JUDGMENT : 1. Challenge in this petition is made to the award of the Labour Court, Bhuj at Kutchh in Reference (LCB) No.5 of 2006, dated 30.04.2008, whereby the Reference of the present petitioner came to be rejected. It is recorded that the subject matter of the Reference was the termination order passed by the respondent Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, dated 28.09.1985, which was challenged by the present petitioner, which was initially registered at Labour Court, Rajkot as Reference (LCR) No.1695 of 1988, which was renumbered as Reference (LCB) No.21 of 2002 at Labour Court, Bhuj, and finally it was numbered as (LCB) No. 5 of 2006. The reasons for such renumbering are recorded hereinafter. 2. Before the merits of the matter are gone into, the relevant facts need to be recorded. The petitioner has appeared in person before this Court. The circumstances leading to permitting the petitioner to appear in person are reflected in the orders of this Court dated 26.03.2013, 29.04.2013 and 18.06.2013, the substance of which is to the effect that, this Court had indicated to the petitioner that he will be provided legal aid if he so desires, not only that it was suggested also to him, that in his case, it was required also, since from the paper book of more than 150 pages, he was not in a position to submit, as to which order is challenged in this petition, before this Court. The resistance of the petitioner to avail legal aid by any advocate was so strong that, this Court had thought it fit to hear the petitioner, who is about 78 years of age, with no means even to travel from his place of residence (Bhuj-Kutchh) to Ahmedabad. He had felt so cheated, by availing legal assistance earlier that, by appearing in person, his case would be damaged the least. Since a senior citizen, almost hand to mouth, frustrated, not only qua his employer, but about the judicial battle of about 25 years, was before the Court, to ascertain as to whether any relief can be granted to him, he was permitted to address the Court. Over and above that, it was also felt necessary that even if on merits he is not entitled to any relief, let him vent his grievance in whatever form he wanted. Over and above that, it was also felt necessary that even if on merits he is not entitled to any relief, let him vent his grievance in whatever form he wanted. Under these circumstances, the petitioner was heard by the Court on different dates at length for few hours. 3. On hearing the petitioner at length, this Court found that the termination order dated 28.09.1985, which was for unauthorized absence for few months, was challenged by him before the Labour Court. According to him, at the relevant time, the concerned Labour Court was at Rajkot, and therefore, proceedings were initiated there. He has stated that, he had engaged a lawyer there, for the said proceedings. He has further stated that at the time of engaging an advocate in the said Reference, he was told by him that, he may not inquire for some years in that regard, since that proceedings may take years to ripe for hearing. Petitioner further stated that, he had inquired from him later on, but he did not get any reply. When he independently visited Labour Court, he found that his case is dismissed for default. For the purpose of restoration also he had to have papers, which he did not have, which he asked for from the concerned lawyer, which was very difficult for him to get. In the meantime, the territorial jurisdiction had changed from Rajkot district to Kutchh district. The petitioner was not aware of this. Further, the said region (Kutchh) suffered deadly earth quake on 26.01.2001, which is the normal place of residence of the petitioner, where everything was destroyed. He then moved application for restoration, which was ultimately allowed. These are the circumstances through which the petitioner has passed through, therefore different numbers of the same Reference are given, and in the assessment of this Court, therefore there is resistance by the petitioner to avail any legal aid. He was heard at length by the Court. 4. So far the merits of the matter are concerned, it is stated by the petitioner that, he had joined the service in April, 1959 as an Electrician. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner vide charge sheet dated 26.07.1985, alleging that from 27.10.1984 he has remained absent unauthorizedly, without any valid reason. 4. So far the merits of the matter are concerned, it is stated by the petitioner that, he had joined the service in April, 1959 as an Electrician. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner vide charge sheet dated 26.07.1985, alleging that from 27.10.1984 he has remained absent unauthorizedly, without any valid reason. It is stated by the petitioner and it has come on record that, he had sent medical certificate to the Disciplinary Authority in support of his sickness, which was the reason for his absence. It is stated by the petitioner that, for these reasons, he could not participate in the inquiry and ultimately the Disciplinary Authority passed an order of the termination on 28.09.1985. The said termination order is on record. The said order was the subject matter of the Reference before the Labour Court. Labour Court has rejected the Reference, for the reasons, which are discussed hereinafter. 5. Learned advocate for the respondent Corporation has taken the Court through the material on record, more particularly, the reasoning recorded by the Disciplinary Authority in the termination order as well as the Labour Court in the impugned award to support the action of the Corporation. Specific reference is made to an aspect that it has come on record that the petitioner had gone abroad and therefore he is not entitled to any relief. On behalf of the Corporation it is also contended that interference by this Court in such facts would send wrong signals and encourage indiscipline. It is contended that the petition be dismissed. 