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Rajasthan High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 623 (RAJ)

Baldev Raj Chopra v. Rakesh Kumar

2013-03-29

P.K.LOHRA

body2013
JUDGMENT : P.K. Lohra, J. Appellant-defendant has laid this first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure , 1908 (for short, 'CPC') for assailing the impugned judgment and decree dated 05.10.1987 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge No.2, Sri Ganganagar (for short, 'learned trial Court'). 2. The learned trial Court on adjudication of the suit filed by respondent-plaintiff has passed a decree for specific performance of contract in his favour and against the appellant. 3. The factual matrix, as depicted in the plaint, is that the respondent-plaintiff instituted a civil suit against the appellant-defendant for specific performance of contract, inter-alia, on the ground that the appellant defendant executed an agreement to sale in respect of his House No.130, 'E' Block, Sri Ganganagar, measuring 32 x 50 ft, for a consideration amount of Rs. 40,000/-. As per description in the plaint, the house in question is having six rooms and latrine etc, and the agreement to sale was executed on 21st of December 1981. The respondent plaintiff also averred in the plaint that at the time of agreement to sale, security amount/earnest money of Rs. 10,000/- was paid to the appellant on the same day and in lieu thereof the appellant handed over possession of one room and kitchen to the respondent. Subsequently, the appellant-defendant again approached the respondent on 11th November 1982 and received a sum of Rs. 5,000/- against the consideration amount, and an endorsement to this effect was made by him overleaf the agreement to sale. Thus, according to the respondent-plaintiff, by 11th November 1982, out of total consideration amount of Rs. 40,000/-, a sum of Rs. 15,000 was paid by him to the appellant-defendant, and therefore, the outstanding consideration amount remained confined to Rs. 25,000/- only. The factual antecedents in the plaint further reveal that as per agreement to sale, the appellant-defendant was under an obligation to execute a registered sale deed within a year from the date of execution of agreement to sale however the said duration was extended by him upto 19th February 1983 but even after expiry of the said date the appellant failed to fulfil his promise and no steps were taken by him to perform his part of the contract by execution of registered sale deed for the house in question. Plaintiff-respondent also averred in the plaint that as per terms of the agreement, entire expenditure for registration was required to be paid by the respondent-plaintiff, therefore, in order to show his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, the plaintiff-respondent sent a registered notice to the appellant on 27th January 1983 calling upon the appellant to execute registered sale deed in his favour. In the notice, the respondent has also stated that he is prepared to pay the remaining consideration amount of Rs. 25,000/- as well as the requisite expenditure for registration charges. However, as per the version of the respondent-plaintiff in the plaint, the appellant refused to accept the said notice and as such the said registered envelope returned back undelivered. For persisting his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract, the respondent-plaintiff thereafter sent a telegram to the appellant on 16th of February 1983 which was received by the appellant. With all these averments, the respondent-plaintiff has asserted in the plaint that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract but the appellant-defendant has not acceded to his request and failed to perform his part of contract in terms of the agreement. In order to show his bona-fides, the respondent-plaintiff has also stated in the plaint that on the appointed day i.e. on 19th February 1983, he visited the office of Sub Registrar (Registration), Sri Ganganagar and presented an application on 19th February 1983 in his office, thereby he conveyed the Sub Registrar that he is prepared to pay the remaining consideration amount as well as the registration charges. However, on 19th February 1983 appellant did not turn up for performing his part of the contract and therefore the sincere efforts made by the respondent-plaintiff remained futile. Highlighting the conduct of the appellant, the respondent-plaintiff has also averred in the plaint that he received a communication from the appellant whereby a request was made at his behest to extend the period of registration upto 19th of April 1983. Relying on the said communication, the respondent plaintiff waited upto 19th April 1983 but uptil 19th April 1983 the appellant has not performed his part of the contract. Relying on the said communication, the respondent plaintiff waited upto 19th April 1983 but uptil 19th April 1983 the appellant has not performed his part of the contract. While castigating the appellant for his reluctance to perform his part of the contract, the respondent-plaintiff has made a specific plea in the plaint that the appellant has resiled from his promise in view of escalation in the market rate of the property in question. According to respondent-plaintiff, the appellant was under an obligation to perform his part of the contract, and therefore, by not adhering to the terms of the contract, he has violated the terms of the agreement to sale, which is ex-face dehors the law. Emphasising the conduct of the appellant, the respondent-plaintiff has averred in the plaint that due to omissions and commissions of the appellant, cause of action accrued to him on 19th February 1983 and on 19th April 1983. On the strength of these pleadings, the respondent-plaintiff has prayed for granting him decree for specific performance of contract. 4. The suit for specific performance of contract launched at the behest of plaintiff respondent was contested by the appellant and written statement was submitted on his behalf before the learned trial Court. In his written statement, the appellant has categorically denied the execution of agreement to sale on 21st December 1981 in favour of respondent-plaintiff. The appellant has further averred in the written statement that he has neither received Rs. 10,000 as earnest money nor handed over possession of one room and kitchen to the respondent. The receipt of amount of Rs. 5,000/- against consideration amount was also refuted by the appellant in his written statement. In totality, almost all the averments contained in the plaint were repelled by the appellant. In his written statement under the head "Additional Pleas", the appellant has alleged that at the relevant point of time the cost of the house in question was around Rs. 1,50,000/- and therefore there was no question of his agreeing for alienating the said house for a petty consideration amount of Rs. 40,000/- only. While adverting to the alleged agreement to sale, the appellant has categorically mentioned in additional pleas that in the year 1981 he was in dire need of money for sending his daughter and son-in-law to Dubai and therefore he approached many persons for getting loan of Rs. 10,000/- only. 40,000/- only. While adverting to the alleged agreement to sale, the appellant has categorically mentioned in additional pleas that in the year 1981 he was in dire need of money for sending his daughter and son-in-law to Dubai and therefore he approached many persons for getting loan of Rs. 10,000/- only. Despite his sincere efforts, as the appellant could not manage the requisite amount, he approached one Kulveer Singh Arora to manage the requisite amount. Mr. Kulveer Singh Arora, thereupon assured the appellant that he would manage the requisite amount from the respondent-plaintiff