Judgment 1. The petitioner is aggrieved against the order of the first respondent, dated 27.12.2004 rejecting his claim to record his name as cultivating tenant in respect of subject matter lands. 2. The case of the petitioner is that an extent of 14.90 Acres of Punja lands at Survey No.1/2 in Jamin Singampatti Part I Village, originally belonged to one late R.K. Viswanatha Thevar. After his demise, the widow Sarojini Devi sold 4 acres 90 cents to the petitioner, out of the said 14 acres 90 cents. The remaining 10 acres are the disputed lands. The said Sarojini Devi executed a tenancy agreement in favour of the petitioner, on 14.06.1984, in respect of those 14 acres and 90 cents for a period of six years. The lease amount fixed was Rs.1200/-per year. The tenancy was in respect of the land and the trees standing thereon. The petitioner is contributing his physical labour by cultivating the land as well as watering the trees. The petitioner had raised chilli crops in a portion of the land. The Record Officer, after a full fledged enquiry, recorded the petitioner's name as the cultivating tenant, by his order dated 15.12.1991. The appellate authority also confirmed the same by his order dated 28.11.1994. However, the first respondent set aside the orders of the original authority as well as the appellate authority, in a revision filed before him, through his order dated 26.12.2004. Aggrieved against the same, the present writ petition is filed by the petitioner. 3. The respondents 2 and 3 filed a counter affidavit and denied the claim of the petitioner. It is stated by them that the tenancy agreement dated 14.06.1984 relied on by the petitioner is a false and invalid document. The said Sarojini Devi had no right to execute the said agreement in respect of the entire 14.90 acres as she got right and title over 4.90 acres only, as per the registered Will dated 08.03.1976 executed by their father late. R.K. Viswanatha Thevar. Under the said Will, the entire 14.90 acres were divided into three parts. The southern 5 acres were allotted to third respondent herein; the middle 5 acres were allotted to the second respondent herein and the northern 4 acres 90 cents were allotted to the said Sarojini Devi, the mother of respondents 2 and 3. R.K. Viswanatha Thevar. Under the said Will, the entire 14.90 acres were divided into three parts. The southern 5 acres were allotted to third respondent herein; the middle 5 acres were allotted to the second respondent herein and the northern 4 acres 90 cents were allotted to the said Sarojini Devi, the mother of respondents 2 and 3. The said Will came into force immediately on the demise of their father on 08.03.1976 and accordingly, the respondents 2 and 3 and their mother are enjoying their respective shares all along. Therefore, their mother had no right to assign any tenancy right in respect of the entire 14 acres 90 cents. Even otherwise, the agreement dated 14.06.1984 had only given the right of plucking fruits from the standing trees. It is further contended by the respondents 2 and 3 that their mother did not sell 4 acres and 90 cents of land in favour of the petitioner. On the other hand, the petitioner filed O.S.No.184 of 1992, a suit for specific performance, based on a sale agreement dated 24.07.1987 alleged to have been executed by their mother in respect of 4 acres and 90 cents out of 14 acres and 90 cents of land. The suit was contested by their mother. However, a decree came to be passed in favour of the petitioner. An appeal filed against the said decree, though was dismissed, a second appeal in S.A.No.614 of 2007 filed by the respondents 2 and 3 herein as the legal-heirs of the deceased mother, is still pending before this Court. It is further contended that the document dated 14.06.1984 is not a lease or tenancy agreement. But, on the other hand, it is only a license to collect usufructs from the standing trees. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim any right as cultivating tenant based on the said deed. When the petitioner was granted only a license to collect usufructs, he had no right to cultivate the land and therefore, the findings recorded by the Record Officer as well as the first appellate authority are factually incorrect. It is further stated that the petitioner did not produce any document to show that he had paid the said amount of Rs.1200/-per year to their mother or to the respondents 2 and 3, after the demise of their mother. It is further stated that the petitioner did not produce any document to show that he had paid the said amount of Rs.1200/-per year to their mother or to the respondents 2 and 3, after the demise of their mother. It is further stated that though the first respondent passed the order on 27.12.2004 rejecting the claim of the petitioner, the petitioner had challenged the same only in the year 2007, which attitude shows that there is no bona fide on the part of the petitioner. 