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2013 DIGILAW 626 (HP)

Sunita Dogra v. Puran Chand

2013-07-01

RAJIV SHARMA

body2013
JUDGMENT : Rajiv Sharma, J. This Regular Second Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 25.9.2001 passed by the District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala in Civil Appeal No. 16-D/XIII/1999 whereby the appeal of the appellant plaintiff has been partly allowed and preliminary decree for dissolution of the partnership firm was passed while the appeal of the plaintiff-appellant for rendition of accounts was dismissed. 2. "Key facts" necessary for the adjudication of this Regular Second Appeal are that the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants-plaintiffs, namely, Roshan Lal (hereinafter referred to as the "plaintiff" for convenience sake) filed a suit for dissolution and rendition of accounts. According to the plaintiff, the parties have been carrying on joint business of bakery in shop No.97, ward No.2, Forsyth Ganj, Upper Dharamshala since June 1987. The plaintiff and respondents-defendants (hereinafter referred to as the "defendants" for convenience sake) have the share each in the business. The plaintiff, defendant No.2 Balwant Singh and Mehnga Ram, predecessor-in-interest of defendants No.3 (a) to 3 (c), namely, Nirmala Devi, Kapil Kumar and Vishal contributed the amount for running the business. Defendant No.1 Puran Chand joined as partner of th share in order to carry out the work of bakery. The amount of profit and loss was to be divided amongst the partners in equal shares. Defendant No.1 is a very clever person and has committed breach of the oral partnership agreement by misappropriating the money of business for personal use and benefit and by not rendering the accounts. The plaintiff and defendant No.3 asked defendant No.1 to render the accounts of partnership, but he has refused to render the accounts of business. A notice was issued to defendant No.1 on 12.12.1988. Defendant No.1 gave reply of the notice and denied the partnership with the plaintiff and refused to render the accounts. The plaintiff wanted to dissolve the partnership as defendant No.1 had committed the breach of terms and conditions of the oral partnership business and the plaintiff also wanted direction to defender No.1 to render the accounts of partnership business. 3. The suit was contested by defendant No.1. According to him, there was no partnership between the parties at any time. He was the sole proprietor of the business and there was no question of dissolution of firm and rendering of accounts. 4. Defendant No.2 was served by way of publication on 17.4.1991. 3. The suit was contested by defendant No.1. According to him, there was no partnership between the parties at any time. He was the sole proprietor of the business and there was no question of dissolution of firm and rendering of accounts. 4. Defendant No.2 was served by way of publication on 17.4.1991. He did not appear in the court. He was proceeded ex parte. Defendant No.3 (a) to 3 (c) filed separate written statement. They have supported the claim of the plaintiff. 5. The suit was decided by the trial court. The plaintiff also filed an appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial court. He sought an amendment for dissolution of firm. It was allowed by the first appellate court and the judgment and decree of the trial court was set aside with a direction to decide the matter afresh. Thereafter, amendment was carried out and the written statement and replication were also filed. Trial court framed the issues on 7.7.1992 and 4.8.1998. Learned Sub Judge-I, Dharamshala dismissed the suit on 7.1.1999. The plaintiff preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala. Learned District Judge partly allowed the appeal and preliminary decree was ordered to be passed for dissolution of the partnership firm and the appeal of the plaintiff for rendition of accounts was dismissed on 25.9.2001. Hence, the present Regular Second Appeal. It was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 17.12.2002: "Whether a partnership firm can be ordered to be dissolved without there being rendition of accounts? 6. Defendant No.1 Puran Chand filed cross objections bearing No. 562/2002. The cross-objections were also admitted by this Court on 2.5.2013. However, inadvertently substantial questions of law framed were not taken into consideration. Now, the cross-objections would be deemed to have been admitted on the following substantial questions of law: 1. "Whether on the material on record the findings that there was a partnership between the parties is contrary to law and perverse and based on misreading? 2. