Research › Search › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 61 (MP)

Ramshankar v. Guru Singh Sabha

2013-01-08

R.S.JHA

body2013
Judgment R.S. Jha, J. 1. Heard Shri Ashish Shroti, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri Imtiaz Husain, learned counsel for the respondent on the question of admission. The appellant has filed this appeal being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 12-2-1999 passed in Civil Appeal No. 10-A/1995 whereby the judgment and decree dated 6-10-1995 passed in Civil Suit No. 99-A/95 by the Civil Judge, Class-II, Harda has been affirmed. 2. The appellant/defendant who is the tenant of the respondent has filed this appeal on the assertion that the following substantial questions of law arises for adjudication in this appeal:-- "(1) Whether the suit filed by the Secretary on behalf of the plaintiff Shri Guru Singh Sabha, a religious and registered public trust, without joining the other trustees as plaintiffs, was maintainable? (2) Whether the plaintiff-trust was exempted from the provisions of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act automatically it being a religious and a registered public trust, in the absence of any notification issued by the State Government under section 3(2) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act? (3) Whether the suit of the plaintiff-Trust is governed by the provisions of section 106(h) of the Transfer of Property Act or the provisions of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act?" 3. It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the suit was filed on behalf of the trust by the Secretary without joining all other trustees as plaintiffs and therefore, the suit deserves to be dismissed as not maintainable. It is submitted that in view of the decision rendered by this Court in the case of Laxman Prasad v. Shrideo Janki Raman, 1973 MPLJ 842 the suit should have been filed by impleading all the trustees or should have been filed by the Secretary by the sanction and approval of co-trustee and in the absence of the same, should have been dismissed as not maintainable, by both the Courts below. It is submitted that both the Courts below have failed to appreciate this aspect and the judgment and decree of both the Courts below deserve to be set aside. 4. I have perused the decision of this Court rendered in the case of Laxman (supra). 5. From a perusal of Ex. It is submitted that both the Courts below have failed to appreciate this aspect and the judgment and decree of both the Courts below deserve to be set aside. 4. I have perused the decision of this Court rendered in the case of Laxman (supra). 5. From a perusal of Ex. P/8, it is apparent that the Secretary was authorized by the Trust to file the present suit on its behalf by resolution of the general body in which all the trustees, except one trustee Jagjeet Singh Saluja, were present, as admitted by PW/1 in his statement and therefore, it is not disputed that the suit has been filed by the Secretary with the consent and approval of the co-trustee. From a perusal of the paragraph 8 of the decision rendered in the case of Laxman (supra) wherein the conclusions have been summarized, it is clear that the suit by the trust can be brought by all the trustees, or by one of the trustees with the sanction and approval of his co-trustees. 6. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant to the effect that the words sanction and approval by co-trustee used in the judgment of this Court in the case of Laxman (supra) mean each and every one of the trustees cannot be accepted mainly on the ground the aforesaid judgment itself does not say so and that the issue in the aforesaid decision related to the filing of a suit by one of the trustees on his own without there being any sanction or approval of the co-trustee as has been done in the present case by a resolution of the general body of the public trust. 7. Quite apart from the above, it is also clear that the suit filed by the Secretary on the strength of the resolution of the general body on behalf of the trust is neither against the interest of the trust nor is it in respect of any dispute between the trustees and has been filed by and on behalf of the trust for eviction of the appellant/defendant. The appellant has also not placed anything on record to indicate any dissent on the part of the trustee who has not signed the resolution. The appellant has also not placed anything on record to indicate any dissent on the part of the trustee who has not signed the resolution. In such circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case mere absence of signature of one of the trustees out of ten trustees would not render the suit for eviction of the appellant unmaintainable and the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in this regard is distinguishable on the ground that it related to the issue regarding filing of a suit by one of the trustees on his own without sanction or approval of 6 trustees and as the said decision does not categorically state that the authorization has to be made by each and every one of the trustees. 8. The aforesaid conclusion is also in conformity with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramgopal and another v. Balaji Mandir Trust and others (2003) 5 SCC 17 wherein similar view taken by this Court in C.F.A. No. 51/2001 decided on 8-1-2002 has been affirmed in paragraph 7. 