4. Mr. A. Arumugam, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is a cultivating tenant in pursuant to the lease agreement executed by the said Sarojini Devi on 14.06.1984. The recital of the said lease deed would undoubtedly show that it was not merely a license given to the petitioner to collect the usufructs alone from the standing trees, but also to enjoy the land as cultivating tenant especially, when the petitioner was asked to maintain the well and pumpsets in the said land. The petitioner is contributing his physical labour by watering the trees. Therefore, such act would bring the petitioner within the meaning of cultivating tenant. When the trees need nourishment from soil, the petitioner, by watering those trees, has indulged in the act of cultivation. The said Sarojini Devi, the mother of respondents 2 and 3, was entitled to enter into the lease deed as the co-owner. Therefore, the lease deed executed by her is valid and binding on the respondents 2 and 3 as well. Before the Record Officer, the respondents 2 and 3 as well as their mother were arrayed as parties and they never questioned the authority of the mother to execute the lease deed. All of them, jointly filed the first appeal. The respondents 2 and 3 never objected their mother's action by issuing any notice questioning the lease agreement. Therefore, the mother acted as an agent of the respondents 2 and 3 and such agency can be inferred from their own conduct. The learned counsel further submitted that though the petitioner had wrongly averred in the affidavit, as if, the mother had sold 4 acres and 90 cents to the petitioner, the fact remains that it was only an agreement of sale and the dispute is pending between the parties by way of second appeal before this Court. The learned counsel further submitted that though the petitioner had wrongly averred in the affidavit, as if, the mother had sold 4 acres and 90 cents to the petitioner, the fact remains that it was only an agreement of sale and the dispute is pending between the parties by way of second appeal before this Court. Thus, according to the learned Counsel, the dispute is with regard to the remaining 10 acres only. 5. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decisions reported in AIR 1982 Mad 396 in the case of R. Saravanan Vs. Sri Vedaranyaswaraswami Devasthanam and in (2003)2 M.L.J. 212 in the case of Nachayee Ammal and others Vs. Sri Venugopalakrishnaswamy Temple, Trichy. 6. Per contra, Mr. M. Vallinayagam, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents 2 and 3 contended that the agreement dated 14.06.1984 is not a valid document as the same had been executed by a person, who had no right or title to the said property. When the petitioner is confining his claim only in respect of those 10 acres, he cannot get any relief when those 10 acres were allotted to the shares of the respondents 2 and 3 in pursuant to the Will executed by their father, especially when no tenancy agreement had ever been entered into between the petitioner and the respondents 2 and 3. He further contended that in the absence of any written authorisation or power given in favour of their mother by the respondents 2 and 3, the agreement dated 14.06.1984 entered for the entire 14.90 acres is invalid and consequently, will not confer any right on the petitioner or binding the respondents 2 and 3. The learned counsel also submitted that even assuming without admitting that the said document is a valid document, still the petitioner cannot claim any right of cultivating tenancy as the very recital of the said document clearly shows that the petitioner was given only a right to collect the usufructs from the standing trees and he was further directed to take care of Well and pumpsets and not given a right to enjoy or cultivate the lands. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the schedule to the said agreement dated 14.06.1984 did not specifically include the lands. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the schedule to the said agreement dated 14.06.1984 did not specifically include the lands. He further submitted that the respondents 2 and 3 filed a suit in O.S.No.355 of 1990 against the petitioner seeking for injunction not to interference with their possession. The injunction was granted and the suit is also pending. He also contended that the Tashildar has not recorded any finding regarding physical labour and or other requirements. The appellate authority also wrongly confirmed the findings of the Tashildar by shifting the burden on the respondents to disprove the tenancy. 7. In support of his contention, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents relied on the decisions reported in 1963(76) L.W. 378 in the case of Govindaswami vanniar Vs. Mahalakshmi Ammal and in 1992(2) L.W. 234 in the case of Mani Thevar Vs. R.M. Venkatachalam. 8. Heard the learned counsel appearing for either side and also perused the documents placed before this Court. 9. Admitted facts between both the parties are as follows:- An extent of 14.90 acres of land in Survey No.1/2 in Jamin Singampatti Part I Village, originally belonged to one R.K. Viswanatha Thevar. He is the father of the respondents 2 and 3 and the husband of one Sarojini Devi, with whom the petitioner entered into an agreement on 14.06.1984, based on which, the claim of cultivating tenancy is made by the petitioner. From these undisputed facts, let me find out as to whether there was a valid tenancy agreement executed by the owner/owners of the land and if such agreement was validly executed, whether the same confers the 'cultivating tenancy right' on the petitioner. 