JUDGMENT M.L. Joseph Francis, J. 1. This Second Appeal is filed by the defendants 2 to 4 in O.S.No.334 of 1989 on the file of the Munsiff Court, Kayamkulam. Respondents 1 and 2 herein were the plaintiffs in that suit and the third respondent herein was the 5th defendant in that suit, which was filed by the plaintiffs for declaration, recovery of possession and for injunction. 2. The plaint allegations in brief are as follows : Plaint schedule property belonged to George Cornation Club, Vallikunnam which was in the possession and enjoyment of that club. Late Neelakandan Krishnan was the husband of the first defendant and father of defendants 2 to 4. Neelakandan Krishnan was a dependent of Konnakottu Neelakanta Pillai, who was the president of of the club. Since Neelakantan Krishnan was the dependent of Neelakanta Pilla even from his childhood, the latter had permitted the former to reside temporarily in the building which belonged to Cornation Club situated in Sy.No.205/1C from 1962. After the death of Neelakantan Krishnan, defendants 1 to 4 continued to reside there. Neelakanta Pillai permitted Neelakantan Krishnan to cultivate cash crops in the plaint property. On the basis of the above permission, Neelakantan Krishnan was cultivating cash crops in the property. After the death of Neelakantan Krishnan, defendants 1 to 4 continued to cultivate in the property. While so, on 28.12.1970, the club has gifted the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff and 85 cents to the 5th defendant Karayogam. Plaintiffs have mutated the property paying tax. In the meantime, Neelakantan Krishnan filed O.S.No.3/71 before Munsiff Court, Kayamkulam against the plaintiff herein and others claiming exclusive right over the property. Since there was an order of injunction against the plaintiff herein, the plaintiff has not taken possession of the property. The plaintiff in this suit was the second defendant in that suit. The 2nd defendant contested the suit. In that case, the court found that Neelankantan Krishnan has no ownership right over the property, but he is residing in the building with the permission of the president of George Cornation Club. The matter was taken in appeal in S.A.No.968/76 before this Court. In that case, this Court found that Neelakantan Krishnan is not entitled to full ownership right over the plaint schedule property and that he was only a licensee. On 8.7.1986, Neelakantan Krishnan died and so the licence was terminated. The matter was taken in appeal in S.A.No.968/76 before this Court. In that case, this Court found that Neelakantan Krishnan is not entitled to full ownership right over the plaint schedule property and that he was only a licensee. On 8.7.1986, Neelakantan Krishnan died and so the licence was terminated. Defendants 1 to 4 are only trespassers now. Hence, it is prayed that a decree may be passed declaring the plaintiff's title over the plaint schedule property, to evict defendants 1 to 4 from the plaint schedule property, restraining defendants 1 to 4 from cultivating cash crops or other permanent cultivation in the plaint schedule property, to restrain them by a permanent injunction from committing waste in the plaint schedule property and also for recovery of mesne profits at the rate of Rs.150/- per annum with future interest. 3. The 5th defendant was set ex parte. Defendants 1 to 4 filed written statement contending as follows : The suit is not maintainable either in law or on facts. The suit is devoid of bonafides. It is denied that the plaint schedule property was in the possession and enjoyment of George Cornation Club. George Cornation Club mentioned in the plaint was functioning before 60 years. But before the year 1100 the functioning of the club was stopped. After 1100 the club was not functioning. Thereafter, nobody had any possession over the property and it was lying with bushes and shrubs. Neelakantan Krishnan, who was the husband of the first defendant and father of defendants 2 to 4 took possession of the same believing it to be a Government puramboke land, cleared the bushes and shrubs, put up structures there and started to reside there with family. He had planted trees and cash crops, constructed temple and well. He had lived there as owner of the same. Nobody claimed any right over the property. The statement in the plaint that Neelakanta Pillai was the president of the club is false. The statement that Neelakantan Krishnan was the dependent of Neelakanta Pillai is also denied. Neelakanta Pillai had no possession over the plaint schedule property. The statement in paragraph 4 of the plaint that Neelakanta Pillai had permitted Neelakantan Krishnan to reside in the building belonging to George Cornation club is false. There was no structures in the property which belonged to the club. Neelakanta Pillai had no possession over the plaint schedule property. The statement in paragraph 4 of the plaint that Neelakanta Pillai had permitted Neelakantan Krishnan to reside in the building belonging to George Cornation club is false. There was no structures in the property which belonged to the club. There was no building in Sy.No.205/1C described in the plaint. The allegation in para 6 is not true. Neelakanta Pillai and others have no right or power to execute the gift deed described in the