C.A.V. JUDGMENT ADITYA KUMAR TRIVEDI 1. Challenge in this appeal is judgment dated 17.05.1990 passed by Sessions Judge, Aurangabad in Sessions Trial No. 32 of 1989 whereby and whereunder sole appellant Bijendra Nonia has been convicted for an offence punishable under Section 302, 201 of the IPC and directed to undergo imprisonment for life under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code as well as imprisonment for a period of 5 years under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code with a direction to run the sentences concurrently. 2. Prosecution case in short as per fardbeyan (Exhibit-3) of Bigu Nonia (PW-2) recorded on 01-11-1988 at Madupur Harijan Tola at about 12:00 noon disclosing therein that he had married his daughter Dulariya Devi (deceased) about 15-16 years ago in her childhood with Bijendra Nonia son of Balkeshwar Nonia of Baddikhurd, P.S.-Barun. Since then his daughter was on visiting term. She had begotten two children. His son-in-law Bijendra Nonia was employed at Khudiya Koliyari. About a month ago, on previous Monday at about 12 noon Bijendra Nonia came to him at Basta Kola Koliyari and divulged that his daughter has met with an accident and is admitted at Dehri Hospital. On this information, he along with his son-in-law proceeded through bus from Dhanbad to Dehri. At about 04:00 AM when the bus reached at Aurangabad, his son-in-law disclosed that his daughter had not met with accident therefore it will be useless to go to Dehri. After saying this his son-in-law got down from the bus and went. On this he became apprehensive with regard to welfare his daughter. He also got down and proceeded towards house of his son-in-law from Aurangabad and during midst thereof, he took company of Ramnath Singh from village-Soris. After arrival at Baddi Khurd he met with his son-in-law who on query disclosed that his daughter is no more. He further disclosed that he had murdered her because of her bad character. He did not respond when he was asked about the dead body. Then he proceeded towards P.S. but met the police official in midst of way and expressed apprehension that his daughter has been killed by his son-in-law and dead body has been concealed. 3. After registering Barun P.S. Case No.154 of 1988 the police took up investigation. He did not respond when he was asked about the dead body. Then he proceeded towards P.S. but met the police official in midst of way and expressed apprehension that his daughter has been killed by his son-in-law and dead body has been concealed. 3. After registering Barun P.S. Case No.154 of 1988 the police took up investigation. After completing the investigation charge sheet was submitted under Section 302, 201 of the IPC whereupon the sole appellant Bijendra Nonia faced the trial and ultimately got conviction and sentence, the subject matter of instant appeal. 4. The defence case as is evident from the mode of cross-examination as well as statement as recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. is of innocence as well as complete denial of the occurrence. It has further been stated that deceased had died at her Naihar on 18.08.1988. As the appellant declined to accept offer of informant to remarry the younger sister of the deceased, so there arose dispute. When there was demand on behalf of appellant to return back the ornaments, then and then only, instant case has been filed just by way of retaliation. To support the same there has been examination of D.Ws along with exhibit of the documents. 5. In order to substantiate its case the prosecution had examined altogether seven PWs out of whom PW-1 is Ram Nath Singh, PW-2 is Bigu Nonia, PW-3 is Ishwari Singh, P.W.-4 is Ram Pravesh Singh, PW-5 is Kamta Singh, PW-6 is Ranvir Minj and P.W.-7 is Dr. Tarkeshwar Prasad. The prosecution had also exhibited Exhibit-1 signature of Ramnath Singh over inquest report, Exhibit-2 Series is the signature of Kamta Singh as well as Awdhesh over inquest report, seizure list respectively. Exhibit-3 is fardbeyan, Exhibit-4 is formal FIR, Exhibit-5 is inquest report, Exhibit-6 is seizure list, Exhibit-7 is Sketch Map, Exhibit-8 is postmortem report. Piece of bangle happens to be material Exhibit-I. Defence had also examined two DWs out of whom DW 1 is Dr. Upendra Singh a homeopathic doctor while DW 2 is Ram Chandra Mahto. Exhibit-A happens to be the register kept by DW-1. 6. While assailing judgment of conviction and sentence it has been argued on behalf of appellant that the judgment suffers from conjecture and surmises as well as patient error is apparent on bare perusal of the judgment. Upendra Singh a homeopathic doctor while DW 2 is Ram Chandra Mahto. Exhibit-A happens to be the register kept by DW-1. 