10. While considering the validity of the agreement dated 14.06.1984, it is seen that the same was executed by the said Sarojini Devi in respect of trees standing in entire extent of 14.90 acres. The respondents 2 and 3 claim that their mother had no right to execute such agreement for the entire extent of lands as she got right and title over 4.90 acres only as per the registered Will dated 08.03.1976. A copy of the said Will is placed before this Court. Clause 3 of the said Will reads as follows:- "TAMIL" 11. A copy of the said Will is placed before this Court. Clause 3 of the said Will reads as follows:- "TAMIL" 11. A perusal of the above recital would show that the said Sarojini Devi was allotted only 4 acres and 90 cents and the remaining 10 acres were allotted to the respondents 2 and 3 equally. The said Will came to be executed on 08.03.1976 and it is stated by the respondents 2 and 3 that on the very same day, the executant, namely, the father of the respondents 2 and 3 died. Consequently, the said Will came into force immediately. 12. Admittedly, the said agreement dated 14.06.1984 in favour of the petitioner came to be executed by the said Sarojini Devi only after nearly eight years after the said Will came into force. Therefore, as on the date of executing the said agreement, the said Sarojini Devi was not having any right or title over the entire extent of 14.90 acres. Consequently, she was not entitled to execute such agreement in favour of the petitioner. A perusal of the said agreement would only shows the said Sarojini Devi had executed the same as an absolute owner of the entire extent of 14 acres 90 cents and she had not even claimed herself as a co-owner along with the respondents 2 and 3. Though the learned Counsel for the petitioner argued that the said Sarojini Devi acted as an Agent of respondents 2 and 3 and executed the said agreement on their behalf as well, no material is placed before this Court to substantiate such contention to show that any power was conferred on the said Sarojini Devi by the respondents 2 and 3 to act on their behalf. At any event, as it is not stated so in the agreement itself that Sarojini Devi had acted as Agent on behalf of the respondents 2 and 3 as well, the petitioner cannot be permitted to say so and consequently, the attempt made by the petitioner's counsel in projecting the said Sarojini Devi as the Agent of the respondents 2 and 3 should also necessarily fail. No doubt, the appeal was preferred by the said Sarojini Devi and the respondents 2 and 3 jointly before the appellate authority as well as the revisional authority. No doubt, the appeal was preferred by the said Sarojini Devi and the respondents 2 and 3 jointly before the appellate authority as well as the revisional authority. Filing of an appeal or revision jointly by all the three of them itself, cannot be taken to mean that the respondents 2 and 3 have accepted the act of their mother. It is needless to say that no right can be conferred on a person in respect of an immovable property without there being any written and valid document of conveyance executed in favour of such person. Even while perusing the order of the Record Officer, it clearly shows that the said Sarojini Devi herself filed a counter statement informing that the respondents 2 and 3 are owners of 10 acres out of 14.90 acres. That is why, the suit for specific performance was filed by the petitioner based on an agreement said to have been executed by the said Sarojini Devi only in respect of 4.90 acres. Thus, from the above facts and circumstances, it is clear that the said Sarojini Devi was not entitled to execute the agreement dated 14.06.1984 in favour of the petitioner for the entire extent of 14.90 acres and on the other hand, the respondents 2 and 3 are the owners of 5 acres of land each. In the absence of any written agreement of lease or tenancy from the respondents 2 and 3, the petitioner cannot have any valid right to claim cultivating tenancy based on the said invalid agreement executed by the said Sarojini Devi. The authorities below including the revisional authority failed to look into this aspect. The revisional authority proceeded to allow the revision only by holding that the said agreement executed by the Sarojini Devi was only a license and not a tenancy right. 13. Though the said agreement is held to be not valid in respect of entire extent of 14.90 acres, still the question that would arise for further consideration is as to whether the said agreement is binding on the parties or not at least insofar as 4.90 acres of land which was admittedly allotted to the share of the said Sarojini Devi. To answer the said question, certainly, we need to go into the merits of the said agreement to find out as to whether the said agreement conferred any valid cultivating tenancy right on the petitioner, at least in respect of 4.90 acres is concerned. Both the counsel have also advanced arguments on this aspect so as to get a finding as to whether the petitioner is a cultivating tenant or not. 14. To answer the above question, it is useful to refer to the following definition clauses:- Section 2(aa) of Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, defines “cultivating tenant” as follows:- “(i) means a person who contributes his own physical labour or that of any member of his family in the cultivation of any land belonging to another, under a tenancy agreement, express or implied ; and (ii) includes - (a) any such person who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement; (b) the heir of such person, if the heir contributes his own physical labour or that of any member of his family in the cultivation of such land; (c) a sub-tenant if he contributes his own physical labour or that of any member of his family in the cultivation of such land ; or (d) any such sub-tenant who continues in possession of the land notwithstanding that the person who sublet the land to such sub-tenant ceases to have the right to possession of such land: but (iii) does not include a mere intermediary or his heir: Sub-clause (b) of the said Section defines the word “cultivation” as follows:- “(b) 'Cultivation' means the use of lands for the purpose of agriculture or horticulture.” 