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to rendition of accounts when there was no partnership firm proved or in existence and more particularly when it was not claimed to be a registered partnership? 3. Whether the plaintiff has locus standi to file the suit and rendition of account on a proper construction of the provisions of the Partnership Act?" 7. Mr. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to rendition of accounts when there was no partnership firm proved or in existence and more particularly when it was not claimed to be a registered partnership? 3. Whether the plaintiff has locus standi to file the suit and rendition of account on a proper construction of the provisions of the Partnership Act?" 7. Mr. Suneet Goel has vehemently argued that once the decree for dissolution of firm has been passed, the decree for rendition of accounts was also to be passed. 8. Mr. Rajnish K. Lall, on the basis of the substantial questions of law framed, has argued that there was no partnership between the parties and, thus, there was no question of rendition of accounts by defendant No.1. He has also contended that the suit filed by the plaintiff was not maintainable. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records carefully. 10. Since the substantial questions of law of the Regular Second Appeal and cross-objections are interconnected and interlinked they are taken up together for determination to avoid repetition of discussion of evidence. 11. Learned trial court while answering issues No.3 and 2-A has held that the suit filed by the plaintiff was not maintainable. However, on issues No. 2 and 1-A, the findings recorded by the trial court are that the business between the parties was joint. However, it was not proved on record what was the share initially invested by the partners and how much was the profit of the said business. Thus, issue No.2 was decided in favour of the plaintiff and issue No. 1-A was decided against the plaintiff. 12. As far as rendition of accounts is concerned, the first appellate court partly allowed the appeal, as discussed herein above, on 25.9.2001. Leaned trial court has held that the suit was not maintainable. The findings recorded by the trial court that the suit was not maintainable were set aside. The first appellate court also upheld the findings of the trial court that the business was joint between the parties. Though, decree for dissolution of the partnership firm was affirmed but the appeal of the plaintiff for rendition of accounts was dismissed. 13. Initially, the plaintiff has only prayed for rendition of accounts. It is only after the amendment a prayer was also made for dissolution of partnership. Though, decree for dissolution of the partnership firm was affirmed but the appeal of the plaintiff for rendition of accounts was dismissed. 13. Initially, the plaintiff has only prayed for rendition of accounts. It is only after the amendment a prayer was also made for dissolution of partnership. The case set up by the plaintiff that he, defendant No.2 Balwant Singh and predecessor of defendants No. 3 (a) to 3 (c), namely, Mehnga Ram had commenced the business and all the partners had th share. Defendant No.1 has not contributed, but taking into consideration his skill in the bakery, he was made partner of the share. A notice was served on 12.12.1988 upon defendant No.1, which he replied on 24.1.1989. 14. Plaintiff Roshan Lal has appeared as PW-1. According to him, he and defendants have started the partnership business. It was decided that defendant Puran Chand will work in the bakery and he will give accounts to other partners and also share the profit as per their share. Puran Chand has not contributed anything. He has not rendered the accounts. In the shop where the bakery was being run, ejectment proceedings were filed bearing case No.118/87 against all the partners. The reply was filed by defendant No.1 and defendant No.2 Balwant Singh. It was stated in the reply by defendant No.1 Puran Chand that the business was in partnership with the plaintiff and defendants. He has placed on record copy of judgment mark 'A' and the copy of notice mark 'B'. In his cross-examination, he has deposed that he, Balwant Singh and Mehnga Ram have contributed Rs. 20,000/- for running the business at the time of its commencement. He did not disclose how much money he has paid. However, it was reduced into writing. The partnership was not registered. He could not disclose what was the turnover of the bakery. However, he has deposed that 50 kgs (flour) maida was used per day. 15. PW-2 is Sh. S.C. Mahindru, Advocate. He had filed petition No. 18/87, titled Kalawati v. Balwant Singh. 