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2013 DIGILAW 614 (RAJ)

Vikram Singh v. State of Rajasthan

2013-03-22

AMITAVA ROY

body2013
JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner, brother of Hem Kanwar alias Pinky seeks to assail the judgment and order dated 21.8.2008 passed by the learned Special Judge, Women Atrocities and Dowry Cases, Jaipur City, Jaipur rendered in Sessions Case No. 27/2008 under Sections 366, 376/511 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') acquitting the respondent No. 2 herein. 2. I have heard Mr.R.K.Daga, learned counsel for the complainant/petitioner, Ms. Alka Bhatnagar, Additional Government Advocate and Mr.M.C.Jain learned counsel for the respondent No. 2. 3. The facts in short are that as Hem Kanwar alias Pinky went missing on 7.9.2007, the petitioner lodged a missing report on 8.9.2007, and eventually, an FIR was lodged with the Police Station, Vaishali Nagar, Jaipur, which was registered as No. 696/2007 under Sections 365, 120B of the Code. It was thereafter that the prosecutrix was recovered on 13.9.2007 while she was in the company of the respondent No. 2. Her statement was recorded successively under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. and on the completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was laid against the respondent No. 2 under Sections 366, 376/511 of the Code. He denied the charge. At the trial, the prosecution has examined seven witnesses, including the prosecutrix as PW-2. The respondent No. 2, in course of his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., stood by his denial. By the impugned judgment and order, he having been acquitted, the informant/complainant seeks to overturn the decision of the learned trial court by invoking the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 397/401 of the Cr.P.C. As the impugned judgment and order would reveal, the learned trial court rejected the case of the prosecution on the ground of delay in lodging of the FIR as well as discernible consent on the part of the prosecutrix in the episode. 4. Mr. R.K. Daga, learned counsel for the petitioner has emphatically argued that having regard to the dates of the incident and filing of the FIR, no delay as such was involved. Further, as the statement of the prosecutrix, in particular, made under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and her testimony at the trial would reveal, she was not a consenting party. According to the learned counsel, therefore, the impugned judgment and order is, on the face of it, unsustainable in law and on facts. Mr. Further, as the statement of the prosecutrix, in particular, made under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and her testimony at the trial would reveal, she was not a consenting party. According to the learned counsel, therefore, the impugned judgment and order is, on the face of it, unsustainable in law and on facts. Mr. Daga has insisted that on the basis of the evidence on record, the learned trial court could, by no means, accord acquittal to the respondent No. 2 and as conclusions leading to that consequence are the yield of total disregard of the materials on record, it is a fit case where the impugned judgment and order ought to be interfered with. In his endeavour to endorse these pleas, the learned counsel has taken the Court through the FIR and the statement of the prosecutrix under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and in course of the trial. Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 1393 and State of Himachal Pradesh v. Asha Ram, AIR 2006 SC 381 . 5. In reply, Mr. M.C. Jain, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 has argued that having regard to the restricted scope of scrutiny in exercise of this Court's revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 of the Cr.P.C., no re-appreciation of the evidence is permissible and as the order of acquittal is based on an exhaustive and elaborate analysis of the materials on record, no interference is called for. According to the learned counsel, a bare perusal of the testimony of the prosecutrix would reveal, beyond all manner of doubt, that she was a consenting companion of the respondent No. 2 in the incident and thus none of the ingredients of the sections of law under which he had been charged, did stand proved. He has argued, in the alternative, that as the view taken by the learned trial court on the basis of the evidence on record is a plausible one, having regard to the settled law outlining the scope of interfering with the order of acquittal, the petition ought to be rejected. To buttress his arguments, he placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Sheetala Prasad & Ors. v. Sri Kant & Anr., (2010) 2 SCC 190 . 6. I have scrutinised the materials on record and have weighed the rival arguments. 7. To buttress his arguments, he placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Sheetala Prasad & Ors. v. Sri Kant & Anr., (2010) 2 SCC 190 . 