JUDGMENT : N.V. Anjaria, J. The applicant tenant in his reply to suit notice as well as in written statement, raised contention about the standard rent, he paid the amount of rent on the date of filing of written statement then due and thereafter paid the rental amounts periodically. However, on the date of first hearing of the suit, being the date of framing of issue, the amount of rent paid by him fell short by Rs. 270/-. 1.1. Whether in the circumstances and in the facts of the case, the tenant is entitled to protection of Section 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 and whether decree for eviction could have been passed, is the question posed in the present Revision Application. 2. Preferred by the aggrieved tenant and filed under Section 29(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as the 'the Act' for sake of brevity), this Revision Application is directed against judgment and decree dated 28th January, 2013 passed by learned Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad. The Appellate Bench set aside the judgment and order of the Small Causes Court dismissing the suit, and passed decree for eviction under Section 12(3)(b) of the Act holding that protection was not available. 3. Only the relevant facts necessary to address the controversy are set out. The rented premises being property bearing City Survey No.4816-4817, Municipal Census No.3649, 3649/1 paiki situated in the Jamalpur area in the City of Ahmedabad was rented by the respondent-landlord to the applicant-tenant upon rent note dated 06th November, 1985 (Exh.122) at a monthly rent of Rs. 70/- plus the property tax, education cess and other taxes to be paid by the tenant. H.R.P. Suit No.1539 of 1987 was instituted by the plaintiff-landlord before the Small Causes Court No.6, Ahmedabad seeking decree of eviction on the grounds of 13(1)(c), 13(1)(g) and on the ground of arrears of rent, out of which only the last stated ground survived before the lower appellate court. 3.1. In the suit notice under Section 12(2) of the Act dated 09th March, 1987 (Exh.23) issued by the landlord, the rent due for a period beyond six months from 01.03.1986 to 30.06.1987 was demanded. The tenant replied to the notice on 09th April, 1987. The suit was instituted on 02nd May, 1987. 3.1. In the suit notice under Section 12(2) of the Act dated 09th March, 1987 (Exh.23) issued by the landlord, the rent due for a period beyond six months from 01.03.1986 to 30.06.1987 was demanded. The tenant replied to the notice on 09th April, 1987. The suit was instituted on 02nd May, 1987. The tenant filed written statement (Exh.11) raising contention inter alia that the rent collected at Rs.70/- was not a standard rent having regard to the area of the premises, the locality and the other relevant aspects. He had raised the standard rent dispute in his reply to suit notice as well. In the suit, issues were framed on 03rd August, 1994 at Exhibit 19. 3.2. It appears that prior to suit notice dated 09th March, 1987 in March, 1986 as well as subsequent to the suit notice in June, 1997 as was seen from Money Order Receipt (Exh.103 to 108), the tenant was found to have sent the rent amount totalling Rs. 1,120/- by two Money Orders for period of 16 months. The landlord did not accept the Money Orders for which the Money Order Slips were on record as above. It further appeared that after institution of the suit, the tenant had filed application under Section 11(4) of the Act, where under the Court had directed to deposit Rs. 4,690/- upto 01st April, 1993. The same was deposited by the tenant. 3.3. The record further showed that from onwards the date of filing of written statement, the due rent deposited time to time as was reflected in the Pursis (Exh.143) dated 21st March, 2001. On the date of framing of issues, the total amount due towards rent payable was Rs. 7,070/-. The payment made by the tenant upto the said date was however Rs. 6,860/-, rendering the amount of rent then due, short by Rs.270/-. This shortfall of Rs. 270/- in the due rent on the date of first hearing-date of framing of issue, was the bone of contention. 3.4. The Trial Court was of the view that looking to the evidence and the material on record, the defendant-tenant had tendered the standard rent after institution of the suit and the shortfall in question in the amount of rent paid on the first day of hearing was a bona fide mistake, and held that decree for eviction was not liable to be passed. The Appellate Bench however taking contrary view reasoned that from 29th September, 1987 to 16th June, 1994, the total rent deposited on different dates was Rs. 6,860/-, and considering the rent due count from the defendant-tenant from 01st March, 1986 (as claimed in the suit notice) upto July, 1994, for 101 months, calculated at the rate of Rs. 70/- per month was coming to Rs. 7,070/-, but since what was deposited on the date of framing of issues was Rs. 6,860/-, no protection could be made available to the tenant and that depositing the rent due on the date of first hearing was mandatory requirement of contemplated under Section 12(3)(b) of the Act. Thus, on the ground that full rent was not deposited by the tenant on the date of framing of issue, the Appellate Bench held that the protection under Section 12(3)(b) of the Act could not be offered to tenant and that he had incurred liability of being evicted from the premises. 