Judgment : 1. Since common questions arise for consideration in the above writ petitions those are decided together. 2. W.P.(C) No. 3240/2010 is filed challenging an order passed by the District Magistrate under Section 16 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 proposing to draw a 110 KV electric line from Tower No.139 through Padinjarekkara estate to the substation at Kanakappalam near Erumely. 3. Petitioners are owners of property through which the proposed line from Tower No.139 is to be drawn. Their complaint is that the original alignment of the 110 KV line was shifted from Tower No.136 to Tower No.139 without properly considering the directions issued by this court and without conducting a proper techno-economical feasibility study by the authorities. Some of the petitioners have a complaint that they were not heard before passing the impugned order. 4. The facts as disclosed would reveal that alignment of the 110 KV line from Tower No.136 was originally approved by KSEB as well as the District Magistrate. Certain persons residing in the said alignment of the electric line, approached this Court by filing writ petitions and by a common judgment dated 20.10.2008 in W.P.(C)Nos.27725/2008 and connected cases, this Court set aside the order of the District Magistrate and directed the District Magistrate, Kottayam to hear the parties and to pass appropriate orders on the alternate route suggested. Pursuant to the said direction the District Magistrate by order dated 28.2.2009 found that the route from Tower No. 139 was more feasible. The said order came to be challenged by the petitioners 1 and 2 in W.P.(C) No. 11996/2009. By judgment dated 15.4.2009, this Court had set aside the impugned order and the matter was remitted back to the District Magistrate for considering the objection raised by the petitioners as well. The matter was reheard, but still the District Magistrate confirmed the route starting from Tower No. 139. 5. Ext. P4 is the impugned order. According to the petitioners, there was no reason for the District Magistrate to have rejected the most feasible route in terms of economy and hardship which starts from Tower No. 136. The route from tower No.136 was chosen after a detailed study and as approved by KSEB and there was no reason to shift the same to Tower No.139. According to the petitioners, there was no reason for the District Magistrate to have rejected the most feasible route in terms of economy and hardship which starts from Tower No. 136. The route from tower No.136 was chosen after a detailed study and as approved by KSEB and there was no reason to shift the same to Tower No.139. The reasons stated by the District Magistrate for approving the line from Tower No. 139 is without any basis and no comparative study had been conducted in the matter. 6. Counter affidavit is filed by respondents 1 to 4 supporting the stand taken by the District Magistrate. According to them though the route from Tower No.136 was approved by the District Magistrate, the same came to be quashed by judgment dated 20.10.2008 and the District Magistrate was directed to check the feasibility of alternate route and pass fresh orders. It is stated that thereafter the Board had conducted survey of the proposal starting from tower location Tower No.139 and Tower No.145 and reports were submitted to the District Magistrate, who after site inspection of the various routes and after hearing the affected parties passed an order dated 28.2.2009 rejecting the route from Tower No.136 and approving the route from Tower No.139. Again the said matter was challenged before this Court and on the basis of the direction issued by this Court all affected parties were heard. As per the directions of the District Magistrate the Board had conducted a site inspection of the petitioners' premises and had submitted a detailed report. It is thereafter the impugned order came to be passed. 7. An additional counter affidavit is also filed by respondents 1 to 4 based on the report submitted by the Advocate Commissioner. According to them about 59 persons will be affected when the line is drawn from Tower No.139 and about 51 persons will be affected if the line is drawn through Tower No.136. 7. An additional counter affidavit is also filed by respondents 1 to 4 based on the report submitted by the Advocate Commissioner. According to them about 59 persons will be affected when the line is drawn from Tower No.139 and about 51 persons will be affected if the line is drawn through Tower No.136. They have also given a comparative statement of the two routes which is extracted as under: Comparative statement of present and previously approved routes : Sl.No. Details Approved routes through Previously approved route Tower Location 139 through Tower Location 136 1 Distance 3.87 4.2 2 No. of parties affected 59 51 3 Over Residential 5 7 building 4 Over worship building Nil 1 5 Over Government Nil 1 building 6 Over Industrial Nil 1 7 Adjacent to building 3 v 8. The 8th respondent has also filed a counter affidavit supporting the stand taken by KSEB. He is one among the persons whose land would have been affected if the line was drawn through Tower No.136. 9. The Advocate Commissioner had submitted a report as per order in I.A.No.5971/2011. An additional commission report is also filed stating that there was an error in the commission report. It is stated that the actual distance from Tower No.136 to Padinjarekkara estate is 4.2 K.M. and the actual distance from Tower No.139 to Padinjarekkara estate is 3.87 K.M. In respect of the number of residents affected if the line is drawn from Tower No.136, it is shown as 46 and the number of parties affected if the line is drawn from Tower No.139 is stated to be 67. 10. Petitioners have also submitted additional documents as Exts. P6 and P7. This is to indicate the falsity of the Minutes of Meeting convened by Additional Chief Secretary to Government of Kerala on 22.2.2012 in order to sort out the issue of construction of the 110 KV line. The contention of the petitioners is that though it is stated in Ext.P7 that the Government Chief Whip and a few MLA's participated in the meeting, they have filed affidavits as Exts.P6 and P7 stating that they did not participate in the said meeting. Therefore, according to the petitioners, the Minutes had been cooked up to suit the convenience of the official respondents. 11. Therefore, according to the petitioners, the Minutes had been cooked up to suit the convenience of the official respondents. 11. The Senior Government Pleader has filed a memo to treat the counter affidavit filed in W.P.(C) No.37589/2009 as counter affidavit in the above case as well. An affidavit is also filed to clarify the mistake committed in recording the Minutes of meeting held on 22.3.2012. According to the Additional Secretary, Revenue (Devaswom) Department who had sworn the affidavit, it is stated that the Government Chief Whip and the MLA's did not participate in the meeting, though intimation was given to them regarding the said meeting. The entry of their names as participants of the meeting was a mistake. Annexure A1 is a communication in that regard and Annexure A2 is the corrected minutes. 12. Counter affidavits were also filed by additional respondents 17, 18, 19, 22 and 44, additional respondents 6 to 9, 11 to 15, 20, 21, 23, 25 to 43, 45 to 48. Respondents 17, 18, 19, 22 and 44 have filed objections to the Advocate Commissioner's report. According to them, many of the buildings identified by the Advocate Commissioner in his report through the route starting from Tower No.139 is not correct and a deliberate attempt has been made to include parties whose properties were never affected when the line is drawn. 13. W.P.(C) No. 37589/2009 is filed by similarly placed persons. According to them, though they have submitted objections before the District Magistrate pointing out the specific reason for choosing an alternate route other than from Tower No.139, but the same did not receive any consideration by the District Magistrate. Petitioners have pointed out three routes, one from Ranni to Kanappalam and then construction of 110 KV Sub-station at Makkapuzha and joining 110 KV line from Kanappalam to Makkapuzha, the distance of which would be less than 6 K.M. and then joining a line from Mundakkayam sub-station to Kanappalam. According to the petitioners, the District Magistrate has failed to act in accordance with the mandate of section 16 of the Telegraph Act. The petitioners further contend that when the line is drawn property having a width of 22 meters would become useless, fully grown yielding rubber trees will have to be cut and removed and the value of the property will be reduced considerably. 14. The petitioners further contend that when the line is drawn property having a width of 22 meters would become useless, fully grown yielding rubber trees will have to be cut and removed and the value of the property will be reduced considerably. 14. Counter affidavit is filed in the above case supporting the impugned order of the District Magistrate and explaining the situation under which the impugned order came to be passed. 15. W.P.(C) No.3594/2011 is filed by certain property owners inter alia contending that they were not heard before passing the impugned order by the District Magistrate. They have also submitted Ext.P7 representation to the District Magistrate on 22.12.2010 proposing a slight deviation from the proposed alignment which would in effect avoid the property of many persons from the alignment. 16. In W.P.(C) No. 6452/2011 the petitioners contend that they were not heard by the District Magistrate before passing the impugned order dated 15.9.2009 17. W.P.(C) No. 20896/2011 is filed by petitioners who seek a direction to the second respondent, the Deputy Chief Engineer, Transmission Circle to consider Ext.P4 representation in order to shift the alignment to avoid drawing the line from the proposed site to another site of the petitioner's property in Sy. No. 77/2. 