16. PW-3 Naresh Kumar, Advocate has deposed that he appeared on behalf of respondent Puran Chand and Balwant Singh. He has filed the reply to the petition on 12.12.1987. The reply was prepared at the instance of Puran Chand and Balwant Singh. He has proved the copy of the same Ex.PC. 16. PW-3 Naresh Kumar, Advocate has deposed that he appeared on behalf of respondent Puran Chand and Balwant Singh. He has filed the reply to the petition on 12.12.1987. The reply was prepared at the instance of Puran Chand and Balwant Singh. He has proved the copy of the same Ex.PC. In his cross-examination, he has testified that he has prepared the reply at the instance of Puran Chand, Balwant Singh and Roshan Lal. Roshan Lal had told him that how the reply to the petition was to be prepared. 17. Defendant Puran Chand has appeared as DW-1. According to him, he was running the bakery since 1980 all alone. There was no partner in the business. He has not signed any partnership deed with any one. He was not given any amount by anyone at the time of commencement of business. He was running it from his own resources. He has raised loan from Khadi Board, Kangra. He has admitted that the reply was filed at the instance of the plaintiff. He had taken over the shop on rent. In his cross-examination, he has deposed that he has not given any power of attorney to the plaintiff to pursue the case file. Roshan Lal was his neighbour. He has admitted that the advocate was engaged by the plaintiff. He has given power of attorney in favour of Naresh Kumar. He has disclosed the facts to Naresh Kumar while filing the reply. He has not submitted any application for correction of document Ex.PW-3/A. His statement was not recorded in the Court. He has denied the suggestion that he was running the business jointly. He has also denied the suggestion that every partner contributed Rs. 20,000/- and he has not contributed anything. He has denied that profits were to be shared between the parties. He has admitted about the issuance of notice. He has admitted that Balwant Singh was tenant of the premises. However, after he left, he started residing there. He could not produce any evidence regarding raising of loan but volunteered that he could show the same. 18. DW-2 Amar Singh has deposed that he was running a tea shop. Only Puran Chand was working in the bakery and he used to buy products from him. DW-3 has produced copy Ex.DW-3/A. According to him, the loan was raised by Puran Chand. 18. DW-2 Amar Singh has deposed that he was running a tea shop. Only Puran Chand was working in the bakery and he used to buy products from him. DW-3 has produced copy Ex.DW-3/A. According to him, the loan was raised by Puran Chand. DW-4 Uttam Chand has deposed that electricity meter was in the name of Puran Chand. 19. The plaintiff has again appeared after the amendment of the plaint as PW-1. According to him, he wanted to dissolve the partnership and also wanted rendition of accounts by defendant No.1. He could not disclose in his cross-examination when the partnership was made. According to him, the shop was taken by Sh. Balwant Singh on rent, but he could not disclose about the rent agreement. He did not know whether any proceedings were initiated against the partnership firm. According to him, the conditions of partnership firm were already on file. According to him, it was written in the partnership who would maintain the records. He could not say how the accounts of firm were to be maintained. He has shown his ignorance about the withdrawal of the amount lying in the bank. 20. DW-5 R.P. Sharma has deposed that the shop was registered in the name of Puran Chand son of Duni Chand. He has placed on record copy of certificate Ex.DW-5/A. According to him, Puran Chand was sole proprietor of the firm. This is the entire oral as well as documentary evidence led by the parties. 21. Learned courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that the business was joint between the parties, more particularly, on the basis of averments contained in Ex.DW-3/A whereby it is specifically stated that in the suit premises, the business was being run with defendant Balwant Singh, Mehnga Ram and Roshan Lal for the last seven years in the partnership firm. This document has been proved by PW-3 Naresh Kumar. He has also deposed that he was told by Roshan Lal that how the reply was to be filed, i.e. Ex.PW-3/A. It has come in the statement of PW-1 that initially a sum of Rs. 20,000/- was contributed by all the partners except defendant No.1 Puran Chand. It has also come in the evidence that all the partners have th share. Defendant Puran Chand was inducted partner of th share since he had necessary skill to run bakery. 20,000/- was contributed by all the partners except defendant No.1 Puran Chand. It has also come in the evidence that all the partners have th share. Defendant Puran Chand was inducted partner of th share since he had necessary skill to run bakery. Defendant Puran Chand while appearing as DW-1 has admitted that reply in case No. 18/87 was filed by the plaintiff. Plaintiff had arranged for the lawyer and he has given the power of attorney in favour of Sh. Naresh Kumar. 