4. Learned advocate for the applicant-tenant Mr. Tarak Damani placing reliance on the Pursis (Exh.143) submitted that it showed the periodical payments of rent by the tenant beginning from the date of filing of written statement and subsequently during the pendency of the appeal. He submitted that the tenant was alive to his responsibility of paying rent and he had paid the rent regularly and it was paid at the rate of Rs. 70/- as demanded by the landlord. He further submitted that merely because on the date of first hearing the amount of rent was paid was less by Rs. 270/-, it could not be a ground to pass decree of eviction. In his submission, for the only reason that there was a shortfall in rent paid it was not proper to conclude that the applicant was a tenant in default. It was submitted that even prior to the suit notice, the applicant had sought to tender the rent by sending Money Orders. He submitted that the requirement of Section 12(2) of the Act that the tenant should be ready and willing to pay the rent was satisfied in the facts of the case and the decree of eviction therefore, was totally uncalled for. 4.1. He submitted that the requirement of Section 12(2) of the Act that the tenant should be ready and willing to pay the rent was satisfied in the facts of the case and the decree of eviction therefore, was totally uncalled for. 4.1. Learned advocate for the applicant further submitted that the Bombay Rent Act was amended by Gujarat Act No.VII of 1985, whereby the word "regularly" was omitted from Section 12(3)(b) which omission or deletion was however, held to be only prospective in its operation and not retrospective as held by Division Bench of this Court in Bai Sakarbai Devraj v. Ibrahim Abdul Ganibhai Pankhida, 1994 (2) GLR 1091 . It was submitted on that basis that the concept of regularity of payment of rent as existed prior to amendment being only retrospective, would have no application to the present case where admittedly date of filing of suit after the date of amendment. 4.2. On the other hand, learned advocate Mr. J.T. Trivedi contended that the requirement of depositing the rent due on the date of first hearing was mandatory and not directory. In his submission, when the amount of rent due on the first hearing was not deposited, the rigors of requirement under Section 12(3)(b) would apply and the tenant would be obliged to vacate the premises. He emphasised and highlighted that when the issue was framed on 03rd August, 1994, the due rent of Rs. 7,070/- was not deposited but only Rs. 6,860/- was deposited. He further referred to paragraph 29 on page 14 of the judgment of the lower appellate court to submit that when the appeal was taken up for final hearing, rent due was Rs. 22,540/-, but the rent deposited was Rs. 21,200/-. Learned advocate for the respondent next relied on judgment dated 18th March, 2005 of this Court in Bachiben Tulsidas v. Jayantilal Chunilal being Civil Revision Application No.281 of 1980, judgment dated 07th July, 2008 in Ravjibhai Gigabhai v. Virjibhai Ravjibhai, again of this Court being Civil Revision Application No.1253 of 1983. 4.3. By placing reliance on decision of the Apex Court in Vasant Ganesh Damle v. Shrikant Trimbak Datar, (2002) 4 SCC 183 , learned advocate for the respondent submitted that date of first hearing was legally sacrosanct and that date could not be stretched further and in that regard invited court's attention to the following observations. 4.3. By placing reliance on decision of the Apex Court in Vasant Ganesh Damle v. Shrikant Trimbak Datar, (2002) 4 SCC 183 , learned advocate for the respondent submitted that date of first hearing was legally sacrosanct and that date could not be stretched further and in that regard invited court's attention to the following observations. "It may be kept in mind that but for the provisions of the Act, the appellant-tenant had no right to resist the claim of the landlords for his eviction after termination of the tenancy. The Rent Control Act is a social welfare legislation meant to protect and safeguard the interests of the tenant, which does not confer unfettered powers on the tenant to remain in the possession of the leased premises without the compliance with directions of the court or the provisions of the statute. The Act is intended to protect the bona fide tenants in possession. It has put restrictions on the right of the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant only on the grounds specified under the relevant statute. There is no dispute that under the Act the landlord is entitled to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of defaults in the payment of rent. The statute further provides that despite default, a tenant can approach the court in any suit for possession on the ground of arrears of rent and submit on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the court may fix to tender the standard rent and permitted increases together with interest and costs. If such a prayer is made, the court, dealing with the suit has been conferred the powers to pass appropriate orders in terms of Section 12(3) and in that event the suit of eviction against the tenant on the ground of default in payment of rent shall be dismissed. Non-payment of rent, as per contract and statutory provisions, entitles the landlord to seek possession. The right conferred upon a bona fide tenant can be availed of only twice and not thereafter." (Para 6) 4.4. Non-payment of rent, as per contract and statutory provisions, entitles the landlord to seek possession. The right conferred upon a bona fide tenant