JUDGMENT Anand Byrareddy, J :- Heard the learned Counsel for the appellant. 2. The appellant was accused No.1 in Special Case No.22/2005 on the file of the Special Court and III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Mysore. The appellant along with two others were the accused. It was the case of the prosecution that the appellant was working as the Inspector of Police in Kuvempunagar Police Station. Accused No.2 was the Sub-Inspector in the same Police Station and accused No.3 was a Police Constable. It transpires that there was a: dispute between one G. Prasanna Kumar and one Dr. G.K.Prakash in respect of a financial transaction. In this regard, the said Dr. G.K.Prakash had filed a complaint. It transpires that accused No.1 contacted Dr. Prakash repeatedly and stated that he should pay Rs. 40,000/- to the appellant for the matter to be settled. Dr. Prakash, in turn, is said to have paid ~5,000/- through accused No.3. The accused thereafter is said to have demanded the remaining amount. It is in this background that the complainant had approached the Lokayukta Police and a trap was laid, which was partly successful, in that, appellant is said to have destroyed the currency notes that he had received as illegal gratification at the time of trap and had thus attempted to negate the proceedings. 3. However, after further investigation, a charge sheet was filed against all the accused before the Court. Thereafter, charges were framed for offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Hereinafter referred to as the 'PC Act', for brevity) and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Hereinafter referred to as the 'IPC', for brevity). The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. After the evidence was tendered for the prosecution and the accused having been examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, (Hereinafter referred to as the 'Cr. PC', for brevity) and on hearing the arguments, the following points were framed for consideration by the trial Court: "1. Accused No.1 being the public servant working as Inspector of Police in Kuvempunagar Police Station have committed an offence punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988? 2. PC', for brevity) and on hearing the arguments, the following points were framed for consideration by the trial Court: "1. Accused No.1 being the public servant working as Inspector of Police in Kuvempunagar Police Station have committed an offence punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988? 2. Further accused No.2 working as Sub-Inspector of Police, Kuvempunagar Police Station and accused No.3 being a public servant working as a police constable in Kuvempunagar Police Station have committed the offence punishable under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act? 3. Whether the prosecution has proved that accused No.1 is guilty of committing offence under Section 201 or IPC by causing the evidence regarding commission of offence under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act to disappear with Intention of screening himself from legal punishment?" Point Nos.1 and 2 were held in the negative. However, point No.3 was held in the affirmative. Insofar as point No.1 is concerned, the finding of the Court below was to the effect that there was no valid sanction to prosecute accused No.1. However, the Court below has gone on to hold that the appellant was guilty of committing an offence punishable under Section 201 of the IPC and has proceeded to sentence the appellant to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-. It is this which is under challenge. 5. The learned Counsel for the appellant would submit that there can be no two opinions as regards the Court being without jurisdiction to proceed with the trial if there was no valid sanction. Therefore, if the that was rendered null and void, it was impermissible for the Court below to have addressed the evidence recorded at such a trial in proceeding to address the charge with reference to the offence punishable under Section 201 of the IPC when the charges and the trial were composite and a valid sanction for prosecution of the appellant was the sine qua non in proceeding against the appellant. The learned Counsel for the appellant places reliance on the following decisions: 1. Baikunthanath Mohanty Vs. State of Orissa, 1985 Cri.LJ 563, 2. B.K. Kutty Vs. State, 1984 Cri.L.J. 1289, 3. Sahebkhan Umerkhan Vs. The State, 1963(2) Cri. The learned Counsel for the appellant places reliance on the following decisions: 1. Baikunthanath Mohanty Vs. State of Orissa, 1985 Cri.LJ 563, 2. B.K. Kutty Vs. State, 1984 Cri.L.J. 1289, 3. Sahebkhan Umerkhan Vs. The State, 1963(2) Cri. LJ 556 Though the learned Counsel for the respondent was required to meet this legal contention, there is no contra material produced. It is to be seen that in the course of final arguments, it has been brought to the attention of the Court below that there was no valid sanction and it has been upheld by the trial Court. In that, a Government Order dated 2.8.1979 was produced by the Counsel for the appellant-accused No.1, which disclosed that the post of Police Inspector was upgraded to a gazetted cadre and classified as a Class-II Gazetted post. It transpires that the Director General of Police had passed an order sanctioning the prosecution against the appellant and the said officer, who was examined as a witness - PW.9, had admitted in the course of his evidence that the post of Police Inspector was upgraded and on such up-gradation, his office would have no power to pass an order sanctioning the prosecution against the appellant. It is on this categorical finding that the Court below has agreed with the argument that there was no valid sanction. Therefore, the question is whether the Court could still proceed to address the case against the appellant insofar as an offence punishable under Section 201 of the IPC, apparently proceeding under the presumption that though there was no valid sanction as required under the provisions of the PC Act, the Court did not stand divested of jurisdiction to consider the case insofar as an offence punishable under the provisions of the IPC is concerned. This can be the only reason that can be attributed to the Court below having proceeded in the manner that it has. While it is also to be noticed that even for prosecution of an offence under the provisions of the IPC, insofar as a public servant is concerned, sanction was necessary under Section 197 of the CrPC. It is not the case of the prosecution that there was any such sanction order available. Therefore, it is inexplicable that the Court below has proceeded in the manner that it has. 6. It is not the case of the prosecution that there was any such sanction order available. Therefore, it is inexplicable that the Court below has proceeded in the manner that it has. 6. In the case of Baihunthanath Mohanty, supra, the prosecution of the accused was under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 read with Section 409 of the IPC. Just as in the case on hand, it was found that there was no valid sanction for the prosecution of the offence alleged under the PC Act. But however, the trial Court having proceeded to convict the accused for the offence punishable under Section 409 of the IPC, the Orissa High Court, following the decisions in Ramautar Mahton Vs. The State, 1961(1) Cri.LJ 694 and a division bench decision of the Gujarat High Court in Sahebkhan Umerkhan Vs. The State, 1963(2) Cri.LJ 556 and three other decisions in Republic of India Vs. Khagendranath Jha, 1982 Cri.LJ 961, Rajib Lochan Pradhan Vs. State, (1984)58 Cut LT.1, and B.K.Kutry Vs. State, 1984 Cri LJ 1289, all of which were of the uniform opinion that when there is no valid sanction to prosecute the offences punishable under the provisions of the PC Act, the Special Judge would have no jurisdiction to try the case and the entire trial would be vitiated and the Special Judge could not deal with any specific charge when the trial itself is vitiated, has allowed the appeal holding that since the trial for an offence under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, is null and void, the Special Judge lacked jurisdiction to try the offence under Section 409 of the IPC, in respect of the same cause of action. The principle laid down in these decisions is sound and is relied upon and applied in this case. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the Court below is set aside. The fine amount, if any, paid by the appellant shall be refunded.