Per Bansi Lal Bhat, J. 1. Appellant seeks leave to file Letters patent Appeal directed against the order dated 31.05.2013 passed by learned Single Judge in OWP No. 1246/2011 titled Mushtaq Ahmad Shah v. State & Ors. In terms whereof, the writ petition was dismissed as being not maintainable. 2. Aggrieved thereof writ petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under clause 12 of the Letters Patent. 3. Adverting to the factual matrix of the case, it appears that the appellant instituted a suit for declaration and perpetual prohibitory injunction against respondents. He prayed for being declared owner in possession of two houses with land beneath and appurtenant thereto measuring 7 marlas falling under survey No. 1388 situated in village Pulwama besides seeking declaration to the effect that the decree passed by Munsiff, Pulwama in suit No. 846 dated 31.03.2000 was null and void and non-est in the eyes of law. It was during the pendency of the suit that the appellant filed a motion for amendment seeking to introduce a new case in regard to six sirsais of land falling under survey No. 2195/1384 claiming prescriptive title thereto on the plea of adverse possession. 4. Respondents contested the motion for amendment of plaint on the ground that the proposed amendment would change the nature of the suit besides the cause of action thereby causing prejudice to the respondents. 5. On consideration of the motion learned Sub Judge, Pulwama trying the suit rejected the application holding that the appellant was trying to incorporate a new cause of action and relief thereby causing prejudice to the respondents. The order formulated by learned Sub Judge, Pulwama on 26.11.2009 in this regard was impugned before this court in revision petition. The Civil Revision No. 185/09 titled Mushtaq Ahmad Shah v. State of J&K & Ors. came to be dismissed by this Court in terms of order dated 05.08.2011 by holding that the revision was no more maintainable in view of the amendment in Section 115 C.P.C. It was observed, that the order of dismissal shall not come in the way of appellant to work out appropriate remedy available under law. Thereafter the appellant filed OWP No. 1246/ 2011 which came to be dismissed in terms of impugned order dated 31.05.2013 holding the same as not maintainable. 6. Thereafter the appellant filed OWP No. 1246/ 2011 which came to be dismissed in terms of impugned order dated 31.05.2013 holding the same as not maintainable. 6. The case of appellant is that the impugned order has been passed without hearing him and the view of learned Single Judge that no writ petition can lie against a discretionary order passed by the trial court is erroneous. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the order dated 26.11.2009 passed by learned Sub Judge, Pulwama against which the appellant had filed the writ petition, was not a interlocutory order passed under provisions of Order 39 CPC but was an order passed in terms of provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. Therefore, it could not be termed as interim order. It is further submitted that the impugned order was amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this court and the impugned order could not be sustained. 7. Heard and considered. 8. The amending Act of 2009 has made drastic changes in Civil Procedure Code. Powers of revisional court have been restricted. The discretionary orders confirmed by the appellate court are no more revisable. The dictum of Hon'ble Apex Court in New Koniworth Hotel (P) Ltd. v. Orissa State Finance Corporation & Ors reported in (1997) 3 SCC 462 is loud and clear that the Letters Patent Appeal would not lie against an order of the learned Single Judge since Section 104 (2) CPC specifically prohibits appeal against an order passed by appellant Court under Section 104 (1) CPC. A Writ petition is akin to a revision petition in the context of judicial review of discretionary orders passed by trial court which have been confirmed in appeal. Extending writ jurisdiction to matters where revision is impermissible would defeat the object of amending Act of 2009. It is indisputable that this court has ample powers while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. However, such powers have to be exercised sparingly and in the rarest of rare case. 9. The order passed by learned trial court falls within the ambit of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and not within the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC as sought to be projected by learned counsel for the appellant. However, such powers have to be exercised sparingly and in the rarest of rare case. 9. The order passed by learned trial court falls within the ambit of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC and not within the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC as sought to be projected by learned counsel for the appellant. Order passed by learned trial court on 26.11.2009 is emphatic on the point. The learned trial Court held in unambiguous terms that the amendment proposed by the appellant had the effect of incorporating a new relief, in as much as, the appellant sought to introduce a case for declaration that he had acquired title by prescription to land measuring six sirsais under Khasra No. 2195/1384 min situated at Pulwama which initially did not, figure as part of subject matter of the suit. Thus a new case was introduced with a new case cause of action thereby changing the nature of suit. The proposed amendment was declined in terms of the order formulated by learned Sub Judge, Pulwama which had been unsuccessfully assailed in revision and also called in question before the writ court. 10. In the given circumstances it cannot be said that the discretion exercised by the learned trial court was arbitrary. The trial court exercised jurisdiction properly in rejecting the motion does not suffer from any legal infirmity. 11. The next question for determination is whether the writ court was justified in holding that the writ was not maintainable. The Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down the principles on the exercise of High Court jurisdiction under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India in case Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil reported in AIR 2010 SCW 6387 as under:- "On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulate: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Court's under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Court cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Court inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power buy the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Court subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basis principles of natural justice have been flouted. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Court subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basis principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view that the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India & Others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court and article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep such strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercise just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality." 12. Admittedly the dispute between the parties is a civil dispute. Appellant has not claimed any relief against the official respondents. The trial Court has not passed the order declining amendment without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. It has not also failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. The Hon'ble Apex Court has frowned upon the practice of frequent interference of High Courts within pending civil and criminal cases. It is apt to refer to the following observations in the judgment rendered in Shalini Shyam Shetty case (supra). "We may also observe that in some High Courts there is tendency of entertaining petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution by terming them as writ petitions. This is sought to be justified on an erroneous appreciation of the ratio in Surya Dev (supra) and in view of the recent amendment to Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999. It is urged that as a result of the amendment, scope of Section 115 of CPC has been curtailed. In our view, even if the scope of Section 115 CPC is curtailed that has not resulted in expanding High Court's power of superintendence. It is urged that as a result of the amendment, scope of Section 115 of CPC has been curtailed. In our view, even if the scope of Section 115 CPC is curtailed that has not resulted in expanding High Court's power of superintendence. It is too well known to be reiterated that in exercising its jurisdiction, High Court must follow the regime of law. As a result of frequent interference by Hon'ble High Court either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution with pending civil and at times criminal cases, the disposal of cases by the civil and criminal courts get further impended and thus causing serious problems in the administration of justice. This Court hopes and trusts that in exercising its power either under Article 226 or 227 Hon'ble High Court will follow the time honoured principles discussed above. Those principles have been formulated by this Court for ends of justice and the High Courts as the Highest Courts of justice within their jurisdiction will adhere to them strictly." 13. As no failure of justice has been occasioned, we are not inclined to interfere. The leave to file LPA is accordingly refused.