can be availed of only twice and not thereafter." (Para 6) 4.4. With regard to the contention about the deletion of word "regularly" raised by the applicant, learned advocate for the respondent submitted that though the said word came to be omitted, the second part of the requirement of Section 12(3)(b) requiring the tenant to pay the rent on the first date of hearing then due was not taken out. He emphasised that the obligation in law cast upon the tenant to pay the dues of standard rent and permitted increases payable on the date of framing of issues was a mandatory requirement. It was submitted that once it was a fact situation obtained that the tenant had not complied with the same, the Court had no discretion in the matter except to pass decree for eviction. Learned advocate for the respondent wanted to become more emphatic in his submissions by relying on the decision in Mrunalini B. Shah v. Bapalal Mohanlal Shah, AIR 1980 SC 954 . In his submission therefore, the decree passed by the lower appellate court accepting the case of the landlord was proper and legal. 5. The case of the landlord was that the tenant was liable to pay the rent as well as the Property Tax, Education Cess and other payments. The case was therefore governed by provision of Section 12(3)(b). In order that protection under Section 12(3)(b) apply, two main conditions were required to be observed, namely, the tenant has paid the arrears of rent and permitted increases then due to the landlord on the first date of hearing of the suit. Secondly, the tenant has thereafter continued to pay the rent during the pendency. It is true that requirement of payment of rent then due on the first date of hearing is held to be mandatory. When the tenant is in default in this regard, he will have to face the consequences of eviction. It is further true that the court does not have discretionary powers under section 12(3)(b). Prior to amendment of 1985, as already noted, the provision contained a word "regularly". The deletion of that word was held to be prospectively applicable as per decision in Sakarbhai Devraj (supra). It is further true that the court does not have discretionary powers under section 12(3)(b). Prior to amendment of 1985, as already noted, the provision contained a word "regularly". The deletion of that word was held to be prospectively applicable as per decision in Sakarbhai Devraj (supra). The present case in its facts would be governed by the amended Section from which the word "regularly" stands omitted. 5.1. Section 12 of the Act contains provision regarding the entitlement of the landlord to recover the possession of the premises, obligation of the tenant to pay rent specifying the conditions and grounds on satisfaction of which the tenant's liability or otherwise to be evicted from the premises would arise. In enacting Section 12, the legislature has envisaged a scheme in itself. Section 12 occurs with the title that no ejectment ordinarily to be made if tenant pays up or ready and willing to pay standard rent and permitted increases. 5.2. The relevant part of section 12 extracted herein reads as under: "12. No ejectment ordinarily to be made if tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay standard rent and permitted increases.- (1) A landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays, or is ready and willing to pay, the amount of the standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and observes and performs the other conditions of the tenancy, in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of this Act. (1A) . (1B) . (2) No suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted by a landlord against a tenant on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent or permitted increases due, until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent or permitted increases has been served upon the tenant in the manner provided in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (IV of 1882). (3) (a) Where the rent is payable by the month and there is no dispute regarding the amount of standard rent or permitted increases, if such rent or increases are in arrears for a period of six months or more and the tenant neglects to make payment thereof until the expiration of the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2), the Court may pass a decree for eviction in any suit for recovery of possession. (b) In any other case, no decree for eviction shall be passed in any such suit if, on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the Court may fix, the tenant pays or tenders in Court the standard rent and permitted increases then due and thereafter, - (i) continues to pay or tender in Court such rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided: and (ii) pays costs of the suit, as directed by the Court. (4) Pending the disposal of any such suit, the Court may out of any amount paid or tendered by the tenant pay to the landlord such amount towards payment of rent or permitted increases due to him as the Court thinks fit. Explanation.-In any case where there is a dispute as to the amount of standard rent or permitted increases recoverable under this Act the tenant shall be deemed to be ready and willing to pay such amount if, before the expiry of the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2), he makes an application to the Court under sub-section (3) of Section 11 and thereafter pays or tenders the amount of rent or permitted increases specified in the order made by the Court." 