provided the appellant was willing to pay "Pathani" interest @ Rs. 4 per month. Due to some compelling reasons, the appellant thereafter accompanied Kulveer Singh Arora and both of them went to Sohanlal - father of respondent-plaintiff. After deliberations, Sohanlal agreed to give loan of Rs. 10,000/- and explained him the terms of loan including interest @ Rs. 4 per month and advance payment of three months' interest. Mr. Sohanlal further explained him the terms of the loan that out of Rs. 10,000/- he would deduct three months' interest and shall pay him only the remaining amount. Besides this, Sohanlal also asked him to mortgage his house as a security. According to the appellant, although all these terms were very onerous but he had no option but to agree due to compelling circumstances. Thus, according to the appellant, in these adverse circumstances, the appellant signed the document without reading the recitals contained therein as dictated by Sohanlal. On execution of the document, Sohanlal handed over him Rs. 8,800/- only after deducting Rs. 1200/- against interest. Narrating his plight, the appellant has further stated in his additional pleas that after a lapse of one year when Sohanlal asked him to pay interest, he showed his inability to pay the same as he could not arrange the funds. When the appellant failed to arrange the requisite amount of interest, Sohanlal asked him to append his signature overleaf the agreement and at that point of time what endorsement was made overleaf the agreement is not within his knowledge because he does not know Hindi. Receipt of Rs. 5,000/- on 11th November 1982 was also specifically denied by the appellant. Adverting to letter dated 19th February 1983, the appellant has averred that the said letter was not written by him. Receipt of Rs. 5,000/- on 11th November 1982 was also specifically denied by the appellant. Adverting to letter dated 19th February 1983, the appellant has averred that the said letter was not written by him. The appellant has also stated in the additional pleas that after lapse of about 1-1½ years from receiving amount of Rs. 8,800, when the appellant could not pay the interest, Sohanlal threatened him to auction the property and defame him and that being so, in these compelling circumstances as per the dictate of Sohanlal he signed the document. Attributing fraud being played by Sohanlal, the appellant has very specifically pleaded that the alleged agreement to sale is a spurious document and therefore the appellant is not bound by the terms and conditions of the said agreement. With all these averments, the appellant has prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. On the basis of pleadings of the rival parties, the learned trial Court settled following issues for determination: ¼1½ D;k izfroknh us iz'uxr nLrkost dk fu"iknu 8800 :i;s izkIr dj mu ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa fd;k] ftudk mYys[k izfrokni= ds pj.k la[;k 13 esa fd;k x;k gS vkSj mlus njvly edku cspus dk lkSnk ugha fd;k Fkk\ ¼2½ D;k fnukad 11-11-82 dks oknh us izfroknh dks 5000 :i;s vnk ugha fd, vkSj izfroknh us izfrokn ds pj.k la[;k&14 esa mYysf[kr ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa bckjr fnukad 11-11-82 dks fu"ikfnr dh\ ¼3½ D;k izfroknh us fnukad 21-12-81 dks bdjkjukek c;k dh fe;kn 19-2-83 rd ugha c<+kbZ\ ¼4½ D;k izfroknh iz'uxr bdjkjukesa ds v/khu vius mRrjnkf;Ro dk fuokZg djus dks lnSo rS;kj jgk gS vkSj vc Hkh gS\ ¼5½ D;k izfroknh 5000 :i;s fo'ks"k gtkZuk ikus dk gdnkj gS\ ¼6½ D;k bdjkjukek fnukad 21-12-81 ds v/khu oknh dks ,d dejs ij dCtk ugha fn;k x;k vkSj oknh dk dejs ij dCtk ugha gS\ ¼7½ vuqrks"k\ 6. After framing of the issues, respective parties led their evidence. In order to substantiate his case, on behalf of respondent-plaintiff, his father and power of attorney Shri Sohanlal appeared in the witness box and testified on oath. Besides oral testimony of PW1 Sohanlal, respondent-plaintiff has also produced documentary evidence for strengthening his case. For authenticating his defence, the appellant himself appeared in the witness box and also examined four other witnesses namely DW2 Kartar Singh, DW3 Om Prakash, DW4 Kulveer Singh, and DW5 Manoharlal. Besides oral testimony of PW1 Sohanlal, respondent-plaintiff has also produced documentary evidence for strengthening his case. For authenticating his defence, the appellant himself appeared in the witness box and also examined four other witnesses namely DW2 Kartar Singh, DW3 Om Prakash, DW4 Kulveer Singh, and DW5 Manoharlal. After conclusion of the pleadings, learned court below heard final arguments and decreed the suit for specific performance of contract. 7. I have heard the learned Senior Counsel Shri L.R. Mehta assisted by Mr. R.K. Singhal for the appellant, and learned Senior Counsel Shri R.K. Thanvi assisted by Mr. Narendra Thanvi for the respondent and scanned the evidence with other materials on record. 8. Learned Senior Counsel Shri L.R. Mehta has urged with full emphasis that the respondent-plaintiff has failed to discharge his onus to prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. According to learned counsel for the appellant, readiness and willingness by the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract is a sine qua- non for grant of a decree for specific performance of contract. Elaborating his submissions, Shri Mehta has emphasised that readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract by plaintiff is both physical and mental. For substantiating this argument, learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that the plaintiff himself has not appeared in the witness box for proving the averments of the plaint. Assailing the findings of the learned court below on Issue No.4, Shri Mehta contends that a power of attorney cannot depose in place and instead of principal. Placing reliance on Order 3 Rule 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code, learned counsel for the appellant submits that Order 3 Rule 1 and 2 simply empowers the holder of power of attorney to "act" on behalf of principal. Explaining the term "act", learned counsel submits that a power of attorney cannot depose for the principal in respect of the matter which only the principal can have a knowledge and in respect of which the principal is entitled to be cross-examined. With these arguments, the learned counsel has impeached the findings on Issue No.4 and categorised the said finding as perverse and dehors the law. 9. With these arguments, the learned counsel has impeached the findings on Issue No.4 and categorised the said finding as perverse and dehors the law. 9. Shri Mehta, learned Senior Counsel, while buttressing his contentions on the anvil of Order 3 Rule 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code has emphatically argued that due to non-appearance of the plaintiff in the witness box, the learned trial Court ought to have drawn adverse inference against him on the strength of rigour of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 (for short, 'the Act of 1872'). Taking shelter of Section 114 of the Act of 1872, Shri Mehta has contended that by not considering adverse inference against plaintiff/respondent, the learned court below has committed manifest error of law rendering the impugned judgment vulnerable. 10. Elaborating his arguments with respect to compelling circumstances, under which the instrument/agreement was executed by the appellant, learned counsel, has submitted that the appellant is not bound by the terms of the agreement. In support of this contention, Shri Mehta has laid full emphasis on testimony of the appellant and Kulveer Singh (D.W.4). 