Sudhir Agarwal, J.— 1. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has arisen from the order dated 11.04.1996 passed by Civil Judge (Junior Division) North, Lucknow rejecting petitioner's objection under Section 47 C.P.C. in Execution Case No. 22 of 1993 and the order dated 18.11.1997 passed by XIVth Additional District Judge, Lucknow dismissing petitioner's Civil Revision No. 52 of 1996 and confirming Executing Court's order dated 11.04.1996. 2. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present dispute may be narrated as under. 3. A partnership came in existence on 21.05.1965 between Kewal Krishna Khosla, petitioner (now deceased and substituted by his heirs and legal representatives) and Som Nath (now deceased and substituted by his heirs and legal representatives) to carry on business of medicines and allied goods in the name and title of "M/s Chemical Traders". The business was to run in a shop forming part of building situate at Tulsidas Marg Chowk, Lucknow, owned by Som Nath. He (Som Nath) instituted Suit No. 134 of 1978 seeking following reliefs: "1. A decree be passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant for rendition of Accounts since 1965 till upto date of the Partnership business and after accounting a decree for Rs. 700/= (Rs. 500/= on account of Capital and Rs. 200/= on account of profits) or for such sum which may be found due to the plaintiff be passed in his favour against the defendant, subject to payment by the plaintiff additional Court Fee, it necessary. 2. That by means of a decree of a Mandatory Injunction, in favour of the Plaintiff against the defendant, the defendant be commanded to remove their possession from the shop fully described in para I of the plaint and restrain himself from obstructing in any manner the exclusive possession and use of the said shop, as enjoyed by the Deed of Partnership. 3. Costs of the suit be also awarded to the Plaintiff against the defendant. 4. Any other relief which may appear proper on the circumstances of the suit be also granted to the Plaintiff against the defendant." 4. Pleading in the plaint are that plaintiff, Som Nath had communicated dissolution of partnership vide notice dated 01.03.1978 submitted to Kewal Krishna Khosla and thus rendition of accounts and restoration of individual partner's property was necessary. 5. Any other relief which may appear proper on the circumstances of the suit be also granted to the Plaintiff against the defendant." 4. Pleading in the plaint are that plaintiff, Som Nath had communicated dissolution of partnership vide notice dated 01.03.1978 submitted to Kewal Krishna Khosla and thus rendition of accounts and restoration of individual partner's property was necessary. 5. It was contested by defendant, Kewal Krishna Khosla vide objections/counter affidavit dated 29.08.1978. He admitted plaintiff, Som Nath as owner of building in which shop in dispute is situated and had been used for running partnership business. He admitted execution of partnership deed with plaintiff but explained the circumstances in which it was executed and contended that it (partnership deed) was nothing but a fake and fictitious paper, never acted upon and partnership was created just to circumvent the provisions of rent statute, i.e., U.P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1947"). He pleaded that shop was in his sole tenancy since beginning in which he was running business in the name and style of M/s Chemical Traders since 1959. He was occupying the said shop in his sole tenancy. He pleaded that plaintiff is the landlord and defendant is tenant in the shop in question and in the garb of partnership deed cannot be evicted therefrom. 6. The aforesaid suit, however, ended into a compromise decree dated 26.10.1979. The terms of compromise decree, as set out in Annexure-4 to the writ petition, are as under: "1. That the defendant will henceforth be the tenant and will pay rent @ Rs. 250/= per month with effect from 1st day of May, 1979 to the plaintiff. The defendant has cleared all the dues to the plaintiff as on 30th day of April 1979. 2. That annual repairs, white-washing, painting etc. will be carried out by the tenant himself. 3. That the tenant defendant will be liable to pay different of House Tax, Water Tax etc, if enhanced in future. 4. That the defendant will peacefully vacate the shop on 31.12.92. Thereafter if the parties agree the term of tenancy shall extended on fresh terms and conditions. 5. That the parties will bear their own costs, wherefore it is respectfully prayed that the suit be decided in terms of compromise." (emphasis added) 7. 4. That the defendant will peacefully vacate the shop on 31.12.92. Thereafter if the parties agree the term of tenancy shall extended on fresh terms and conditions. 5. That the parties will bear their own costs, wherefore it is respectfully prayed that the suit be decided in terms of compromise." (emphasis added) 7. There is some overwriting in para 4 of compromise decree and the date has been made as 31.12.1990 in respect whereto there is a dispute between parties. On this aspect this Court shall consider the matter later at appropriate stage. 8. The shop in question was not vacated by defendant-petitioner, whereupon Smt. Urmila Kanta, wife of deceased plaintiff, Som Nath, instituted execution proceedings vide application dated 16.04.1993. 9. The defendant-petitioner, Kewal Krishna Khosla contested execution by filing objection under Section 47 C.P.C. wherein he mainly contended that shop was to be handed over on 31.12.1990 but the parties agreed to extend tenancy on fresh terms and conditions and the same having been done, compromise decree dated 26.10.1979 now cannot be executed having already exhausted and no more in existence. He pleaded that compromise decree has already come to an end on 31.12.1990. 10. This objection was rejected by Execution Court vide order dated 11.04.1996 and thereagainst defendant-petitioner's Revision No. 52 of 1996 has also been rejected by Revisional Court. 11. Sri N.K. Seth, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for petitioner raised following contentions: (I) The compromise decree is merely declaratory one, having no clause for its execution in case of its breach, and, therefore, inexecutable. He refers to Order 20 Rule 16 C.P.C. and also relied on decisions in Smt. Nai Bahu Vs. Lal Ramnarayan and others, AIR 1978 SC 22 ; B.K. Thapar and others Vs. Sudhir Kumar and others, AIR 1966 J & K 13; and, State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mangilal Sharma, 1998(2) SCC 510 . (II) The Execution Court cannot go behind the decree and same has to be executed as it stands without any addition, alteration or substitution. (III) In the garb of execution of a decree, no eviction can be executed. Reliance is placed on Khalli Rath, Judgment-debtor Vs. Epplli Ramachandra, Decree-holder, AIR 1953 Orissa 74. Mangilal Sharma, 1998(2) SCC 510 . (II) The Execution Court cannot go behind the decree and same has to be executed as it stands without any addition, alteration or substitution. (III) In the garb of execution of a decree, no eviction can be executed. Reliance is placed on Khalli Rath, Judgment-debtor Vs. Epplli Ramachandra, Decree-holder, AIR 1953 Orissa 74. (IV) In any case the suit itself was barred by Section 69 of Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1932"), and, therefore, the decree itself was wholly without jurisdiction and such issue of lack of inherent jurisdiction can be raised before Execution Court also. Where there is inherent lack of jurisdiction, execution is not permissible in law. Reliance is placed on Delhi Development Authority Vs. Kochhar Construction Work and another, 1998(8) SCC 559 ; Loonkaran Sethia etc. Vs. Mr. Ivan E. John and others, AIR 1977 SC 336 ; Rahmatullah Vs. Mohd. Sharif and another, 1997 ARC(1) 508; Raja Ram Vs. Bhagwan Das and others, AIR 1972 All 82; and, Chandrika Misir and another Vs. Bhaiyalal, AIR 1973 SC 2391 . (V) In respect to shop in question, U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1972") was applicable and onus to prove that the said statute does not apply lies upon landlord which he failed and, therefore, shop in dispute could not have been allowed to be evicted without complying with the provisions of Act, 1972. Here reliance is placed on Ram Saroop Rai Vs. Smt. Lilawati, 1980 ARC 466 (SC). (VI) Lastly it is contended that findings recorded by courts below on the question of manipulation in the compromise decree about the date by which shop in question was to be vacated is perverse, based on no evidence. In this regard reliance is placed on Surain Singh (Dead) By Lrs. and others Vs. Mehenga (Dead) By Lrs., 1996(2) SCC 624 ; State of West Bengal Vs. Atul Krishan Shaw and another, AIR 1990 SC 2205 ; Nanha and another Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Kanpur and others, AIR 1976 All 91 ; Kochukakkada Aboobacker and others Vs. Attah Kasim and others, 1996(7) SCC 389 ; and, M/s Artificial Limbs Mfg. Corpn. of India, Kanpur Vs. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal III, Kanpur and another, 1997(15) LCD 523. 12. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Kanpur and others, AIR 1976 All 91 ; Kochukakkada Aboobacker and others Vs. Attah Kasim and others, 1996(7) SCC 389 ; and, M/s Artificial Limbs Mfg. Corpn. of India, Kanpur Vs. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal III, Kanpur and another, 1997(15) LCD 523. 12. Per contra, Sri R.U. Verma, learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 3 submitted that the suit was not barred under Section 69(2) of Act, 1932 inasmuch as after dissolution, it was instituted for rendition of accounts and for restoration of possession of individual property of partner which was not property of firm but only allowed to be used by firm. Reliance is placed on Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. Vs. Ganesh Property, 1998(7) SCC 184 and M/s Haldiram Bhujiawala and another Vs. M/s Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar and another, AIR 2000 SC 1287 . He further submitted that a compromise decree unless satisfied cannot be said to be inexecutable and condition of eviction from property can also be part of a compromise decree. The argument that decree was nullity has no legs to stand since decree is not declaratory and merely because there is no default clause it cannot be said that it is inexecutable. Reliance is placed on Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and another Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another, 1986(3) SCC 156 ; Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi Vs. Rajabhi Abdul Rehman and others, AIR 1970 SCC 1475; Jagbir Singh Vs. 6th Additional District Judge, Bijnor and others, 1997(15) LCD 836; Mohd. Yasin and another Vs. Mohd. Yasin, 1992(10) LCD 49; Bhanwar Lal Vs. T.K.A. Abdul Karim, AIR 1992 SC 2166 ; Jagbir Singh Rana Vs. IVth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar and others, 1998(2) ARC 79 ; Byram Pestonji Gariwala Vs. Union Bank of India and others, AIR 1991 SC 2234 ; Prakash Chand Khurana Vs. Harnam Singh and others, AIR 1973 SC 2065 ; Smt. Kalloo and others Vs. Dhaka Devi and others, 1982 (1) SCC 633 ; Hiralal Moolchand Doshi Vs. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas, AIR 1993 SC 1449 ; Harihar Pandey Vs. Mangala Prasad Singh and others, AIR 1986 All 9 ; Thakur Prasad Vs. 1st Additional District Judge, Gonda and another, 1997(1) ARC 367; V.N. Sreedharan Vs. Bhaskaran, AIR 1986 Kerala 49; Devdutta Dheer Vs. Janki Vallabh and others, AIR 1986 Rajasthan 170; Som Dutt Vs. Govind Ram, 2000(2) ARC 2 (SC); R.N. Gosain Vs. Mangala Prasad Singh and others, AIR 1986 All 9 ; Thakur Prasad Vs. 1st Additional District Judge, Gonda and another, 1997(1) ARC 367; V.N. Sreedharan Vs. Bhaskaran, AIR 1986 Kerala 49; Devdutta Dheer Vs. Janki Vallabh and others, AIR 1986 Rajasthan 170; Som Dutt Vs. Govind Ram, 2000(2) ARC 2 (SC); R.N. Gosain Vs. Yashpal Dhir, 1993(1) ARC 1 (SC); Mohan Lal Vs. Raghunath Singh, 1995(1) ARC 332 (SC); Zila Sahkari Bank Ltd. Lalitpur Vs. Anjey Verma, 1998(1) CRC 167; Mohan Singh Vs. Late Amar Singh, 1998(6) SCC 686 ; Dhananjay Sharma Vs. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1995 SC 1795 ; and, Harish Chandra Srivastava Vs. XVth Additional District Judge, Lucknow and others, 1998(1) ARC 554. 13. From the above, certain facts which are apparent and not in dispute, are: (I) Respondent no. 3 is the landlord of building in which shop in dispute forms part. (II) There existed a partnership deed between plaintiff, Som Nath and defendant, Kewal Krishna Khosla, executed on 21.05.1965, for running a partnership business in the shop in dispute wherein the shop was to constitute a tenanted accommodation and partnership firm was to pay rent thereof to owner, i.e., plaintiff, Som Nath. (III) The partnership firm constituted in 1965 between plaintiff and defendant was an unregistered firm. (IV) The partnership was at will. One of partner, i.e., plaintiff, vide notice dated 01.03.1978, informed another partner, i.e., defendant, about dissolution of partnership, calling upon him to render accounts since inception of partnership. (V) One of the condition in partnership deed was, possession of shop will remain with plaintiff and partnership itself will not create any interest in the said shop, in favour of partnership firm or defendant. 14. Looking to the rival submissions, in my view, following four issues need be adjudicated in this case: (I) Whether compromise decree in the present case is merely a declaratory one and having no clause for execution in case of its breach, is it inexecutable? (II) Whether Execution Court has gone behind the decree? (III) Whether execution of compromise decree amounts to grant of relief of eviction to plaintiff though no suit for eviction was filed and, therefore, it could not have been executed so as to result in eviction of petitioner? (II) Whether Execution Court has gone behind the decree? (III) Whether execution of compromise decree amounts to grant of relief of eviction to plaintiff though no suit for eviction was filed and, therefore, it could not have been executed so as to result in eviction of petitioner? (IV) Whether the suit itself was barred by Section 69 of Act, 1932 and, therefore, compromise decree, being a nullity since inception, could not have been executed? Issue No. IV 15. It is in these facts and circumstances, this Court will have to consider, whether the factum that firm was unregistered, itself, could have rendered Original Suit No. 134 of 1978, not maintainable, and, barred by Section 69(2) or (3) of Act, 1932. 16. It cannot be doubted that Act, 1932 does not require every partnership to be registered compulsorily. There are provisions for registration of firm contained in Chapter VII of Act, 1932 but it nowhere provides that registration would be compulsory for a Partnership Firm. 17. In order to understand import of Section 69, it would be desirable to look into certain historical background of Act, 1932. Provisions governing partnership were earlier part of Indian Contract Act, 1872. Before enacting Act, 1932, a special Committee was constituted to examine draft Bill and submit report. It consisted of Sir Brojendra Lal Mitter, Sir Dinshah F. Mulla, Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Iyer and Mr. Arthur Eggar, which examined draft Bill and made recommendation which the legislature considered before enacting Act, 1932. 18. The Apex Court in Haldiram Bhujiawala (supra) has found it permissible to look into such report for the purpose of construing provisions of Act 1932. In respect to registration of a firm, the contents of report in paragraphs no. 17, 18 and 19 would be of much assistance; and, are reproduced as under: "17. The outlines of the scheme are briefly as follows. The English precedent, in so far as it makes registration compulsory and imposes a penalty for non-registration has not been followed, as it is considered that this step would be too drastic for a beginning in India, and would introduce all the difficulties connected with small or ephemeral undertakings. The outlines of the scheme are briefly as follows. The English precedent, in so far as it makes registration compulsory and imposes a penalty for non-registration has not been followed, as it is considered that this step would be too drastic for a beginning in India, and would introduce all the difficulties connected with small or ephemeral undertakings. Instead, it is proposed that registration should lie entirely within the discretion of the firm or partner concerned; but, following the English precedent, any firm which is not registered will be unable to enforce its claim against third parties in the civil Court; and by partner who is not registered will be unable to enforce his claims either against third parties or against fellow partners". 18. Once registration has been effected the statement recorded in the register regarding the constitution of the firm will be conclusive proof of the facts therein contained against the partners making them and no partner whose name is on the register will be permitted to deny that he is a partner - with certain natural and proper exceptions which will be indicated later. This should afford a strong protection to persons dealing with firms against false denials of partnership and the evasion of liability by the substantial members of a firm". 19. ..............On the other hand, a third party who deals with a firm and knows that a new partner has been introduced can either make registration of the new partner a condition fur further dealings, or content himself with the certain security of the other partners and the chance of proving by other evidence, the partnership of the new but unregistered partner. A third party who deals with a firm without knowing of the addition of a new partner counts on the credit of the old partners only and will not be prejudiced by the failure of the new partners to register" 19. It is in this context and as interpreted by various Courts from time to time, I would look into Section 69 and its scope. 20. It is in this context and as interpreted by various Courts from time to time, I would look into Section 69 and its scope. 20. Section 69 of Act, 1932 reads as under: "Effect of non-registration.- (1) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by this Act shall be instituted in any court by or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm unless the firm is registered and the person suing is or has been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner in the firm. (2) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as parter in the firm. (3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to a claim of set off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, but shall not affect,- (a) the enforcement of any right to sue for the dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm, or (b) the powers of an official assignee, receiver or Court under the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, 1909 (3 of 1909) or the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 (5 of 1920) to realise the property of an insolvent partner." (4) This section shall not apply- (a) to firm or to partners in firm which have no place of business in the territories to which this Act extends, or whose places of business in the said territories are situated in areas to which, by notification under section 56, this Chapter does not apply, or (b) to any suit or claim of set-off not exceeding one hundred rupees in value which, in the Presidency-towns, is not of a kind specified in section 19 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, or outside the Presidency-towns, is not of a kind specified in the Second Schedule to the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, or to any proceeding in execution or other proceeding incidental to or arising from any such suit or claim." (emphasis added) 21. Section 69 of Act, 1932 bars a remedy by way of a suit to enforce a right arising from a contract or conferred by Act, 1932. Broadly, Section 69 signifies a right sought to be enforced by an unregistered firm, and what is barred is that it must be a right arising out of a contract with third party defendant in respect of the firm's business transactions. 22. In M/s Raptakos Brett (supra) the Apex Court considered the ambit of the word "right arising from a contract". In para 9, Court observed that contractual rights arising from contract means it must be a contract entered into by the firm with third party defendants. Relevant observation in para 9 of the judgment reads as under: "A mere look at the aforesaid provision shows that the suit filed by an unregistered firm against a third party for enforcement of any right arising from a contract with such third party would be barred at its very inception." 23. The above observations have been quoted and followed in Haldiram Bhujiawala (supra) and in paras 21 and 22 the Court said: "21. The above Report and provisions of the English Acts, in our view, make it clear that the purpose behind Section 69(2) was to impose a disability on the unregistered firm or its partners to enforce rights arising out of contracts entered into by the plaintiff firm with the third party-defendants in the course of the firm's business transactions. 22. In Raptokas Brett and Co., [1998] 7 SCC 184 ...... From the above passage it is firstly clear that a contract must be a contract by the plaintiff firm not with anybody else but with the third party defendant.. . . ." 24. Going further, in Haldiram Bhujiawala (supra), the Court said, that contract by unregistered firm referred to in Section 69(2) must not only be one entered into by the firm with the third party defendant but must also be one entered into by the plaintiff firm in the course of business dealings of the plaintiff firm with such third party defendant. Section 69(2), is not attracted to any and every contract referred to in the plaint as the source of title to an asset owned by the firm. If the plaint referred to such a contract it could only be as a historical fact. Section 69(2), is not attracted to any and every contract referred to in the plaint as the source of title to an asset owned by the firm. If the plaint referred to such a contract it could only be as a historical fact. In para 26, the Court said, that, the Act, in fact, has not prescribed that the transactions or contracts entered into by a firm with a third party are bad in law if the firm is an unregistered firm. The Court concluded that a suit filed, not for enforcement of any right arising out of a contract entered into by or on behalf of the unregistered firm with third party in the course of the firm's business transactions, is not barred by section 69(2). 25. In Mukund Balkrishna Kulkarni vs. Kulkarni Powder Metallurgical Industries & Anr (2004) 13 S.C.C. 750 , Section 69 was dealt with in detail. In paragraphs no. 9 and 10 the Court said that sub section (1) of Section 69 contains embargos which must coexist before a plaintiff can be non-suited under that sub section. The two embargos are: (i) that the suit should be filed by person "suing as a partner in a firm" and (2) that the suit must be to enforce a right arising from a contract. Referring to the issue before the Court whether a declaration of the existence of the partnership and share between the parties was prayed, the Court said that prayer for such declaration could not be said to be made by person suing as a partner. It was a prayer, to be a partner, and is, therefore, not debarred under Section 69(1) of Act 1932. It was clarified that what in fact prayed for by the plaintiff, was, a declaration of existence of a contract between the parties. That could not be said to be a suit to enforce a right arising from a contract. 