6. I have scrutinised the materials on record and have weighed the rival arguments. 7. As the FIR would disclose, it was alleged therein that on 7.9.2007, the prosecutrix at about 6:30 p.m. in the evening, had gone ought to a nearby shop to procure some household articles, but thereafter did not return. It was further stated therein that she had, few days before, disclosed to him (the informant) that the respondent No. 2 had been threatening to abduct her and assault him(the informant). That the respondent No. 2 and his brother together with his sister-in-law had been pressurising the informant's father to get restarted his dairy business or face dire consequences, was also mentioned. It was alleged that the prosecutrix had been abducted by the respondent No. 2 with the connivance of his brother and sister-in-law. Prior to this FIR, a missing report was also lodged on 8.9.2007. The FIR was registered with the Police Station, Vaishali Nagar, Jaipur and on the conclusion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted under Sections 366, 376/511 of the Code against the respondent No. 2. The records reveal that on 13.9.2007, the prosecutrix was recovered in course of the investigation while she was in the company of the respondent No. 2. She however, when produced before the investigating officer, declined to make any statement to reveal the facts pertaining to the incident. She however, in her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. recorded subsequently, stated that on the date of the incident, she had been whisked away by the respondent No. 2 in the Maruti Van against her wish, whereafter they stayed together till she was recovered on 13.9.2007. She alleged that in course of such stay, the respondent No. 2 attempted to commit rape on her. She stated that though she, at times, made attempt to free herself and shouted for help, she was unsuccessful. She also alleged that the respondent No. 2 pressurised her to marry him and also got some documents signed by her. In her deposition at the trial, she reiterated her statements made under Section 164 Cr.P.C. She however, in course of the investigation, declined to get herself medical examined. She also alleged that the respondent No. 2 pressurised her to marry him and also got some documents signed by her. In her deposition at the trial, she reiterated her statements made under Section 164 Cr.P.C. She however, in course of the investigation, declined to get herself medical examined. In her testimony at the trial, she clarified that according to her, it was not necessary as during the period of her stay with the respondent No. 2, nothing had happened to her. She elaborated that during the period in question, she and the respondent No. 2 inter alia stayed in a dharmshala where, at times, she used to be alone in the room when the respondent No. 2 went out to fetch food. That the respondent No. 2 also brought fresh set of clothes, was admitted by her as well. She admitted that they got married thereafter at the Arya Samaj, but insisted that it was against her consent. She knew the respondent no. 2 from before, who had been insisting for their marriage. She also admitted that at the time of marriage, the father of the respondent No. 2 and his cousin were present, amongst other persons. That the prosecutrix, at the time of the incident, was major is an admitted fact. 8. DW-1 Dr. Balwant Singh Arya, who at the relevant time was the Secretary of the Arya Samaj and also Priest thereof, did testify the marriage between the prosecutrix and the respondent No. 2 by observing the necessary legal formalities. He also proved the necessary records in connection therewith. 9. On a consideration of the materials on record, I am of the view that though the prosecution case was not liable to be rejected on account of delay, the finding of acquittal on the ground that the charge against the respondent No. 2 had not been proved, cannot be faulted with. The view taken by the learned trial court, on a totality of the consideration of the evidence on record, more particularly, the statement of the prosecutrix, cannot be branded as absurd, illogical or perverse. It is not a case where the evidence adduced by the prosecution does prove the charge against the respondent No. 2 beyond all reasonable doubt, so much so, that the view taken by the learned trial court cannot be a plausible one. It is not a case where the evidence adduced by the prosecution does prove the charge against the respondent No. 2 beyond all reasonable doubt, so much so, that the view taken by the learned trial court cannot be a plausible one. It is no more res integra and that an order of acquittal does not warrant interference, if it is a consequence of a plausible view on the basis of the materials available. No patent illegality or absurdity in the findings recorded by the learned trial court is decipherable. It did analyze the evidence on record and reach its conclusions on the basis thereof.The revision, therefore, lacks in merit and is dismissed. Revision dismissed. *******