18. Counter affidavit is filed by the respondents on similar lines and further contending that change in alignment is not possible. 19. W.P.(C) No.5178/2011 is also filed challenging the order dated 15.9.2009 passed by the District Magistrate inter alia contending that the petitioners were not given notice before approving the alignment from Tower No.139. 20. W.P.(C) No.6545/2011 is filed by petitioners who also complain that though the petitioners have properties falling within the alignment of the route from Tower No.139, they were not heard before the impugned order was passed. 21. W.P.(C) No.1190/2010 is filed challenging Ext.R1(a) order No. K. Dis.4355/2002/85 dated 4.9.2002 issued by the additional third respondent, namely the District Magistrate and the subsequent order issued as per FB 1680/2006 dated 20.6.2006 which was the present proposal to draw 110 KV line to Erumeli from Kanjirappally and also the order dated 15.9.2009 of the District Magistrate, Kottayam. 22. 21. W.P.(C) No.1190/2010 is filed challenging Ext.R1(a) order No. K. Dis.4355/2002/85 dated 4.9.2002 issued by the additional third respondent, namely the District Magistrate and the subsequent order issued as per FB 1680/2006 dated 20.6.2006 which was the present proposal to draw 110 KV line to Erumeli from Kanjirappally and also the order dated 15.9.2009 of the District Magistrate, Kottayam. 22. The petitioners contend that the very object of disposal of W.P.(C) No.37013/2007 by this Court was directing the KSEB to identify the route which causes least inconvenience to the least number of land owners and to give proposal to the District Magistrate taking into account the cost aspect also. Ext.P1 is the said judgment and the District Magistrate was also directed to decide the matter as provided under S.16(1) of the Indian Telegraph Act read with S.164 of the Electricity Act, 2000. Further direction is issued to KSEB to install posts and draw line only after the line is approved by the District Magistrate. Petitioners contend that it is pursuant to the said judgment that the 110 KV line from Kanjirappaly to Erumely was proposed, the same was objected by several persons suggesting alternate routes. However, the District Magistrate passed an order dated 14.8.2008 as Ext.P2. The said order was challenged and Ext.P3 is the judgment dated 20.10.2008 in W.P.(C) No. 27725/2008. This Court having formed an opinion that the petitioners objections indicating alternate route was not considered, directed the District Magistrate to take up the matter and decide it afresh after giving an opportunity to the parties. This resulted in Ext.P4 order dated 28.2.2009 wherein the District Magistrate approved the route from Tower No.139. The District Magistrate formed an opinion that the said route affects less number of houses and since it is passing through major holding, it is cost effective and causes inconvenience to lesser number of people. 23. This order again was challenged in W.P.(C) No. 11434/2009 and the impugned order was set aside on the ground that petitioners in that case was not heard. Ext.P5 is the judgment as far as the petitioners are concerned. Ext.P6 is the representation submitted by the petitioners before the District Magistrate on 11.7.2009 on the basis of the judgment at Ext.P5. This order again was challenged in W.P.(C) No. 11434/2009 and the impugned order was set aside on the ground that petitioners in that case was not heard. Ext.P5 is the judgment as far as the petitioners are concerned. Ext.P6 is the representation submitted by the petitioners before the District Magistrate on 11.7.2009 on the basis of the judgment at Ext.P5. Petitioners also filed an application Ext.P7 requesting the authorities to Comparative statement of present and previously approved routes: consider the suggestions or proposal with reference to the alternate route for drawing the lines to be examined by experts in the field of electrical energy. Ext.P8 is the report submitted by the Executive Engineer, Transmission Circle to the District Magistrate on the basis of the submission made by the petitioners at Ext.P7. In regard to the drawing of 110 KV line from Ranny to Kanakappalam it is mentioned that the distance from Ranny sub-station is 93 K.M. away from Pallom whereas from Kanjirappaly it is only 41 K.M. The voltage drop will be much more for the proposed line from Ranny as there is considerable difference between the route length. There is only one sub-station between Kanjirappally and Pallom whereas there are eight 110 KV sub-station in between Ranny and Pallom making the number of interruptions very high and consequent energy loss will be more. Hence the said suggestion is not technically feasible. With reference to the second suggestion of drawing line from Makkapuzha and Kanakappalam, the cost of construction of 220 KV substation is around Rs. 25 crores and the consumer strength required for utilising the cost should be more than one lakh whereas the projected consumer strength after 10 years will be less than 20,000 in that area. That apart the line passing through Makkappuzha is through thick forest which is a hurdle to draw such a line. It is stated that in respect of Kerala's special geographical condition the said proposal is not feasible. In regard to the third proposal for drawing 110 KV line from Mundakkayam, it is stated that since Mundakkayam is situated about 38 Km. away from Pallom and Erumely is about 14 Km. away from Mundakkayam, there will be voltage drop when compared to the proposal from Kanjirappally. In regard to the third proposal for drawing 110 KV line from Mundakkayam, it is stated that since Mundakkayam is situated about 38 Km. away from Pallom and Erumely is about 14 Km. away from Mundakkayam, there will be voltage drop when compared to the proposal from Kanjirappally. That apart the line will have to pass through thickly populated Erumely town area and the hardship to the dwellers and land owners will be very high when compared with the other proposal. Hence this suggestion was also not found feasible by the KSEB. In regard to the drawing of line from Tower No.139 the Executive Engineer-in-charge, Transmission Circle's report is at Ext.P8. It is indicated that the construction and maintenance of Extra High Tension (EHT) lines and substations are done by the Transmission Wing of KSEB from 1956. The route is initially surveyed and suggested by a team under the Assistant Engineer which is further verified and discussed at different platforms by Assistant Executive Engineer at Sub Division level, Executive Engineer at Division level and Deputy Chief Engineer at Circle level. It is after such deliberations that the proposal is forwarded to the Chief Engineer (Transmission-South). An expert technical wing under the Chief Engineer (Transmission- South) studies the proposal and after a series of discussions, approves the line route. While doing so, the geographical condition of the area, whether it is economical, the nearness of public places, thickly populated areas and religious worship places are to be avoided. The least expensive, and the route causing least inconvenience to the public is considered. The maximum ankle in any tower may be below 60%. Therefore, it was suggested that when KSEB had a special expert team to verify the feasibility of the report, a further verification in that regard is not required. The petitioners had approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No.25293/2009 to direct the District Magistrate to consider the alternate proposal by getting a feasibility report through experts, but this Court did not interfere in the matter. Ext.P9 is the judgment. Thereafter the order dated 15.9.2009 which is impugned came to be passed. 24. It is contended by the petitioners that the alternate routes suggested by the petitioners were not properly considered. No technical report had been obtained by the District Magistrate whereas it has acted only on the recommendation of the Electricity Board. Ext.P9 is the judgment. Thereafter the order dated 15.9.2009 which is impugned came to be passed. 24. It is contended by the petitioners that the alternate routes suggested by the petitioners were not properly considered. No technical report had been obtained by the District Magistrate whereas it has acted only on the recommendation of the Electricity Board. When the very report of the KSEB authorities were under challenge and the reason is not proper, the District Magistrate ought to have engaged another expert agency to consider the technical feasibility of the proposed proposal. 25. Before proceeding further in the matter it is also worthwhile to consider orders passed by this Court in the present batch of writ petitions. The matter was for some time placed before the Bench dealing with Devaswom Board matters. The Division Bench of this Court on 3.12.2011 observed that: “Matters relating to technical feasibility is within the exclusive domain of KSEB authorities unless of course such decision making process is shown to be mala fide or totally irrational, capricious, arbitrary and other grounds on which there can be a jurisdictional visitation of different jurisdiction. We, therefore, have to be told as to what was the imput given in the form of the report or opinion of the KSEB authorities superceding the contents of Exts.P2 and P5 after the earlier order of this Court in April 2009“. 26. Further this Court observed that the Board should make available the files sought for in I.A.4232/2010. The Board was also directed to produce any report that it may have presented before the District Magistrate after the order of this Court in April 2009. The learned Government Pleader was also directed to obtain the District Magistrate's file leading to the impugned order. 