22. Both the courts below have given a finding that the plaintiff has failed to prove about the investment made by each partner at the time of commencement of the bakery. However, as discussed herein above, it has come that all the partners except Puran Chand have contributed Rs. 20,000/- each. They were running the business on the basis of Ex.PW-3/A. The averments made in Ex.PW-3/A were never withdrawn nor any application was filed in the court for withdrawing the same. According to PW-1, profits and losses were shared equally. However, defendant No.1 has never given accounts to them. A notice was also served upon defendant Puran Chand to render the accounts. 23. Mr. Rajnish K. Lall has vehemently argued that the suit filed by the plaintiff was not maintainable. The trial court has held that the suit was not maintainable, but the first appellate court by referring to section 69 [3 (a)] of the Partnership Act, 1932 has concluded that the suit was maintainable. 24. The scope of section 69 (3) of the Partnership Act, 1932 has been explained by their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishna Motor Service by its partners v. H.P. Vittala Kamath, (1996) 10 SCC 88 as under: "6. The contention of Shri Javali is that since the word "other proceedings to enforce a right arising from a contract" clearly envisage that when a party to the contract seeks to enforce the right arising from the contract, the main part of sub-section (3) stands attracted the exceptions provided in the exclusionary clauses have no application. Therefore, the ratio in Jagdish Chandra Gupta's case, ( AIR 1964 SC 1882 ), though related to reference under Section 8 would apply to the facts of the case and that the reference is not maintainable. We find no force in the contention. Therefore, the ratio in Jagdish Chandra Gupta's case, ( AIR 1964 SC 1882 ), though related to reference under Section 8 would apply to the facts of the case and that the reference is not maintainable. We find no force in the contention. The words "but shall not affect" require to be given meaning and effect thereof in the operation of the main part of sub-section (3). But as seen, the exceptions engrafted in sub-section (3) intend to exclude the embargo created by subsection (3) and intended to effectuate the exceptions enumerated therein. It is seen that the proviso given an exception stating that the main part of sub-section (3) shall not affect (a) the enforcement of any right arisen from dissolution of a firm or for account of a dissolved firm, or any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm; it confide interest to the partner, i.e., parties to the contract. Undoubtedly, Section 69 is mandatory in character and its effect is to render a suit by plaintiff in respect of a right vested in him or acquired under a contract which he entered into as a partner of a firm, whether existing or dissolved void. In other words, a partner of an erstwhile unregistered partnership firm cannot bring a suit to enforce a right arising out of a contract falling within the ambit of the main part of Section 69 (3) of the Act. In Jagdish Chandra's case at page 60 (of 1964 (8) SCR 50 ) : (at p. 1886 of AIR 1964 SC 1882 ) this Court interpreting main part of subsection (3) had held that "In our Judgment, the words 'other proceeding' in sub-section (3) must receive their full meaning un trammelled by the words 'a claim of set-off". The latter words neither intend nor can be construed to cut down the generality of the words 'other proceeding's. The sub-section provides for the application of the provisions of sub-secs. (1) and (2) to claims of set-off and also to other proceedings of any kind which can properly be said to be for enforcement of any right arising from contract except those expressly mentioned as exceptions in sub-section (3) and sub-section (4)". 7. (1) and (2) to claims of set-off and also to other proceedings of any kind which can properly be said to be for enforcement of any right arising from contract except those expressly mentioned as exceptions in sub-section (3) and sub-section (4)". 