'Land' is define under sub-section (d) as follows:- “(d) 'Land' means land used for the purpose of agriculture of horticulture and includes any building, or any waste, vacant or forest land, appurtenant thereto, and any house-site belonging to the landlord and let to the cultivating tenant under the same agreement of tenancy.” and 'Landlord' is define under sub-clause (e) as follows:- (e) “Landlord” in relation to a holding or part thereof means the person entitled to evict the cultivating tenant from such holding or part; 15. A combined reading of all the above said definition clauses would show that a person who seeks cultivating tenancy right under the said Act must first enter into a tenancy agreement either express or implied with the landlord and he should contribute his own physical labour or that of any member of his family in the cultivation of such land. Therefore, in order to find out as to whether such right is conferred on a person claiming the cultivating tenancy, one has to necessarily see as to whether any valid agreement either express or implied existed between the so called tenant and the landlord and even if there is a valid agreement, it is further to be seen as to whether the tenant is contributing his own physical labour or that of any of his family members in the cultivation of the land. Above all, the basic requirement is that the land must get involved directly in the transactions between the landlord and the tenant. In other words what should have been conveyed by way of a tenancy agreement either express or implied is only the land, as it is very much emphasised in the definition of the cultivating tenant under Section 2(aa) itself that cultivation of any land is a must. Therefore, in the absence of the transfer of interest in land under the tenancy agreement, in my considered view, there cannot be any claim made by a person to be a cultivating tenant in respect of such land. In this case, I have already found out that the tenancy agreement relied on by the petitioner did not confer any tenancy right over the said land whether it is in respect of 14.90 acres or in respect of 4.90 cents. Therefore, in the absence of such conveyance of tenancy right of land, the petitioner cannot seek the relief as the cultivating tenant. Moreover, the petitioner had also not proved any physical labour contributed by him either of his own or through any of his family members. Even assuming so, still such physical labour itself cannot confer tenancy right in the absence of specific conveyance of such right. 16. No doubt, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that watering of the trees and maintaining the pump-sets and Well would constitute a physical labour and therefore, the petitioner is entitled to the benefit under the Act. 16. No doubt, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that watering of the trees and maintaining the pump-sets and Well would constitute a physical labour and therefore, the petitioner is entitled to the benefit under the Act. I am unable to accept the said contention. The physical labour as contemplated under the Act cannot be taken to mean even a part of the labour in cultivating the land. The cultivation of the land should necessarily commence with the act of correction/preparation of the land and end with the act of harvesting of the crops or enjoying the usufructs. It is a chain of actions where the physical labour should commence from the beginning, continue all throughout and end with the harvesting process. Therefore, the physical labour and the cultivation is interlinked and inseparable and should exist all throughout. When that being the requirement, a part of physical labour of watering the trees cannot be considered as the physical labour as contemplated under the Act. Such single or isolated action, out of the chain of actions cannot be taken as a physical labour in satisfaction of the requirement of the Act. In this case, in fact, the petitioner has not cultivated the trees and what was given to him under the said agreement were the trees already grown. Only the right to collect the usufructs from those trees alone was given to him. Therefore, in my considered view either watering of those trees or maintaining well and pump-sets would alone certainly not amount to an act of cultivation or physical labour as required under the said Act. 17. The agreement dated 14.06.1984 is extracted hereunder:- "TAMIL” 18. From the perusal of said agreement, it is seen that only the right of collecting the usufructs from the mango trees standing in the total extent of 14 acres 90 cents of land in Survey No.2/1 was given to the petitioner. The schedule of the said document would undoubtedly show that what was conveyed is only the right to enjoy the usufructs and not the land. The words "TAMIL" show that the property conveyed was only the usufructs and not the land as well. No doubt, the recitals of the said document show that the petitioner was directed to maintain the Well and pump-sets situated in the property. It is also stated therein that the petitioner has to maintain the fences. The words "TAMIL" show that the property conveyed was only the usufructs and not the land as well. No doubt, the recitals of the said document