11. While taking dig at the impugned judgment, learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that the learned court below while passing the impugned judgment and decree has given total slip to the provision envisaged under Section 20 of the Act of 1963. Precisely, the submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that inadequacy of the consideration amount and the unconscionable terms of the contract were completely overlooked by the learned court below while passing the impugned decree. That apart, as per learned counsel for the appellant, the learned court below has not at all cared to appreciate the hardship caused to the appellant on account of passing of the impugned judgment and decree. 12. Enunciating the legislative intent, as expressed under Section 10 read with Section 20 of the Act of 1963, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that granting of a decree for specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief and such discretion is liable to be exercised by the Court judiciously. 12. Enunciating the legislative intent, as expressed under Section 10 read with Section 20 of the Act of 1963, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that granting of a decree for specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief and such discretion is liable to be exercised by the Court judiciously. For substantiating his this argument, the learned counsel for the appellant has drawn attention of this Court towards evidence of the appellant which according to him is clear and unequivocal that at the time of execution of the agreement, the appellant remained under this impression that he is executing a deed of mortgage of his house in favour of respondent-plaintiff. The learned counsel has also laid emphasis on the fact that the appellant was totally unaware about the recitals of the agreement for the reason that he did not know Hindi language and the entire text of the agreement was in Hindi language. To support his arguments, the learned counsel for the appellant has also laid emphasis on the evidence of other witnesses produced by the appellant showing value of the property more than one lac at the time of agreement. On the strength of this plea, the learned counsel has further reiterated that on appreciation of evidence and other materials on record, it is abundantly clear that the terms of the agreement are unconscionable. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the evidence tendered on behalf of the appellant was in consonance and in conformity with the pleadings and same remained rebutted ought to have been given due credence by the learned court below. Adverting to the conduct of the plaintiff-respondent, learned counsel for the appellant has urged that after filing the suit at the stage of evidence of the plaintiff, he has executed power of attorney in favour of his father to depose on his behalf. The non-appearance of the plaintiff in the witness box was objected to by the appellant at the time of examination of PW1, his power of attorney, as is evident from order sheet dated 16th August 1985. Further highlighting the conduct of the respondent, learned counsel has argued that after closure of the evidence of the appellant, the respondent-plaintiff has availed many opportunities to produce his evidence in rebuttal but no evidence was tendered by the respondent in rebuttal. Further highlighting the conduct of the respondent, learned counsel has argued that after closure of the evidence of the appellant, the respondent-plaintiff has availed many opportunities to produce his evidence in rebuttal but no evidence was tendered by the respondent in rebuttal. The learned counsel for the appellant has also contended that the case in hand is a glaring example of variance in pleading and proof. In the plaint there is no averment made by the respondent-plaintiff that in this entire transaction his father and power of attorney was involved, whereas while deposing on his behalf his father and power of attorney has stated on oath that he was present at the time of execution of the agreement and he is in know of all the facts. Therefore, according to submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, impugned judgment is highly unjust and improper and cannot be sustained. 13. Lastly, the learned counsel for the appellant has argued that granting a decree for specific performance of contract is discretionary in nature and therefore it is not imperative for the Court to grant such a decree merely because it is lawful to do so. 14. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel Shri R.K. Thanvi appearing for the respondent has argued that the learned trial Court has exercised its discretion judiciously while passing the impugned judgment. Stoutly defending the impugned judgment, learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the respondent-plaintiff has not only pleaded but has proved his readiness and willingness to carry out his part of the contract. For substantiating his contention, the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on Para 3 to 6 of the plaint and has also laid emphasis on Para 3 and 4 of the written statement. According to learned counsel for the respondent, the averments contained in Para 3 and 4 of the plaint have not been specifically denied by the appellant and as such this sort of evasive reply by the appellant amounts to admission. For this proposition, learned counsel has placed reliance on Order 8 Rule 5 Civil Procedure Code and urged with full emphasis at his command that in want of specific denial, provisions contained in Order 8 Rule 5 are liable to be invoked for non suiting the appellant. 15. For this proposition, learned counsel has placed reliance on Order 8 Rule 5 Civil Procedure Code and urged with full emphasis at his command that in want of specific denial, provisions contained in Order 8 Rule 5 are liable to be invoked for non suiting the appellant. 15. Authenticating his submissions, learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the appellant having accepted his signature on the original agreement and the other documents cannot be allowed to disown the recitals contained in these documents. As per learned counsel for the respondent, the conduct of refusal to accept the notice by appellant attracts the provisions contained in Section 114 of the Act of 1972 so as to draw presumption against the appellant that he has shown his reluctance to carry out his part of the contract. Buttressing his submissions, the learned counsel Shri Thanvi has urged that letter Ex.4, which was submitted by the respondent before the Sub Registrar (Registration), Sri Ganganagar and notice Annex.5 sent on behalf of the respondent-plaintiff by his counsel, clearly and unequivocally reveals that the respondent plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. With these arguments, the learned counsel for the respondent has emphatically argued that the finding of the learned court below on Issue No.4 is just and proper and is in consonance and in conformity with the evidence and other materials on record which deserves no interference in exercise of appellate jurisdiction of this Court. 16. Learned counsel has also taken a dig on the conduct of the appellant by inviting attention of this Court towards letter Annex.3 which is scribed in the hand-writing of appellant himself where he himself has mentioned that date for registration be extended upto 19th April 1983. As per learned counsel for the respondent, it is really strange that the entire text of the letter is hand-written by the appellant and yet he has disowned the said letter, which is a matter of grave concern. Thus, the substance of the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is that there is absolutely no room of doubt on marshaling of evidence and other materials available on record that the respondent-plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and he was forced to launch the litigation because of the stubborn attitude of the appellant. 