6. While assailing judgment of conviction and sentence it has been argued on behalf of appellant that the judgment suffers from conjecture and surmises as well as patient error is apparent on bare perusal of the judgment. It has further been submitted that none is an eye witness to occurrence. Therefore, the case rests upon the theme of circumstantial evidence. From the evidence on record, it is apparent that none of the witness has come forward to say that deceased was residing at Barakhurd and she was last seen in the company of appellant. Not only this, there happens to be deficiency on the score of proper identification of the dead body. Hence it could not be said that the recovered and seized dead body was that of Dulariya Devi. It has further been submitted that on account of non-examination of other family members of PW-2, the informant, it could not be conclusively concluded that one month prior to alleged recovery of so-called dead body, a Bidai was effected and appellant accompanied Dulariya to his place. In likewise manner, there is no positive and concurrent evidence available on the record as to on which date Dulariya was taken to Bara Khurd by the appellant. Contrary to it the appellant had examined two DWs who had deposed regarding death of Dulariya at her Naihar much before the alleged date of Bidai and in the aforesaid background, there happens to be no question of killing the Dulariya at her Sasural and in likewise manner identification of a dead body of unknown female to be that of Dulariya. 7. It has also been argued that from the evidence of PW-1 as well as PW-2, it is crystal clear that before recording of Exhibit-3 fardbeyan, investigation was already taken up, so alleged dead body was recovered for which inquest report was prepared. In the aforesaid background fardbeyan (Exhibit-3) has lost its legal identity because of the fact that same is hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C. 8. Because of the fact that instant case happens to be based upon circumstantial evidence therefore, all the links of the chain should be properly completed in such manner that no other hypothesis than that of guilt of accused should be inferred. Because of the fact that instant case happens to be based upon circumstantial evidence therefore, all the links of the chain should be properly completed in such manner that no other hypothesis than that of guilt of accused should be inferred. Contrary to it, as has been pleaded that there are visibility of several missing links and on account thereof, the judgment of conviction and sentence recorded by the learned lower court became non-sustainable in the eye of law. 9. On the other hand repelling the argument so advanced on behalf of appellant, it has been argued by the learned Addl. P.P. that status of Dulariya as wife of appellant is found fully established and accepted by the appellant himself by examining DWs. It is also been established from the evidence that there was no difficulty in identifying the dead body because of the fact that the dead body was intact. Decomposition of body had not started though pilling of skin was found at some place and that happens to be on account of external force which might have been used during course of excavation. When the dead body of Dulariya was taken out from Bara Khurd village where her Sasural lies and in the opinion of doctor the death was due to throttling, then in that event, it was incumbent upon the appellant to explain the same as per requirement of Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Though the appellant had unsuccessfully tried to shift the burden over informant and for that he had examined two DWs whose sanctity is found to be completely demolished in the background of recovery of dead body of Dulariya from the appellant’s village. No other kind of explanation has been given by the appellant. Therefore, the reasoning assigned by the learned trial court leading to conviction and sentence of the appellant is found to be based upon sound principle of law and is accordingly fit to be confirmed. 10. After hearing both the sides as well as going through the records, it is apparent that none claimed to be an eye witnesss to occurrence and in the aforesaid background, certainly this case found to be based upon circumstantial evidence. 11. The Hon’ble Apex Court elaborately dealt with the principles to be considered, in case, the same happens to be based upon circumstantial evidence in Arvindkumar, Anuplal Poddar Vs. 11. The Hon’ble Apex Court elaborately dealt with the principles to be considered, in case, the same happens to be based upon circumstantial evidence in Arvindkumar, Anuplal Poddar Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2012 Cr.L.J. 4007. “11. As in the case on hand conviction imposed on the appellant is only based on circumstantial evidence, we feel that the various decisions of this Court laying down the principles of appreciating the circumstantial evidence while imposing the sentence can be highlighted. The earliest case on this subject was reported as Hanumant Govind Nargundkar & Anr. v. State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343 . In para 10, the position has been succinctly stated as under: “10. xxx xxx xxx xxx It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. In spite of the forceful arguments addressed to us by the learned Advocate-General on behalf of the State we have