6. Having heard the petitioner in person and learned advocate for the respondent Corporation and having gone through the material on record, this Court finds that, the reasons recorded by the Disciplinary Authority to base the decision of termination suffers from the vice of perversity and it needs to be interfered with. This Court also finds that the Labour Court has erred in not appreciating the illegalities in the termination order which was under its scrutiny, in right perspective. In this regard, it needs to be recorded that, the Labour Court has recorded that, in absence of any explanation before the Disciplinary Authority, no interference is required. The Labour Court has even refused to exercise powers under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In this regard, it needs to be recorded that, the Labour Court has recorded that, in absence of any explanation before the Disciplinary Authority, no interference is required. The Labour Court has even refused to exercise powers under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Having gone through the termination order minutely, this Court finds that the said termination order was perverse on two aspects. Firstly, with regard to medical certificate, which was sent by the petitioner, the Disciplinary Authority has recorded that since the said certificate recommended grant of leave on medical ground from 23.07.1985 to 22.10.1985, in the perception of Disciplinary Authority, the Doctor concerned was not authorized to make such recommendation, legally and therefore the same was required to be rejected. In my view, the Disciplinary Authority could not have refused to take into consideration the medical certificate like this. Further, the said termination order is also founded on a pillar, where the Disciplinary Authority has, in terms, recorded that his informers had told him that, the delinquent (the petitioner) had traveled abroad. Since the petitioner could not remain present in the inquiry, according to the Disciplinary Authority, the knowledge which he had on the basis of information which he had received from his informers, remained uncontroverted, which warranted termination of service. In my view, the Disciplinary Authority, in absence of any evidence to that effect, legally could not have taken that aspect into consideration. Thus, the Disciplinary Authority has recorded satisfaction as reflected in the termination order, after excluding relevant material, and by relying on the irrelevant material. Thus, on both grounds, the impugned termination order cannot be allowed to stand in eyes of law. 7. Coming next to the reasons recorded by the Labour Court, this Court finds that the Labour Court in terms has recorded that the petitioner had conceded before it that he, the petitioner, had gone abroad. Be it noted that, the Labour Court was examining the matter after year 2006. The date of birth of the petitioner is 03.10.1936 and he had attained the age of superannuation in October, 1994. In the year 2002, the petitioner had lost everything in the earth quake. He had conceded before this Court that in resent years, in any case, years after the age of superannuation (1994), he had gone to a gulf country as a Mazdoor, to earn some livelihood for his family. In the year 2002, the petitioner had lost everything in the earth quake. He had conceded before this Court that in resent years, in any case, years after the age of superannuation (1994), he had gone to a gulf country as a Mazdoor, to earn some livelihood for his family. The say of a raw man, conceding something before the Court, in my view, could not have been stretched beyond what was conceded. The Labour Court fell in error, to consider this fact, as if in the year 1984-85, the petitioner should be treated to have gone abroad, since now he has said so. The petitioner was specifically asked in this regard by this Court, and he was quite categorical that on any date before his date of retirement, he had not gone to any other country, and even thereafter he has gone as a Mazdoor to earn some livelihood for his family. Further, the Labour Court has been influenced by an additional factor, as reflected in the discussion for issue no.3 that, the Reference in question was dismissed for default twice. In my view, dismissal of Reference for default of advocate in the facts of this case, would in no way change the merits of the termination order dated 28.09.1985. Thus, the reasoning recorded by the Labour Court as narrated above, are not just and proper and since the final order is based on such reasoning, in my view, the same cannot be allowed to stand in eyes of law. Further, independent of the reasons recorded by the Labour Court, I have examined the termination order on its own merits and found that, not only the reasons recorded and conclusion arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority was illegal, and on that ground the same needs to be interfered with, but there are other reasons also, as recorded hereinafter, why the termination order needs to be interfered with. 8. So far the orders passed in disciplinary matters by the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation are concerned, judicial cognizance can be taken of a fact that, in hundreds of cases, even in case of misappropriate of money, the punishment of withholding of one or two increments are imposed by the authority. This was the case of absentism. 