ORDER : The respondent, Sukhibai, along with one Lal Chand faced trial for offences punishable under Sections 302 and 120-B read with Section 34 and Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code (for short "IPC) before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bali, in Sessions Case No. 40 of 1986 who on the basis of circumstantial evidence brought on record found both the accused persons guilty and sentenced them to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 5000/- each and, in default of payment of fine, to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years for the offence under Section 302 IPC and for offence under Section 201 IPC he sentenced them to one year rigorous imprisonment each and to pay a fine of Rs. 5000/- with a default clause. Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 2. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of conviction and order of sentence Lal Chand and Sukhibai preferred Criminal Appeal No. 78 of 1988 in the High Court of Rajasthan and the High Court, re-appreciating the evidence on record, came to hold that the circumstances which had been placed reliance upon by the learned trial Judge were really not such circumstances which could lead to the conclusion that the guilt of the accused persons stood established. Being of this view, a judgment of acquittal was recorded by the High Court. 3. We have heard Ms. Sonia Mathur, learned counsel for the appellant, and Mr. Sanjay Jha, learned counsel for the respondent. 4. To consider the justifiability of the judgment of acquittal we have carefully perused the view expressed by the learned trial Judge and that of the High Court. 3. We have heard Ms. Sonia Mathur, learned counsel for the appellant, and Mr. Sanjay Jha, learned counsel for the respondent. 4. To consider the justifiability of the judgment of acquittal we have carefully perused the view expressed by the learned trial Judge and that of the High Court. The trial Court has taken into consideration seven circumstances, namely, the accused Sukhibai after having a quarrel with her husband, Ghisalal, had left for her parental house along with her children; that she was having an illicit relationship with the accused Lal Chand; that on 13th/14th May, 1984 accused Lal Chand visited accused Sukhibai at Desuri; that accused Sukhibai created two documents, Ext.P-17 and Ext.P-35, through her brother, Amrit Lal, to show that Ghisalal was available at Bombay; that Lal Chand had written a letter vide Ext.P-23 indicating that Ghisalal had met with an accident at Bombay and the said letter was delivered by him to Sukhibai's father at Desuri; that Lal Chand had made a confession before Badri Lal, and accused Sukhibai had confessed before Kishan Singh, PW-1, and Juhar Mal, PW-26; and that on 17th July, 1984 Pratap Chand, PW-9, had seen Lal Chand talking to Sukhibai where after Lal Chand had stated that Ghisalal was missing for the last 10-15 days. The High Court, re appreciating the evidence, has come to hold that the matrimonial dispute between Ghisalal and Sukhibai had been proven; that she had gone to her parental home with her children; that though there was some proof that Lal Chand and Sukhibai had some kind of intimacy, yet that would not create a presumption in favour of the prosecution; that the conversation between Lal Chand and Sukhibai was absolutely irrelevant; that the reliance placed on Exts. P-17, P-18, P-35 and P-46 which have been alleged to have been created by Amrit Lal, brother of Sukhibai, was incorrect inasmuch as Amrit Lal had already been discharged by the High Court of the charge under Section 201 IPC; that the letter, Ext.P-23, which pertained to the accident of Ghisalal had been written by Lal Chand but the said letter in no way implicated connected Sukhibai in the crime; that the extra judicial confession, as far as Sukhibai is concerned, the trial court has itself has recorded that Kishan Singh had not stated that she had made a confession pertaining to her involvement in the murder and as far as statement before Juharmal is concerned, the same is full of material contradictions and could not be given credence to; that Sukhibai did not make a complaint about missing of her husband was not such a circumstance to convict the accused Sukhibai for an offence under Section 302 IPC; and that the learned trial Judge has presumed that there would have been conspiracy because there was some illicit relationship between the two and such an assumption could not be regarded as a circumstance against the accused Sukhibai. After so stating, the High Court has opined that the learned trial Judge had proceeded on the basis of certain presumptions and treated suspicion to be proof which is not acceptable and, accordingly, dislodged the judgment of conviction. 5. Analysis of the High Court, as we find from the material on record, is quite sound and based on proper reasoning. The learned trial Judge, in fact, has really proceeded on certain assumptions and opined that the chain of circumstances was complete and they led to the singular hypothesis that the accused persons were guilty of the offence. But, on a proper scrutiny of the evidence, it is clear that barring one or two circumstances there is nothing substantial to connect the accused-respondent in the crime in question. Thus, we find that the view expressed by the High Court is absolutely sustainable and does not warrant any interference by this Court. 6. In the result, we do not find any substance in the appeal and, accordingly, the same stands dismissed. Appeal dismissed.