27. Thereafter the matter was taken up on 7.12.2011 and this Court having regard to the factual situation in the case observed at paragraph 9 to 12 as under: "9. We see that in so far as the impugned order is concerned, there is considerable confusion as to whether the competent authorities had subsequently provided technical inputs to support its views after what was reported as Exts.P2 and P5 as available in W.P(C).3240/10. We have already recorded that there was not even clearance from the Chief Engineer, Transmission Circle. We see that in so far as the impugned order is concerned, there is considerable confusion as to whether the competent authorities had subsequently provided technical inputs to support its views after what was reported as Exts.P2 and P5 as available in W.P(C).3240/10. We have already recorded that there was not even clearance from the Chief Engineer, Transmission Circle. We see from the files available that the Chief Engineer, Transmission Circle has accorded technical sanction and the Board authorities appear to have granted financial sanction for the route T-139 after the impugned order of the District Magistrate. 10. The aforesaid facts are recorded without expressing anything on the merits of the rival contentions and only to trigger proper submissions so that these matters can be disposed of at the earliest, more particularly, having regard to the public interest involved to provide augmentation of power supply to Erumely and other parts of Sabarimala. 11. Obviously, if the competent authorities would re-think on the Ranni-Erumely route, the question of financial component could also be immediately taken up for consideration. 12. The matters stated above will gain the immediate attention of the Chairman of the KSEB, the Secretary to the Government of Kerala in the Department of Power and the Additional Chief Secretary who is also in charge of Devaswoms". 28. Subsequently another order dated 17.8.2012 is passed with reference to the meeting with the representatives of the people held on 22.3.2012 which reads as under: "Though we have some materials on record following earlier orders, there is some controversy about the manner in which the record of discussions of the meeting of the Representatives of People held on 22.3.2012 was made. Hence, excluding that controversy, we looked into the notes submitted by the Chairman, Kerala State Electricity Board, which is placed along with the memo filed on behalf of the Board on 29.5.2012. Learned senior counsel for the Board also points out that the said report of the Chairman was generated on specific inputs by the Chief Engineer (Transmissions South). We have looked into the same and think it appropriate that the Chief Engineer (Transmissions South) files an affidavit touching those relevant aspects and also producing therewith the aforesaid communication dated 17.12.2011 (readable copy), after serving copies of such affidavit and materials to all sides in all the connected matters so that the issue can thereafter be considered. We have looked into the same and think it appropriate that the Chief Engineer (Transmissions South) files an affidavit touching those relevant aspects and also producing therewith the aforesaid communication dated 17.12.2011 (readable copy), after serving copies of such affidavit and materials to all sides in all the connected matters so that the issue can thereafter be considered. Similarly, learned Government Pleader will ensure that appropriate clarification is placed as to the allegations regarding the contents of the record of discussions". 29. Heard the learned counsed for petitioners, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of KSEB, Sri. Santhalingam and the learned Government Pleader and learned counsel appearing for the party respondents. 30. There cannot be any dispute that the scope for judicial review in respect of choosing a route for drawing an electric line is very limited. Learned senior counsel Sri. K. Jayakumar appearing on behalf of the petitioners points out that the present route from Tower No.139 has been chosen without conducting a technical feasibility study which was available as far as route from Tower No.136 was concerned. Certain petitioners complains that they were not heard and therefore there is violation of natural justice. A few of the petitioners only want slight change in the alignment so that their property will not be substantially affected. The petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 1190/2010 complains that the alternate route suggested by the said petitioners and its techno-economic feasibility study was not properly conducted and unless an independent agency conducts such a study the opinion expressed by the KSEB cannot be approved by the District Magistrate. According to them the original proposal was to draw the 110 KV line from Ranny that is from Tower No. 145 which had gone far ahead and even a contractor was engaged, which was later dropped by KSEB. It is the common contention of the petitioners that when this Court had directed a proper evaluation of the technno-economic consideration of various proposals, having not done so, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 31. Reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 1190/2010, Sri. P.S. Krishna Pillai to various judgments to sustantiate the contentions urged by the petitioner. (i) Refernce is made to the judgment of supreme court in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh ( 1980 (2) SCC 471 ) to emphasize as to what amounts to malfides. Reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 1190/2010, Sri. P.S. Krishna Pillai to various judgments to sustantiate the contentions urged by the petitioner. (i) Refernce is made to the judgment of supreme court in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh ( 1980 (2) SCC 471 ) to emphasize as to what amounts to malfides. It is held that: "9. The question, then, is what is mala fides in the jurisprudence of power? Legal malice is gibberish unless juristic clarity keeps it separate from the popular concept of personal vice. Pithily put, bad faith which invalidates the exercise of power — sometimes called colourable exercise or fraud on power and oftentimes overlaps motives, passions and satisfactions — is the attainment of ends beyond the sanctioned purposes of power by simulation or pretension of gaining a legitimate goal. If the use of the power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal. The action is bad where the true object is to reach an end different from the one for which the power is entrusted, goaded by extraneous considerations, good or bad, but irrelevant to the entrustment. When the custodian of power is influenced in its exercise by considerations outside those for promotion of which the power is vested the court calls it a colourable exercise and is undeceived by illusion. In a broad, blurred sense, Benjamin Disraeli was not off the mark even in law when he stated: “I repeat . . . that all power is a trust — that we are accountable for its exercise — that, from the people, and for the people, all springs, and all must exist”. Fraud on power voids the order if it is not exercised bona fide for the end designed. Fraud in this context is not equal to moral turpitude and embraces all cases in which the action impugned is to effect some object which is beyond the purpose and intent of the power, whether this be malice-laden or even benign. If the purpose is corrupt the resultant act is bad. Fraud in this context is not equal to moral turpitude and embraces all cases in which the action impugned is to effect some object which is beyond the purpose and intent of the power, whether this be malice-laden or even benign. If the purpose is corrupt the resultant act is bad. If considerations, foreign to the scope of the power or extraneous to the statute, enter the verdict or impel the action, mala fides or fraud on power vitiates the acquisition or other official act." (ii) The Judgment of the Supreme Court in Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Broothers ( (1992) 1 SCC 534 ) is relied upon to contend that fraud and collusion vitiates even the most solemn proceedings in any civilized system of jurisprudence and the difference of fraud in public law and private law. It is held as under: "But fraud in public law is not the same as fraud in private law. Nor can the ingredients which establish fraud in commercial transaction be of assistance in determining fraud in Administrative Law. It has been aptly observed by Lord Bridge in Khawaja that it is dangerous to introduce maxims of common law as to effect of fraud while determining fraud in relation to statutory law. In Pankaj Bhargava it was observed that fraud in relation to statute must be a colourable transaction to evade the provisions of a statute. “If a statute has been passed for some one particular purpose, a court of law will not countenance any attempt which may be made to extend the operation of the Act to something else which is quite foreign to its object and beyond its scope.” Present day concept of fraud on statute has veered round abuse of power or mala fide exercise of power. It may arise due to overstepping the limits of power or defeating the provision of statute by adopting subterfuge or the power may be exercised for extraneous or irrelevant considerations. The colour of fraud in public law or administrative law, as it is developing, is assuming different shades. It arises from a deception committed by disclosure of incorrect facts knowingly and deliberately to invoke exercise of power and procure an order from an authority or tribunal. It must result in exercise of jurisdiction which otherwise would not have been exercised. The colour of fraud in public law or administrative law, as it is developing, is assuming different shades. It arises from a deception committed by disclosure of incorrect facts knowingly and deliberately to invoke exercise of power and procure an order from an authority or tribunal. It must result in exercise of jurisdiction which otherwise would not have been