was filed before the respondent no. 4; the Chairman of the respondent Corporation through post, which was dismissed by order dated 10.10.1985. It was argued that the court below has failed to truly appreciate the documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff in its correct perspective. The plaintiff-appellant stated on oath that the review petition was filed before the respondent no. 4; the Chairman of the respondent Corporation through post, which was dismissed by order dated 10.10.1985. It was argued that both the courts below have dismissed the suit of the plaintiff-appellant on surmises and conjectures. The plaintiff-appellant moved an application on 28.9.1991 for producing the documents under Order 11, Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was allowed on 7.12.1991. The plaintiff-appellant moved another application on 6.2.1992 under Order 11, Rule 21 of the Civil Procedure Code for striking out defence of the defendants and that application was allowed on 12.10.1992 striking out defence of the defendants. It was argued that the departmental appeal of the plaintiff was dismissed on 25.02.1982 and the review petition was dismissed on 10.10.1985. Therefore, the suit could be filed within three years and the period of three years should be counted from the date of rejection of the review petition on 10.10.1985. 8. Shri Babu Lal Gupta, learned counsel for plaintiff-appellant, has cited judgment of this court dated in S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 447/1998, titled RSRTC and others v. Ghanshyam Murari, decided on 12.11.2002. He also relied on the judgment of this court in S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 286/1997 Khadarmal v. The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and others, dated 24.9.2002. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of this court in S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 245/1996 Ram Ratan Sharma v. R. S. R. T. C. and others dated 1.3.1997 and argued that this court decided batch of three appeals in that case. In that case, it has been held that the power of review under clause (b) of the schedule, has been conferred on the Chairman of the respondent Corporation against the order passed by the appellate authority under the specific circular dated 2.8.1978, and the provisions of Order 35(e)(vii) of the Rajasthan state Road Transport Workers and Workshop Employees Standing Orders, 1965 would not bar review. In that case also the suit was dismissed by the court below on the ground of limitation. In that case also the suit was dismissed by the court below on the ground of limitation. This court in the aforesaid judgment has held that the limitation of filing the suit will start from the date when the review application was disposed of and therefore the suit was held to have been filed within limitation. It was argued that in the present case also the plaintiff filed the suit within three years from the date of rejection of the review petition on 26.12.1985 and therefore if the suit filed on 30.08.1988, it should be held to have been filed within time. Finding on the question of limitation as recorded by the first appellate court, is erroneous. It is argued that as far as merit of the case is concerned, the first appellate court on question no. 2 formulated by it, held that Clause 35(e) of the Standing Orders was violated and that the appellant was not provided opportunity of hearing prior to passing order of removal. It held that the department also failed to provide relevant and crucial documents to the appellant before passing of the order of penalty. It was also held that the appellant was not heard on the question of penalty. It was therefore argued that once the suit is held to have been filed within the period of limitation, the suit deserves to be decreed in favour of the plaintiff-appellant with all the consequential benefits. 9. Shri Babu Lai Gupta, learned counsel cited the judgment of this court in State of Rajasthan v. Radha Mohan 1985 RLR 584 , and argued that in that case this court deprecated the conduct of the Government in raising plea of limitation to defeat just claim of its employees. It was held that question of limitation normally should be raised in pleadings or written statement like other objections and cannot be permitted to be raised in appeal directly without there being proper basis in pleadings before trial court. Learned counsel relied on the judgment of this court in Khadarmal, supra, and argued that in that case also it was held that since the order of removal dated 10.9.1984 was subject matter of appeal and the departmental appeal was dismissed on 9.10.1986, therefore, counting from that date, the suit filed on 25.10.1988 should be held to have been filed within the period of prescribed limitation. Reliance has also been placed on the judgment of this court in RSRTC and Others v. Ghanshyam Murari , supra, to the same effect. 10. Shri Babu Lal Gupta, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1990 SC 10 , a case of service dispute, wherein it was held that cause of action must be taken to have arisen not from the date of original adverse order but when the order of higher authority entertaining statutory remedy of appeal as well as representation, is made. In the present case, even though the Standing Orders provided the remedy of appeal but review petition was held maintainable in view of circular dated 2.8.1978 in pursuance of the Resolution of the respondent Corporation dated 6.7.1978, whereby the power of review has been conferred on the Chairman of the respondent Corporation and therefore the review petition would also be a remedy available to the aggrieved employee. 