7. If the right to dissolve the firm itself is in dispute and is subject matter of the suit, necessarily in the suit for dissolution of the partnership firm, if a party to the contract of partnership seeks a reference for arbitration to resolve that dispute, it would be a right from a contract arisen in the proceedings for enforcement of the right to dissolve the firm. In that event, necessarily, the main part of sub-section (3) stands attracted and no such reference is valid in law. But in a case where the parties have already agreed for dissolution of the partnership by mutual consent, the partnership stood dissolved. There is no dispute as regards the right arising from the contract of a firm. The dispute is only with regard to working out the rights flown from dissolution for settlement of accounts of the dissolved firm or any right or power to realise the property of the dissolved firm etc. That right would form part of the exception engrafted in sub-section (3) of Section 69. The object intended by the Legislature appears to be that in spite of the defect of non-registration and the prohibition created in the main part of non-enforceability of the right arising from a contract, the parties having worked under that contract, to the limited extent of the enforcement of a right to realise the assets, settlement of the accounts of the dissolved firm or any right or power to realise the property of the dissolved firm are exceptions engrafted therein and gives right to the parties to enforce the same, independent of the right arising from the contract. Therefore, the parties are relieved from the prohibition created by operation of Section 69." 25. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhartesh Chandra Jain v. Shoiab Ullah and others, (2004) 13 SCC 358 have held that suit claiming a decree for dissolution of the unregistered firm is maintainable. Their Lordships have held as under: "2. Therefore, the parties are relieved from the prohibition created by operation of Section 69." 25. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhartesh Chandra Jain v. Shoiab Ullah and others, (2004) 13 SCC 358 have held that suit claiming a decree for dissolution of the unregistered firm is maintainable. Their Lordships have held as under: "2. The short issue in this appeal is whether the suit filed by the appellant was maintainable under Section 69 sub-section (3) of the Partnership Act, 1932 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). In the plaint, the appellant has claimed a decree for accounting of the appellant's profits and for dissolution of the firm of which Respondents 1-4 are also partners. The first prayer of the plaint also provides for a tentative valuation of the relief claimed and that "process court fee shall be paid on the plaintiff's share of profits after final accounting is done between the parties". In addition to this there was a second prayer for payment of profits plus investment and for an injunction restraining Defendants 3 to 6 who are Respondents 1-5 before this Court from receiving any payment without the written consent of the appellant. 3. The preliminary objection raised by Respondents 1-5 before the trial court that the suit was not maintainable under the provisions of the Act, was allowed for reasons which are incomprehensible. The appellant preferred an appeal before the Additional District Judge who partially allowed the appeal by holding that the first prayer which pertained to the dissolution of the firm accounts was maintainable under the provisions of Section 69 (3) but that the second prayer could not be sustained. Accordingly, the matter was remanded back to the trial court for the purpose of deciding the suit insofar as it pertained to the first relief. 5. The language of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 69 of the Act shows that suits for dissolution of an unregistered firm or for accounts of a dissolved firm or for any right or power to realise the property of a dissolved firm have been expressly excluded from the embargo put on the filing of suits by an unregistered firm or by any partner of an unregistered firm. The first prayer in the plaint squarely falls within this exception. The first prayer in the plaint squarely falls within this exception. The order of the High Court, therefore, cannot be sustained and the order of the Additional District Judge must be restored." 26. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V. Subramaniam v. Rajesh Rathuvandra Rao, (2009) 5 SCC 608 have declared sub-section 2 (a) of section 69 of the Partnership Act inserted by Maharashtra Amendment Act 29 of 1984 violative of Articles 14, 19 (1) (g) and 300-A of the Constitution of India. The question which had arisen before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether sub-section 2 (a) of section 69 introduced by the Maharashtra Amendment Act 29 of 1984 was unconstitutional. Their Lordships have declared the insertion of sub-section 2(a) of section 69 violative of Articles 14, 19 (1) (g) and 300-A of the Constitution of India. Their Lordships have held as under: "12. Till the Maharashtra Amendment of 1984 came into force on 1.1.1985, a partner in a firm could file a suit for dissolution of an unregistered partnership firm or for accounts of the dissolved firm or to recover the properties of the dissolved firm. 13. However, in view of sub- section 2A of Section 69, since 1.1.1985 a partner in an unregistered partnership firm in the State of Maharashtra cannot file a suit for dissolution or for accounts of a dissolved firm or realise properties of a dissolved firm, unless the duration of the firm was only six months or it's capital is upto Rs. 2000/-. The question before us is whether sub-section 2A of Section 69 inserted by the Maharashtra Amendment is constitutionally valid. 