show that the petitioner was directed to maintain the Well and pump-sets situated in the property. It is also stated therein that the petitioner has to maintain the fences. Those recitals cannot be taken to mean that the petitioner was given a right to cultivate the land or enjoy the land unless such intention was expressly stated so therein. In my considered view, only the right to collect the usufructs was given under the agreement dated 14.06.1984 and therefore, it is not a tenancy agreement in respect of the lands as well. 19. Now, let me now consider the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Insofar as the decision reported in 2003(2) MLJ 212 (cited supra) is concerned, no doubt, the learned Single Judge had observed that the lease of plucking coconuts or mangoes would amount to transfer of interest in immovable property and therefore, the plaintiffs therein are the tenants in respect of the agricultural lands. While going through the facts of that case, it is seen that the lease deed executed therein under Exs.A-1 and A-2 show that apart from the right to collect the usufruct, the plaintiffs therein were also given right to cultivate the land. Consequently, the learned Judge taking note of the recitals made under Exs.A1 and A2 therein, had held that the plaintiffs therein are the cultivating tenants. The learned Judge has specifically observed at paragraph 19, that there may not be any difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the plaintiffs in the suits were also given the right to pluck coconuts and mangoes and as a matter of fact in Exs.A-1, A-2, A-33, A-34, the right was given to enjoy the land also and as such, it has to be necessarily held that the plaintiffs therein are the cultivating tenants in respect of the agricultural lands. Therefore, when the facts of that case are totally different and distinguishable, the said decision of the learned Single Judge cannot be pressed into service in favour of the petitioner. 20. Therefore, when the facts of that case are totally different and distinguishable, the said decision of the learned Single Judge cannot be pressed into service in favour of the petitioner. 20. While coming to the other decision relied on by the petitioner reported in AIR 1982 Mad 396 (cited supra), a perusal of the said judgment would show that the matter had arisen in pursuant to a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendants therein from interfering with the plaintiff, by claiming that he was entitled to the benefit of Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955 and thus cannot be evicted. No doubt, in the said judgment, the learned Single Judge had considered the question as to whether right to pluck coconuts would amount to a lease or license. The learned Judge by following a decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench reported in 1948(2) MLJ 155 in the case of P. Venugopala Pillai vs. Thirunavukkarasu and others came to the conclusion that the right to tap the coconut trees and obtain toddy is in the nature of immovable property because it is a benefit which arises out of land. Thus, the finding of the learned Judge was based on the Division Bench decision reported in 1948(2) MLJ 155 (cited supra). In fact, a subsequent decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench made in the case of Govindasamyvanniar vs. Mahalakshmiammal reported in 1963(76) L.W. 378 was not placed before the learned Single Judge. 21. Thus, it leads me to look into the said decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench reported in 1948(2) MLJ 155 (cited supra). A perusal of the said judgment shows that only question which fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Division Bench was as to whether the defendant therein was in the position of a lessee from plaintiffs 1 to 3 therein as regards the right to tap the coconut trees in the two properties or whether he was in position of a mere licensee. After considering various aspects of the matter based on the factual situation of that case, the Hon'ble Division Bench came to the conclusion that right to tap the coconut trees and obtain toddy is in the nature of the immovable property, because it is the benefit which arises out of land. After considering various aspects of the matter based on the factual situation of that case, the Hon'ble Division Bench came to the conclusion that right to tap the coconut trees and obtain toddy is in the nature of the immovable property, because it is the benefit which arises out of land. It was further observed therein that the right to enjoy the yield of toddy from trees would be in the nature of leasehold right. However, in the very same decision, the Hon'ble Division Bench also observed that having regard to the circumstances, it cannot be said that the exclusive possession of the entire garden was conveyed to the defendant and so far as the land itself was concerned, he was only in the position of licensee. 