17. 17. Joining the issue with the appellant on his argument which hovers around Order 3 Rule 1 and 2, learned Senior Counsel Shri R.K. Thanvi has submitted that true it is that the plaintiff himself has not appeared in the witness box but then according to him his non-appearance in the witness box has not at all prejudiced the cause of the plaintiff. According to learned counsel for the respondent, the appellant himself has very candidly admitted in his written statement that his entire dealing at the time of execution of the agreement was with the father and power of attorney of the respondent-plaintiff. That apart, the learned counsel has also urged that the appellant himself in his statements has admitted that the agreement in question was executed by him in presence of power of attorney of the plaintiff and his entire dealing was with the power of attorney. Learned counsel invited attention of this Court towards testimony of the alleged star witness of the appellant DW4 Kulveer Singh, which according to learned counsel has demolished the entire case of the appellant. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, the said witness has corroborated the version of the appellant so as to prove direct nexus of the power of attorney with the entire transaction. Thus, the substance of the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that deposition of PW1 power of attorney of the plaintiff respondent is in consonance and in conformity with the rigor of Order 3 Rule 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code and as such the learned court below has rightly placed reliance on the said testimony for decreeing the suit. 18. Repelling the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently argued that provisions of Section 114 of the Act of 1872 are not at all attracted in the instant case so as to draw adverse inference against the respondent-plaintiff. According to learned counsel for the respondent, the power of attorney of the plaintiff-respondent has deposed before the Court only those facts which were within his knowledge and not pertaining to the facts and circumstances which were within the knowledge of the principal. According to learned counsel for the respondent, the power of attorney of the plaintiff-respondent has deposed before the Court only those facts which were within his knowledge and not pertaining to the facts and circumstances which were within the knowledge of the principal. Therefore, according to learned counsel for the respondent, it is a clear and unambiguous case of an 'act' done by the power of attorney on behalf of the principal within the four corners of Order 3 Rule 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code. 19. While adverting to the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant regarding inadequacy of the consideration amount, unconscionable terms of the contract and the alleged hardship caused to the appellant, the learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that the agreement was signed by the appellant with open eyes voluntarily and therefore at this stage these arguments are merely ornamental and deserves no credence whatsoever. According to learned counsel for the respondent, the appellant himself has approached the respondent-plaintiff and has entered into an agreement with the respondent plaintiff in presence of his father and power of attorney; it is not open for him to disown all these acts which were voluntarily undertaken by him. Defending the agreement and its terms, learned counsel has urged that there is no semblance of evidence or other materials on record to show that the said agreement was executed by the appellant under duress, coercion or undue influence. Thus, in substance, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is that in a suit for specific performance of contract on the face of it all these pleas are very attractive but on examination of these pleas on the touchstone of the facts and circumstances of the case makes the thing abundantly clear that these emotional arguments are unworthy of any credit whatsoever. 20. Impeaching the testimony of DW4 Kulveer Singh, learned counsel Shri Thanvi has argued with full emphasis that he has not supported the version of the appellant so far as the terms of the agreement are concerned. 20. Impeaching the testimony of DW4 Kulveer Singh, learned counsel Shri Thanvi has argued with full emphasis that he has not supported the version of the appellant so far as the terms of the agreement are concerned. Inviting attention of this Court towards the statement of this witness recorded during cross-examination, learned counsel has pointed out that the witness is very candid in his deposition inasmuch as he has stated on oath that what was the transaction between Sohanlal and the appellant is not known to him, nor he is aware about the terms and conditions which were agreed between both of them. Even the witness has pleaded ignorance about the deal which was entered into between both the parties and so also the transaction of money. Therefore, in the estimation of the learned counsel for the respondent, the testimony of PW4 Kartar Singh is neither dilating on the terms of the agreement, nor it can have any reflection on the deal which in fact stuck between Sohanlal and the appellant. In totality, on the strength of this submission, the learned counsel for the respondent has repudiated the contention of the appellant about the alleged unconscionable terms of the contract. 21. Learned counsel for the respondent Shri Thanvi has argued that legal position is no more res-integra that granting a decree for specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief but according to his submission, the said discretion is to be exercised judiciously and the learned court below rightly exercised the same while decreeing the suit filed by the respondent. As per learned counsel for the respondent, the case in hand is a unique example of nonperformance of his part of contract by the appellant and therefore the learned court below while considering equity in favour of the respondent-plaintiff has granted the decree for specific performance of contract taking into account the fact that compensation in terms of money would not afford adequate relief to the respondent-plaintiff. 22. Dealing with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant on the issue of variance in pleadings and proof, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that there is no variance in the pleadings and the proof. 22. Dealing with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant on the issue of variance in pleadings and proof, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that there is no variance in the pleadings and the proof. The submission of the learned counsel in this behalf is that edifice of the entire claim of the respondent plaint is the agreement to sale which is executed by the appellant and the same has been proved by the evidence of the power of attorney of the plaintiff PW1. 23. In contrast to the last submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, learned counsel has argued that the impugned decree has been passed by the learned court below because it was lawful for it to grant the said relief in the given circumstances. Thus, according to learned counsel for the respondent, the discretion, which has been exercised judiciously by the learned trial Court in the form of impugned judgment and decree, calls for no interference by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. 24. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by both the learned counsels and scrutinised their submissions in the light of legal precedents cited at Bar. 25. The learned counsel for the appellant in support of his argument founded on Order 3 Rule 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code has placed heavy reliance on following judgments: 1. Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani and Anr. v. Indusind Bank Limited and Ors., 2005(2) CCC 324 (S.C.) : AIR 2005 SC 439 ), 2. Iswar Bhai C. Patel alias Bachu Bhai Patel v. Harihar Behera and Anr., 1999 (1) ACJ 407 (S.C.) : 1999 (2) CCC 01 (S.C.) : AIR 1999 SC 1341 3. Smt. Shanta Meena v. Smt. Kulshree and Ors., 2011 (2) CCC 421 (Raj.) : 2011(2) DNJ (Raj.) 558] 26. In case of Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (supra), the Apex Court had the occasion to examine the legislative intent as envisaged under Order 3 Rule 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code. While interpreting Order 3 Rule 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code, the Court has made following observations in Para 13 of the said verdict: 13. Order 3, Rules 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code, empowers the holder of power of attorney to "act" on behalf of the principal. While interpreting Order 3 Rule 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code, the Court has made following observations in Para 13 of the said verdict: 13. Order 3, Rules 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code, empowers the holder of power of attorney to "act" on behalf of the principal. In our view the word "acts" employed in Order 3, Rules 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code, confines only in respect of "acts" done by the power of attorney holder in exercise of power granted by the instrument. The term "acts" would not include deposing in place and instead of the principal. In other words, if the power of attorney holder has rendered some "acts" in pursuance to power of attorney, he may depose for the principal in respect of such acts, but he cannot depose for the principal for the acts done by the principal and not by him. Similarly, he cannot depose for the principal in respect of the matter which only the principal can have a personal knowledge and in respect of which the principal is entitled to be cross-examined. 27. The second judgment of Iswar Bhai C. Patel (supra), on which the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance, is not of great significance and is clearly distinguishable. In the said judgment, the Apex Court has examined the locus of an individual to file an appeal; therefore, this judgment is of no assistance to the appellant. 28. The learned counsel for the appellant has also invited my attention to a judgment of this Court in case of Smt. Shanta Meena (supra). In the said judgment, the learned Single Judge of this Court has reiterated the same principles which are laid down by the Apex Court in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani's case (supra). On both these judgments, the learned counsel for the respondent has also placed reliance and therefore virtually the parties are in agreement so far as position of law on the subject matter is concerned. 29. There is no wrangle in the legal position that Order 3 Rule 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code mandates with clarity and precision that a power of attorney can act on behalf of the principal and the term 'act' would not include 'deposing in place and instead of the principle'. 29. There is no wrangle in the legal position that Order 3 Rule 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code mandates with clarity and precision that a power of attorney can act on behalf of the principal and the term 'act' would not include 'deposing in place and instead of the principle'. However, a power of attorney is well within his rights to depose in respect of acts done by him for the principal and within his personal knowledge. Applying the ratio decidendi of the judgments referred to supra in the light of facts and circumstances of the instant case and considering rigor of Order 3 Rule 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code, in my opinion, testimony of PW1 is worth credence and the same has been rightly relied upon by the learned court below. There is no quarrel in the factual position that originally the suit was filed by the plaintiff and the power of attorney to his father Sohanlal was conferred subsequent to filing of the suit but then in is written statement the appellant himself has involved the power of attorney in the entire deal and has specifically pleaded that his entire transaction was with the power of attorney holder. That apart, the appellant in his deposition and the other witness DW4 Kulveer Singh have established the proximity of the power of attorney holder in the entire deal. In fact, from pleading and proof of the appellant himself, the entire deal and transaction has taken place in presence of the power of attorney of the respondent-plaintiff. Thus, in these circumstances, the deposition of the power of attorney on behalf of principle for acts which were within his personal knowledge cannot be overlooked, nor on this count the respondent-plaintiff can be non-suited. On close scrutiny of the averments contained in the plaint and the written statement, it is amply clear that the appellant himself has involved the power of attorney in the entire transaction and has persisted with the said stand during his deposition as a witness in the Court and by producing a corroborating evidence in the form of DW4 Kulveer Singh. By his own acts and omissions, the appellant has involved the power of attorney in the entire transaction and has in fact facilitated his status as a main witness of the case on behalf of respondent-plaintiff. By his own acts and omissions, the appellant has involved the power of attorney in the entire transaction and has in fact facilitated his status as a main witness of the case on behalf of respondent-plaintiff. Therefore, in the given circumstances, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent-plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract solely on the strength of his non-appearance in the witness box cannot be sustained. Apart from it, the documentary evidence Annex.4 and 5 and the handwritten letter of the appellant Annex.3 are sufficient to conclude that the respondent plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. In this view of the matter, this argument, of the learned counsel for the appellant, merits rejection. 30. The second limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, which hovers around the same issue, is founded on Section 114 of the Act of 1872. For that proposition, the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on following judgments: 1. Vidyadhar v. Mankikrao and Anr., AIR 1999 SC 1441 2. Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh, 2010 (4) CCC 792 (S.C.) : 2010(3) ACJ 756 (S.C.) : 2010 (10) SCC 512 31. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that adverse inference cannot be drawn against the respondent-plaintiff for his nonappearance in the witness box because the respondent plaintiff has adduced the evidence of the material witness who had the personal knowledge about the entire transaction. Moreover, according to learned counsel for the respondent when the appellant has joined the issue before the learned trial Court and has cross-examined the power of attorney, now there appears to be no justification available with the appellant to invoke Section 114 of the Act of 1872. 