26. Another prayer in the suit up for consideration before the Court in Mukund Balkrishna Kulkarni (Supra) was direction not to continue as a partner of firm and to dissolve the firm. It was said that to this extent plaintiff was suing as a partner but he was entitled to do so under Section 69(3)(a). In para 10 of the judgment, Court said: "10. It was said that to this extent plaintiff was suing as a partner but he was entitled to do so under Section 69(3)(a). In para 10 of the judgment, Court said: "10. The right of partner to ask the dissolution of a firm is a right the enforcement of which is otherwise forbidden under Section 69(1). It is because of the exception under sub-section (3) of Section 69 that a person suing as a partner can enforce a right under the contract for dissolution of the firm and accounts. The claim for a half share in the firm's assets would be a necessary corollary to a prayer for dissolution. Without the prayer for specified shares in the firm's assets and business, the relief that may be granted in a suit for dissolution would be ineffective." 27. In V. Subramaniam Vs. Rajesh Raghuvandra Rao (2009) 5 SCC 608 looking to historical background of Section 69, the Court in para 10 said : "10. The English law in so far as it makes registration compulsory for a firm and imposes a penalty for non-registration was not followed when the Partnership Act was made in India in 1932 as it was considered that this step would be too drastic and would introduce several difficulties. Hence registration was made optional at the discretion of the partners, but following the English precedent, any firm which was not registered by virtue of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 69 disabled a partner or the firm (as the case may be ) from enforcing certain claims against the firm or third parties (as the case may be) in a Civil Court. An exception to this disability with regard to an unregistered firm was made in sub-section (3)(a) to Section 69, and this clause enabled the partners in an unregistered firm to sue for the dissolution of the firm or for accounts or for realising the property of the dissolved firm. This exception in clause (a) of Section 69(3) was made on the principle that while registration of a firm is designed primarily to protect third parties, the absence of registration does not mean that the partners of an unregistered firm lose all rights in the said firm or its property and hence cannot sue for accounts or for its dissolution or for realizing their property in the firm." 28. It cannot be doubted that legislature has made its intention clear that, wherever applicable, Section 69 would have to be complied with strictly and it is mandatory in character. Its effect is to render a suit by a plaintiff in respect of a right vested in him or acquired by him under a contract, which he entered into as a partner of a unregistered firm, whether existing or dissolved, void. In other words, a partner of erstwhile unregistered partnership firm cannot bring a suit to enforce a right arising out of a contract falling within the ambit of Section 69 of Act, 1932. The Apex Court in Loonkaran Sethiya (supra), in para 20, observed: "a partner of a erstwhile unregistered partnership firm cannot bring a suit to enforce a right arising out of a contract falling within the ambit of Section 69 of the Partnership Act." 29. Here I may also refer to some earlier judgments of different Courts dealing with Section 69 of Act, 1932. Construing the above provisions, Madras High Court in Shanmugha Mudaliar Vs. P.V. Rathina Mudaliar and Anr., AIR 1948 Madras 187, said in paras 4 and 7 as under: "4. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 69 of the Partnership Act forbid the institution of a suit to enforce a right arising from a contract in respect of a partnership when the partnership is not registered. Sub-section (3) of the same section, however, provides that the provisions of Sub-sections (1) and (2) shall not affect any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm. It is to be noticed that the Indian Partnership Act places no prohibition upon an unregistered partnership making contracts either between the partners inter se or with some third party nor upon an unregistered partnership acquiring property or assets. All that it does is to make a suit instituted by an unregistered partnership, to recover property, unenforceable.. . . . 7. The words in Sub-section (3) of Section 69 which I have quoted above are very wide. The sub-section enacts that the provisions of the two previous subsections shall not affect any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm. It is the right of all the partners, or by some arrangement as between themselves, one or more, to realise the property of their late partnership. The sub-section enacts that the provisions of the two previous subsections shall not affect any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm. It is the right of all the partners, or by some arrangement as between themselves, one or more, to realise the property of their late partnership. In the course of the argument it has not been suggested that moneys due to the partnership from a third party in respect of dealings between him and the partnership do not form part of the partnership property. It seems to me that the intention of the Legislature was to inflict disability for non-registration only during the subsistence of the partnership . . . . ." 30. Again in P.M.S.M. Mohammed Abdul Samad & Ors.Vs. P.M.S.C. Madarsa Rowther and Ors., AIR 1959 Madras 440, the Court said: "The object of Section 69(2) is to compel a firm which is a going concern to get itself registered it has to institute a suit or make claims in courts of law. Section 69(1) refers to a suit instituted in any court by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm. If such a person instituted a suit against the firm or any person alleged to be or to have been a partner in the firm, the suit would be dismissed unless the firm had been registered and the person suing was or had been shown in the Register of Firms as a partner in the firm. "Firm" is thus defined in Section 4 : "Persons who have entered into partnership with one another are called individually 'partners' and collectively 'a firm' and the name under which their business is carried on is called the 'firm name', " That definition makes it clear that the expression "firm" cannot be applied to a partnership except where it is continuing to carry on business. Where the partnership has been dissolved, it is referred to in the Act as a dissolved firm, and not simply as a firm. Neither Section 69(1) nor Section 69(2) can apply to a suit instituted by a person who claims to have been a partner in a dissolved firm or to a suit instituted by or on behalf of a dissolved firm. Such suits lie outside the purpose of the sub-sections.. . . . . . Neither Section 69(1) nor Section 69(2) can apply to a suit instituted by a person who claims to have been a partner in a dissolved firm or to a suit instituted by or on behalf of a dissolved firm. Such suits lie outside the purpose of the sub-sections.. . . . . . Hence a suit by or on behalf of a dissolved firm or by a partner of a dissolved firm cannot possibly be hit by the prohibition enacted in those sub-sections. If a person, who claims that he is a partner in firm and whose claim is disputed, sues the firm or a partner or a former partner of the firm, such a suit, again, is within the prohibition enacted in Section 69(1). That is because the suit is instituted by the plaintiff in his capacity as partner and since the firm is in being and is capable of being registered, it is opposed to the policy of the Act, subject to the exceptions enacted in Section 69(3) to allow the institution of a suit by a person who claims to be a partner unless the firm is registered and his name appears, or appeared, in the Register as a partner. But unless there is a firm -- that is to say, a partnership that is continuing to do business --and the suit instituted by the plaintiff involves a basic claim on his part to be recognised as a continuing partner of the firm, the suit would not be hit by the prohibition enacted in Section 69(1) of the Act. In this case, it is admitted by both parties that the firm was dissolved in 1949. The plaintiffs were partners in the dissolved firm. They sue the defendants who were the other partners of the dissolved firm. The suit and the defence pressed alike on the basis that the relationship pf partnership has ceased to subsist and that the firm is no longer in existence. To such a suit, Section 69(1) can have no application. I hold that the institution of the suit is not barred by Section 69(1) of the Partnership Act. 5. In the lower courts the contention that was urged was that the claim made by the plaintiff was to enforce his right and power to realise the property of the dissolved firm. The lower courts overruled that contention, They were right in doing so. 5. In the lower courts the contention that was urged was that the claim made by the plaintiff was to enforce his right and power to realise the property of the dissolved firm. The lower courts overruled that contention, They were right in doing so. 6. The surcharge refundable to the firm has been realised on behalf of the firm. The plaintiffs are seeking now not to realise the property of the dissolved firm but to realise from some of the partners of the former firm the plaintiffs' share of the money that has been realised. The plaintiffs cannot therefore be said to be enforcing or exercising any right or power to realise the property of the dissolved firm. The lower courts rightly held that the suit is not within the terms of the exception enacted in Section 69(3)(a) of the Act. 31. A Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Ajit Kumar Maity Vs. Narendra Nath Jana and Ors., AIR 1955 Cal.224, the Court said: 2. Primarily the bar in Section 69 is against the plaintiff, the result being, if a partnership has not been registered, no suit to enforce a right arising from a contract will be entertained either on behalf of the firm against a third party or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm against the firm or any person alleged to have been a partner in the firm. These are the consequences of the provisions of Sub-sections (1) and (2). The first effect of the extension of the provisions of Sub-sections (1) and (2) by Sub-section (3) is that if a defendant claims set-off on the basis of a partnership, he will be debarred from doing so unless the partnership is registered. The next effect is that if any person is by "any proceeding" seeking "to enforce a right" arising from a contract on the basis of a partnership he will be debarred from doing so, unless the partnership is registered. Can it be reasonably said that when a defendant tries to defeat the claim of the plaintiff by setting up a right on the basis of partnership, that is "a proceeding" 'to enforce a right on the basis of partnership'. In my judgment, the written statement as such is in the first place not a proceeding contemplated in Sub-section (3). Can it be reasonably said that when a defendant tries to defeat the claim of the plaintiff by setting up a right on the basis of partnership, that is "a proceeding" 'to enforce a right on the basis of partnership'. In my judgment, the written statement as such is in the first place not a proceeding contemplated in Sub-section (3). In the second place, it cannot, in my judgment, be properly said that by setting up a plea to defeat the plaintiff's claim a defendant can be said to be seeking 'to enforce a right arising from a contract'. A party can be said to be seeking to 'enforce a right' only if he is seeking some relief from the court. Where no relief is being sought from the court, it cannot be said that he is seeking to enforce a right. Not only in form, but also in substance, what the defendants have sought to do in these cases is to try to defeat the plaintiff's claim to certain properties. There is no attempt to enforce their own rights. Reliance was placed on certain observations in -- 'Jamal Usman v. Firm Umar Haji Karim Shop', AIR 1943 Nag 175 (A), to the effect that a claim arising out of a contract set up in defence to negative the right of suit of the plaintiff is placed under the same disability as the right to bring a suit under Sub-sections (1) and (2). 32. Calcutta High Court in the above, expressed its disagreement with a judgment of Nagpur High Court in Jamal Usman Vs. Firm Umar Haji Karim Shop, AIR 1943 Nag. 175 where the view taken appears to be otherwise. 