exercised. That is misrepresentation must be in relation to the conditions provided in a section on existence or nonexistence of which power can be exercised. But non-disclosure of a fact not required by a statute to be disclosed may not amount to fraud. Even in commercial transactions non-disclosure of every fact does not vitiate the agreement. “In a contract every person must look for himself and ensures that he acquires the information necessary to avoid bad bargain.” In public law the duty is not to deceive." (iii) Bajaj Hindustan Ltd. v. Sir Shadi Lal Enterprises Ltd. (2011) 1 SCC 640 ) is relied upon to demonstarte the scope of interference with administrative actions. Supreme Court held as under: "39. We should not be understood to have meant that the judiciary should never interfere with administrative decisions. However, such interference should be only within narrow limits e.g. when there is clear violation of the statute or a constitutional provision, or there is arbitrariness in the Wednesbury sense. It is the administrators and legislators who are entitled to frame policies and take such administrative decisions as they think necessary in the public interest. The Court should not ordinarily interfere with policy decisions, unless clearly illegal." (iv) In Radhy Shyam v. State of U.P. [ (2011) 5 SCC 553 )] Supreme Court held as under: "21. Therefore, while examining the landowner’s challenge to the acquisition of land in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court should not adopt a pedantic approach, as has been done in the present case, and decide the matter keeping in view the constitutional goals of social and economic justice and the fact that even though the right to property is no longer a fundamental right, the same continues to be an important constitutional right and in terms of Article 300-A, no person can be deprived of his property except by authority of law." (v) In Noida Entrepreneurs Assn. v. Noida (2011) 6 SCC 508 ) Supreme Court held under: "39. v. Noida (2011) 6 SCC 508 ) Supreme Court held under: "39. State actions are required to be non-arbitrary and justified on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. Action of the State or its instrumentality must be in conformity with some principle which meets the test of reason and relevance. Functioning of a “democratic form of Government demands equality and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination”. The rule of law prohibits arbitrary action and commands the authority concerned to act in accordance with law. Every action of the State or its instrumentalities should neither be suggestive of discrimination, nor even apparently give an impression of bias, favouritism and nepotism. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule, it is unpredictable and such a decision is antithesis to the decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. 40. The public trust doctrine is a part of the law of the land. The doctrine has grown from Article 21 of the Constitution. In essence, the action/order of the State or State instrumentality would stand vitiated if it lacks bona fides, as it would only be a case of colourable exercise of power. The rule of law is the foundation of a democratic society. [Vide Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of W.B., Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, Haji T.M. Hassan Rawther v. Kerala Financial Corpn., Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. and M.I. Builders (P) Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu.] 41. Power vested by the State in a public authority should be viewed as a trust coupled with duty to be exercised in larger public and social interest. Power is to be exercised strictly adhering to the statutory provisions and fact situation of a case. “Public authorities cannot play fast and loose with the powers vested in them.” A decision taken in an arbitrary manner contradicts the principle of legitimate expectation. An authority is under a legal obligation to exercise the power reasonably and in good faith to effectuate the purpose for which power stood conferred. In this context, “in good faith” means “for legitimate reasons”. It must be exercised bona fide for the purpose and for none other. [Vide Commr. of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji, Sirsi Municipality v. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis, State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, Collector (District Magistrate) v. Raja Ram Jaiswal, Delhi Admn. In this context, “in good faith” means “for legitimate reasons”. It must be exercised bona fide for the purpose and for none other. [Vide Commr. of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji, Sirsi Municipality v. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis, State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, Collector (District Magistrate) v. Raja Ram Jaiswal, Delhi Admn. v. Manohar Lal and N.D. Jayal v. Union of India.] (vi) In K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2011)9 SCC 1 ) Supreme Court held as under: "190. Article 300-A would be equally violated if the provisions of law authorising deprivation of property have not been complied with. While enacting Article 300-A Parliament has only borrowed Article 31(1) (the “Rule of Law” doctrine) and not Article 31(2) (which had embodied the doctrine of eminent domain). Article 300-A enables the State to put restrictions on the right to property by law. That law has to be reasonable. It must comply with other provisions of the Constitution. The limitation or restriction should not be arbitrary or excessive or what is beyond what is required in public interest. The limitation or restriction must not be disproportionate to the situation or excessive." "219. One of the fundamental principles of a democratic society inherent in all the provisions of the Constitution is that any interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possession should be lawful. Let the message, therefore, be loud and clear, that the rule of law exists in this country even when we interpret a statute, which has the blessings of Article 300-A." (vii) In Union of India v. Kushala Shetty (2011) 12 SCC 69 ) Supreme Court held as under; "28. Here, it will be apposite to mention that NHAI is a professionally managed statutory body having expertise in the field of development and maintenance of national highways. The projects involving construction of new highways and widening and development of the existing highways, which are vital for the development of infrastructure in the country, are entrusted to experts in the field of highways. It comprises of persons having vast knowledge and expertise in the field of highway development and maintenance. NHAI prepares and implements projects relating to development and maintenance of national highways after thorough study by experts in different fields. Detailed project reports are prepared keeping in view the relative factors including intensity of heavy vehicular traffic and larger public interest. It comprises of persons having vast knowledge and expertise in the field of highway development and maintenance. NHAI prepares and implements projects relating to development and maintenance of national highways after thorough study by experts in different fields. Detailed project reports are prepared keeping in view the relative factors including intensity of heavy vehicular traffic and larger public interest. The courts are not at all equipped to decide upon the viability and feasibility of the particular project and whether the particular alignment would subserve the larger public interest. In such matters, the scope of judicial review is very limited. The court can nullify the acquisition of land and, in the rarest of rare cases, the particular project, if it is found to be ex facie contrary to the mandate of law or tainted due to mala fides. In the case in hand, neither has any violation of mandate of the 1956 Act been established nor has the charge of malice in fact been proved. Therefore, the order under challenge cannot be sustained." (vii) In Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v. Devendra Kumar (2011)12 SCC 375) Supreme court held as under: "49. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to reiterate that the acquisition of land is a serious matter and before initiating the proceedings under the 1894 Act and other similar legislations, the Government concerned must seriously ponder over the consequences of depriving the tenure holder of his property. It must be remembered that the land is just like mother of the people living in the rural areas of the country. It is the only source of sustenance and livelihood for the landowner and his family. If the land is acquired, not only the present but the future generations of the landowner are deprived of their livelihood and the only social security. They are made landless and are forced to live in slums in the urban areas because there is no mechanism for ensuring alternative source of livelihood to them. Mindless acquisition of fertile and cultivable land may also lead to serious food crisis in the country." 32. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents relies upon the following judgments to support their contentions. Mindless acquisition of fertile and cultivable land may also lead to serious food crisis in the country." 32. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents relies upon the following judgments to support their contentions. (i) In Bharat Plywoods & T. Products v. Kerala State Electricity Board (1970 K.L.T. 872 (FB), the full bench of High Court while considering the scope and effect of section 10 and 16 of the Telegaph held as under: "20. The contentions based on mala fides too are without any substance. What is urged in the petition is that the notice Ext. P1 was addressed to Sri Haridas Govardhandas Sait, Bharat Plywoods, Baliapattam, it is said, in his personal capacity, on the assumption that the property over which the line is to be placed belonged to him; that the property really belonged to the petitioner company; and that this disregard to facts indicates that the notice issued is an empty formality, and it is urged that this shows mala fides. Haridas Govardhandas Sait is admittedly the Managing Director of the petitioner-company. In the counter affidavit it is stated that the notice was issued to him because he is the Managing Director of the company. From the mere fact that Govardhandas Sait has not been described as the Managing Director we are not able to spell out mala fides. 21. One other contention in support of the case of mala fides is that the line could be taken along the nearby road instead of over the property of the petitioner-company, and the decision to take it over the property of the petitioner-company is mala fide. In the counter affidavit it is asserted that it is not possible to take the line along the road mentioned and the line had to be taken over the property of the petitioner-company. The petitioner has not been able to make out any mala fides. 22. During the course of the arguments the ambit of the power of the telegraph authority under S.10 of the Telegraph Act, when that section is read with S.16 thereof, came up for considerable amount of discussion. The petitioner has not been able to make out any mala fides. 22. During the course of the arguments the ambit of the power of the telegraph authority under S.10 of the Telegraph Act, when that section is read with S.16 thereof, came up for considerable amount of discussion. On behalf of the respondents, it was urged that, notwithstanding the resistance or obstruction by the owner or occupier of the land over which a line was sought to be placed, the authority may proceed to lay the line disregarding such resistance or obstruction or, if necessary, after removing the same. On the other hand, on behalf of the petitioner, counsel urged that it is clear from the provisions in subsections (1) & (2) of S.16 of the Telegraph Act that the telegraph authority has no such power and that in cases of resistance or obstruction by the owner or occupier the authority must resort to the procedure indicated in sub-section (1) of S.16, that is, he should approach the District Magistrate and get an order from the District Magistrate that the authority shall be permitted to exercise the powers. We shall read once again sub-sections (1) and (2) of S.16." "23 It is clear from the wording of S.16, and particularly from the expression "the District Magistrate may, in his discretion", that an order will not be forthcoming automatically. A District Magistrate may in his discretion in a given case refuse or decline to pass an order that the telegraph authority shall be permitted to exercise the powers. The wording is significant. The District Magistrate does not grant permission to the authority. But he orders that the authority "shall be permitted". The discretion conferred by the section on the District Magistrate is certainly a judicial discretion, and, in cases where the District Magistrate refuses to pas an order that the telegraph authority shall be permitted to exercise the powers mentioned in S.10, it is inconceivable that the telegraph authority may, notwithstanding such refusal, continue to exercise such powers. The wording of the section is thus itself indicative of the fact that in cases of resistance or obstruction the District Magistrate will have to decide whether the authority should be permitted or not to exercise the powers under S.16 of the Telegraph Act. The wording of the section is thus itself indicative of the fact that in cases of resistance or obstruction the District Magistrate will have to decide whether the authority should be permitted or not to exercise the powers under S.16 of the Telegraph Act. This necessarily means that the telegraph authority cannot override or ignore the resistance or obstruction and continue to exercise the powers under S.10 notwithstanding such resistance or obstruction. It follows that, when an owner or occupier resists or obstructs the exercise of the power under S.10, the telegraph authority will have to approach the District Magistrate for an order under sub-section (1) of S.16 and can exercise the power under S.10 only in cases where the District Magistrate deems it fit to pass an order that he shall be permitted to do so. The power conferred by S.10 is thus a conditional power; conditional on an order being passed under S.16 (1) by the District Magistrate that the authority may be permitted, in case of resistance or obstruction, to exercise the power. This is so not only in regard to a telegraph authority but to the public officer or any other person authorized under the Electricity Act. We are fortified in this view by what is provided by sub-section (2) of S.16. If the telegraph authority has the power, notwithstanding the resistance or obstruction, to exercise the powers under S.10, the resistance or obstruction by the owner or occupier, we conceive, would be an offence under S.186 of the Indian Penal Code. That section makes voluntary obstruction to any public servant in the discharge of his public functions an offence, and such an offence is punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. Sub-section (2) of S.16 provides that, if, after the making of an order under sub-section (1), any person resists the exercise of the powers under S.10 or does not give all facilities for their being exercised, he shall be deemed to have committed an offence under S.188 of the Indian Penal Code. S.188 of the Indian Penal Code makes disobedience to an order duly promulgated by a public servant an offence. S.188 of the Indian Penal Code makes disobedience to an order duly promulgated by a public servant an offence. This offence, as long as it does not cause or tend to cause danger to human life, health or safety, or cause or tend to cause a riot or affray, is punishable with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, or with both. We notice that subsection (2) of S.16 has a positive as well as a negative aspect; the former being the duty on the part of the person having control over the property to give all facilities for the exercise of the power under S.10 and the latter not to resist the exercise of such power. Nevertheless, it is clear that only resistance after an order has been passed under subsection (1) of S.16 that is deemed to be an offence under S.188 of the Indian Penal Code. This necessarily implies that any resistance to the telegraph authority in the exercise of powers under S.10 before an order under S.16 (1) has been passed by the District Magistrate, is not an offence. The provision in subsection (2) of S.16 would become meaningless and absurd if even the initial resistance or obstruction is already an offence under S.186 of the Indian Penal Code and punishable with a sentence more stringent than that which can be imposed under S.188. We have, therefore, necessarily to understand the statute as enabling an owner or occupier or a person having control over the property over which a line is sought to be placed as having the right to resist or obstruct. When the telegraph authority is so resisted or obstructed, the District Magistrate can be approached. If he is approached, the District Magistrate would decide whether the authority should be permitted to exercise the power. When the District Magistrate decides that he should be so permitted resistance thereafter is made an offence. And there is an obligation cast upon the owner or occupier to render all facilities for the exercise of that power. The section (sub-sections) (1) and (2) of S.16) can only be understood in this manner. When the District Magistrate decides that he should be so permitted resistance thereafter is made an offence. And there is an obligation cast upon the owner or occupier to render all facilities for the exercise of that power. The section (sub-sections) (1) and (2) of S.16) can only be understood in this manner. In short, S.10 and 16 have to be read together, and when there is resistance or obstruction, the power under S.10 can be exercised only when the District Magistrate passes an order under S.16 (1) that he shall be permitted to exercise them." (ii) In Valsamma Thomas v. Addl. Dist. Magistrate ( 1997 (2) KLT 979 ) a Division Bench of this court held as under: "12. Thus, on a review of the authorities of this question, we come to the following conclusions: (1) The District Magistrate has to exercise his discretion judicially. (2) He has to pass the order under S. 16(1) of the Telegraph Act, after hearing the parties and after taking such evidence as is required with regard to the objections raised. (3) The order passed by the Court should be a speaking order. (4) The order should reflect the objections raised by the parties and reasons given by the Magistrate for accepting or rejecting the same. (5) The order should also reflect the materials relied on by the District Magistrate for arriving at the conclusion. If the discretion is exercised by the District Magistrate as above, then unless it is shown that the findings are perverse or that the proceedings are vitiated by malafides this Court will not be justified in interfering with such orders. This Court will not be justified in substituting its own opinion. It is also worth bearing in mind that this Court has not got technical expertise and will be slow to interfere with such matters." (iii) In Kesavan v. Addl. District Magistrate (1986 K.L.T. 395) this court held as under: "It is settled law that such an authority should act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides, inasmuch as that was duty which lay on anyone who decided anything. But the authority was not bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial. District Magistrate (1986 K.L.T. 395) this court held as under: "It is settled law that such an authority should act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides, inasmuch as that was duty which lay on anyone who decided anything. But the authority was not bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial. It could, obtain information in any way, which it thought best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who were parties to the controversy to correct or contradict any relevant statement prejudicial to their view. If the result of the personal inspection was disclosed, it might have been useful. But I do not think that the 1st respondent was bound to do so, any more than it would have been bound to disclose all minutes made on the papers in the office before a decision was reached. (See Local Government Board v. Arlidge (1915 AC 120 : 1915 All E R. Rep. page 1 at p. 7). So, the second objection that the petitioner was not given a notice regarding the personal inspection, nor was the petitioner informed about his impression is of no consequence. The first respondent has considered the entire matter in Ext. P5 proceedings. It is not open to any attack." 