22. Thus, by going through the above said decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench, it can be seen that the facts are totally different and distinguishable while applying the same to the present case. In fact, the Hon'ble Division Bench had specifically observed that insofar as the land is concerned, the defendant therein was only in the position of the licensee. Here also, what was conveyed is only the right to collect the usufruct and not the land. If that being the factual position, the petitioner cannot claim tenancy right in respect of the said land, when the same was not conveyed to him as a tenancy. At any event, the issue before the Hon'ble Division Bench in the above said case was not in respect of considering the right of tenancy under the Record of Tenancy Act. But on the other hand, the issue was as to whether the right to enjoy the usufructs is a license or a lease. In my considered view, not every lease given in favour of a person in connection or relation with a land would automatically be construed as a tenancy right in respect of the land also. Even assuming that such right conferred on such person is to be construed as a lease, still it has to be further seen as to whether such lease was in respect of cultivating the land or for enjoying any other right in connection or relation with the said land. Even assuming that such right conferred on such person is to be construed as a lease, still it has to be further seen as to whether such lease was in respect of cultivating the land or for enjoying any other right in connection or relation with the said land. Right to collect or enjoy the usufruct may be a lease, but still such right itself cannot be construed to have conferred a tenancy right on the person in respect of the land as well. Therefore, the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner are factually distinguishable and not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Even otherwise the above referred decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench reported in 1948(2) MLJ 155 (cited supra) was considered in a latter decision of another Division Bench reported in 1963(76) L.W. 378 (cited supra) which is being discussed in the next para. 23. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 strongly relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench reported in 1963(76) L.W. 378 (cited supra) to contend that the right to collect usufructs from the trees is only a license. A perusal of the said decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench would show that the matter therein arises under Madras Cultivating Tenants' Protection Act (now called as Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants' Protection Act, 1955). The question that arose for consideration of the Hon'ble Division Bench in that case was as to whether the appellant was the cultivating tenant entitled to protection under the said Act. The appellant therein contended that he was in occupation of the land as the lessee in respect of coconut Thop and he being a cultivating tenant was entitled to protection against the eviction by reason of the provisions of the said Act. In that case, the appellant had taken on lease of coconut trees standing on the 5 Thopes specified in the schedule to the documents which exclusively stated that the lease was in respect of the trees standing on the property. In that case, the appellant had taken on lease of coconut trees standing on the 5 Thopes specified in the schedule to the documents which exclusively stated that the lease was in respect of the trees standing on the property. The Hon'ble Division Bench after considering various aspects of the matter and also after considering the decision of the earlier Division Bench reported in 1948(2) MLJ 155 (cited supra) has observed as follows:- "The substantial question that arises for consideration in this second appeal is whether there has been a lease of the land in favour of the appellant by respondents 1 and 2, and secondly, whether such a lease is for agricultural purposes. The document makes it clear that the right created under the document is only in respect of the trees. The preamble as well as the schedule indicate that the agreement entitled the appellant only to collect the produce from the trees. There is no doubt a clause in the agreement which says that the appellant would entitled to repair the land so as to render it useful for obtaining the produce. However that would seem to imply that no interest in land was created for it such a right or interest was intended to be created under the document, there was no necessity for this clause at all.........." "In Venugopala Pillai v. Thirunavukkarasu (3), there was a lease of coconut trees for the purpose of drawing toddy. The document which was executed between the parties showed that the lessee obtained the right to enjoy the toddy yield from the trees and a right to enter upon the land for the said purpose. But it was equally clear from it that the lessee did not obtain any right in and to the land. It was held that so far as the land was concerned, the lessee was a mere licensee, and his right to enter the land was only so long as he had the right to enjoy the toddy yield from the trees. But there was a further question in the case, viz, that with which we are not now concerned, whether such right as was granted to the lessee, the right of drawing toddy would be " immovable property" within the definition of that term in the Transfer of Property Act. But there was a further question in the case, viz, that with which we are not now concerned, whether such right as was granted to the lessee, the right of drawing toddy would be " immovable property" within the definition of that term in the Transfer of Property Act. The learned Judges cited with approval the following passage in Marshall vs. Green (1) "The principal of those decisions appears to be this, that wherever at the time of the contract it is contemplates that the purchaser should derive a benefit from the further growth of