33. In Mumtaz Khoda Bux Vs. Ahsanul Haq & Anr., AIR 1955 Vindhya Pradesh 12, the Court construed Section 69 in para 14 as under: "Finally, it was argued that the suit is barred under S. 69, Partnership Act. The partnership between Ahsanul Haq, Abdul Hafiz and Mumtaz Husain was dissolved on 29.6.51. It was held in Bairang Lal Vs. Anandi Lal', AIR 1944 Nag 124 (C) that after the settlement of accounts between partners of a dissolved partnership, the bar in S. 69 does not extend to suits for recovery of money due on a contract entered into between the partners of an unregistered firm. In Sheo Dutt Vs. It was held in Bairang Lal Vs. Anandi Lal', AIR 1944 Nag 124 (C) that after the settlement of accounts between partners of a dissolved partnership, the bar in S. 69 does not extend to suits for recovery of money due on a contract entered into between the partners of an unregistered firm. In Sheo Dutt Vs. Pushi Ram, AIR 1947 All 229 (D), it was held that a suit by A, the partner of an unregistered dissolved firm against B, the other partner, to recover a sum which was overdrawn by B from the partnership assets and the amount which was B's share of the loss incurred by the partnership, is a suit to recover the property of a dissolved firm within the meaning of the exception contained in S. 69(3)(a). In Shri Ram Shaligram Shop v. Lakshmi Bai, AIR 1951 Nag 143 (E) it was held that S. 69 should be construed strictly and that it is only a suit brought as a partner that is barred. It was observed "when there is an agreement between the parties by which some right is created which is capable of enforcement independently and without resort to general accounts of the unregistered partnership, it furnishes entirely a different cause of action and the suit of the partner based on them is not barred as he cannot be described there as suing as a partner." In view of these decisions, the learned Additional District Judge rightly held that the present suit is not barred under S. 69, Partnership Act." 34. In Bedabar Sahu Vs. Khetramani Barik, AIR 1969 Orissa 194, the Court said: "The present claim of the plaintiff is directly covered by the last clause in Sub-section (3) (a). Non-registration of the firm would not thus stand as a bar in respect of any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm. The question for consideration is whether the dues of the plaintiff against the defendant after accounts being taken retain the character Of the property of a dissolved firm. In one sense it can be, namely, this property had belonged to the firm before dissolution and after dissolution and accounting it came to the hands of the plaintiff who has the right to realise it from the defendant. The present case comes within this exception. In one sense it can be, namely, this property had belonged to the firm before dissolution and after dissolution and accounting it came to the hands of the plaintiff who has the right to realise it from the defendant. The present case comes within this exception. The matter is also covered by a decision of this Court reported in 25 Cut. LT 34 : AIR 1959 Orissa 110, Daitari Mohapatra v. Brundaban Hatia. 3. The plaintiff's case stands on a stronger footing from another analysis. The cause of action for recovery of the amount agreed to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff has nothing to do with the property of the firm except that in its historical context it once belonged to the firm. After accounts were taken and an agreement was executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff acknowledging the liability to pay that amount, a different cause of action arises which has nothing to do with the dissolved firm. On such a view the plaintiff's suit is bound to succeed. 35. In Shriram Shaligram Shop Vs. Laxmibai and others, AIR (38) 1951 Nagpur 143, a Division Bench presided by Hon'ble Hidayatullah, J, as His Lordship then was, held: "When there is an agreement between the partners by which some right is created which is capable of enforcement independently and without resort to general accounts of the unregistered partnership, it furnishes an entirely different cause of action and the Plaintiff cannot be described as 'suing as a partner'. It is not every suit that is barred but only a suit brought 'as a partner.' The section must be construed strictly and the bar of the section cannot be carried further than what the words import." 36. In Bajranglal Maniram Singhvi Agarwal Vs. Anandilal Ramchandra Potdar and another, AIR (31) 1944 Nagpur 124 enforcement of an agreement with respect to settlement of account and to claim money accordingly was held not barred by Section 69 though the Firm is unregistered. The Court said that the suit is not one by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm but one by a person entitled to recover an amount on the basis of a settled account, and as such is not governed by Section 69 (1) of Act, 1932. The Court said that the suit is not one by or on behalf of any person suing as a partner in a firm but one by a person entitled to recover an amount on the basis of a settled account, and as such is not governed by Section 69 (1) of Act, 1932. As the terms of the partnership do not at all enter into the consideration in such a case. The fact that the partnership was an unregistered firm has no bearing on the suit as laid. The Court distinguished an earlier decision in Chhotelal Vs. Gopaldas, AIR 1940 Nagpur 78 observing that, "The ratio decidendi of that case is that it is not essential that the firm should be actually in existence on the date when the suit is instituted for the application of S. 69, sub-ss. (1) and (2), Partnership Act. In that case the suit was by a partner in respect of money due to him on the basis of the partnership transaction and was held to be barred under S. 69 (2) of the Act even though the partnership has been dissolved before the institution of the suit. The suit was not one based on the cause of action afforded by a settlement of account between the parties after the dissolution of an unregistered partnership. That case therefore has no application to the facts of the present case and is easily distinguishable." 37. A Division Bench of this Court in Ram Kumar Vs. Kishore Lal and others, 1945 ILR (All.) 309 (at page 316) says after referring to Section 69(3)(a) as under: "It also makes it clear that the bars created by clauses (1) and (2) will not affect the right recognized by this clause. Assuming that the old partnership was dissolved, there was nothing to prevent the plaintiff either himself or along with the surviving members of the family of Musamal to realise the property by bringing a suit on the bond." 38. The Court relied on a decision of Bombay High Court in Bhagwanji Morarji Goculdar Vs. Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd., AIR 1943 Bom. 385 holding that partners of a dissolved partnership are entitled to realize all the assets of dissolved firm and such a suit is not barred by Section 69(2). 39. To the same effect is another Division Bench decision in Sheo Dutt & others Vs. Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd., AIR 1943 Bom. 385 holding that partners of a dissolved partnership are entitled to realize all the assets of dissolved firm and such a suit is not barred by Section 69(2). 39. To the same effect is another Division Bench decision in Sheo Dutt & others Vs. Pushi Ram & others, AIR (34) 1947 Allahabad 229 where in para 16 the Court held: "To our mind, the exception in sub-s. (3) is wide enough to include a claim for money due to a dissolved firm either by a partner or by a third party." 40. To sum up, Sub-section (3) is an exception to sub-section (1) and (2) except to a case where an unregistered firm or its partner set up as defence a claim of set-off or other proceeding to enforce a right arising from a contract, but then there are three classes which are excluded from the ambit of earlier sentence and that includes Clause (3)(a) i.e. the enforcement of any right to sue for dissolution of a firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realize the property of a dissolved firm. 41. In the present case suit for rendition of accounts was filed after issuing notice for dissolution of firm and such a suit is protected and permitted vide Section 69(3)(a) of Act, 1932. The restoration of property permitted to be used by firm, though remain to be property of individual partner, in my view, constitute part and parcel of settlement of accounts between partners of an unregistered firm. It thus cannot be said that suit in question was barred by Section 69(2) of Act, 1932. Reliance placed on Delhi Development Authority Vs. Kochhar Construction Work (supra) is misplaced since it has no application to the case in hand. Therein the Court observed that institution of suit by an unregistered firm against third party is barred under Section 69(2) but that is not the situation herein. The suit is between the partners and for rendition of accounts. The issue engaged attention of Apex Court in Delhi Development Authority Vs. Kochhar Construction Work (supra) is whether subsequent registration of firm can cure the initial defect. The Court held that it shall not cure the defect. The said issue is not at all relevant for the present case. The suit is between the partners and for rendition of accounts. The issue engaged attention of Apex Court in Delhi Development Authority Vs. Kochhar Construction Work (supra) is whether subsequent registration of firm can cure the initial defect. The Court held that it shall not cure the defect. The said issue is not at all relevant for the present case. Therefore, the aforesaid decision does not help petitioner in any manner. 42. At this stage it would also be appropriate to consider whether the shop in question became property of firm or it continued to be the property of plaintiff, Som Nath and subject to stipulations contained in partnership deed it was allowed to be used by partnership firm to the extent and manner as it was provided therein and liable to be dealt with subsequently in terms of partnership deed. The shop however never put in as a joint stock of firm. 43. It is always permissible for a partner to put his individual property as property of firm. Similarly a partner may also make his individual rights attached to an immoveable property as that of a partnership firm's right and thereby those rights would become the rights of partnership firm vis a vis the immovable property and will have to be dealt with in accordance with terms of partnership deed read on statutory provisions of Act, 1932. 44. In order to appreciate legal aspect of this issue, this Court would have reference to Section 14 of Act, 1932, which reads as under: "S. 14. The property of the firm.-Subject to contract between the parties, the property of the firm includes all properties and rights and interests in property originally brought into the stock of the firm, or acquired, by purchase or otherwise, by or for the firm, or for the purposes, and in the course of the business of the firm, and includes all the goodwill of the business." 45. The provision is very clear and admits no ambiguity or doubt. The property, having whatever character, which belong to individuals, can be brought in by the parties into joint stock. When a partnership relationship is constituted by entering into an agreement, it is always open to the individuals entering into the contract to bring their property, held individually or otherwise, in the joint stock of the partnership firm. 46. In Arjun Kanoji Taukar Vs. When a partnership relationship is constituted by entering into an agreement, it is always open to the individuals entering into the contract to bring their property, held individually or otherwise, in the joint stock of the partnership firm. 46. In Arjun Kanoji Taukar Vs. Shantaram (1969) 3 SCC 555 a contention was raised that in any event, by virtue of Section 14 of Act 1932 all the assets with the aid of which business was carried on by the plaintiff, must be deemed in law to have become partnership assets under the deed of partnership. Rejecting the submission, Court held that under Section 14 property belong to a person in absence of any agreement to the contrary, does not, on a person entering into a partnership with others, become property of partnership, merely because it is/has been used for the business of the partnership. It will become property of partnership only if there is an agreement, express or implied, that the property was, under the agreement of partnership, treated as property of the partnership. 