not been able to discover any such evidence either intrinsic within Exhibit P-3-A or outside and we are constrained to observe that the courts below have just fallen into the error against which warning was uttered by Baron Alderson in the above mentioned case.” The decision in Hanumant Govind (supra) was followed in the Constitution Bench decision of this Court reported as Govinda Reddy Krishna & Another v. State of Mysore, AIR 1960 SC 29 . The said position was subsequently reiterated in the decision reported as Naseem Ahmed v. Delhi Admn., (1974) 3 SCC 668 ( AIR 1974 SC 691 ). In para-10 of the decision in Naseem Ahmed (supra), the legal position has been stated as under: “10. The said position was subsequently reiterated in the decision reported as Naseem Ahmed v. Delhi Admn., (1974) 3 SCC 668 ( AIR 1974 SC 691 ). In para-10 of the decision in Naseem Ahmed (supra), the legal position has been stated as under: “10. This is a case of circumstantial evidence and it is therefore necessary to find whether the circumstances on which prosecution relies are capable of supporting the sole inference that the appellant is guilty of the crime of which he is charged. The circumstances, in the first place, have to be established by the prosecution by clear and cogent evidence and those circumstances must not be consistent with the innocence of the accused. For determining whether the circumstances established on the evidence raise but one inference consistent with the guilt of the accused, regard must be had to the totality of the circumstances. Individual circumstances considered in isolation and divorced from the context of the over-all picture emerging from a consideration of the diverse circumstances and their conjoint effect may by themselves appear innocuous. It is only when the various circumstances are considered conjointly that it becomes possible to understand and appreciate their true effect. If a person is seen running away on the heels of a murder, the explanation that he was fleeing in panic is apparently not irrational. Bloodstains on the clothes can be attributed plausibly to a bleeding nose. Even the possession of a weapon like a knife can be explained by citing a variety of acceptable answers. But such circumstances cannot be considered in water-tight compartments. If a person is found running away from the scene of murder with blood-stained clothes and a knife in his hand, it would in a proper context, be consistent with the rule of circumstantial evidence to hold that he had committed the murder.” In the decision reported as Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 : ( AIR 1984 SC 1622 ), this Court has laid down the cardinal principles regarding appreciation of circumstantial evidence and held that whenever the case is based on circumstantial evidence, the following features are required to be complied with which has been set out by this Court in para 153 at page 185 which reads as under: “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra19 where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047] “Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between “may be” and “must be” is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.” (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. The above principles have been followed and reiterated in the recent decision of this Court reported as Mustkeem alias Sirajudeen v. State of Rajasthan, 2011 (11) SCC 724 ( AIR 2011 SC 2769 ). In the decision reported in Rukia Begum v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 4 SCC 779 : ( AIR 2011 SC 1585 ), this Court again restated the principles as under: “17. In order to sustain conviction, circumstantial evidence must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. Such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but inconsistent with his innocence. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid to say that particular circumstances are conclusive to establish guilt. In order to sustain conviction, circumstantial evidence must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. Such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but inconsistent with his innocence. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid to say that particular circumstances are conclusive to establish guilt. It is basically a question of appreciation of evidence which exercise is to be done in the facts and circumstances of each case. 18. Here in the present case the motive, the recoveries and abscondence of these appellants immediately after the occurrence point out towards their guilt. In our opinion, the trial court as also the High Court on the basis of the circumstantial evidence rightly came to the conclusion that the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt so far as these appellants are concerned.” 12. Now adverting to the evidence on record, first of all evidence of PW-7 the doctor is to be taken at first instant. 1) Bruise over front of neck upper part on both side size left side 2 ½” x ½”, right side 1” x ½”. 