33. The statutory provision which deals with the right of KESB to draw electric lines through private property is covered by Section 164 of the Electricity Act, 2003 which reads as under: “164. Exercise of powers of Telegraph Authority in certain cases.—The Appropriate Government may, by order in writing, for the placing of electric lines or electrical plant for the transmission of electricity or for the purpose of telephonic or telegraphic communications necessary for the proper coordination of works, confer upon any public officer, licensee or any other person engaged in the business of supplying electricity under this Act, subject to such conditions and restrictions, if any, as the Appropriate Government may think fit to impose and to the provisions of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, any of the powers which the telegraph authority possesses under that Act with respect to the placing of telegraph lines and posts for the purposes of a telegraph established or maintained, by the Government or to be so established or maintained." 34. The relevant provisions with reference to the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 in the matter relating to drawing of electric line are Sections 10, and 16 which reads as under: “10. Power for telegraph authority to place and maintain telegraph lines and posts.—The telegraph authority may, from time to time, place and maintain a telegraph line under, over, along or across, and posts in or upon, any immovable property: Provided that— (a) the telegraph authority shall not exercise the powers conferred by this section except for the purposes of a telegraph established or maintained by the [Central Government], or to be so established or maintained; (b) the [Central Government] shall not acquire any right other than that of user only in the property under, over, along, across, in or upon which the telegraph authority places any telegraph line or post; and (c) except as hereinafter provided, the telegraph authority shall not exercise those powers in respect of any property vested in or under the control or management of any local authority, without the permission of that authority; and (d) in the exercise of the powers conferred by this section, the telegraph authority shall do as little damage as possible, and, when it has exercised those powers in respect of any property other than that referred to in clause (c); shall pay full compensation to all persons interested for any damage sustained by them by reason of the exercise of those powers. 16. Exercise of powers conferred by Section 10, and disputes as to compensation, in case of property other than that of a local authority.— (1) If the exercise of the powers mentioned in Section 10 in respect of property referred to in clause (d) of that section is resisted or obstructed, the District Magistrate may, in his discretion, order that the telegraph authority shall be permitted to exercise them. (2) If, after the making of an order under subsection (1), any person resists the exercise of those powers, or, having control over the property, does not give all facilities for their being exercised, he shall be deemed to have committed an offence under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). (2) If, after the making of an order under subsection (1), any person resists the exercise of those powers, or, having control over the property, does not give all facilities for their being exercised, he shall be deemed to have committed an offence under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). (3) If any dispute arises concerning the sufficiency of the compensation to be paid under Section 10, clause (d), it shall, on application for the purpose by either of the disputing parties to the District Judge within whose jurisdiction the property is situate, be determined by him. (4) If any dispute arises as to the persons entitled to receive compensation, or as to the proportions in which the persons interested are entitled to share in it, the telegraph authority may pay into the Court of the District Judge such amount as he deems sufficient or, whose all the disputing parties have in writing admitted the amount tendered to be sufficient or the amount has been determined under sub-section (3), that amount; and the District Judge, after giving notice to the parties and hearing such of them as desire to be heard, shall determine the persons entitled to receive compensation or, as the case may be, the proportions in which the persons interested are entitled to share in it. (5) Every determination of a dispute by a District Judge under sub-section (3) or sub-section (4) shall be final: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall affect the right of any person to recover by suit the whole or any part of any compensation paid by the telegraph authority, from the person who has received the same. By virtue of Section 10 of the Telegraph Act, read with S. 164 of the Electricity Act, KSEB being a licensee has the power of a telegraph authority under the Telegraph Act. As per Section 10, it is open for the KSEB to place and maintain electric line over, along or across and posts in or upon any immovable property subject to the provisos. Section 10(d) indicates that while exercising such powers, the telegraph authority shall do as little damage as possible and shall pay full compensation to all persons interested, for any damage sustained by them by reason of exercising such powers. The power of the District Magistrate is specified under S. 16(1) of the Act. Section 10(d) indicates that while exercising such powers, the telegraph authority shall do as little damage as possible and shall pay full compensation to all persons interested, for any damage sustained by them by reason of exercising such powers. The power of the District Magistrate is specified under S. 16(1) of the Act. When the power under S. 10(d) is exercised by the KESB and it is resisted or obstructed, the District Magistrate may, in his discretion order that the telegraph authority shall be permitted to exercise the said right. Apparently, the impugned order is an order passed by the District Magistrate under S. 16(1) of the Act. The resistance and obstruction have come in the form of objections submitted by the concerned land owners whose rights are being affected when attempts were made by KSEB to put up posts or draw a line over, along or across their properties. 35. Going by the provisions of the Telegraph Act, the right to resist or obstruction arises at a stage when the lines are about to be drawn or when an attempt is made by KSEB informing the persons in possession or holder of the land, or the owner thereof stating that the line will be drawn across their property. The resistance or obstruction can be either physical or in writing. Normally one expects an objection to be filed, to the authority concerned namely KSEB, who shall then place the said objection before the District Magistrate who in his discretion shall pass appropriate orders in the matter. Therefore, while considering the question of violation of natural justice, as contended by a few of the petitioners, if they have not resisted or obstructed or objected to the line being drawn across their property, necessarily, there is no reason for hearing such petitioners. Whereas if they have submitted any objection in writing, KSEB is under obligation to place the same before the District Magistrate who shall after hearing them pass appropriate orders. 36. Therefore in these batch of writ petitions if the petitioners have submitted objections which are not considered by the District Magistrate, necessarily the files in that regard has to be placed by the KSEB before the District Magistrate who shall pass appropriate orders. Such contentions have been raised by the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.s 5178/2011 and 6545/2011. Apparently, they have not objected to the drawal of line across their properties. Such contentions have been raised by the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.s 5178/2011 and 6545/2011. Apparently, they have not objected to the drawal of line across their properties. They have produced Ext.P6 dated 12.1.2011. They were served with Ext.P7 notices dated 8.2.2011 to ascertain the damages in respect of the drawing of lines. The impugned orders are passed on 15.9.2009. Petitioners does not have a case that they were not aware of an earlier order dated 28.2.2009 approving the line from Tower No.139 which came to be set aside. According to them their properties were marked for the purpose of cutting the trees. Nothing is stated as to when such marking were made. Apparently it was after the order dated 28.2.2009. But the petitioner still kept quite until they were served with notices dated 8.2.2011. Therefore it could only be assumed that these petitioners did not object to the drawing of line at any point of time in between the marking of trees and the submission of Ext.P6 on 12.1.2011. Having not objected to the drawing of lines across their property, such petitioners are not entitled to challenge the impugned order. At any rate, if any of their objections are pending consideration it shall be open for the District Magistrate to consider the same and pass appropriate orders. 