plaint. The defendants came to know about the gift deeds executed in favour of the plaintiff and 5th defendant only now. Those gift deeds have not been acted upon. The executants of those gift deeds had no right or possession over the property. So the gift deeds are not binding on the defendants. The plaintiffs have no right to get any relief based on that gift deed. In O.S.No.3/71 the possession of Neelakantan Krishnan over the property was declared by the court. After that suit, the plaintiffs have not taken any steps. So their right is lost. It can be seen from the plaint itself that Neelakantan Krishnan is the licensee of Neelakanta Pillai. As Neelakantan Krishnan became the licensee, he constructed structures therein. So it can be seen that his licence became irrevocable. As Neelakantan Krishnan's right and possession are not mentioned in the gift deed relied on by the plaintiff, for that reason itself it can be seen that the gift deed is a fabricated one. It is admitted by the plaintiffs that they have no possession over the property and that Neelakantan Krishnan is in possession. The plaintiffs have no right over the plaint schedule property. The property in Sy.No.205/1C is not included in the document of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have no right over the property which is in the possession of the defendants. In S.A.968/76, the plaintiffs herein were the defendants. In that suit, the possession of the defendants herein was not fully decided. Plaintiff's right is lost by adverse possession of the defendants. Hence, it is prayed that the suit may be dismissed with costs. 4. Before the Munsiff Court, PW1 and PW2 were examined and Exts.A1 to A3 were marked. No evidence was adduced from the side of the defendants. Plaintiff's right is lost by adverse possession of the defendants. Hence, it is prayed that the suit may be dismissed with costs. 4. Before the Munsiff Court, PW1 and PW2 were examined and Exts.A1 to A3 were marked. No evidence was adduced from the side of the defendants. The learned Munsiff, on considering the evidence on record, found that the plaintiffs have title over the plaint schedule property and the suit was decreed as follows : 1. The title of the plaintiffs over the plaint schedule property is hereby declared and defendants 1 to 4 are directed to put the plaintiffs in possession of the plaint schedule property. 2. Defendants 1 to 4 are restrained from cultivating or effecting any improvements or committing any waste in the plaint schedule property. 3. Plaintiffs are allowed to recover Rs.180/- p.a. towards past mesne profits and also allowed to recover mesne profits at the rate of Rs.30/- p.a. from the date of suit till the date of getting actual possession of the property. 4. The parties do suffer their respective cost. Against that judgment and decree, the defendants 1 to 4 filed A.S.No.79 of 1993 before the Additional District Court No.II, Mavelikkara. In that appeal, the judgment of this Court in S.A.No.968/76 dated 10.10.1980 was marked as Ext.B1. The Additional District Court dismissed A.S.No.79 of 1993 by confirming the judgment and decree of the Munsiff Court. Against that judgment and decree, the appellants 2 to 4/ defendants 2 to 4 filed this Second Appeal. 5. The questions of law that arise for consideration in this Second Appeal are the following : (1) In the light of the findings in Ext.B1 judgment dated 10.10.1980, is not the right to recover lost on the expiry of 12 years from 28.12.1970, the date on which the right to possession accrued? (2) Is not the present suit barred by the Law of Limitation? 6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel for the respondents. 7. At the time of hearing, the learned counsel for the appellants raised the following arguments : The lower appellate court failed to see that no suit for recovery of possession was filed by the plaintiffs within 12 years of Ext.A1 document so as to arrest the running of time which perfected title by adverse possession. 7. At the time of hearing, the learned counsel for the appellants raised the following arguments : The lower appellate court failed to see that no suit for recovery of possession was filed by the plaintiffs within 12 years of Ext.A1 document so as to arrest the running of time which perfected title by adverse possession. At least when O.S.No.3 of 1971 was filed, it must be taken that the plaintiffs have knowledge that the appellants' predecessor was holding the property adversely to their interests. The period started to run at least when O.S.No.3 of 1971 was filed. Nothing contained in Ext.B1 judgment will entitle the plaintiffs to extend the period of limitation under Article 65 of the Limitation Act. A defence set up in a suit for declaration of title and injunction will not arrest the running of time as against the defendants desiring later to sue for recovery of possession. The lower appellate court ought to have held that the title of the plaintiffs, if any, is lost by adverse possession. The learned counsel for the respondents supported the judgments of the courts below. 