JUDGMENT : N.V. Anjaria, J. The appellant herein is the original plaintiff who succeeded in his suit before the trial court. The learned Civil Judge, Gadhada, while allowing the suit of the plaintiff being Regular Civil Suit No.129 of 2001, passed the judgment and decree dated 21.08.2009, directing the defendant to reinstate pipeline of the plaintiff at his own cost, which was, as stated, broken down by the defendant. On appeal being preferred by the defendant, the First Appellate Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court. 2. The aforesaid judgment and order of the First Appellate Court dated 15.03.2013 passed in Regular Civil Appeal No.79 of 2009 is put under challenge in this Second Appeal. 3. Regular Civil Suit instituted by the appellant-plaintiff prayed for permanent injunction against the defendant. It was prayed that the defendant be permanently restrained from removing the pipeline laid by the plaintiff in land survey No.638/1. It was further prayed to restrain the defendant from taking water from the well. That was only and specific prayer in the suit. The case in the plaint pleaded by the plaintiff was that the Mamlatdar had sanctioned laying of pipeline on 31.03.1995 for taking water from the well. It was the case that the defendant was threatening to remove the pipeline and further threatening to cause damage to the pipeline. On such facts pleaded and on such cause of action stated, prayer for permanent injunction was made in the suit. 3.1. The defendant filed written statement at Exh.25 and denied the case of the plaintiff. It was contended that the plaintiff had illegally used his land and the pipeline was laid. It was further contended that defendant had no knowledge of any permission granted for laying the pipeline in the land of the defendant. The trial court framed the issues at Exh.66 and decreed the suit, as above. The trial court, while decreeing the suit, granted relief which was not found in the relief clause of the plaint. The suit was for permanent injunction against removal of pipeline and to restrain the defendant from using the well to fetch the water, whereas the suit was decreed by granting relief that defendant shall restore the pipeline at his own costs which was broken by him. The suit was for permanent injunction against removal of pipeline and to restrain the defendant from using the well to fetch the water, whereas the suit was decreed by granting relief that defendant shall restore the pipeline at his own costs which was broken by him. The trial court's view was that such relief was flowing from the facts and was grant-able in the facts of the case. 4. Heard Mr. Dhaval Vyas, learned advocate appearing for the appellant and Mr. D.M.Thakkar, learned advocate appearing for the respondent. 4.1. Learned advocate for the appellant, however, submitted that the relief granted by the trial court would be covered under prayer clause B. The prayer B was an omnibus prayer wherein it was prayed that any other relief, which may be incidentally available, may be granted. It was next submitted by learned advocate for the appellant that in any view of the matter, the relief regarding restoration of pipeline granted by the court finally was the relief prayed for in course of proceedings of the suit in an application below Exh.48. In this regard, it was submitted that since the defendant broke down the pipeline when the suit proceedings were in progress, the plaintiff had an occasion to file application Exh.48 seeking restoration of the pipeline. It was submitted that an order was passed below the said application and defendant was directed to restore it. Learned advocate for the appellant submitted that the said direction was not complied with by the defendant and, therefore, the trial court, while passing the decree in suit rightly granted that prayer, though it may not have been prayed for expressly. 4.2. In support of above contentions, learned advocate for the appellate has relied on the decision in Babu Nisar Ahmad Khan v. Babu Raja Mohan Manucha and Ors., Air 1940 Privy Council 204, another decision relied on was in Kedar Lal Seal and another v. Hari Lal Seal, AIR 1952 SC 47 . Yet another decision in Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram, AIR 1992 SC 700 was pressed into service. 4.3. Yet another decision in Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram, AIR 1992 SC 700 was pressed into service. 4.3. Posing here to deal with the above decision in Privy Council Judgment in Babu Nisar (Supra), it was held that where the mortgagee in his suit on the mortgage asks for a repayment of the amount due on the mortgage, and a sale in default of it and also such further and other relief as the court might think fit and the suit for sale is dismissed, the court has power to make order of repayment. The appellant had contended that as the suit was for sale and was dismissed, the court below had no power to pass a decree for repayment of the money due under the mortgage. While negativing the said contention, it was observed that inter alia that the said argument lost sight of the fact that the plaintiff in their prayer (a) asked for a repayment of amount due on the mortgage, and a sale in default of it. There was also a prayer (d) asking for such further and other relief as the court might think fit. Thus, the prayer for repayment was incidental and necessarily flowing from the relief prayed for and, therefore, it was considered in the prayer under the head "any further and other relief." In Kedar Lal Seal(supra), it was observed that the Court would be slow to throw out a claim on a mere technicality of pleadings and would give such general relief if it was to be the same extent asked for. And, Ramesh Kumar(supra) laid down proposition that relief based on subsequent event could be considered. 