14. In our opinion sub-section 2A of Section 69 inserted by the Maharashtra Amendment violates Articles 14, 19 (1)(g) and 300A of the Constitution of India. It has already been mentioned above that a partnership firm, whether registered or unregistered, is not a distinct legal entity, and hence the property of the firm really belongs to the partners of the firm. Sub-section 2A virtually deprives a partner in an unregistered firm from recovery of his share in the property of the firm or from seeking dissolution of the firm. 24. However, the Maharashtra Amendment effects such stringent disabilities on a firm as in our opinion are crippling in nature. It lays down that an unregistered firm cannot enforce its claims against third parties. 24. However, the Maharashtra Amendment effects such stringent disabilities on a firm as in our opinion are crippling in nature. It lays down that an unregistered firm cannot enforce its claims against third parties. Similarly, a partner who is not registered is unable to enforce his claims against third parties or against his fellow partners. An exception to this disability was a suit for dissolution of a firm or a suit for accounts of a dissolved firm or a suit for recovery of property of a dissolved firm. Thus a partnership firm can come into existence, function as long as there is no problem, and disappear from existence without being registered. This is changed by the 1984 Amendment extending the bar of the proceedings to a suit for dissolution or recovery of property as well. 25. The effect of the Amendment is that a partnership firm is allowed to come into existence and function without registration but it cannot go out of existence (with certain exceptions). This can result into a situation where in case of disputes amongst the partners the relationship of partnership cannot be put an end to by approaching a court of law. A dishonest partner, if in control of the business, or if simply stronger, can successfully deprive the other partner of his dues from the partnership. It could result in extreme hardship and injustice. Might would be right. An aggrieved partner is left without any remedy whatsoever. He can neither file a suit to compel the mischievous partner to cooperate for registration, as such a suit is not maintainable, nor can he resort to arbitration if any, because the arbitration proceedings would be hit by Section 69 (1) of the Act (Jagdish Chandra Gupta v. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd. AIR 1964 SC 1882 ). 27. In the Constitution bench decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and another (supra) it has been held that arbitrariness and unreasonableness violates Articles 14 and 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution. 27. In the Constitution bench decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and another (supra) it has been held that arbitrariness and unreasonableness violates Articles 14 and 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution. The said provision is clearly unreasonable and arbitrary since by prohibiting suits for dissolution of an unregistered firm, for accounts and for realisation of the properties of the firm, it creates a situation where businessmen will be very reluctant to enter into an unregistered partnership out of fear that they will not be able to recover the money they have invested in the firm or to get out of the firm if they wish to do so. 31. Since in our opinion sub-section 2A of Section 69 as introduced by the Maharashtra Legislature clearly violates Articles 14, 19 (1)(g) and 300A of the Constitution, it is in our opinion ultra vires and is hence declared unconstitutional. Consequently this appeal is allowed and impugned judgment of the Bombay High Court is set aside. The suit can now proceed ignoring sub-section 2A which we have declared invalid. No costs." 