37. In regard to the contention raised by the petitioner in W.P(C) No. 3240/2010, the learned senior counsel Sri. K. Jayakumar submits that after remittance of the matter to the District Magistrate for fresh consideration, no technical material was available and no feasibility study was conducted to substantiate the shifting of the route. 38. The law regarding the scope for interference in such matters is well settled. In Bharat Plywoods & T. Products (supra) full bench of this Court held that the discretion conferred by section 16(1) of the Telegraph Act on the District Magistrate is certainly a judicial discretion. When an owner or occupier resists or obstructs the exercise of the power under S.10, the telegraph authority will have to approach the District Magistrate for an order under subsection (1) of S.16. When an owner or occupier resists or obstructs the exercise of the power under S.10, the telegraph authority will have to approach the District Magistrate for an order under subsection (1) of S.16. In Valsamma Thomas (supra) a division bench of this court held that when the District Magistrate has been given discretion to permit or not to permit the Electricity Board or the Telegraph Authority to draw the lines through the property of an individual, this function is to be exercised after hearing the affected parties. The District Magistrate has to enquire into the objections raised by the affected parties and try to minimise the hardship caused to the person by drawing the line through a particular portion of a property. The District Magistrate also has to take into account the technical feasibility and also the expenditure involved which has to be ascertained from the Department as the Department would be able to give necessary data with regard to the expenditure involved. It is further held that "The ground on which the courts will review the exercise of a discretion is abuse of power, eg. bad faith, a mistake in construing the limits of the power, a procedural irregularity or unreasonableness in the Wednesbury sense -unreasonableness verging on an absurdity." On a reference to Benjamin Cardozo in "The Nature of Judicial Process" it is also held that there is nothing like unfettered discretion immune from judicial review ability. After reference to various authorities the division bench held that (1) The District Magistrate has to exercise his discretion judicially, after hearing the parties and after taking such evidence as is required with regard to the objections raised, it should be a speaking order, it should reflect the objections raised by the parties and reasons given by the Magistrate for accepting or rejecting the same and the order should also reflect the materials relied on by the District Magistrate for arriving at the conclusion. If the discretion is exercised by the District Magistrate as above, then unless it is shown that the findings are perverse or that the proceedings are vitiated by malafides this Court will not be justified in interfering with such orders. It is also held that this Court will not be justified in substituting its own opinion as this Court does not have the technical expertise and will be slow to interfere with such matters. It is also held that this Court will not be justified in substituting its own opinion as this Court does not have the technical expertise and will be slow to interfere with such matters. In Kesavan (supra) this court held that the authority under section 16(1) of the Telegraph Act, should act in good faith and should give a fair opportunity to those who were parties to the controversy to correct or contradict any relevant statement prejudicial to their view. In Gurdial Singh (supra) the Supreme Court held that bad faith invalidates the exercise of power and at times amounts to colourable exercise or fraud on power. The action is bad where the true object is to reach an end different from the one for which the power is entrusted. It is further held that fraud on power voids the order if it is not exercised bona fide for the end designed. In Shrisht Dhawan (supra) it is held that "The colour of fraud in public law or administrative law, as it is developing, is assuming different shades. It arises from a deception committed by disclosure of incorrect facts knowingly and deliberately to invoke exercise of power and procure an order from an authority or tribunal. It must result in exercise of jurisdiction which otherwise would not have been exercised. That is misrepresentation must be in relation to the conditions provided in a section on existence or non-existence of which power can be exercised. But nondisclosure of a fact not required by a statute to be disclosed may not amount to fraud." In Bajaj Hindustan Ltd. (supra) Supreme Court held the judiciary should interfere with administrative decisions only within narrow certain limits e.g. when there is clear violation of the statute or a constitutional provision, or there is arbitrariness in the Wednesbury sense. It is the administrators and legislators who are entitled to frame policies and take such administrative decisions as they think necessary in the public interest. The Court should not ordinarily interfere with policy decisions, unless it is clearly illegal. It is the administrators and legislators who are entitled to frame policies and take such administrative decisions as they think necessary in the public interest. The Court should not ordinarily interfere with policy decisions, unless it is clearly illegal. In Radhy Shyam (supra) the Supreme Court held that while examining the landowner’s challenge to the acquisition of land in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court should not adopt a pedantic approach, and should decide the matter keeping in view the constitutional goals of social and economic justice and the fact that even though the right to property is no longer a fundamental right, the same continues to be an important constitutional right and in terms of Article 300-A. In Noida Entrepreneurs Assn. (supra) Supreme Court held that State actions are required to be non-arbitrary and justified on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution and that action of the State or its instrumentality must be in conformity the principle which meets the test of reason and relevance. Every action of the State or its instrumentalities should neither be suggestive of discrimination, nor even apparently give an impression of bias, favouritism and nepotism. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule, it is unpredictable and such a decision is antithesis to the decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. It is further held that the public trust doctrine is a part of the law of the land and in essence, the action/order of the State or State instrumentality would stand vitiated if it lacks bona fides, as it would only be a case of colourable exercise of power. An authority is under a legal obligation to exercise the power reasonably and in good faith to effectuate the purpose for which power stood conferred. In K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. (supra) Supreme Court held that Article 300-A would be violated if the provisions of law authorising deprivation of property have not been complied with. An authority is under a legal obligation to exercise the power reasonably and in good faith to effectuate the purpose for which power stood conferred. In K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. (supra) Supreme Court held that Article 300-A would be violated if the provisions of law authorising deprivation of property have not been complied with. It also held that "Let the message, therefore, be loud and clear, that the rule of law exists in this country even when we interpret a statute, which has the blessings of Article 300-A." In Kushala Shetty (supra) Supreme Court held that when the courts are not equipped to decide upon the viability and feasibility of the particular project and whether the particular alignment would subserve the larger public interest, the scope of judicial review is very limited. The court can nullify the acquisition of land only, if it is found to be contrary to the mandate of law or tainted due to mala fides. In Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority (supra) the Supreme court considers the scope of enquiry in land acquisition cases. It is held that "If the land is acquired, not only the present but the future generations of the landowner are deprived of their livelihood and the only social security. They are made landless and are forced to live in slums in the urban areas because there is no mechanism for ensuring alternative source of livelihood to them. Mindless acquisition of fertile and cultivable land may also lead to serious food crisis in the country." 39. A perusal of the impugned order would show that the District Magistrate has considered each and every objection raised by the objectors and after conducting a site inspection the alignment is finalised. Needless to say that the District Magistrate's jurisdiction is to first consider the damage or loss the land owners/ holders may suffer on account of the line being drawn along or across their property. As far as the petitioners are concerned, their requirement is that the line should not be drawn through, along or across their property as KSEB themselves had after conducting a techno-economic feasible study approved route from Tower No. 136. 40. There is no dispute about the fact that KSEB had approved two routes namely route from Tower No.136 and Tower No.139. 