32. I have pondered over this limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant and on examining the ratio decidendi in Man Kaur's case (supra), I am of the view that in the given circumstances power of attorney was a competent witness inasmuch as the power of attorney alone had the personal knowledge of the entire acts and transactions and not the principal. Therefore, the testimony of the power of attorney was rightly construed and relied by the learned court below while deciding issue No.4 in favour of respondent-plaintiff. Therefore, the testimony of the power of attorney was rightly construed and relied by the learned court below while deciding issue No.4 in favour of respondent-plaintiff. In this view of the matter, the provisions of Section 114 of the Act of 1872 are not attracted in the instant case and consequently this argument of the learned counsel for the appellant also fails. 33. The next submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the agreement in question was executed by the appellant under certain compelling circumstances appears to be very attractive, but I am afraid, this argument cannot come to the rescue of the appellant. On scanning the materials on record, there is no whisper by the appellant that he has executed the said agreement under duress, coercion or undue influence. Moreover, subsequent reiteration of the appellant for his commitment by his letter Annex.3 further establishes no room of doubt about execution of an agreement by the appellant to sell the house in question in favour of respondent-plaintiff. It is also noteworthy that the appellant has admitted his signature on the agreement to sale and further overleaf the agreement in his own handwriting he has admitted receipt of Rs. 5,000 on 11.11.1982 and extended the date upto 19th February 1983 vide his endorsement dated 21.12.1982. All these acts were voluntarily done by the appellant, and therefore the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is just and proper that the appellant cannot be permitted to eschew his own words and commitments. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on testimony of DW4 Kulveer Singh but in my considered opinion, the statements of the said witness are obviously of no avail and consequence to the appellant. If the evidence of DW4 Kulveer Singh is examined in totality then it will ipso facto reveal that he has pleaded total ignorance about the deal which has struck between Sohanlal and the appellant. Accordingly, this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is also overruled. 34. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant about variance in pleading and proof on the strength of the legal precedents, viz., Mrs. Om Prabha Jain v. Abbnash Chand and Anr. ( AIR 1968 SC 1083 ), and Bhagwan Datta Shastri v. Ram Ratanji Gupta & Ors. 34. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant about variance in pleading and proof on the strength of the legal precedents, viz., Mrs. Om Prabha Jain v. Abbnash Chand and Anr. ( AIR 1968 SC 1083 ), and Bhagwan Datta Shastri v. Ram Ratanji Gupta & Ors. ( AIR 1960 SC 200 ) is not at all tenable for the simple reason that in the instant case there is no variance in pleadings and proof. Moreover, the appellant himself has agreed the fact that he has executed the agreement in question and his entire deal was with the power of attorney holder. This being the situation, the argument is superfluous and merits rejection. 35. At this stage, I deem it just and appropriate to deal with the argument developed by the learned counsel for the respondent during the course of arguments. The learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff, in support of his argument, which hovers under Order 8 Rule 5 Civil Procedure Code, has placed reliance on two judgments, namely, Asha v. Pd. B.D. Sharma University of Health Sciences and Ors. (2012 (3) CCC 814 SC : 2012(2) ACJ 624 (S.C.)), and Smt. Roopi Bai v. Mahaveer and Ors. ( AIR 1994 Raj. 133 ). 36. Refuting this argument of the learned counsel for the respondent, Shri Mehta has urged that denial of the averments was specific on behalf of appellant and therefore provisions of Order 8 Rule 5 are not attracted. For this submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on additional pleas raised in the written statement which according to him cannot be read in isolation to the reply to each para of the plaint. Learned counsel has also countered this by submitting that on consideration of proper and specific denial, issues were settled by the learned court below and subject matter was put to trial. 37. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent lacks the legal foothold and therefore is not tenable. A cumulative reading of written statement makes it amply clear that averments contained in plaint were not admitted by the appellant and he has made endeavour to contest the claim of the respondent-plaintiff. Accordingly, this ambitious argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is hereby overruled. 38. A cumulative reading of written statement makes it amply clear that averments contained in plaint were not admitted by the appellant and he has made endeavour to contest the claim of the respondent-plaintiff. Accordingly, this ambitious argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is hereby overruled. 38. Now, adverting to the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant concerning Section 20 of the Act of 1963, that the consideration amount is grossly inadequate and the terms of the contract are unconscionable, deserves due credence and these contentions are required to be examined in the light of facts and circumstances and the evidence and other materials on record. From a bare perusal of the agreement to sale, it is crystal clear that the consideration amount as agreed between the rival parties is Rs. 40,000/- only and according to submission of the learned counsel for the appellant at the relevant point of time the valuation of the house in question was about Rs. 1,50,000/-. As per learned counsel for the appellant, this inadequacy of the consideration amount itself has rendered the contract unconscionable and therefore by virtue of Section 20 of the Act of 1963, the said contract is not specifically enforceable. To substantiate his this argument, learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on the statement of the appellant as well as statements of DW2 Kartar Singh, DW3 Om Prakash and DW5 Manoharlal. If the testimony of all these witnesses is harmoniously construed then it can very well be inferred by any prudent man that the amount of consideration for house in question was grossly inadequate. 39. Joining the issue on this argument, the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that mere inadequacy of the consideration amount cannot render a contract unconscionable nor on this plea it can be held that the contract is not enforceable. This sort of alternative relief is also in conformity with the residuary relief prayed for by the respondent-plaintiff in para 11 (Gha) of the plaint. 40. There is no quarrel that the Act of 1963 is inspired by the principles of equity, justice and good conscience and the reliefs to be granted under the Act of 1963 are founded on equitable considerations. 40. There is no quarrel that the Act of 1963 is inspired by the principles of equity, justice and good conscience and the reliefs to be granted under the Act of 1963 are founded on equitable considerations. The Court while deciding the question regarding specific performance of contract cannot altogether overlook the amount of inadequacy of consideration amount and the passage of time by which cost of property in question has escalated. At this stage, the Court feels that the rigor of Section 20 of the Act of 1963, which provides with clarity and precision that grant of relief of specific performance of contract is discretionary, also deserves due credence as the said issue also deserves to be decided simultaneously. In order to substantiate his argument that the remedy of specific performance of contract is discretionary, the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the following judgments: 1. Bal Krishan and Anr. v. Bhagwan Das and Ors., 2008(2) ACJ 551 (S.C.) : 2008(3) Civil Court 153 (S.C.) : AIR 2008 SC 1786 . 