11. Per contra, Shri Virendra Lodha, learned senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents R.S.R.T.C., argued that as per clause 35(e)(vii) of the Standing Orders, appeal against the order of punishment can be filed against the order of punishment within 15 days of its passing and the decision of the appellate authority shall be final. It is argued that since the order of departmental appeal has been given finality, no further review petition lies and if review petition is not permissible as per the Standing Order, its filing would not have the effect of extending limitation for filing suit for declaration against the order of removal dated 7.6.1979. The suit filed on 30.8.1988 was thus not filed within the prescribed period of limitation of three years, the suit was therefore rightly dismissed by the court below. 12. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing the material on record, I find that in the present case the plaintiff was removed from service by order dated 7.6.1979. The plaintiff filed departmental appeal against the said order, which was dismissed by the appellate authority vide order dated 25.2.1982. Aggrieved thereby, plaintiff filed review petition before respondent no. 4 - the Chairman of the respondent Corporation, who, by order dated 10.10.1985, dismissed the same. The plaintiff thereupon filed a suit for declaration on 30.8.1988 in less than three years time. Aggrieved thereby, plaintiff filed review petition before respondent no. 4 - the Chairman of the respondent Corporation, who, by order dated 10.10.1985, dismissed the same. The plaintiff thereupon filed a suit for declaration on 30.8.1988 in less than three years time. The trial court dismissed the suit as time barred as well as on merits by holding that the suit could be filed from the date of dismissal of appeal and the order of appeal has been given finality. Same view was reiterated by the appellate court as far as the question of limitation is concerned but on merits learned appellate court held that that Clause 35(e) of the Standing Orders was violated. The appellant was not provided opportunity of hearing prior to passing of order of removal. The department also failed to provide relevant and crucial documents to the appellant before passing of the order of penalty. It was also held that the appellant was not heard on the question of penalty. 13. What would be the starting point of limitation for filing the suit in the case, was the question that was decided by this court in the case of Ram Ratan Sharma, supra. This court in aforesaid judgment rejected the argument that review petition is not maintainable. It was held that Chairman of the respondent Corporation was competent to entertain the review petition in view of Clause (b) of the circular dated 2.8.1978. It was argued that the provisions of Order 35(e)(vii) of the Standing Orders are not applicable to the present case as they were framed under the Industrial Disputes Act. Limitation of three years for filing a suit will start from the date when the review petition was dismissed by the respondent no. 4. In Khadarmal v. RSRTC and others , supra, also it was held by this court that the limitation for filing the suit will start from the date of dismissal of appeal. In that case, service of the plaintiff was terminated on 10.09.1984. He filed an appeal against aforesaid termination order which was dismissed by the appellate authority on 9.10.1986. It was held that the order of appeal being last order, the suit filed on 25.10.1988 would be within the period of limitation. In that case, service of the plaintiff was terminated on 10.09.1984. He filed an appeal against aforesaid termination order which was dismissed by the appellate authority on 9.10.1986. It was held that the order of appeal being last order, the suit filed on 25.10.1988 would be within the period of limitation. In the case of RSRTC & Others v. Ghanshyam Murari , supra, also the suit was held to have been filed within the period of limitation counting the period of limitation from the date of dismissal of the appeal by the plaintiff. 14. In view of the aforementioned proposition of law, it must be held that the plaintiffs suit filed on 30.8.1988 was within limitation i.e. within three years from the date of rejection of the review petition on 10.10.1985 and, therefore, the finding of learned first appellate court on issue/question of limitation formulated by it, is liable to be set aside. The judgment and decree dated 10.2.1999 of the first appellate court in Regular Civil Appeal No. 93/1998 and the judgment and decree dated 10.5.1994 of the trial court, deserve to be set aside and the suit filed by the plaintiff-appellant is liable to be decreed. 15. Accordingly, this second appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. Both the judgments and decrees of the learned first appellate court as well as learned trial court are therefore set aside. Consequently, the suit filed by the plaintiff-appellant is decreed. Considering, however, the length of service and the fact that the plaintiff-appellant has not physically discharged the duties of the office, he is held entitled to only 50% of the back-wages with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. He would, for that purpose, be also entitled to consequential benefits of pay revision, increments, selection scales and promotion etc., treating as if the order of termination was never passed and would get all such benefit which he would have otherwise received but for his removal, actual arrears being paid to the extent of only 50%. Second appeal accordingly stands disposed of. Parties shall bear their own costs. Second Appeal stands disposed of. *******