8. The plaint schedule property is having an extent of 5 cents comprised in Survey No.205/1C. The plaintiffs are claiming title over the plaint schedule property on the basis of Ext.A1 gift deed dated 28.12.1970 executed by Neelakanta Pillai and two others, who were the then office bearers of George Cornation Club(G.C.club). This Second Appeal was heard along with S.A.583/1995 in which the copies of judgments in O.S.3/1971 on the file of Munsiff Court, Kayamkulam and the common judgment in A.S.39/1974 and A.S.65/1974 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Mavelikkara are produced. 9. There is no dispute that the husband of the first defendant and father of defendants 2 to 4 Neelakantan Krishnan filed O.S.3/1971 before the Munsiff Court, Kayamkulam for declaration of title, possession and injunction with regard to 1 acre of property including the plaint schedule property in the present suit. In that suit, the plaintiff Sangham herein was the second defendant. The 5th defendant N.S.S. Karayogam in the present suit was the first defendant in that suit. In the judgment in that suit dated 29.9.1973, it was found by the learned Munsiff that Exts.B7 and B8 executed by George Cornation Club are valid and binding on the plaint schedule property. In that suit, the plaintiff Sangham herein was the second defendant. The 5th defendant N.S.S. Karayogam in the present suit was the first defendant in that suit. In the judgment in that suit dated 29.9.1973, it was found by the learned Munsiff that Exts.B7 and B8 executed by George Cornation Club are valid and binding on the plaint schedule property. Ext.B7 in that suit was the gift deed dated 28.12.1970 executed by Vallikunnam G.C. club in favour of the first defendant N.S.S.Karayogam. Ext.B8 in that suit was the gift deed dated 28.12.1970 executed by G.C. club in favour of plaintiff Sangham in the present suit in respect of 5 cents which is the plaint schedule property in the present suit. In that judgment, it was found that since the plaintiff in that suit executed work of a permanent nature in the plaint schedule property and incurred expenses also, his licence is a licence coupled with interest in the property. So, it is irrevocable at the will of the licensor and the suit was decreed in part granting injunction restraining the defendants from trespassing into the plaint schedule property and taking income from it. Against that judgment and decree, the first defendant N.S.S.Karayogam filed A.S.No.39/1974 and the plaintiff Neelakantan Krishnan filed A.S.65/1974 before the Sub Court, Mavelikkara. As per the common judgment in those appeals, it was found that the plaintiff in that suit has not established that he has acquired title to the plaint schedule property in that suit by adverse possession. It was also found that the finding of the Munsiff Court that the plaintiff has only right of licence in the plaint schedule property is not correct. It was also found that the defendants 1 and 2 in that suit have not proved that they are in possession of the property taken in Exts.B7 and B8. The finding of the Munsiff Court that the plaintiff is only a licensee coupled with interest was set aside and that till the plaintiff is evicted from the plaint schedule property under due process of law, he is entitled to be in possession of the same and the injunction granted against the defendants restraining them from entering upon the plaint schedule property was confirmed and both appeals were dismissed with the above observations. Against that judgment, the appellant/ plaintiff in A.S.65/1974 filed S.A.No.968/76 before this Court. Against that judgment, the appellant/ plaintiff in A.S.65/1974 filed S.A.No.968/76 before this Court. Ext.B1 is the copy of the judgment of this Court in the said Second Appeal dated 10.10.1980. In that judgment, it was held that in that suit, there was only a declaration of plaintiffs' possession from 1962 onwards without deciding the nature of his possession whether as a licensee or in assertion of a title in himself. It was also observed that these are matters which can be appropriately agitated in the pending suit. At that time, O.S.No.278/1973 filed by the first defendant N.S.S.Karayogam was pending before the Munsiff Court, Kayamkulam. Ext.A3 is the copy of the judgment in O.S.No.278/1973 in which the title of the plaintiff in that suit was declared and recovery of possession of 85 cents was allowed. In view of the finding in O.S.3/1971 that Ext.B8 in that suit (Ext.A1 in the present suit) is valid and binding on the plaint schedule property which has become final, the defendants in the present suit, who are the legal heirs of the plaintiff in that suit cannot challenge the validity of Ext.A1. Therefore, the finding of the learned Munsiff in the present suit which was confirmed by the lower appellate court that Ext.A1 is valid, cannot be challenged by the appellants herein. 