47. In other words, when 'A' transferred his property voluntarily through a contract/agreement to others so as to bring in their rights also in the same way transferrer enjoys, rights and that transfer is to the extent that all the individuals in a new partnership called partnership, treat the property to be joint property of resultant of new relationship of partnership. It will become property of partnership firm and such a transfer is valid as it is legal consequence and there is no irregularity, illegality or otherwise objectionable therein. The term "transfer of property" is not to be construed in the terms of Transfer of Property Act but in a case of partnership firm, such transfer of property has to be looked into from lightly different angle. This term "transfer of property" has been considered by Apex court in Sunil Siddhart Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax Ahmedabad, Gujarat (1985) 156 ITR 509 (SC)=1985(4)SCC 519. The term "transfer of property" was construed by Court observing: "In its general sense, the expression "transfer of property" connotes, the passing of rights in property from one person to another. In one case, there may be a passing of the entire bundle of rights from the transferor to the transferee. The term "transfer of property" was construed by Court observing: "In its general sense, the expression "transfer of property" connotes, the passing of rights in property from one person to another. In one case, there may be a passing of the entire bundle of rights from the transferor to the transferee. In another case, the transfer may consist of one of the estates only out of all the estates comprising the totality of rights in the property. In a third case, there may be a reduction of the exclusive interest in the totality of rights of the original owner into a joint or shared interest with other persons. An exclusive interest in property is a larger interest than a share in that property. To the extent to which the exclusive interest is reduced to a shared interest, it would seem that there is a transfer of interest. Therefore, when a partner brings in his personal asset into the capital of the partnership firm as his contribution to its capital, he reduces his exclusive rights in the asset to shared rights in it with the other partners of the firm. While he does not lose his rights in the asset altogether, what he enjoys now is an abridged right which cannot be identified with the fullness of the right which he enjoyed in the asset before it entered the partnership capital." 48. The decision in Arjun Kanoji Taukar Vs. Shantaram (supra) was followed and reiterated in Arm Group Enterprises Ltd. Vs. Waldorf Restaurant, (2003) 6 SCC 432 and Mohd. Laiquiddin and Anr. v. Kamala Devi Misra (Dead) by L.Rs. and Ors., 2010 (2) SCC 407 . 49. In Boda Narayana Murthy and Sons Vs. Valluri Venkata Suguna and others AIR 1978 AP 257 , it was observed that a property would become property of partnership only when there is an agreement, express or implied, that the property under the agreement of the partnership is to be treated as property of partnership. 50. In another case, namely, M/s. Shivraj Fine Art Litho Works and others Vs. Purushottam and others AIR 1993 Bom. 30 (DB), the Court said that the partner, who brings in his own assets as property of the partnership business reduces his exclusive right in the assets to the shared rights in it of the other partners of the firm. The concept of co-ownership cannot apply to such property. 51. Purushottam and others AIR 1993 Bom. 30 (DB), the Court said that the partner, who brings in his own assets as property of the partnership business reduces his exclusive right in the assets to the shared rights in it of the other partners of the firm. The concept of co-ownership cannot apply to such property. 51. The aforesaid decision of Bombay High Court, however, on another point of Section 69(2) has been reversed in appeal by Apex Court vide its decision in Purushottam and Anr. Vs. Shivraj Fine Art Litho Works and Ors., JT 2007 (4) SC 564. 52. In Mrs. Sujan Suresh Sawant Vs. Dr. Kamlakant Shantaram Desa AIR 2004 Bom. 446 , the Court came across a similar situation. It held, when a partner brings in his personal asset into partnership firm as his contribution to the capital, an asset which originally was subject to the entire ownership of the partner, becomes now subject to the rights of other partners in it. It is not necessary that every partnership firm for the purpose of its business should own and utilize its own property only. It can utilize the property owned by others for the purpose of its business. It would, however, become property of partnership only if there is an agreement that property under the agreement of the partnership is to be treated as property of partnership. For a property to become property of firm, it must be brought into stock of the firm by the partners, originally, when the firm was formed, or subsequently acquired by purchase or otherwise in the course of the business of the firm. 53. In other words, one must distinguish the property of a partner, not put in the joint stock of the firm, but, permitted to be used for the firm or for carrying out the business, since, in such a case, property would not become property of the firm or property of the partnership business. Property belong to a partner as his personal property, in absence of any agreement to that effect does not ipso facto become property of the partnership firm merely for its use for the business of partnership. 54. In Shashi Kapila Vs. R.P. Ashwin JT 2001 (9) SC 488, the Court observed that a partnership firm is an association of persons. Property belong to a partner as his personal property, in absence of any agreement to that effect does not ipso facto become property of the partnership firm merely for its use for the business of partnership. 54. In Shashi Kapila Vs. R.P. Ashwin JT 2001 (9) SC 488, the Court observed that a partnership firm is an association of persons. Despite the unity between them, every partner can have his own separate existence from the firm. Any property over which a partner has right, other than the partnership firm, would remain his individual asset. Mere fact that particular person has chosen to include himself as a partner of the firm will not result in incorporation of all his individual properties as assets of the partnership. 55. A somewhat similar situation, as in this case, came to be considered before Kolkata High Court in Broadway Centre Vs. Gopaldas Bagri AIR 2002 Cal. 78 . There one partner purchased property in Court auction sale and had interest in the said property by virtue of Court sale. He became owner thereof. However, he brought property in partnership agreement. The said partner together with other partners, supplied necessary consideration for purchase of the said property at the time of Court sale. It was held that property would be the property of the firm. 56. In V. Subramaniam Vs. Rajesh Raghuvandra Rao (supra) the Court observed that a partnership firm, unlike a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, is not a distinct legal entity. It is only a compendium of its partners. The partners of a firm are co-owners of the property of the firm, unlike shareholders in a company who are not co-owners of the property of the company. 57. For better understanding, this Court may say that the parties by contract between themselves agree with what kind of property can be or have been included or excluded in the property of partnership firm. As such, in order to determine whether a particular property is the assets of the partnership firm, agreement between the parties has to be looked into. 58. In Firm Ram Sahay Mall Rameshwar Dayal and others Vs. Bishwanath Prasad AIR 1963 Pat. As such, in order to determine whether a particular property is the assets of the partnership firm, agreement between the parties has to be looked into. 58. In Firm Ram Sahay Mall Rameshwar Dayal and others Vs. Bishwanath Prasad AIR 1963 Pat. 221 , a Division Bench said that no written or registered document is necessary for an individual to contribute any land or immovable property as a contribution against his share of the capital of a new partnership business. They become properties of the firm as soon as partners intend to so, bring them in, and, treat them as such. 59. The effect of bringing in a property of individual as a joint stock of the firm would be that the said property thereafter shall be and can be used by the partners exclusively for the purpose of business. It ceased to be an individual's property since it has been made property of the partnership firm. This is also subject to the contract between the parties. If there is a stipulation in the agreement between the partners otherwise, obviously that will prevail but in absence of any such thing, Section 14/15 of Act, 1932 shall have its operation. So long as partnership continues, no part of the assets of the partnership can be regarded as if it belong to an individual partner. In absence of any contract to the contrary, all the partners hold, use and have interest in whole of the partnership firm. They have community of interest. Their rights in the property are not mutually exclusive. In other words, so long as partnership subsists, such property cannot be deemed to be separate property of a partner. This is what the incident of ordinary partnership as has been, as observed in Mohammad Abdul Sattar Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1958 AP 555 . 60. In Reddi Veerraju Vs. Chittori Lakshminarasamma and others AIR 1971 AP 266 (DB), the Court said that all the members of partnership are interested in whole of the partnership property and it is only upon a dissolution that any part of the partnership property may convert into separate, individual property of the individual partner. Every partner has dominion over the partnership property for the reason of the fact that he is a partner. A partnership is well known to be distinguished from co-ownership. Every partner has dominion over the partnership property for the reason of the fact that he is a partner. A partnership is well known to be distinguished from co-ownership. None of the partners has any right to treat property of firm as individual property and transfer it as such. The basic distinction between co-ownership and partnership is that the co-ownership is not necessary result of agreement while the partnership is. The concept of involvement of community of profits or loss is not attached with the concept of co-ownership. A co-owner can without consent of others may transfer his interest, but partner cannot. 61. In the present case though there is no adjudication on these issues since the suit has been decided on compromise but assuming what has been stated by petitioner to be correct that he initially entered in the shop in dispute as tenant in 1959 and was running his business being the sole tenant of shop in question, the situation underwent major change when he surrendered tenancy rights of shop in question being that of a partnership firm without compromising proprietorship right of another partner who own the shop in question. In other words what is evident from stipulations contained in partnership deed is that the property, i.e., the shop in question continued to be the sole property of individual partner who actually owned it and was never made property of partnership except that it was allowed to be used by partnership firm as a tenant. The another partner, namely, defendant surrendered or made his individual tenancy rights to be that of tenancy rights of partnership firm and that is how the said rights stood shared by both partners constituting partnership firm. In order to govern the rights between parties entering into an agreement to constitute partnership the registration of partnership creates no obstruction in any manner and the partners can settle their rights, obligations etc. by express terms of partnership deed and would be governed thereby after such agreement. In my view, therefore, from 1965 and onwards it is the partnership firm which became tenant shop in question, hence tenancy rights were available to firm though shop in question continued to be sole property of plaintiff liable to revert it back after dissolution of firm. In the circumstances, since the suit itself was not barred, as discussed above, the various authorities cited at bar Rahmatullah Vs. Mohd. In the circumstances, since the suit itself was not barred, as discussed above, the various authorities cited at bar Rahmatullah Vs. Mohd. Sharif (supra); Raja Ram Vs. Bhagwan Das (supra); and, Chandrika Misir Vs. Bhaiyalal (supra) by petitioner to argue that there was an inherent lack of jurisdiction in respect to compromise decree, hence, it was not executable, become inapplicable to the present case and lend no credence to petitioner to assail the orders of courts below, impugned in this writ petition. Issue IV, thus, returned, as above, against the petitioner. 