Hon'ble CHAUHAN, J.—The petitioners, Shankardas and Brijmohan are aggrieved by the order dated 20.8.2008 passed by the learned S.D.M., Chhabra, whereby he has appointed a receiver on a land belonging to a temple. They are also aggrieved by the order dated 16.1.2010, passed by the Additional Session Judge, Chhabra, District Baran, whereby the learned Judge has dismissed the revision petition filed by them and has upheld the order dated 20.8.2008. 2. The brief facts of the case are that in village Kaisholi, Tehsil Chhabra, District Baran, a temple of Lord Ram exists. According to the respondent nos. 1 and 2, Devkaran and Chander Mohan, they are hereditary priests of the said temple. However, subsequently, they had appointed Shankardas and Brijmohan as priests for carrying out the religious activities of the temple. For this purpose, they were paying them salary and giving them foodgrain for the maintenance of their families. But according to the respondents No.1 and 2, the petitioners had started indulging in certain activities, which were against the religious sentiments of the people at large. According to the respondents, the petitioners would drink within the temple complex, would collect anti-social elements within the complex, and would even carry out flesh trade in the complex. When the respondents tried to explain to the petitioner no.1, Shankardas and requested him not to drink within the complex, he became agitated and tried to assault them. Therefore, an application under Section 145 Cr.P.C. for evicting the petitioners from the temple complex was filed. By order dated 20.8.2008, the learned S.D.M. appointed the Tehsildar Chhabra, as a receiver. Since the petitioners were aggrieved by the said order, they filed a revision petition before the learned Judge. However, by order dated 16-1-2010, the learned Judge dismissed the revision petition. Hence, this petition before this Court. 3. Mr. Sudarshan Laddha, the learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following contentions before this Court:- Firstly, the entire allegations against the petitioners was that they were misusing the temple complex for irreligious activities. Thus, by their conduct they were lowering the esteem of the temple in the eyes of the people. The faith of the people in the temple deity was being corroded. When the respondents requested them to desist from consuming alcohol in the premise, the petitioner no.1 became agitated and tried to assault the respondents. Thus, by their conduct they were lowering the esteem of the temple in the eyes of the people. The faith of the people in the temple deity was being corroded. When the respondents requested them to desist from consuming alcohol in the premise, the petitioner no.1 became agitated and tried to assault the respondents. According to the learned counsel, the case does not fall within the four corners of Section 145 Cr.P.C. as the case is merely with regard to disturbance of public peace. Therefore, the entire application under Section 145 Cr.P.C. was highly misplaced. Secondly, the learned S.D.M. has invented a new story that both the parties are trying to cultivate the land belonging to the deity. There is no evidence on record to show that the parties were about to disturb the public peace, as they were fighting over the cultivation of the land. In fact, not an iota of allegation has been made vis-à-vis the land. In spite of the fact that there was no mention of the land, yet still the learned S.D.M., has appointed the Tehsildar as a receiver over the land belonging to the deity. Hence, the learned S.D.M., has misapplied himself to the facts of the case. Thirdly, no relief was sought by the respondents under Sections 107 and 116 Cr.P.C. Yet, the learned S.D.M. has granted the relief under Sections 107 and 116 Cr.P.C. Thus, the learned S.D.M. has travelled beyond the prayer clause of the application. Lastly, even the learned Judge has not noticed that the dispute between the parties was with regard to the alleged conduct of the petitioners within the temple complex. Instead, in a mechanical manner, the learned Judge has passed the order dated 16-1-2010. Hence, according to the learned counsel, both the orders need to be interfered with. 4. On the other hand, Dr. Mahesh Sharma, the learned counsel for the respondents, has vehemently contended that there is evidence to show that both the parties were, in fact, fighting over the land which belonged to the deity. Since, the temple belongs to the respondents, they had a right to cultivate the land belonging to the deity; the petitioners could not have interfered with the same. Moreover, considering their anti-religious activities, they deserve to be evicted from the temple. Therefore, the learned S.D.M. and the learned Judge were justified in appointing the Receiver over the land. Since, the temple belongs to the respondents, they had a right to cultivate the land belonging to the deity; the petitioners could not have interfered with the same. Moreover, considering their anti-religious activities, they deserve to be evicted from the temple. Therefore, the learned S.D.M. and the learned Judge were justified in appointing the Receiver over the land. Hence, the learned counsel has supported the impugned orders. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned orders. 6. Section 145 Cr.P.C. does not fall within Chapter VIII, which deals with “security for keeping peace, and for good behaviour”. Instead Section 145 Cr.P.C. falls within the Chapter X of Cr.P.C. dealing with “maintenance of public order and tranquility”. Specifically it falls under part D of the said Chapter, which deals with disputes as to immovable property. 7. Section 145 Cr.P.C. is as under:- S.145:Procedure where dispute concerning land or water is likely to cause breach of peace. (1) Whenever an Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within his local jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, on a specified date and time, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. (2) For the purposes of this section, the expression "land or water" includes buildings, markets, fisheries, crops or other produce of land, and the rents or profits of any such property. (2) For the purposes of this section, the expression "land or water" includes buildings, markets, fisheries, crops or other produce of land, and the rents or profits of any such property. (3) A copy of the order shall be served in the manner provided by this Code for the service of a summons upon such person or persons as the Magistrate may direct, and at least one copy shall be published by being affixed to some conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute, (4) The Magistrate shall then, without, reference to the merits or the claims of any of the parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute, peruse the statements so put in, hear the parties, receive all such evidence as may be produced by them, take such further evidence, if any, as he thinks necessary, and, if possible, decide whether any and which of the parties was, at the date of the order made by him under sub-section (1), in possession of the subject of dispute: Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that any party has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the date on which the report of a police officer or other information was received by the Magistrate, or after that date and before the date of his order under sub-section (1), he may treat the party so dispossessed as if that party had been in possession on the date of his order under sub-section (1). (5) Nothing in this section 'shall preclude any party so required to attend, or any other person interested, from showing that no such dispute as aforesaid exists or has existed ; and in such case the Magistrate shall cancel his said order, and all further proceedings thereon shall be stayed, but, subject to such cancellation, the order of the Magistrate under subsection (1) shall be final. (6) (a) If the Magistrate decides that one of the parties was, or should under the proviso to sub-section (4) be treated as being, in such possession of the said subject, he shall issue an order declaring such party to be entitled to possession thereof until evicted therefrom in due course of law, and forbidding all disturbance of such possession until such eviction; and when he proceeds under the proviso to sub-section (4), may restore to possession the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed. (b) The order made under this sub-section shall be served and published in the manner laid down in sub-section (3). (7) When any party to any such proceeding dies, the Magistrate may cause the legal representative of the deceased party to be made a party to the proceeding and shall thereupon continue the inquiry, and if any question arises as to who the legal representative of a deceased party for the purposes of such proceeding is, all persons claiming to be representatives of the deceased party shall be made parties thereto. (8) If the Magistrate is of opinion that any crop or other produce of the property, the subject of dispute in a proceeding under this section pending before him, is subject to speedy and natural decay, he may make an order for the proper custody or sale of. such property, and, upon the completion of the inquiry, shall make such order for the disposal of such property, or the sale-proceeds thereof, as he thinks fit. (9) The Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, at any stage of the proceedings under this section, on the application of either party, issue a summons to any witness directing him to attend or to produce any document or thing. (10) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to be in derogation of the powers of the Magistrate to proceed under section 107. 8. Section 145 Cr.P.C. deals with a situation when there is likelihood of a breach of peace caused by a dispute concerning any land, or water, or the boundaries thereof. In case, a question arises as to who was in lawful possession, and/or who has been illegally dispossessed from his land, and such issues lead to breach of peace, then such issues are to be dealt with by the Executive Magistrate, upon a report of a Police Officer, or upon other information received by him. 9. Section 145 and 146 Cr.P.C. lay down the procedure for the Executive Magistrate to follow when such issues are brought before him. Most importantly, Section 145 Cr.P.C. deals with disputes arising and concerning any land, or water, or the boundaries thereof. Section 145 Cr.P.C. does not deal with “security for keeping peace, and for good behaviour”. In fact, Sections 107 and 116 Cr.P.C. deal with security for keeping the peace, and for good behaviour. 10. Most importantly, Section 145 Cr.P.C. deals with disputes arising and concerning any land, or water, or the boundaries thereof. Section 145 Cr.P.C. does not deal with “security for keeping peace, and for good behaviour”. In fact, Sections 107 and 116 Cr.P.C. deal with security for keeping the peace, and for good behaviour. 10. A bare perusal of the application filed under Section 145 Cr.P.C. clearly reveals that the allegation levelled against the petitioners is as under:- ^^;g fd orZeku esa 'kadjnkl }kjk eafnj dk ekgkSy iw.kZr;k [kjkc dj fn;k x;k gS og vk;s fnu eafnj ij vuSfrd dk;ksZ dks vatke ns jgk gSA eafnj ifjlj esa vkdj 'kjkc vkfn ihrk gS rFkk & vlkekftd rRoksa dk te?kV ges'kk eafnj ifjlj esa cuk;s j[krk gS ,oa eafnj ifjlj esa os';kozfr Hkh dh tk jgh gS ,oa eafnj dh eaMh esa ifjokj lfgr fuokl djus yx x;k gS ftlesa eafnj ifjlj viekfur gks jgk gS rFkk yksx eafnj ij vkus ls drjkus yxs gS eafnj dh ifo=rk u"V gks jgh gSA eafnj dh ns[kjs[k ds vHkko esa th.kkZrh.kZ voLFkk esa igqap x;k gS rFkk fxjus dh dxkj ij gS ftl ij vizkFkhZ }kjk dksbZ /;ku ugha fn;k tkrk gSA yksxksa dh /kkfeZd Hkkouk ij foifjr izHkko iM+ jgk gSA** 11. Thus, the allegations of the respondents against the petitioners was with regard to their conduct within the temple premises. There was not an iota of allegation that the petitioners were trying to cultivate the land belonging to the deity. There was not even a mention of dispute between the parties with regard to possession over the land. Thus, the learned S.D.M., seems to have invented a new story with regard to dispute which existed between the parties in relation to the land. 12. Moreover, the respondents did not make any prayer for appointment of a receiver. Their prayer was for evicting the petitioners and for appointing any other person for carrying out the ceremonies within the temple premise. Yet, the learned S.D.M. has not only passed an order under Section 107 and 116 Cr.P.C., but has also appointed a receiver under Section 146 Cr.P.C. Thus, the learned S.D.M., has travelled far beyond the prayer clause. Obviously, he could not and should not have granted the relief never prayed for by the respondents. Hence the order dated 20-8-2008 is legally untenable. 13. Obviously, he could not and should not have granted the relief never prayed for by the respondents. Hence the order dated 20-8-2008 is legally untenable. 13. The glaring facts mentioned above have been ignored by the learned Judge. Instead of going through the record of the case, the learned Judge has mechanically passed his order dated 16-1-2010 while upholding the order dated 20-8-2008. Therefore, even the impugned order dated 16-1-2010, is legally unsustainable. 14. For the reasons stated above, this Court quashes and sets aside the orders dated 20-8-2008 and 16-1-2010. The petition is, hereby, allowed.