8. So far the orders passed in disciplinary matters by the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation are concerned, judicial cognizance can be taken of a fact that, in hundreds of cases, even in case of misappropriate of money, the punishment of withholding of one or two increments are imposed by the authority. This was the case of absentism. Thus, this is the case where powers under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, ought to have been exercised by the Labour Court. Further, even judicial cognizance needs to be taken of the policy decision of the respondent Corporation of the year 2009, as reflected in Special Civil Application No.3411 of 2013, that by one stroke of pen, about seven hundred employees, were reinstated by the Corporation, who were terminated and the litigation in that regard was going on. The said action was sought to be defended by the Corporation saying that, it was only in those cases, where misappropriation was not alleged, and particularly in cases where the allegation was about unauthorized absence etc. Thus, going by such policy decision of the Corporation itself, the present petitioner could not have been denied the said benefit. 9.1 In above factual and legal background, the termination order dated 28.09.1985 and the order of the Labour Court dated 30.04.2008 needs to be quashed and set aside. The next question would be what relief to be granted to the petitioner. In this regard, the following aspects are taken into consideration. 9.2 The date of birth of the petitioner is 03.10.1936 and had he been continued in service, he would have attained the age of retirement in October, 1994. 9.3 There is no scheme of payment of pension by the respondent Corporation. Thus, whatever amount that may be awarded by this Court, would be the total amount, within which, the petitioner will have to arrange for livelihood for his family. 9.4 While awarding back-wages, this Court is conscious of a factor that, if the Reference in question was dismissed for default, that too more than once, the period during which it had remained as dismissed, cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of awarding back-wages. However, as noted above, the date of retirement of the petitioner was 31.10.1994 and all orders dismissing the said Reference for default, are subsequent in point of time, first being on 07.09.1995 by the Labour Court, Rajkot. However, as noted above, the date of retirement of the petitioner was 31.10.1994 and all orders dismissing the said Reference for default, are subsequent in point of time, first being on 07.09.1995 by the Labour Court, Rajkot. Copy of the said order is on record. Thus, while passing the final order, awarding back-wages till date of retirement, this aspect should not weigh against the petitioner, more particularly, when no interest is being awarded on such payment. 9.5 While awarding back-wages, the view expressed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India in case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation vs. C.P. Goswami reported in 2013 (10) SCALE 503 and in case of Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and ors. reported in 2013 (11) SCALE 268 are also kept in view. Additionally, it is also kept in view that the petitioner is entitled to the means of survival of his family, may be with acute financial crunch. 10. For the reasons recorded above, this petition is partly allowed. The order passed by the respondent Corporation dated 28.09.1985 terminating the service of the petitioner is held to be illegal and arbitrary, and consequently is quashed and set aside. The original Reference filed by the workman challenging the said termination order in the Labour Court, Rajkot, being Reference No.1695 of 1988, which, on being transferred to Labour Court, Bhuj, was numbered as Reference (LCB) No.5 of 2006, is partly allowed and the final award of the Labour Court, Bhuj dated 30.04.2008 rejecting the Reference, is quashed and set aside. The petitioner shall be entitled to 50% back wages, from the date of termination to the date of his retirement, which is indicated to be 31.10.1994. The petitioner shall be treated to be in continuous service till the date of his retirement, for all purposes including for the purpose of calculation of all terminal / retirement dues, and shall be paid such dues accordingly. Since the termination order dated 28.09.1985 is held to be illegal today, the Corporation, which is a public body, cannot be fastened with liability of interest, either on the back wages or on the retiral dues and therefore it is clarified that the petitioner shall not be entitled to claim interest on this amount, till date. Since the termination order dated 28.09.1985 is held to be illegal today, the Corporation, which is a public body, cannot be fastened with liability of interest, either on the back wages or on the retiral dues and therefore it is clarified that the petitioner shall not be entitled to claim interest on this amount, till date. It is further clarified that, considering the totality and peculiarity of the facts of this case, this order is passed, which shall not operate as a precedent against the Corporation. It is directed to the respondent Corporation that, the amount of back wages and terminal / retirement dues, as ordered above, shall be paid to the petitioner within a period of three months from today. The petitioner shall be entitled to claim interest at the rate of 12% per annum from 01.02.2014 on the above amount. Rule made absolute to the above extent. No order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.