JUDGMENT B.D. Agarwal, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 24.5.2010 passed by the learned Special Judge, Assam in Special Case No. 9(A) of 2002. By this impugned judgment the learned Special Judge has convicted the appellant under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Heard Mr. D. Talukdar, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. BJ Dutta, learned Addl. PP, Assam. Also gone through the evidence tendered in the trial court by the prosecution as well as by the accused. 2. The accused was tried for possessing disproportionate assets to the tune of Rs. 11,94,038/- during the period 1989 to 1996. 3. Mr. Talukdar, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that while convicting the appellant under the aforesaid provisions of law, the learned Special Judge ignored the depositions of a large number of prosecution witnesses, who deposed in favour of the accused. Similarly, the trial court also discarded the defence evidence superficially and on flimsy ground. According to the learned counsel, the wife of the accused/appellant had additional earning by way of getting rent from different shopkeepers. However, the income of the wife has not been taken into consideration by the trial court solely on the ground that the shops were constructed on Government khas land. The learned counsel also submitted that at some point of time the wife of the accused had also purchased a truck by taking loan of Rs. 80,000/- from a financial institution, which could be gathered from the deposition of PW 14. The learned counsel also submitted that PW 22 has also admitted that in the salary statement the department did not include the arrear D.A. Referring to the depositions of PW 19 and 24 the learned counsel submitted that the accused had also sold a plot of land in the year 1996 at an amount of Rs. 1,30,000/- According to the learned counsel, if all these incomes are added then the difference of assets would stand satisfactorily explained. 4. PWs 5, 9, 10, 18 and DWs 1, 2 and 3 are the tenants of the wife of the appellant. They have deposed that they were paying rent to the wife of the appellant during the period 1989 to 1996. These witnesses have further deposed that the appellant's wife had also taken advance/security money for the construction of the shop houses. 5. They have deposed that they were paying rent to the wife of the appellant during the period 1989 to 1996. These witnesses have further deposed that the appellant's wife had also taken advance/security money for the construction of the shop houses. 5. As noted earlier the learned Special Judge has not accepted the income of the wife of the appellant solely on the ground that the shops were constructed on Government khas land and the income was not shown in the income tax return. 6. Explanation to Section 13(d)(e) of the P.C. Act defines "known sources of income". As per this explanation all the incomes derived from lawful sources and duly intimated to the concerned department shall be taken into account to assess the assets of a public servant. 7. In the case before me a good number of prosecution and defence witnesses have admitted that they were paying rent to the wife of the appellant. Hence, it cannot be said that the income was unlawful. It is true that the fact of income derived by the wife should have been intimated to the concerned department and also reflected in the income tax return by the accused or by his wife. Similarly, construction of shop houses on the Government khas land is also a misconduct. However, these mis-conducts can be satisfactorily dealt with in a departmental proceeding. In my considered opinion since the accused has brought into record the evidence of income from shop houses as rent the benefit of doubt can be given to the appellant. With the aforesaid observations the appeal stands allowed. The conviction of the appellant is hereby set aside and the appellant is acquitted from the charges. However, liberty is given to the concerned department to take appropriate disciplinary action against the appellant in accordance with law. Appeal allowed