the thing sold, from further vegetation and from the nutriment to be afforded by the land, the contract is to be considered as for an interest in land; but where the process of vegetation is over, or the parties agree that the thing sold shall be immediately withdrawn from the land, the land is to be considered as a mere warehouse of the thing sold, and the contract is for goods. We are not however concerned in this case with any such provision of the Transfer of Property Act, or whether a lease of usufruct form trees will immovable property; what we have to see is whether there has been a lease of the land. There can be no doubt that the appellant's right was to enjoy only the coconut yield from the trees which derived their nutriment from the land. It may be that such a benefit amounts to an interest in immoveable property. But that is not the same thing as saying that there has been a transfer of the land itself. In the case cited above, the distinction that there could be a transfer of interest in immoveable property without there being a transfer of the land has been recognised. " "The question to be considered in the present case as we said earlier is whether there had been a lease f the tope as such or of the trees alone. That question would depend mainly on the terms of the agreement. It is evident from the contents of the document which we have set out above that it cannot be said that exclusive possession of the land was given to the appellant. On the other hand, he is prohibited from doing anything on the land. That question would depend mainly on the terms of the agreement. It is evident from the contents of the document which we have set out above that it cannot be said that exclusive possession of the land was given to the appellant. On the other hand, he is prohibited from doing anything on the land. In the case of three of the topes he was specifically given a power to render the soil fit, to facilitate presumably the irrigation of the trees etc. We are, therefore, of opinion that there has been no lease of the land. It is argued for the respondents that even if that question were to be answered in the affirmative, the lease should not be regarded as one for agricultural purposes. Support for the argument is sought from the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy (3). The question in that case concerned whether the profits realised from sale of forest trees would constitute agricultural income within the meaning of the Income-Tax Act. The Supreme Court pointed out that the term "agricultural" would comprise within it (1) basis operations like tilling of the land, sowing seeds, planting etc., such basic operations requiring expenditure of human skill and labour on the land itself, and (2) other operations which have to be resorted to by the agriculturist and which are absolutely necessary for the purpose of effectively raising the produce from the land, referred to as subsequent operations like protecting the crops, pruning, cutting, harvesting etc. It was held that where there had been no sowing or planting but only subsequent tending and protection of the produce as in the case of a forest, it would not be agriculture. This view was reiterated in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar and Orissa v. Sri Rama Krishna Deo (1). What is therefore, essential to constitute an agricultural operation is the tilling of the land, sowing seeds, planting and similar operations on the land. The mere presence of subsequent operations without there being the basic operations referred to above, as in the case of forest produce and spontaneous growth, could not be agricultural operations. In other words, if there are no basic operations as referred to above, there cannot be an agricultural operations." 24. The mere presence of subsequent operations without there being the basic operations referred to above, as in the case of forest produce and spontaneous growth, could not be agricultural operations. In other words, if there are no basic operations as referred to above, there cannot be an agricultural operations." 24. A perusal of the above decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench clearly shows that entire contention raised by the petitioner based on the said agreement dated 14.06.1984 has to be rejected with regard to his claim as cultivating tenant. Even assuming that the said document is a lease, as I have already pointed out that the said agreement was made in respect of only usufruct and not in respect of the land, I am bound to follow the latter decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench reported in 1963(76) L.W. 378 (cited supra) which had in fact considered the earlier Division Bench Judgment reported in 1948(2) MLJ 155 (cited supra). The learned counsel for the petitioner further relied on a decision of the learned Single Judge reported in 1992(2) L.W. 234 (cited supra) to show that the right to pluck coconuts is neither a lease nor a license, but it is only a sale of goods. The learned Single Judge in that case had in fact considered both decisions of the Division Bench and had chosen to follow the latter one. Therefore, by considering all the facts and circumstances of the case and by following the decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench reported in (1963)76 L.W. 378 (cited supra), I reject the claim of the petitioner in all aspects. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. No costs.

Subramanian v. District Revenue Officer, Tirunelveli