5.3. From reading of above provision, it would be seen that Sub-section (1) of Section 12 provides for a condition which comes as a condition precedent. It provides that landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays or he is ready and willing to pay the amount and observes other conditions of the tenancy. Therefore, so long as there is a readiness and willingness on part of tenant for payment of rent, a kind of embargo is contemplated to operate on the right of landlord to recover possession. Therefore, so long as there is a readiness and willingness on part of tenant for payment of rent, a kind of embargo is contemplated to operate on the right of landlord to recover possession. Sub-sections subsequently occurring are in the nature of sub-conditions and requirements on the basis of which decree for eviction may be sought for by the landlord and may be resisted by the tenant. 5.4. This court in Phagumal Lahirumal v. Khajumal Kalachand, 1974 GLR 577 considered the scheme of section 12 as under. "If we examine the scheme of section 12 of the Rent Act, we find that sub-section (1) thereof completely shuts out a landlords right to recover the possession of the suit premises so long as the tenant occupying these premises is found ready and willing to pay the amount of standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and observes and performs other conditions of the tenancy, in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of the Rent Act. Section 13 of the Rent Act, which specifies the grounds which would entitle a landlord to recover possession of the leased premises, work as an exception to the general principle thus stated by sub-section (1) of section 12. So far as this suit is concerned, we are not concerned with any of the grounds mentioned in section 13, because, eviction notice is given by the landlord only on the ground that the tenant is not ready and willing to pay the amount of standard rent. The readiness and willingness of the tenant to pay the rent provides therefore a general protection to every tenant against his eviction. If a tenant in a given case is not found ready and willing to pay the rent of the leased premises, he cannot avail of the general protection granted to him by the Legislature under sub-section (1) of section 12. Sub-section (2) of section 12 contemplates a procedure which a landlord should follow before instituting a suit for recovery of possession of the leased premises from his tenant on the ground of nonpayment of rent." (para 10) 5.4.1. In Phagunmal (supra), the court was dealing with nearly a similar controversy, wherein in the facts of that case, the only default of the tenant in the compliance of provisions of section 12(3)(b) consisted in the short payment of Rs. In Phagunmal (supra), the court was dealing with nearly a similar controversy, wherein in the facts of that case, the only default of the tenant in the compliance of provisions of section 12(3)(b) consisted in the short payment of Rs. 14/- in the amount of rent on the first date of hearing of the suit. The court considered the question whether the said default was sufficient to lead the court to a finding that the tenant was not willing and ready to pay the amount of rent fixed for the suit premises. Explaining the applicability of section 12(3)(b), the court observed that clause (b) of sub-section (3) applies in cases wherein clause (a) does not apply. It stated that according to this clause if a tenant in arrears wants to save himself from eviction, what he is required to do is to pay or tender in court the whole amount of the rent in arrears on the first date of hearing and thereafter to continue to pay or tender in court regularly the standard rent and permitted increases together with the costs of the suit till the suit till the suit is finally decided as directed by the court. 5.4.2. The Court then proceeded to consider the issue: "The question which arises to be determined is what would happen if these conditions of cl (b) are not completely satisfied by a tenant in a given case. Would it be open to such a tenant to show to the court that even though for some reasons, he could not strictly comply with all the requirements of cl (b) a decree for eviction should not be passed against him because he is otherwise found to be ready any willing to pay the rent as contemned by sub-section (1) of section 12. In other words, even if a particular tenant is found to have not complied with the requirements of clause (b) can he claim the protect on of sub-section (1) of section 12 on the ground that he has always been ready and willing to pay the standard rent and permitted increases if any, relating to the suit premises." (para 12) 5.4.3. It was observed and held: "We therefore come to the main point which is involved in this matter namely whether the tenant in this case should be evicted from the suit premises merely because the amount tendered by him before the first date of hearing is short by Rs. 14.00. The examination of the scheme of section 12 of the Rent Act shows that all the tenants who are ready and willing to pay standard rent and permitted increases are protected from eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent. This is the general protection secured to the tenants under sub-section (1)." (para 13) 5.4.4. The Court interpreted: "Sub-secs. (2) and (3) of this section do not take away or curtail this general protection. They merely deal with the procedure which should be followed