5. The court can grant the other relief than specifically prayed for, if it is to the same extent asked for. Order VII Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides that relief is to be stated specifically. The provision says that "every plaint shall state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims either simply or in the alternative, and it shall not be necessary to ask for general or other relief which may always be given as the Court may think just to the same extent as if it had been asked for.". 5.1. In the present case, the prayer made was one of permanent injunction seeking the defendant to restrain from removing the pipeline. 5.1. In the present case, the prayer made was one of permanent injunction seeking the defendant to restrain from removing the pipeline. The relief granted directing to reinstate the broken pipeline was altogether a different prayer and could not be said to be incidental to the main prayer. It, by no stretch of reasoning, could be termed of same extent as was prayed for. It did not arise as flowing necessarily from the main one which could be granted without having been specifically prayed for or under an omnibus general prayer that "any other relief deemed proper by the Court". Such a prayer has to be one inextricably interwoven with the main prayer. It is one flowing to the same extent in its width and breath as would be covered in the compass of the main prayer. 5.2. Looking at it from another angle, the alleged breaking of the pipeline took place during the pendency of the suit. A prayer in this regard was upon occurrence of different facts and based on such new facts and, hence, founded on different causes of action. In other words, the cause of action relating to the prayer seeking reinstatement of pipeline had another bundle of facts distinguished from the cause of action for the suit, or the cause of action on the premise of which the original prayer for permanent injunction was based. Order VII Rule 8 of the Code provides that relief has to be founded on separate grounds. Where the plaintiff seeks relief in respect of several distinct claims or causes of action founded upon separate and district grounds, they shall be stated on far as may be separately and distinctly. Now, the relief regarding reinstatement or reinstatement of pipeline alleged to have been broken during the pendency of the suit was a distinct relief in itself arising out of subsequent events and upon arising of new facts. The cause of action was different. The bundle of facts in the context of which the prayer required to be made was a subsequent product not forming part or not in existence at the time of institution of the suit. Therefore, it ought to have been prayed specifically and distinctly. 6. The cause of action was different. The bundle of facts in the context of which the prayer required to be made was a subsequent product not forming part or not in existence at the time of institution of the suit. Therefore, it ought to have been prayed specifically and distinctly. 6. Though the plaintiff claimed for relief regarding reinstatement of broken pipeline in the context of alleged developments took place during the pendency of the suit, the factual details in that regard were not made part of the pleadings. The plaintiff could have filed an application under Order VI Rule 17 for amendment in the original plaint. He did not move any such application and, therefore, the relief, which was insisted upon subsequently was without being backed by the necessary pleadings. 6.1. In Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal, AIR 2002 SC 665 , the Supreme Court observed that the ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystallized on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore, the decree in the suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stood at the commencement of the lis. It was stated that the Court has, however, power to take a note of subsequent events and in appropriate case, the Court may mould the relief as well. The Apex Court stated that for taking note of subsequent events and granting relief on the basis of subsequent events, following conditions may apply:- Firstly that the relief as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted. Secondly, such subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten the litigation. It was then observed that the subsequent event has to be brought to the notice of the Court in accordance with rule and procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise. In moulding or granting relief based on subsequent events, the rule of fairness to both the