2. K.S. Vidhyanadam v. Vairavan, 1997(1) ACJ 423 (S.C.) : AIR 1997 SC 1751 3. A.C. Arulappan v. Smt. Ahalya Nayak, RLW 2002 (1) SC 1. 4. Late Lajpat Rai v. Late Jorawar Singh, 2010(3) CCC 655 (Raj.) : 2010 (3) WLC (Raj) 77. 41. In case of Bal Krishan (supra), the Apex Court while examining Section 20 of the Act of 1963 has made following observations in Para 8 of the judgment: 8. Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") corresponds with Section 24 of the old Act of 1877 which lays down that the person seeking specific performance of the contract, must file a suit wherein he must allege and prove that he has performed or has been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract, which are to be performed by him. The specific performance of the contract cannot be enforced in favour of the person who fails to aver and prove his readiness and willingness to perform essential terms of the contract. Explanation (ii) to clause (c) of Section 16 further makes it clear that plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction. Explanation (ii) to clause (c) of Section 16 further makes it clear that plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction. The compliance of the requirement of Section 16(c) is mandatory and in the absence of proof of the same that the plaintiff has been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract suit cannot succeed. The first requirement is that he must aver in plaint and thereafter prove those averments made in the plaint. The plaintiff's readiness and willingness must be in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform the essential part of the contract would be required to be demonstrated by him from the institution of the suit till it is culminated into decree of the court. It is also settled by various decisions of this Court that by virtue of Section 20 of the Act, the relief for specific performance lies in the discretion of the court and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so. The exercise of the discretion to order specific performance would require the court to satisfy itself that the circumstances are such that it is equitable to grant decree for specific performance of the contract. While exercising the discretion, the court would take into consideration the circumstances of the case, the conduct of parties, and their respective interests under the contract. No specific performance of a contract, though it is not vitiated by fraud or misrepresentation, can be granted if it would give an unfair advantage to the plaintiff and where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant, which he did not foresee. In other words, the court's discretion to grant specific performance is not exercised if the contract is not equal and fair, although the contract is not void. The said view was further reiterated by the Apex Court in A.C. Arulappan (supra) and the Apex Court while elaborating on the discretion, conferred on the Court under Section 20(2) of the Act of 1963, has made following observations: "The jurisdiction to decree specific relief is discretionary and the court can consider various circumstances to decide whether such relief is to be granted. Merely because it is lawful to grant specific relief, the court need not grant the order for specific relief; but his discretion shall not be exercised in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. Certain circumstances have been mentioned in Section 29(2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as to under what circumstances the Court shall exercise such discretion. If under the terms of the contract the plaintiff gets an unfair advantage over the defendant, the Court may not exercise its discretion in favour of the plaintiff. So also, specific relief may not be granted if the defendant would be put to undue hardship which he did not foresee at the time of agreement". 42. This Court in Late Lajpat Rai's case (supra) has also reiterated the same principle. 43. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has urged that although legislature has conferred discretion on the Court in the matter of grant of decree for specific performance of contract but the said discretion can be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. Learned counsel for the respondent has also contended that escalation of price cannot be cited as a ground for refusal of specific performance of contract. According to learned counsel for the respondent, hardship caused to the defendant cannot be cited as a valid reason for refusal to grant a decree for specific performance of contract because according to learned counsel it is not a case where the defendant did not foresee the hardship at the time of execution of the agreement. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on a judgment of Apex Court in the case of P. D'Souza v. Shondrilo Naidu, 2004(2) ACJ 573 (S.C.) : 2005(1) CCC 131 (S.C.) : (2004) 6 SCC 649 ]. In the said judgment in Para 39, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under: 39. It is not a case where the defendant did not foresee the hardship. It is furthermore not a case that non-performance of the agreement would not cause any hardship to the plaintiff. The defendant was the landlord of the plaintiff. He had accepted part payments from the plaintiff from time to time without any demur whatsoever. He redeemed the mortgage only upon receipt of requisite payment from the plaintiff. Even in August, 1981, i.e., just two months prior to the institution of suit, he had accepted Rs. The defendant was the landlord of the plaintiff. He had accepted part payments from the plaintiff from time to time without any demur whatsoever. He redeemed the mortgage only upon receipt of requisite payment from the plaintiff. Even in August, 1981, i.e., just two months prior to the institution of suit, he had accepted Rs. 20,000/- from the Plaintiff. It is, therefore, too late for the Appellant now to suggest that having regard to the escalation in price, the respondent should be denied the benefit of the decree passed in his favour. Explanation I appended to Section 20 clearly stipulates that merely inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature would not constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 20. 44. On giving thoughtful consideration to the law cited by both the learned counsel for the parties on that issue, in my considered opinion, the consideration amount for sale of house in question is grossly inadequate. Moreover, escalation in the land prices cannot be lost sight of by this Court in the given circumstances. The unimpeachable evidence of the appellant and his witnesses in want of there being any rebuttal by the respondent plaintiff about value of the property at the time of execution of the agreement and subsequent escalation are the factors which are relevant and germane to the matter. The legal position is no more res-integra that in a suit for specific performance of contract, sale of immovable property is not invariably ordered as a matter of right. The relief is discretionary but the discretion being a judicial one; it has to be exercised neither arbitrarily nor unreasonably but according to law and reason. The Act of 1963 provides certain guidelines which are required to be adhered to while adjudicating such a dispute between the parties. If the Court feels that the consideration to be received by the defendant is so grossly inadequate with reference to the set of things existing at the date of contract has to be either by itself or coupled with other circumstances including undue advantage taken by the plaintiff. If the Court feels that the consideration to be received by the defendant is so grossly inadequate with reference to the set of things existing at the date of contract has to be either by itself or coupled with other circumstances including undue advantage taken by the plaintiff. If the inadequacy of the consideration is so much as to shock the conscience of the Court in respect of fairness of the agreement, it is a case of gross inadequacy of the consideration making the instrument vulnerable on the anvil of being unconscionable contract. 