27. Learned Single Judge of Lahore High Court in Jhandu Mal and others v. Rulia Ram, AIR 1937 Lahore 633 has held that in a suit for dissolution of partnership; court has power to pass preliminary decree for accounts. Learned Single Judge has held as under: "A prayer for "dissolution of partnership" through Court is a Compendious mode of asking a fourfold relief: (a) a declaration that the partnership stands dissolved from a certain date, (b) a declaration as to who the partners are and what are their proportionate shares; (c) a prayer that accounts be taken and the assets and liabilities of the partnership as on the date of dissolution be determined, and (d) a final decree be passed. It is obvious that a decree for dissolution simpliciter will not yield any tangible results. In order to be of some practical use to the partners, it must be followed by certain consequential reliefs, leading up to a final decree. These prayers are implicit in the prayer for dissolution made in a "suit for dissolution of partnership", and I have no doubt that it is in this sense that this expression is used in section 69. These prayers are implicit in the prayer for dissolution made in a "suit for dissolution of partnership", and I have no doubt that it is in this sense that this expression is used in section 69. It could not have been the intention of the Legislature, as appears to have been supposed by the learned District Judge, that after the Court has passed a decree for dissolution and the partnership has been declared dissolved on a certain date, a fresh suit for accounts will have to be brought. Rule 15 Order 20, C.P.C. makes the position quite clear. It is laid down there, that: Where a suit is for the dissolution of a partnership, or the taking of partnership accounts, the Courts, before passing a final decree, may pass a preliminary decree declaring the proportionate shares of the parties, fixing the day on which the partnership shall stand dissolved or be deemed to have been dissolved and directing such accounts to be taken, and other acts to be done, as it thinks fit. It is obvious that in a suit for dissolution of partnership, the Court has the power to pass a preliminary decree directing inter alia that accounts be taken. It seems to have been argued before the Courts below that if a suit for accounts is brought subsequently it will be barred under Order 2, Rule 2. Mr. Shamair Chand for the respondent frankly conceded that his contention is without force, as ex hypothesi, the two suits will not be based on the same cause of action. I accept the appeal, set aside the decree of the learned District Judge and restore that of the Court of first instance. The appellant firm will get its costs from Rulia Ram, respondent, in all courts." 28. Learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court in Chiranji Lal v. Emperor, AIR 1939 Allahabad 735 has held that the partner of the unregistered firm has the right to include a claim for accounts in a suit for dissolution. He need not bring two separate suits. 29. Learned Single Judge in Damodhar Gulabrao Chohan and another v. Khushal Laxman Marathi Teli, AIR 1943 Nagpur 12 has held that the suit by one partner against another for dissolution and accounts is not affected by section 69 of the Partnership Act. 30. He need not bring two separate suits. 29. Learned Single Judge in Damodhar Gulabrao Chohan and another v. Khushal Laxman Marathi Teli, AIR 1943 Nagpur 12 has held that the suit by one partner against another for dissolution and accounts is not affected by section 69 of the Partnership Act. 30. Learned Single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Baldev Singh v. Smt. Sukhdev Kaur, 1992 (2) P.L.R. 535 has held that relief by way of dissolution of firm also includes the relief of taking rendition of accounts between the partners. 31. Thus, in view of the definitive law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and other High Courts, the suit filed by the plaintiff was maintainable. Once the first appellate court has granted the decree of dissolution of firm, it should have also ordered the rendition of accounts by defendant No.1 qua shop No.97, ward No.2 as well. 32. Consequently, in view of the observations and analysis made herein above, the Regular Second Appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court qua dissolution of partnership is affirmed and preliminary decree for rendition of accounts is also passed against defendant No.1. It is declared that plaintiff and defendants were partners of the partnership firm in the ratio of th share. Sh. Sanjay Rana, Chartered Accountant, Bane Road, Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. is appointed as Receiver before whom defendant No.1 would produce the accounts within a period of four weeks from today. These accounts shall be settled and produced before this Court for the purpose of passing final decree by the Receiver within a period of three months from today. The final decree qua dissolution of firm would be passed after receiving the report of the Receiver. Necessary orders towards Receiver's fee shall be passed at the time of passing of final decree. Cross-objections No. 562/2002 are dismissed accordingly. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.