62. As a proposition it cannot be disputed that if a decree ex facie lacks inherent jurisdiction, such an issue could have been raised before Execution Court and such a decree would not be executable, as is the case in Chandrika Misir Vs. Bhaiyalal (supra). There the Court held that Civil Court had no jurisdiction at all to entertain suit since the kind of suit up for consideration before Apex Court could have been filed before a Special Court created under Act 1 of 1951. The Civil Court lacks inherent jurisdiction to entertain such a suit and, therefore, such an objection could have been raised even in execution proceedings that the decree was a nullity. This situation, however, does not exist in present case. 63. Similarly, in Raja Ram Vs. Bhagwan Das (supra) this Court held that validity of decree can be challenged in execution proceedings on the ground that the Court which passed decree was lacking inherent jurisdiction in the sense that it could not have seisin of the case because the subject matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction as the defendant was dead at the time suit had been instituted or decree passed or some such other ground which could have the effect of rendering the Court entirely lacking in jurisdiction in respect of subject matter of suit or over the parties to it. Relying on Apex Court's decision in Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi Vs. Rajabhi Abdul Rehman (supra) the Court said, that, when decree is made by a Court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make it, objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of record. Relying on Apex Court's decision in Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi Vs. Rajabhi Abdul Rehman (supra) the Court said, that, when decree is made by a Court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make it, objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of record. But I do not find application of said decisions in the present case since I am clearly of the view that suit was not barred by Section 69(2) or (3) of Act, 1932. 64. No other issue has been raised to challenge the jurisdiction of Court passing compromise decree, hence it cannot be said that decree was wholly without jurisdiction. Issues I, II and III 65. Now I come to the next question. All these three issues can be dealt with together, i.e., whether compromise decree, in the present case, was inexecutable and whether it is a mere declaratory decree or that in the garb of suit of a partner seeking rendition of accounts was a suit for eviction and whether it was permissible in law or not. 66. Sri Seth, learned Senior Advocate referred to Section 20 of Act, 1972 contended that petitioner was a tenant in the shop in question and, therefore, even by efflux of time or after determination of tenancy, he could not have been evicted having acquired status of statutory tenancy under Section 20(1) of Act, 1972, unless and until sub-section (2) thereof is satisfied, and, only thereupon, by filing a suit for eviction, he could have been evicted. 67. The submission is thoroughly misconceived inasmuch as proviso to Section 20(1) of Act, 1972 reads as under: "Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall bar a suit for the eviction of a tenant on the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time where the tenancy for a fixed term was entered into by or in pursuance of a compromise or adjustment arrived at with reference to a suit, appeal, revision or execution proceeding, which is either recorded in court or otherwise reduced to writing and signed by the tenant." 68. Further sub-section (5) thereof also reads as under: "(5) Nothing in this section shall affect the power of the court to pass a decree on the basis of an agreement, compromise or satisfaction recorded under Rule 3 of Order XXIII of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil procedure, 1908." 69. Though in my view Section 20 has no application in the present case but even otherwise I am clearly of the view that proviso to Section 20(1) excludes a case where there is a compromise decree, recorded in the court, which is sought to be executed. 70. Now I proceed to consider whether compromise decree was executable and whether it was recorded in accordance with law or not. 71. It is not the case of petitioner and none has proved that compromise was not entered into by petitioner or there is any case of fraud or misrepresentation etc. Rule 3 Order 23 C.P.C. as amended in U.P. deals with compromise of suit and reads as under: "Rule 3. Compromise of suit.--Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement in writing and signed by the parties, or where the defendant satisfied the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit. Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose on deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment. Explanation.--An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule." 72. The Court, therefore, can pass a decree in accordance with agreement, compromise or satisfaction recorded by parties. Such a compromise may be the same as the subject matter of suit or not. The Court, therefore, can pass a decree in accordance with agreement, compromise or satisfaction recorded by parties. Such a compromise may be the same as the subject matter of suit or not. The Apex Court in Byram Pestonji Gariwala (supra), first referred to the position as it was available before 1976 amendment in para 22 of the judgment and said: ". . . . . a compromise decree may incorporate not only matters failing within the subject matter of the suit, but also other matters which are collateral to it. The position before the amendment in 1976 was that, in respect of the former, the decree was executable, but in respect of the latter, it was not executable, though admissible as judicial evidence of its contents." 73. Then it refers to the decisions rendered by various Court in the light of Order 23 Rule 3 C.P.C. as it stood prior to amendment of 1976 and cited Privy Council authority in Hemanta Kumari Debi Vs. Midnapur Zamindari Co., AIR 1919 PC 79 and various High Court's decisions, namely, Ram Jawan Vs. Devendra Nath Gupta, AIR 1960 MP 280 ; Vishnu Sitaram Auchat Vs. Ramchandra Govind Joshi, AIR 1932 Bom. 466; Jasimuddin Biswas Vs. Bhuban Jelini, 1907 ILR (34) Cal 456; and, Ganganand Singh Vs. Rameshwar Singh Bahadur, AIR 1927 Patna 271. Then from para 28, onwards, it dealt with Order 23 Rule 3, after amendment of 1976, and in para 38 said as under: "38. Considering the traditionally recognised role of counsel in the common law system, and the evil sought to be remedied by Parliament by the C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976, namely, attainment of certainty and expeditious disposal of cases by reducing the terms of compromise to writing signed by the parties, and allowing the compromise decree to comprehend even matters falling outside the subject-matter of the suit, but relating to the parties, the legislature cannot, in the absence of express words to such effect, be presumed to have disallowed the parties to enter into a compromise by counsel in their cause or by their duly authorised agents. Any such presumption would be inconsistent with the legislative object of attaining quick reduction of arrears in Court by elimination of uncertainties and enlargement of the scope of compromise." 74. Any such presumption would be inconsistent with the legislative object of attaining quick reduction of arrears in Court by elimination of uncertainties and enlargement of the scope of compromise." 74. This is one aspect of the matter to test and analyse contention of petitioner that compromise decree containing certain conditions beyond the scope of suit, therefore, the compromise was not in terms of statutory provision and hence not executable. Looking to other side of the matter I am clearly of the view that compromise decree in question cannot be said to be beyond subject matter of suit inasmuch as there are two aspects in the suit. Firstly, for rendition of account and secondly, for restoration of possession of shop in question to plaintiff in terms of partnership deed. Possession of shop to plaintiff would automatically entail in consequences of dispossession of defendant, therefore, his eviction from shop in question was a subject matter of suit. The suit was decided in terms of compromise executed between parties and compromise decree clearly provides that on a particular date the defendant shall handover vacant possession of shop in question to plaintiff and till then shall pay rent etc. in terms of other stipulations in the compromise decree. It leaves open to parties to agree for terms of tenancy for extending the same on fresh terms and conditions. This fresh tenancy preceded by word "thereafter". Similarly clause 1 of compromise decree treats the defendant as tenant by adding word "henceforth". Clause 1 of compromise decree dated 26.10.1979 shows that defendant was treated as the sole tenant with effect from the date of compromise and extension of tenancy on fresh terms and conditions was to precede the vacant possession handed over to plaintiff by defendant. The compromise decree has not been exhausted or satisfied since admittedly defendant, i.e., petitioner at no point of time ever handed over peaceful possession of premises in dispute to plaintiff. The decree, therefore, had to be put on for execution for satisfaction/compliance of Clause 4 about handing over vacant possession of disputed shop by defendant to plaintiff. 75. The compromise decree has not been exhausted or satisfied since admittedly defendant, i.e., petitioner at no point of time ever handed over peaceful possession of premises in dispute to plaintiff. The decree, therefore, had to be put on for execution for satisfaction/compliance of Clause 4 about handing over vacant possession of disputed shop by defendant to plaintiff. 75. The manner in which, I have discussed above, leaves no manner of doubt that decree had to be executed and was executable but if something more is required I may refer to certain authorities of Apex Court and of this Court which would expose fallacy in the arguments of learned counsel for petitioner that the decree was inexecutable. 76. The submission that decree is purely declaratory, is ex facie incorrect inasmuch as when decree required something to be done by defendant, on or up to a particular point of time, it cannot be said to be a mere declaratory decree but a decree where parties have to act or omit in a particular manner to satisfy decree. Even otherwise non mention of executability of decree on failure to satisfy condition will not render the decree inexecutable. 77. In Prakash Chand Khurana Vs. Harnam Singh (supra) a contention was raised that award is merely declaratory of the rights of parties and, therefore, inexecutable. Clause 7 of award which was sought to be read in above manner as quoted in para 6 of the judgment, reads as under: "In case the second party does not make payment to the Faridabad Development Board as mentioned in clause No. 2, mentioned above, for a period of 1 1/2 years or does not take the liability of the Development Board on itself as a result whereof the liabilities of the first party do not come to an end, as mentioned in clause No. 2, ........ the first party shall be entitled to take back the possession." 78. The Apex Court in para 18 of the judgement said: "18. . . . . This contention is based on the wording of clause 7 of the award which provides that on the happening of certain events the respondents "shall be entitled to take back the possession". We are unable to appreciate bow this clause makes the award merely declaratory. The Apex Court in para 18 of the judgement said: "18. . . . . This contention is based on the wording of clause 7 of the award which provides that on the happening of certain events the respondents "shall be entitled to take back the possession". We are unable to appreciate bow this clause makes the award merely declaratory. It is never a pre-condition of the executability of a decree that it must provide expressly that the party entitled to a relief under it must file an execution application for obtaining that relief. The tenor of the award shows that the arbitrator did not intend merely to declare the rights to the parties." 79. Whenever a compromise is entered into, the points of dispute are deemed to have been settled between parties, consistent with terms of compromise entered by them, and, it cannot be said that despite the compromise having been entered into by parties in a suit, still their points of difference have continued or have been recognised unless the same is fortified from the terms of compromise. The intention of parties have to be gathered from the terms of compromise. It is possible that a compromise may create new rights between parties but it all will depend on the language of compromise and for the same, Executing Court will not go to look into pleadings, evidence etc., as available before Trial Court in the suit, unless and until, it is absolutely necessary to gather correct intention of parties in case of some ambiguity in the terms of compromise. 80. In Smt. Kalloo and others Vs. Dhaka Devi (supra) the Court observed: "The intention has to be gathered from the terms of compromise and surrounding circumstances including the order recorded by Court on the basis of compromise." 81. In Hiralal Moolchand Doshi Vs. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas (supra) the issue relating to admission was considered. It was observed that admissions, if true and clear, are, by far, the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under Section 58 of Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under Section 58 of Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. Relying on its earlier decision in Suleman Noormohammed Vs. Umarbhai, AIR 1978 SC 952 the Court said: "An admission by the tenant about the existence of a statutory ground, expressly or impliedly, will be sufficient and there need not be any evidence before the Court on the merits of the grounds before the compromise order is passed. If there is an admission of the tenant it will not be open to him to challenge its correctness as the admission made in judicial proceedings are absolutely binding on the parties. At any rate decree cannot be called a nullity to enable the executing court to go behind it." 82. Even otherwise assuming that there is no execution clause in case of default still the compromise decree is executable. In Harihar Pandey Vs. Mangala Prasad Singh (supra) Hon. N.N. Mittal, J. in paras 8 and 9 of the judgment said: "8. A decree is a formal expression of an adjudication that conclusively determines the rights of the parties as respects the matter in controversy. However, this adjudication of rights may take place after contest, and also by consent i.e under a compromise. 9. It is urged that under the compromise petition injunction was not specifically granted but is that really necessary? Where in an injunction suit the decree merely says that the suit be decreed, can it be said that it grants no injunction? In such a case the decree must be correlated to the relief claimed in the plaint Similarly where the parties agree to a future mode of conduct either by doing something or by refraining to do some act and obtain a decree in those terms this may, in appropriate cases, amount to self inducted injunction against one's self. There cannot be any real difference in an injunction granted by the court after adjudication of the rights and a self invited injunction under a compromise decree. There cannot be any real difference in an injunction granted by the court after adjudication of the rights and a self invited injunction under a compromise decree. However, what one has to look for in such a case is to search for the real intent of the parties. If the prohibitions and/or positive mandates mentioned in the compromise to regulate their future mode of conduct were intended to be enforced as injunction then, notwithstanding the fact that no injunction is specifically granted under the decree, it must be held to be one for injunction. For doing so the court must only delve deeper in order to discover the true intent of the parties and that alone must be given effect to. In such cases, too strict an interpretation of the compromise petition must not be attempted and an allowance must always be made for infirmity of expression in the compromise petition." 83. In Thakur Prasad Vs. 1st Additional District Judge, Gonda (supra), the Court, in para 13, said: ". . . . the terms of the compromise in the present case contained in implied admission by the tenant of the existence and availability and the grounds contemplated under Section 20(2)(a) of the Act having been made out, the consent decree, therefore, could not be called a nullity so as to enable the executing Court to go behalf it and refuse its execution as sought for." 84. Hon'ble K.T. Thomas, J. (as His Lordship then was) in V.N. Sreedharan Vs. Bhaskaran (supra), in para 8 and 12 of the judgment, said: "8. . . . . Executability is one of the main incidences of a decree, whether it is a compromise decree or otherwise. Unless the right to execute a decree is restricted either expressly or by necessary implication either by the terms of that decree, or by the provisions of any supervening legislative enactments, the executable character of a decree is not lost. It is not necessary that the decree must embody in it, a clause empowering the initiation of execution proceedings in the event of non-satisfaction of it or non-fulfilment of any condition or non-compliance of any term therein. Absence of such a clause in it does not strip the decree of its executability which inheres in a decree." "12. It is not necessary that the decree must embody in it, a clause empowering the initiation of execution proceedings in the event of non-satisfaction of it or non-fulfilment of any condition or non-compliance of any term therein. Absence of such a clause in it does not strip the decree of its executability which inheres in a decree." "12. The emerging position is that the non-inclusion of a particular clause in a compromise decree, that in the event of non-performance of the conditions in it the party concerned is entitled to apply for execution and get the conditions enforced through Court will not render the decree inexecutable." 85. In Prakash Chand Khurana Vs. Harnam Singh (supra), considering executability of a decree, based on arbitration award, the Court said: "A clause in a decree passed in terms of an arbitration award providing that on the happening of certain events the vendor shall be entitled to take back possession of the property does not make the award declaratory so as to make it incapable of execution. The intendment of the award is that on the happening of; stipulated events the vendor would be entitled to apply for execution of the award and obtain possession of the property. The mere fact that the award fails to mention filing of an execution application does not make it declaratory. It is never a pre-condition of the executability of a decree that it must provide expressly that the party entitled to a relief under it must file an execution application for obtaining that relief." 86. In Ramaswami Iyengar Vs. Sree Rangachary, 1910(6) Indian Cases 681 Madras High Court said that a decree is executable notwithstanding the absence of an express clause to that effect. 87. In Abdul Shakoor Vs. Bijai Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 874 the Court had an occasion to consider executability of a compromise decree without any specific clause enabling execution. Clause 2 of compromise memo, filed in that case, had recorded that the mortgage properties are hereby sold for the amount of the decree in full satisfaction thereof and the defendants will execute a regular sale within ten days from this date. On failure of defendant to execute sale deed, the Apex Court held that decree can be executed and sale deed can be got executed through the intervention of Court. 88. In Gopinath Nair Vs. On failure of defendant to execute sale deed, the Apex Court held that decree can be executed and sale deed can be got executed through the intervention of Court. 88. In Gopinath Nair Vs. Madhavan, 1984 ILR (1) Ker 464 the Court said: "A decree is the fruit of litigation. The rights under a decree have to be realised by execution unless the party liable readily discharges his obligation under the decree. A compromise decree is also a decree. In the normal course, parties fight to the last and the Court is called upon to give a decision on the issues involved. But when the parties compromise, the Court disposes of the suit in terms of the compromise. Simply because a decree is compromise decree, it cannot be said that the decree is not executable. It cannot also be said that unless there is a direction in the compromise decree, to execute and realise the right conferred by the decree, the decree cannot be executed." 89. It is well settled that Courts are always in favour of construing compromise in a manner which tends to shorten litigation. The Court will always resist an attempt on the part of any of the parties to construe a decree in such a way as to multiply litigation. 90. In fact the occasion to seek execution of decree in question would have arisen to plaintiff only if the defendant fails to handover vacant possession of shop in dispute by time stipulated in the compromise decree. In Devdutta Dheer Vs. Janki Vallabh (supra) almost a similar kind of compromise was entered into between the parties. The Court observed, when defendant agreed to handover possession of property in dispute to plaintiff in a compromise decree, it meant that they, agreed to got passed a decree for ejectment against him. The Court thus granted him time to vacate the suit premises for the period it is mentioned in decree. Such a decree cannot be said to be a fresh contract. No fresh lease can be said to have arrived at between parties and the decree was executable. Similar view has been taken by Apex Court in Som Dutt Vs. Govind Ram (supra). 91. Now comes the last question about the date by which defendant had to vacate the premises. Whether originally it was mentioned in compromise decree as 31.12.1990 or 31.12.1992. 92. Similar view has been taken by Apex Court in Som Dutt Vs. Govind Ram (supra). 91. Now comes the last question about the date by which defendant had to vacate the premises. Whether originally it was mentioned in compromise decree as 31.12.1990 or 31.12.1992. 92. This Court looked into various certified copies and apparently found that there is some manipulation in the decree making 31.12.1992 as 31.12.1990. However, instead of recording any finding on its own this Court vide order dated 11.05.1999 required the District Judge to look into this aspect of the matter and submit his report. The District Judge, Lucknow has submitted inquiry report dated 30.06.1999 and has clearly opined that original date in the compromise was 31.12.1992. By making some interpolation thereupon after January 1993, the date was changed to 31.12.1990. This Court has not been addressed by learned counsel for the petitioner in respect of aforesaid date and no serious dispute has been raised on the aforesaid report. I have also perused the record and report as well and find no reason to express any other view in the matter. 