45. Therefore, viewed from any angle, on close scrutiny of the facts and circumstances of this case, I feel inclined to hold that the consideration amount as mentioned in the agreement to sale for house in question was grossly inadequate at the relevant point of time and that renders the contract unconscionable. If the impugned judgment is tested on the touchstone of Section 20 of the Act of 1963 then it will ipso facto reveal that the learned court below has not at all cared to examine the matter in that background despite availability of umpteen material on record. Moreover, the learned trial Court has not bothered to analyze the evidence adduced by the appellant vis-a-vis inadequacy of consideration amount in the agreement to sale. A glance at impugned judgment makes it crystal clear that the learned Court below has not recorded any finding worth the name to brush aside testimony of all the witnesses of the appellant. In fact while adjudicating the lis involved in the matter, the learned trial Court has neither considered the relevant factors of unconscionable term of contract on the strength of gross inadequacy of consideration amount nor the hardship of the appellant. In this view of the matter, the impugned judgment is conspicuously silent on a very vital issue which ought to have been given due credence by the learned Court below. It is a trite law that there are some contracts which though they may be enforceable at law, and may relate to a subject matter of which equity ordinarily takes jurisdiction are denied equitable relief. For this reason, the jurisdiction of equity is generally called discretionary. The specific performance is not a matter of right but rests on the sound discretion of the court. For this reason, the jurisdiction of equity is generally called discretionary. The specific performance is not a matter of right but rests on the sound discretion of the court. It will not be enforced as a matter of course, when it will impose unreasonable or unjust hardship on the defendant. More exactly, therefore, it may be said that whenever a contract, though legally valid is grossly unfair, or its enforcement opposed to good policy for any reason, equity will refuse to enforce it. The overall analysis of the entire scenario, the vulnerability of the impugned judgment is writ large and therefore I am inclined to hold that the discretion has not been properly exercised by the learned trial Court while granting relief to the respondent-plaintiff. Thus, invoking the principles of equity, justice and good conscience, and the rigor of Section 20 of the Act of 1963, in my considered opinion, grant of decree for specific performance of contract cannot be sustained and relief granted to the respondent-plaintiff deserves to be moulded for imparting substantial justice. 46. There is no quarrel in the factual position that agreement to sale was executed by the appellant voluntarily and subsequently he has also reiterated the terms of the contract and parties are litigating since almost last three decades and the appellant is also enjoying the property being in possession even after passing of the decree by the learned court below. Since passing of the decree by the learned trial Court almost two and half decades have elapsed and the appellant who is in possession of the property is paying a meager sum of mesne profits @ Rs. 200 per month to the respondent. The amount paid by the appellant for last about 25 years as mesne profits for use and occupation of the property roundabout comes to Rs. 60,000 only. As the said amount was paid by the appellant during subsistence of a decree of the learned trial Court, the respondent-plaintiff is declared entitled to retain the same. Therefore, for doing equity between the rival parties and to impart substantial justice, it has become imperative to grant monetary compensation to the respondent-plaintiff which would afford adequate relief to him within the four corners of Section 10 for breach of contract by the appellant. Therefore, for doing equity between the rival parties and to impart substantial justice, it has become imperative to grant monetary compensation to the respondent-plaintiff which would afford adequate relief to him within the four corners of Section 10 for breach of contract by the appellant. The alternative relief, in the given circumstances will also mitigate the hardship of both the parties inasmuch as the appellant shall not be deprived of his property on which he is in possession since passing of the decree and the respondent-plaintiff who is pursuing his remedy bona-fide may not be deprived of the investment which he has made for purchase of property and the time spent by him for litigating in the matter. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and decree granting specific performance of contract is liable to be set aside by way of substitution of other adequate relief to the respondent plaintiff. Although it is a case wherein matter can be remanded to learned trial Court for its adjudication afresh, but I feel dissuaded to do so in the light of pendency of this litigation for last three decades. In my opinion, it will unnecessarily prolong the agony of both the parties and may result in travesty of justice. Thus, I feel persuaded to modify the judgment and decree passed by the learned Court below by way of granting reasonable compensation to the respondent-plaintiff. Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case wherein the present litigation has taken almost three decades and escalation of land prices is alarming in the present era, lump sum amount of compensation is required to be determined rationally to compensate the respondent-plaintiff. There is no straight jacket formula for assessing the reasonable compensation in such matters, nor there is any prescribed method for determining amount of reasonable compensation which would afford adequate relief to the respondent plaintiff. However, while considering this aspect of the matter, the Court is guided by certain factors which are relevant and germane, more particularly, devaluation of money, alarming escalation in the land prices, longevity of the litigation and the zeal and quest for justice at the behest of respondent plaintiff. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the amount of compensation payable to the respondent-plaintiff is assessed and quantified to the tune of Rs. 3,25,000/- only and the impugned decree is accordingly ordered to be modified. 47. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the amount of compensation payable to the respondent-plaintiff is assessed and quantified to the tune of Rs. 3,25,000/- only and the impugned decree is accordingly ordered to be modified. 47. The net result of the above discussion is that this appeal is partly allowed. The impugned judgment and decree dated 05.10.1987 passed by Addl. District Judge No.2, Sri Ganganagar is set aside and the said decree is substituted by decree for compensation to the tune of Rs. 3,25,000/- which shall be payable by appellant to the respondent-plaintiff for satisfaction of all the obligations of the appellant vis-a-vis the agreement to sale of the property in question. The appellant is directed to pay the said amount of compensation within a period of three months from the date of judgment. The modified decree be accordingly drawn. 48. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.