2) Swelling over right upper chest 3” x 2”. On dissection skull was intact, (2) Hoyoid bone thoyriod, cricoid bone were broken. Lyranx congested on its almost middle part. (3) Rib of right side of chest third and fourth rib anterior side were broken. (4) Lung was congested. (5) Heart –All chambers of heart were empty (6) Liver splin, kindly wee slightly pale. (7) Bladder empty, (8) Stomach contained partially digested food. (9) Uterous normal, and ante-verted. Death in his opinion was caused due to asphyxia, leading to cardic respiratory failure due to injury no.1 and 2 which were found ante-mortem, caused by hard and blunt substance, specially No.1. Time elapse since death was within 72 hours. Injury No.1 was caused by throttling. During cross-examination Injury No.1 indicates that there was pressure on both sides of neck. Asphyxia can be caused by putting pressure on the chest provided the pressure has enough force. Volunteers- In this case it was not possible since there was fracture of ribs on one side. Fracture o ribs can be caused by pressure on chest. It is not necessary that the fracture of ribs will cause congestion of lungs. Asphyxia can be caused by putting pressure on the chest provided the pressure has enough force. Volunteers- In this case it was not possible since there was fracture of ribs on one side. Fracture o ribs can be caused by pressure on chest. It is not necessary that the fracture of ribs will cause congestion of lungs. In this case congestion of lungs was due to asphyxia. The ribs had not penetrated. In this case both lungs wee congested. If the pressure is on one side of the lungs both the lungs will not be congested. Ribs on one side was broken therefore I say that the pressure on one side of the chest. If there is pressure of course plenty of pressure on the chest it may cause congestion of the lungs even without breaking of the ribs. Asphyxia can be caused by blocking the nose and mouth simultaneously. It is not necessary that if a body is buried under earth, the pressure of earth on the body will break the bones and ribs. There may be fracture of bones by pressure of earth on the body if the pressure is enough to break the bones. Decomposition generally starts after 18 hours but it is subject to different other factors like seasonal change, clime, heat, height and so. In the month o November, December in the district of Aurangabad, the process of decomposition will be little slower. On an average the period of decomposition is 49 hours. In a period of 3 to 5 days in general, the different parts of body start disintegrating. This is also subject to the preservation of body in cool temperature. Bone does not decomposed in three days. Hairs start falling after five days of the death. Skin peeling starts after three days of the death, generally. In the instant case rigour mortis was not present in both the lungs, eyes were swollen and partially open, tongue was portended, blood tinged liquid was coming out from the mouth. In the instant case decomposition was not apparent. There was no peeling of skin over the entire body. There was no foreign body. In my finding there is no mention of existence of mud or earth on the dead body at the post mortem examination I did the postmortem examination single handed without any assistance of the sweeper. In the instant case decomposition was not apparent. There was no peeling of skin over the entire body. There was no foreign body. In my finding there is no mention of existence of mud or earth on the dead body at the post mortem examination I did the postmortem examination single handed without any assistance of the sweeper. It is not a fact that I did not hold the postmortem examination myself rather I noted whatever the sweeper said and it is also not a fact that the body was highly decomposed and there was extensive peeling of the skin. 13. It is evident that defence cross-examined this witness at length but nothing could be gained to discredit the finding of the doctor. Therefore cause of death of deceased Dulariya Devi by means of throttling is found to be fully proved. 14. As much emphasis has been made with regard to identification of the dead body so recovered, for that again the evidence of the PW-7 has minutely been gone through to search out whether the dead body was decomposed to such extent that her face was not identifiable. Postmortem report totally rules out the aforesaid theme as well as the evidence of PW-7 also negativated the plea of the appellant on this very score. The other connecting document that means to say inquest report Exhibit-5 is found to be in addition which also erased the claim of the appellant. Contrary to it, apart from the above referred evidence, ocular evidence consisting PW-1 & PW-2 also substantiates the fact that at the time of excavation of the dead body, it was fully identifiable and was accordingly identified to be of Dulariya Devi. Hence the dead body so found over which postmortem was conduct appears to be that of Dulariya Devi and no controversy subsists so far this part is concerned. 