93. Interpolation in judicial records is a serious matter but who has done it still a matter of inquiry. The petitioner cannot absolve himself from its liability since he is beneficiary of such interpolation and has set up a defence on the basis of changed date, i.e., 31.12.1990, regarding fresh agreement of tenancy after 31.12.1990. His involvement, therefore, cannot be ruled out. For the purpose of present case, however, I am refraining myself from making further observations on this aspect and leave the parties to take up such proceedings as advised. 94. The discussion made above show that the the impugned orders passed by courts below do not suffer any error apparent on the face of record. 95. This Court may remind that it does not sit in appeal while considering the judgments and orders of courts below when challenged under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 96. Scope of judicial review of this Court under Articles 226 or 227 is not to permit the parties to raise a new factual aspect before this Court and thereby treating the subordinate courts' judgment to be erroneous on the face of it and decide in a particular manner or otherwise or to remand the matter. 96. Scope of judicial review of this Court under Articles 226 or 227 is not to permit the parties to raise a new factual aspect before this Court and thereby treating the subordinate courts' judgment to be erroneous on the face of it and decide in a particular manner or otherwise or to remand the matter. If this is permitted, it will lead no litigation to any conclusion and may result in an unending litigation. Such a situation can neither be countenanced nor can be permitted. In fact this is the gist evident from various authorities dealing with on the ambit of judicial review open for this Court while considering correctness of judgment of courts below exercising powers under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 97. The scope of judicial review in such matters where the orders of courts below are assailed before this Court in a writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution is very limited. This power involves a duty on the High Court to keep the inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. But this power does not vest the High Court with any unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Court or Tribunal. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principle of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. 98. In D. N. Banerji Vs. P. R. Mukherjee 1953 SC 58 the Court said: "Unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention, it is not for the High Court under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere." 99. A Constitution Bench of Apex Court examined the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution in Waryam Singh and another Vs. Amarnath and another AIR 1954 SC 215 and made following observations at p. 571 : "This power of superintendence conferred by article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J. in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. Vs. Sukumar Mukherjee AIR 1951 Cal. Amarnath and another AIR 1954 SC 215 and made following observations at p. 571 : "This power of superintendence conferred by article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J. in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. Vs. Sukumar Mukherjee AIR 1951 Cal. 193 , to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors". 100. In Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim and Ors. AIR 1984 SC 38 the Court held that this Court has very limited scope under Article 227 of the Constitution and even the errors of law cannot be corrected in exercise of power of judicial review under Article 227 of the Constitution. The power can be used sparingly when it comes to the conclusion that the Authority/Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or proceeded under erroneous presumption of jurisdiction. The High Court cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decision. For interference, there must be a case of flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or where order of the Tribunal, etc. has resulted in grave injustice. 101. For interference under Article 227, the finding of facts recorded by the Authority should be found to be perverse or patently erroneous and de hors the factual and legal position on record. (See: Nibaran Chandra Bag Vs. Mahendra Nath Ghughu, AIR 1963 SC 1895 ; Rukmanand Bairoliya Vs. the State of Bihar & ors., AIR 1971 SC 746 ; Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha & ors., AIR 1980 SC 1896 ; Laxmikant R. Bhojwani Vs. Pratapsing Mohansingh Singh Pardeshi, (1995) 6 SCC 576 ; Reliance Industries Ltd. Vs. Pravinbhai Jasbhai Patel & ors., (1997) 7 SCC 300 ; M/s. Pepsi Food Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Sub-Judicial Magistrate & ors., (1998) 5 SCC 749 ; and Virendra Kashinath Ravat & ors. Vs. Vinayak N. Joshi & ors. (1999) 1 SCC 47 ). 102. It is well settled that power under Article 227 is of the judicial superintendence which cannot be used to up-set conclusions of facts, howsoever erroneous those may be, unless such conclusions are so perverse or so unreasonable that no Court could ever have reached them. (See: Rena Drego Vs. Lalchand Soni & ors., (1998) 3 SCC 341 ; Chandra Bhushan Vs. (See: Rena Drego Vs. Lalchand Soni & ors., (1998) 3 SCC 341 ; Chandra Bhushan Vs. Beni Prasad & ors., (1999) 1 SCC 70 ; Savitrabai Bhausaheb Kevate & ors. Vs. Raichand Dhanraj Lunja, (1999) 2 SCC 171 ; and Savita Chemical (P) Ltd. Vs. Dyes & Chemical Workers' Union & Anr., (1999) 2 SCC 143 ). 103. Power under Article 227 of the Constitution is not in the nature of power of appellate authority enabling re-appreciation of evidence. It should not alter the conclusion reached by the Competent Statutory Authority merely on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. (See: Union of India & ors. Vs. Himmat Singh Chahar, (1999) 4 SCC 521 ). 104. In Ajaib Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-opeative Marketing cum Processing Service Society Ltd., (1999) 6 SCC 82 , the Court has held that there is no justification for the High Court to substitute its view for the opinion of the Authorities/ Courts below as the same is not permissible in proceedings under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. 105. In Mohan Amba Prasad Agnihotri Vs. Bhaskar Balwant Aheer, AIR 2000 SC 931 , the Court said that jurisdiction of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is not appealable but supervisory. Therefore, it cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by Courts below unless there is no evidence to support findings or the findings are totally perverse. 106. In Indian Overseas Bank Vs. Indian Overseas Bank Staff Canteen Workers' Union (2000) 4 SCC 245 , the Court observed that it is impermissible for the Writ Court to reappreciate evidence liberally and drawing conclusions on its own on pure questions of fact for the reason that it is not exercising appellate jurisdiction over the awards passed by Tribunal. The findings of fact recorded by the fact finding authority duly constituted for the purpose ordinarily should be considered to have become final. The same cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having based on materials or evidence not sufficient or credible in the opinion of Writ Court to warrant those findings. At any rate, as long as they are based upon some material which are relevant for the purpose no interference is called for. Even on the ground that there is yet another view which can reasonably and possibly be taken the High Court can not interfere. 107. In Union of India Vs. At any rate, as long as they are based upon some material which are relevant for the purpose no interference is called for. Even on the ground that there is yet another view which can reasonably and possibly be taken the High Court can not interfere. 107. In Union of India Vs. Rajendra Prabhu, (2001) 4 SCC 472 , the Court observed that the High Court, in exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, cannot re-appreciate the evidence nor it can substitute its subjective opinion in place of the findings of Authorities below. 108. Similar view has been reiterated in State of Maharashtra Vs. Milind & ors., (2001) 1 SCC 4 ; Extrella Rubber Vs. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97 ; and Omeph Mathai & ors. Vs. M. Abdul Khader, (2002) 1 SCC 319 . 109. In Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai and others (2003) 6 SCC 675 , it was held that in exercise of supervisory power under Article 227, High Court can correct errors of jurisdiction committed by subordinate Courts. It also held that when subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned, the Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. However, it also said that be it a writ of certiorari or exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or law unless error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law; or, a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. 110. In Jasbir Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2006 ) 8 SCC 294, the Court said: "...while invoking the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution, it is provided that the High Court would exercise such powers most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority. The power of superintendence exercised over the subordinate courts and tribunals does not imply that the High Court can intervene in the judicial functions of the lower judiciary. The power of superintendence exercised over the subordinate courts and tribunals does not imply that the High Court can intervene in the judicial functions of the lower judiciary. The independence of the subordinate courts in the discharge of their judicial functions is of paramount importance, just as the independence of the superior courts in the discharge of their judicial functions." 111. In Shalini Shyam Shetty and another Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 329 , the Court said that power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. The above authority has been cited and followed in Kokkanda B. Poondacha and others Vs. K.D. Ganapathi and another AIR 2011 SC 1353 and Bandaru Satyanarayana Vs. Imandi Anasuya (2011) 12 SCC 650. 112. In Abdul Razak (D) through Lrs. & others Vs. Mangesh Rajaram Wagle and others (2010) 2 SCC 432 , Court reminded that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227, High Courts should not act as if they are exercising an appellate jurisdiction. 113. In T.G.N. Kumar Vs. State of Kerala and others (2011) 2 SCC 772 , the Court said that power of superintendence conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is both administrative and judicial, but such power is to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority. 114. In Commandant, 22nd Battalion, CRPF and others Vs. Surinder Kumar (2011) 10 SCC 244 , Apex Court referring to its earlier decision in Union of India Vs. R.K. Sharma (2001) 9 SCC 592 observed that only in an extreme case, where on the face of it there is perversity or irrationality, there can be judicial review under Articles 226 or 227 115. The discussion leaves no manner of doubt that this writ petition is totally devoid of merit. It is accordingly dismissed. The respondent no. 3 is entitled to costs which is quantified to Rs. 25,000/- against petitioner. 116. The report of District Judge shall be placed in sealed cover again and shall form part of this judgment. 117. The discussion leaves no manner of doubt that this writ petition is totally devoid of merit. It is accordingly dismissed. The respondent no. 3 is entitled to costs which is quantified to Rs. 25,000/- against petitioner. 116. The report of District Judge shall be placed in sealed cover again and shall form part of this judgment. 117. The original record of courts below, if summoned and received, shall be remitted back to lower court, forthwith. _____________