sides has to be scrupulously observed. The cognizance of subsequent events or developments should be cautious in that way. In other words, it is reiterated that where the necessary pleadings require to be incorporated, such procedure ought to have been followed. Order VI Rule 17 of the Act provides for amendment of the pleadings which would have to be resorted to. 6.1.1. The cognizance of subsequent events or developments should be cautious in that way. In other words, it is reiterated that where the necessary pleadings require to be incorporated, such procedure ought to have been followed. Order VI Rule 17 of the Act provides for amendment of the pleadings which would have to be resorted to. 6.1.1. The Court proceeded to observe further "such subsequent event may be one purely of law or founded on facts. In the former case, the Court may take judicial notice of the event and before acting thereon put the parties on notice of how the change in law is going to affect the rights and obligations of the parties and modify or mould the course of litigation or the relief so as to bring it in conformity with the law. In the latter case, the party relying on the subsequent event, which consists of facts not beyond pale of controversy either as to their existence or in their impact, is expected to have resort to amendment of pleadings under Order VI Rule 17 of the C.P.C. Such subsequent event, the court may permit being introduced into the pleadings by way of amendment as it would be necessary to do so for the purpose of determining real questions in controversy between the parties. In Messrs. Trojan & Co. v. R.M.N.N. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235 , the court has held that the decision of a case cannot be based on ground outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found; without the amendment of the pleadings, the court would not be entitled to modify or alter the relief. In Sri Mahant Govind Rao v. Sita Ram Kesho and others, (1898) 25 Indian Appeals 195 (PC), their Lordships observed that, as a rule, relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted." 6.2. In view of above principle, even if the plaintiff wanted to advert to subsequent events of breakage in the pipeline as claimed by him, it was incumbent in law for the plaintiff to incorporate and amend the pleadings in that regard, if he wanted to pray a relief with reference to subsequent happening. The prayer, which was granted by the trial court while decreeing the suit, was not supported by the pleadings. The prayer, which was granted by the trial court while decreeing the suit, was not supported by the pleadings. Therefore, though based on the alleged subsequent events, it could not have been granted, in granting relief, the trial court travelled beyond the pleadings. 7. There was another decisive aspect. The land of the plaintiff was survey No.75, whereas the land of the defendant was survey No.76. It was the case of the plaintiff that Exh.81 and 82 were the permission granted for laying down the pipeline. The position of the lands of the parties and the claim of the plaintiff regarding laying of pipeline were appreciated by the First Appellate Court from the map (Exh.109) and documents of permission (Exh.81 and 82), referred to above. The First Appellate Court recorded a clear finding that it could not be shown that any permission was given to lay down pipeline from survey No.76, i.e. the defendant's stand. Upon appreciation of the map Exh.109, the Court found that the land of the plaintiff was situated after the place of the well and the land of the defendant fell thereafter, implying thereby that the land of the defendant was not situated between the land of the well and the plaintiff's land. Therefore, it was not possible to accept the say that pipeline was passing from the land of the defendant. 7.1. The court below appreciated the position of the land of the parties on the basis of map which was exhibited (Exh.109). A clear finding of fact was recorded by the First Appellate Court which concluded that the geography of the different survey numbers was suggestive to the contrary and against the premises on which the case of the plaintiff was based. The First Appellate Court set aside the decree accordingly. In that view, no irregularity or illegality was committed by the First Appellate Court in setting aside the decree. The findings of fact were recorded by the First Appellate Court, as noted above. Those findings were properly arrived at and reasonably emanated from the evidences on record. No perversity therein was demonstrated. 8. In view of above, no interference is warranted in the impugned judgment and order of the First Appellate Court. There is no substance in the Second Appeal. It does not raise any question of law much less any substantial question of law. 9. The Appeal, therefore, stands dismissed. No perversity therein was demonstrated. 8. In view of above, no interference is warranted in the impugned judgment and order of the First Appellate Court. There is no substance in the Second Appeal. It does not raise any question of law much less any substantial question of law. 9. The Appeal, therefore, stands dismissed. Notice is discharged. Appeal dismissed.