15. In away to dwell the issue, the oral evidence has minutely been gone through. PW-1, the person who had accompanied PW-2, the informant, had not disclosed that the dead body was decomposed to such extent that it was not identifiable. PW-2 the informant also deposed in same manner coupled with the evidence of I.O. PW-6. Surprisingly no cross-examination on this very score has been made on behalf of defence at least to raise suspicion with regard to mode of identification of the dead body on account of its decomposition. PW-2 the informant also deposed in same manner coupled with the evidence of I.O. PW-6. Surprisingly no cross-examination on this very score has been made on behalf of defence at least to raise suspicion with regard to mode of identification of the dead body on account of its decomposition. Consequent thereupon, the plea of the appellant that dead body was completely decomposed and was not identifiable is found to be non-sustainable in the background of the of above referred evidence. Therefore, it is held that the dead body happens to be that of Dulariya Devi daughter of PW-2 Bigu Nonia. 16. Then thereafter a plea has also been raised that from the FIR itself, it is evident that deceased had begotten two children. Neither they were named nor the informant fairly stated with regard about her where about either in the fardbeyan or during course of evidence. Both the children appear to be material witness, if examined, would have divulged the actual mode on occurrence. Both the above children were not even interrogated during course of investigation. In likewise manner, it has also been argued that no persons of the locality either has been examined during course of investigation nor been cited as a prosecution witness. Whoever may be, PW-3, PW-4 and PW-5 they all became volte-face to the prosecution. Therefore, the conviction should not have been based upon such flimsy evidence of PW-1 and PW-2. 17. Section 134 of the Evidence Act did not require production of witnesses in bunch rather the basic requirement as envisaged there under extent to the genuineness, authenticity, reliability, truthfulness of the evidence of even a singe witness. The only criteria so affixed is with regard to scaling the evidence of the PW on the score of its credibility as well as worthiness. So far this peculiar kind of case whereunder deceased was done to death at her Sasural, as alleged by the prosecution, it was very difficult for the prosecution to have their version supported by co-villager of the accused. 18. Though there happens to be presence of two children begotten by deceased Dulariya Devi from the appellant. But aforesaid theme has not been exposed through PW-2 as well as PW-6 during course of cross-examination at least with regard to their age as well as having their presence at the place of accused on or around the so alleged date of occurrence. But aforesaid theme has not been exposed through PW-2 as well as PW-6 during course of cross-examination at least with regard to their age as well as having their presence at the place of accused on or around the so alleged date of occurrence. As the defence had not questioned during course of cross-examination therefore, the said plea cannot be availed by the defence at the present stage. In likewise manner, the theme of non-examination of other family members are concerned. 19. Whether non-examination of these persons would be fatal to the prosecution is found fully explained by the Apex Court in Nirpal Singh v. State of Haryana reported in (1977) 2 SCC 131 . “16. ……… The real question for determination is not as to what is the effect of non-examination of certain witnesses as the question whether the witnesses examined in court on sworn testimony should be believed or not. Once the witnesses examined by the prosecution are believed by the court and the court comes to the conclusion that their evidence is trust-worthy, the non-examination of other witnesses will not affect the credibility of these witnesses. We would, however, like to indicate that it is not at all necessary in law to incorporate the statements of the witnesses in the inquest report. The inquest report is to be made by the investigating officer just to indicate the injuries which he has found on the bodies of the deceased persons. It may be witnessed by one or two persons but it is not at all necessary for the investigating officer to record the statements of the witnesses or to get the statements of witnesses signed on the inquest report and incorporate the same in it which introduces an element of chaos and confusion and demanding an explanation from the prosecution regarding the statements made therein. For these reasons, therefore, we are unable to hold that merely because Roop Singh and Sardara Singh have not been examined, the prosecution case is not proved. We might mention that it is not necessary for the prosecution to multiply witnesses after witnesses on the same point. In the instant case, once the evidence of the eyewitnesses is believed, there is an end of the matter.” 