40. There is no dispute about the fact that KSEB had approved two routes namely route from Tower No.136 and Tower No.139. In fact there was an earlier proposal during 2002 to draw the line from Ranny which was dropped as per Ext.R1(a) in W.P.(C) No. 1190/2010, which I shall deal with separately. 41. It could be seen that the property owners/holders whose lands will be affected on account of the line being drawn have challenged the original proposal from Tower No.136 which resulted in KSEB coming forward with another route from Tower No.139 and also from Tower No.145. These three routes were considered and after making a comparative assessment of the proposal it was found that in regard to the original proposal of KSEB it would have affected people belonging to poorer section of the community, residing along the alignment and the Board was directed to avoid a colony and the proposal from Tower No.139 avoids Kanappalam colony resulting in saving four houses and reducing the tankles from 9 to 7. It is also found that not even a single house has to be shifted as there is ample vertical/lateral clearance. 42. In regard to the economic feasibility, the District Magistrate had annexed a report submitted by the Asst. Engineer in respect of complaints raised by various persons whose property will be affected on account of the drawing of line from Tower No.139. Apparently the main reason for deciding route from Tower No.139 is based on a comparative assessment of the hardship caused to the persons who are affected, either by loss of land, building or otherwise. According to the District Magistrate, when the line is drawn from Tower No.139 the number of affected persons are only 77, and after avoiding Kanakappalam colony, the line passes over only 5 buildings, adjacent to 5 buildings and the number of ankles are less. Apparently it affects lesser number of persons. It might be true that a fresh techno-feasible study is not conducted by the KSEB after the matter is remitted to the District Magistrate as per the judgment dated 15.4.2009 of this Court in W.P.(C) 11434/2009 and connected cases. A perusal of the said judgment would only show that this Court had set aside the earlier order dated 28.2.2009 only on the ground of violation of natural justice. 43. A perusal of the said judgment would only show that this Court had set aside the earlier order dated 28.2.2009 only on the ground of violation of natural justice. 43. The contention of the petitioners is that the advocate commissioner's report would show that the findings of the District Magistrate were incorrect. The Advocate Commissioner's report is opposed by the respondents on various grounds. I do not think that it will be feasible to refer to the Advocate Commissioner’s report as against the District Magistrate's report in ascertaining the number of persons affected. The District Magistrate had verified and submitted the report with reference to the situation which prevailed as on the said date and not at the time when the Advocate Commissioner had visited the said place. According to the Advocate Commissioner only 67 persons are affected if the line is drawn from Tower No.139, whereas only 46 persons are effected if the line is drawn through Tower No.136. The party respondents in their objection has stated that the Advocate Commissioner had relied upon the list of affected persons submitted by the 3rd petitioner and the list was not prepared on the basis of revenue records. 44. True that a Division Bench of this Court while considering the case earlier sought for placing all records relating to the study conducted by the KSEB in that regard. It is evident that a decision was taken at the Government level after a discussion with the Additional Chief Secretary. Even though there is dispute regarding the participants in the said meeting it cannot be disputed that there was no meeting at all. In the meeting attended by various officials of KSEB, there was an expression of opinion that the option from Tower No. 139 is the most feasible one which causes least disturbance to the local people. In fact this meeting was convened after an order was passed by this Court on 7.12.2011. 45. Though it is contended by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners that after the matter was remitted to the District Magistrate for fresh consideration, there was no fresh study in the matter one has to consider the scope of S. 16(1) of the Telegraph Act as held in Valsamma Thomas (supra). The jurisdiction vested in the District Magistrate is to consider the resistance or objection and pass appropriate orders. The jurisdiction vested in the District Magistrate is to consider the resistance or objection and pass appropriate orders. Basically, the District Magistrate will have to consider the objections relating to the difficulties of the persons in occupation of land. The question is whether such consideration is actuated by bad faith or is it an arbitrary decision, or is it a decision which is actuated by fraud or legal malice. The materials placed on record does not establish any illegality committed by the District Magistrate, nor does it evidence any discrimination or arbitrariness. 46. In regard to the techno-economic features of a particular route is concerned, it cannot be stated that KSEB does not have the proper expertise in that field. The option with reference to Tower No. 139 has to be considered based on the objection raised by certain people in the locality with reference to the route through Tower No.136. When this Court had directed the District Magistrate to consider the alternate routes, definitely the District Magistrate's jurisdiction is confined to the least inconvenient route. When KSEB suggests a route, it has to be assumed that all the routes are technically feasible, but certain routes are more feasible on account of the lesser damage caused on account of various factors. As far the cost factor is concerned, the District Magistrate had not expressed any opinion. But the District Magistrate had considered the route on a comparative analysis and had formed an opinion that among the suggested route, the route from Tower No.139 is more convenient. 47. Such a finding of fact by the District Magistrate on the basis of the jurisdiction vested in it under S.16(1) of the Telegraph Act cannot be found to be incorrect by this Court on the basis of the additional materials now put forward by way of Commissioner's report. 48. Coming to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for petitioners in W.P.(C) No.1190/2010, Sri P.S. Krishna Pillai, the first question to be considered is whether Ext.R1(a) can be challenged at this point of time. According to the learned counsel, such a proposal, which was more viable and cost effective was dropped by the Department without any specific reason. The said route is still viable and cost effective and ought to have been considered by the District Magistrate. According to the learned counsel, such a proposal, which was more viable and cost effective was dropped by the Department without any specific reason. The said route is still viable and cost effective and ought to have been considered by the District Magistrate. In fact the first question is whether it is possible for a person objecting to the drawal of lines across his property to insist that another route should be considered, and whether the District Magistrate can give such a finding. Going by the Scheme of section 16 (1) of the Telegraph Act, I do not think that it will be possible for the District Magistrate to consider the techno-economic feasibility of a particular route. It is purely within the technical expertise of KSEB to identify the routes through which the lines could be drawn. The District Magistrate's jurisdiction is only to consider whether the resistance or objection of the land owners or holders is justifiable or not. Of course, in that process, if alternate routes are suggested, by the land owners/holders and if KSEB finds that such options are technically feasible and it is approved by them, necessarily the District Magistrate can evaluate whether the said proposal can be considered. In regard to the suggestions made by the petitioner in the impugned order itself the District Magistrate has expressed his opinion based on the opinion expressed by the KSEB. It is found that the alternate route suggested by the petitioners is not viable. Reasons are also mentioned. Once KSEB comes to such an opinion, the District Magistrate cannot have a different opinion in regard to the said route. In that view of the matter, I am of the view that the District Magistrate was justifed in rejecting the alternate proposal of the petitioners. The contention of the petitioners that Ext.R1(a) was issued in bad faith is not sustainable. The said order was issued as early as in 2002. As matters stand now, if KSEB had formed an opinion that such a proposal cannot be revived, as it is not feasible, I do not think that this Court can direct KSEB to approve the said proposal. 49. The judgments relied upon the petitioners have to be considered in the light of the limited jurisdiction exercised by a District Magistrate in terms of S. 16(1) of the Telegraph Act in the judgments cited above. 49. The judgments relied upon the petitioners have to be considered in the light of the limited jurisdiction exercised by a District Magistrate in terms of S. 16(1) of the Telegraph Act in the judgments cited above. Hence I am of the view that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or irregularity warranting interference. 50. In the light of the aforesaid findings, these writ petitions are disposed of as follows: (i) W.P.(C) Nos.3240/2010, 1190/2010 and 37589/2009 are dismissed. (ii) In W.P.(C) Nos.3594/2011, 5178/2011, 6452/2011, 6445/2011 and 20896/2011, KSEB is directed place the objections of the petitioners, if any, to the District Magistrate who shall pass appropriate orders after hearing those petitioners.