when a tenant is found to be in arrears of rent and provide for the application of this general protection to specific cases of non-payment. Thus while sub-section (2) contemplates a procedure which a landlord should follow to recover possession on the ground of non-payments. Sub-section (3) deals with two types of cases of nonpayment. One type is of the cases where a tenant is in arrears of six months rent and the other type is of the cases which are not covered by the first type." (para 14) 5.4.5. The court finally held: "The question therefore is how the court should judge the readiness and willingness of such a tenant to pay rent it cannot be gainsaid that readiness and willingness to pay rent is essentially a question which can be answered only with reference to the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. One circumstance which the court can take into consideration is the reason why the tenant has not been able to comply with the directions contained in clause (b). Non-compliance with the directions of clause (b) may tilt the balance in favour of a landlord but before the balance is so tilted the court has to apply its mind to consider whether the facts of the case justify the conclusion that the tenant concerned has lost the general protection contemplated by sub-section (1). Non-compliance with the directions of clause (b) may tilt the balance in favour of a landlord but before the balance is so tilted the court has to apply its mind to consider whether the facts of the case justify the conclusion that the tenant concerned has lost the general protection contemplated by sub-section (1). To put it differently the court should consider whether by not complying with the directions of clause (b) the tenant has shown a conduct which would be indicative of a want of his readiness and willingness to pay the rent. If the answer is in the affirmative the general protection granted to tenants by sub-section (1) cannot be availed of by the tenant. If the answer is in the negative court should consider how far the tenant can avail of the general protection contemplated by sub-section (1). The point is that so far as clause (b) is concerned eviction does not automatically follow from its non-compliance and a pragmatic approach of the court with reference to the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case is not ruled out. Thus in effect, clause (b) provides for an additional protection to a tenant who is sought to be evicted on the ground of non-payment of rent. If a tenant has not been able to avail of this additional protection the court can examine the reasons why he has not been able to do so and if the court finds that these reasons did not reflect adversely upon his readiness and willingness to pay rent the court can protect him." (para 17) 5.5. In Savitaben Jesha v. Kiritkumar Bhalchandra, 1997 (1) GCD 736 , this Court observed thus with regard to Section 12. "Sec.12 of the Bombay Rent Act is a substantive section giving protection to the tenant against ejectments. It does not in positive terms create any new rights in the tenants. As such, the provisions of Section 12 are really restriction upon the general law to the extent it restricts the general law against the interest of the landlord. It could be safely said that the provisions of Section 12 afford protection to the tenant. It creates a restriction on the landlord's right to recover of possession. It imposes restrain upon a landlord's desire to earn higher rent and prevent him from recovering possession of his premises just for that purpose. It could be safely said that the provisions of Section 12 afford protection to the tenant. It creates a restriction on the landlord's right to recover of possession. It imposes restrain upon a landlord's desire to earn higher rent and prevent him from recovering possession of his premises just for that purpose. Obviously, therefore, the Court is debarred from passing of decree for possession in favour of the landlord so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay standard rent and permitted increases and observe the conditions laid down in Section 12(1)." (Para 5) 6. Therefore, it is manifest from the scheme of Section 12 of the Bombay Rent Act that willingness and readiness of the tenant to pay the rent is a driving force in judging the tenant's liability to be evicted from the suit premises. The case of the tenant has to be tested on the said yardstick before any debilitating conditions could be attributed to him and requiring him to vacate the premises. In other words, the entitlement of the landlord to seek decree of eviction has to be measured with a threshold consideration of tenant's readiness and willingness to pay the rent. This aspect in section 12(1) of the Act has a pervading effect in construing and applying the subsequent rest of the provisions of the section dealing with land-lord's right to seek decree of eviction on the ground of arrears of rent. The conditions provided under Section 12(3)(b) and non-fulfilment or otherwise thereof cannot be viewed dehors the primary requirement provided in Section 12(2) about the readiness and willingness of the tenant to pay rent. 6.1. Therefore, the position of law surfacing as above, posing the discussion here to recapitulate, at the cost of repetitiveness, the facts and features of this case which unfailingly manifest that the appellant-tenant was willing and ready to pay the rent. In that regard, the undisputed and the contentions canvassed by both the sides, Exhibit 103 to 108 showed that two Money Orders-one prior and the second subsequent to suit notice, whereby Rs. 1,160/- was sought to be tendered towards rent which was refused by the landlord. Having taken contention about the standard rent in the reply to suit notice as well as in the written statement, the tenant paid the amounts towards rent, details of which were available from Exhibit 143 pursis on record. 