9. It is next submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent/plaintiff was required to plead and prove the grounds enumerated under section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act for the purpose of seeking eviction of the appellant as it was not automatically exempted from the purview of the aforesaid Act on being a religious and registered public trust. It is submitted that apart from pleading and establishing that it was a registered public trust and the respondent was also required to plead and prove that the income derived by the respondent/Trust, was utilized fully for the purpose of implementing the object of the Trust and on failure on the part of the respondent to do so, the suit should have been dismissed. 10. From a perusal of the impugned judgment and decree available on record it is clear that the respondent has established the fact that it is a registered public trust. That apart, it is also clear that the appellant did not at any point of time raise the issue regarding that fact that the income from the property in question was not being utilized by the respondent/Trust for the purpose of its aim and object. 11. That apart, it is also clear that the appellant did not at any point of time raise the issue regarding that fact that the income from the property in question was not being utilized by the respondent/Trust for the purpose of its aim and object. 11. The Supreme Court in the case of Ramgopal (supra) has clearly held, that it is for the tenant/appellant to take up this issue in the written statement and join issues regarding the exemption notification as well as the fact that the rental income from the premises was not utilized for the purpose of the trust and on failure on its part to do so, it cannot seek dismissal of the suit, in the following terms:-- "7. As already noticed above, the appellants did not challenge the finding of facts before the High Court except the legal question. In para 2 of the plaint plaintiff averred that it is a religious institution and is registered under the M.P. Public Trust Act. The defendants, while admitting this averment in the written statement only stated that the suit has not been filed by all the trustees, therefore, the suit was not maintainable. The trial Court recorded a finding that the suit was maintainable. In the written statement the defendants did not raise any plea that the plaintiffs are not entitled for the benefit of the Exemption Notification, extracted above; it was also not pleaded that the rental income from the premises was not utilized for the purpose of the plaintiff trust; so also they did not challenge the validity of the said notification either before the trial Court or before the High Court. In this view the High Court rejected the submission made on behalf of the appellants that in the absence of any pleading and the proof tendered by the plaintiff no benefit of the Exemption Notification in filing the suit and getting the eviction decree could be granted to the plaintiff. In para 11 of the impugned judgment the High Court has held thus:-- "11. In our opinion, therefore, the trial Court was perfectly justified in proceeding on the basis that the plaintiff is a religious trust and is entitled to file a suit on the strength of the exemption notification and also claim a decree for eviction of the defendant without taking recourse to section 12 of the Act. In our opinion, therefore, the trial Court was perfectly justified in proceeding on the basis that the plaintiff is a religious trust and is entitled to file a suit on the strength of the exemption notification and also claim a decree for eviction of the defendant without taking recourse to section 12 of the Act. The decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent reported in 1998(1) MPWN 113 is distinguishable on facts. In that case parties joined issue on these facts and hence it had become necessary for the plaintiff to prove the facts. As held supra, such is not the case here." 10. The learned senior counsel for the appellants tried to draw a distinction on the ground that the provision for issuing Exemption Notification in the case of Tamil Nadu is different inasmuch as the whole of the income derived from which is utilized for that institution is not to be found unlike the provision contained in section 3(2) of the Act. This Court in Betibai case, as already noticed above, has rejected the contention. That apart, when the appellants have not challenged the validity of the notification and when they have failed to plead that whole of the rental income derived from the accommodations in question is not utilized for the purpose of the trust, we do not find any merit in this submission of the learned counsel also." 12. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court and in the absence of any objection or pleadings on the part of the appellant regarding non utilization of the income from the premises for the purpose of the trust, I find no legal infirmity in the impugned judgment and decree of the Courts below. I am of the considered opinion that the substantial questions of law as raised by the appellant in this regard, do not arise for adjudication of the present appeal. The appeal being meritless is accordingly dismissed.