10. The next question to be considered in this case is whether the title of the plaintiffs over the plaint schedule property is lost by adverse possession and limitation. In the decision reported in Raman v. S.Devadasa Maller and others ( 1991(1) KLJ 377 ), it was held that possession under a wrong or mistaken impression that the defendant himself is the owner and nobody else has ownership is also adverse possession, even if the fact that somebody else is the owner or his identity is not known. In the decision reported in Haraballav v. Mohodar (AIR 1975 Gauhati 76) it was held that when a person openly, continuously possesses land under a claim of right adverse to the title of the true owner for the statutory period, his possession becomes adverse to the rightful owner. His belief that the land did not belong to the true owner is immaterial. His belief that it belonged to himself is necessary as that will be a claim of right adverse to the title of the true owner. His belief that the land did not belong to the true owner is immaterial. His belief that it belonged to himself is necessary as that will be a claim of right adverse to the title of the true owner. In the decision reported in Devaki Pillai v. Gouri Amma Meenakshi Amma ( 2003(1) KLJ 256 ) it was held that even if a person enjoys the property as his own for a large number of years and for more than 12 years before the date of the suit and if the true owner does not take any action within the period of limitation it can be said that the person in possession has perfect title and adverse possession as the three conditions of 'peaceful', 'open' and 'continuous' possession to constitute adverse possession are satisfied by him. 11. Section 27 of the Limitation Act provides that at the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished. The period of limitation for possession of immovable property is 12 years from the date when the possession of defendants becomes adverse to the plaintiffs. 12. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the period of pendency of O.S.No.3/71 on the file of the Munsiff Court, Kayamkulam, which culminated in the judgment in S.A.968/76 dated 10.10.1980 has to be deducted under Section 14 of the Limitation Act in computing the period of limitation in filing the present suit. The essential requisites of application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are that the party seeking the benefit of Section 14 had to affirmatively show (i) that he had been prosecuting the previous suit with due diligence; (ii) that the matter in issue for the previous suit and new suit are the same; (iii) The previous suit was prosecuted in good faith and (iv) that the court was unable to entertain that suit on account of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature. If all the aforesaid four elements are established, then only the period occupied in prosecuting the earlier suit will have to be excluded or added to the prescribed period in computing the period of limitation under Article 65 of the Limitation Act. O.S.3/1971 was not filed by the plaintiff in the present suit. If all the aforesaid four elements are established, then only the period occupied in prosecuting the earlier suit will have to be excluded or added to the prescribed period in computing the period of limitation under Article 65 of the Limitation Act. O.S.3/1971 was not filed by the plaintiff in the present suit. The plaintiff herein was the second defendant in that suit and the plaintiff herein was defending that suit. Defending a proceeding is different from prosecuting a proceeding. That suit was filed before a competent court having jurisdiction. There was no bar for the present plaintiff in filing the present suit within the prescribed period of limitation during the pendency of O.S.No.3/1971. There was no injunction in that suit against the second defendant in that suit against the filing of the present suit for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property within the prescribed period of limitation. Therefore, the plaintiff in the present suit cannot claim the benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. 13. Ext.B1 judgment shows that the plaintiffs in O.S.3/1971 are in possession of the plaint schedule property in that suit, which includes the plaint schedule property in the present suit from 1962 onwards. The plaintiff in the present suit claims title to the plaint schedule property on the basis of Ext.A1 gift deed dated 28.12.1970. But, the plaintiff has not obtained possession over that property, which was in the possession of defendants 1 to 4 in the present suit. The plaintiff has not filed any suit for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property within 12 years from the date of Ext.A1 gift deed dated 28.12.1970. The present suit was filed only in 1989. Since the plaintiff has not filed the present suit for possession within 12 years of execution of Ext.A1 gift deed, the title of the plaintiff over the plaint schedule property is extinguished, in view of Section 27 of the Limitation Act. Since the plaintiff has no subsisting title over the plaint schedule property, the plaintiff is not entitled to get any relief in the suit. Accordingly, this Second Appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree in O.S.334 of 1989 on the file of the Munsiff Court, Kayamkualm which was confirmed in A.S.79 of 1993 on the file of Additional District Judge - II, Mavalikkara are set aside and that suit is dismissed without costs. Accordingly, this Second Appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree in O.S.334 of 1989 on the file of the Munsiff Court, Kayamkualm which was confirmed in A.S.79 of 1993 on the file of Additional District Judge - II, Mavalikkara are set aside and that suit is dismissed without costs. Parties are directed to suffer their respective costs in this appeal and in the first appeal.