1,160/- was sought to be tendered towards rent which was refused by the landlord. Having taken contention about the standard rent in the reply to suit notice as well as in the written statement, the tenant paid the amounts towards rent, details of which were available from Exhibit 143 pursis on record. The first payment was Rs. 1,260/- was on 29th September, 1987 being the rent due on that date, which was the date of filing of written statement. It was demonstrated from Exhibit 143 that thereafter at different intervals, amounts towards rent were paid. The tenant made application under Section 11(4) of the Act and as per the order of the Court passed therein, Rs. 4,690/- being the rent due upto 01st April, 1993 was paid by the tenant. On 03rd August, 1994, i.e. the date of framing of issues, the total amount periodically paid was Rs. 6,860/- on different dates reflected in Exhibit 143 upto 03rd August, 1994 when the issues were framed. As noted above, this amount fell short by Rs. 270/-. It was seen from Exhibit 143 further that the payment next made after the date of issue was on 26th August, 1994 Rs. 420/- were paid. The said pursis Exhibit 143 gave the details of payment upto 07th July, 2000. The tenant thereafter continued to pay the rent time to time and during the pendency of the proceedings of the appeal, which is recorded by lower appellate court. Subsequent payments of rent made were from time to time during the pendency of the proceedings, the total amount from March, 1986 till December, 2012 which was for 322 months, was Rs. 21,200/- as against the required deposit of Rs. 22,540/-. In the circumstances, the conduct of the tenant was one clearly evincing his readiness and willingness to pay. 6.2. The facts of the present case offer a peculiar situation akin to Phagunmal (supra) where the total amount paid towards the rent then due on the date of first hearing was less by Rs. 270/-. The rent payable was Rs. 70/- per month. 6.2. The facts of the present case offer a peculiar situation akin to Phagunmal (supra) where the total amount paid towards the rent then due on the date of first hearing was less by Rs. 270/-. The rent payable was Rs. 70/- per month. If this shortfall by itself is treated to render the tenant as defaulter, liable to be evicted form the rented premises, and if this by itself is to be held amounting to breach of the requirement of Section 12(3)(b), it would mean penalising the bona fide tenant who is ready and willing to pay the rent for nothing, which will be antithetic to the very object of the Act. In Vasant Ganesh Damle (supra), the Apex Court inter alia observed that the Rent Control is a social welfare legislation meant to protect and safeguard the interests of bona fide tenant. 6.3. A purposive interpretation has to be given to Section 12(3)(b) and it has to be held that merely because there was a short-fall of Rs. 270/- in payment of rent on the date of first hearing, when all other conditions necessary to be satisfied were satisfied, that the decree for eviction could not have been passed holding that there was a non-compliance of conditions under Section 12(3)(b). Applying the doctrine of object-oriented construction and principle of purposive interpretation, the noncompliance of Section 12(3)(b) in its conditions cannot be viewed de hors the elementary conditions in Section 12(1) that the tenant was ready and willing to pay rent. A pedantic approach in applying law should be eschewed because quite often than not, such an approach counteracts the very object with which the provision is enacted in the statute and defeats the purpose it seeks to achieve. 6.4. Once on facts when it is found that the tenant was ready and willing to pay the rent, merely because he paid Rs. 270/- less out of the rent payable Rs. 7,070/- on the date of first hearing, it would not be prudent, nor proper, not legal to hold that the tenant had not fulfilled the requirements under Section 12(3)(b) of the Act. The protective condition contemplated under Section 12(1) of tenant's readiness and willingness would come into play and it would disentitle the landlord at the threshold to seek decree of eviction. The protective condition contemplated under Section 12(1) of tenant's readiness and willingness would come into play and it would disentitle the landlord at the threshold to seek decree of eviction. The reasoning supplied and view taken by the lower appellate court holding the applicant liable to be evicted under Section 12(3)(b) was erroneous and not acceptable in law. 7. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment and decree by the lower appellate court cannot be sustained. The decree of eviction passed by it is rendered illegal and is only deserves to be set aside. Accordingly, the judgment and decree dated 28th January, 2013 passed by learned Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad in Civil Appeal No.101 of 2001 is hereby quashed and set aside. The Revision Application succeeds. Application allowed.

Mohmmed Sabir Ibrahim Byavarwala v. Yusufbhai Noormohmmed Jodhpurwala