20. We might mention that it is not necessary for the prosecution to multiply witnesses after witnesses on the same point. In the instant case, once the evidence of the eyewitnesses is believed, there is an end of the matter.” 20. Another plea has been raised by the defence that as the case is based upon circumstantial evidence therefore absence of motive is bound to dent upon prosecution case. Certainly motive plays an important role relating to the case based upon circumstantial evidence. Presence of motive though explained during course of evidence by the PW-2 in para-3 of his examination-in-chief, though a development from his initial version that he had got some sort of affection towards his Bhabhi but is found unchallenged. Moreover, it is apparent from paragraph 1 of his examination-in-chief that his daughter used to live with the accused at Khudiya Koliyari, found shifted to place of her Sasural where she ultimately faced the death knell alleged to be at the hands of appellant is a circumstance to be taken into consideration. At the other hand, the motive is found carried by the accused within its mind which cannot be perceived by the other when it relates to affair of spouses unless and until one has access in day to day affair. 21. In Ujjagar Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in (2007) 13 SCC 90 , it has been observed in para-17 as: “17. ….It is true that in a case relating to circumstantial evidence motive does assume great importance but to say that the absence of motive would dislodge the entire prosecution story is perhaps giving this one factor an importance which is not due and (to use the cliché) the motive is in the mind of the accused and can seldom be fathomed with any degree of accuracy.” 22. An argument has also been advanced with regard to conduct of the appellant. It has been submitted at the bar that had the appellant been a culprit, then in that event he would not have gone to the place of PW-2, did not have accompanied PW-2 up to Aurangabad and then departing his company would have escaped there from that to show his presence at his house rather he might have escaped from the place of occurrence after commission of the crime. 23. 23. It has further been submitted that prosecution story is unbelievable on the score that after escaping from Aurangabad his presence was found at his house where PW-1 and 2 arrived and in whose presence appellant had given extra judicial confessional statement followed with recording of fardbeyan as well as recovery of dead body at the instance of appellant. At the present juncture it has also been submitted that no seizure list was prepared with regard to recovery of dead body. So far inquest report (Ext.-5) and seizure of broken bangle (Ext.-6) are concerned that have got no relevancy in the background of absence of signature/ LTI of appellant over the same. 24. The learned Additional P.P. rules out any sort of fabrication on this score because of the fact that the witnesses have categorically stated so. Moreover recovery of dead body was there followed with conduction of postmortem (Ext.-8). The submission made on behalf of defence has got no leg to stand in the background of the fact that dead body of a lady was recovered and was forwarded to mortuary for conduction of the postmortem. Presence of appellant was very much there as the Chowkidar and Dafadar got him produced before the police official PW-6, who apprehended him and from the L.C. record it is evident that he was produced before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on 02-11-1988. As such, presence of accused is found to be conclusively proved by cogent, reliable evidence. 25. Now coming to the story of extra judicial confessional statement, it is found to be bifurcated in two parts. The first part happens to be when PW-1 and 2 met with accused at his place where he categorically stated making inculpatory statement admitting murdering of his wife Dulariya and then, as the accused failed to disclose furthermore, compelled the prosecution party to approach the police official with whom he met during midst of way leading to recording of fardbeyan followed with apprehension of accused in successive way and having under police custody, the appellant not only confessed the guilt rather pointed out the place where dead body of deceased was concealed beneath muddy soil which, was excavated on being so pointed out by the appellant. 26. PW-1 and PW-2 have deposed in detail showing conduct as well as over inculpatory extra judicial confessional before them. 26. PW-1 and PW-2 have deposed in detail showing conduct as well as over inculpatory extra judicial confessional before them. Even during course of cross-examination, defence could not be able to demolish their testimony. The evidence of PW-1 inspires so natural as he had not tried to mix any kind of embellishment nor ornamenting his evidence. He had not claimed identification of deceased as he had not seen her since before. At the other hand stated that on the request of PW-2 he accompanied him to the place of appellant who was enquired by PW-2 regarding whereabout of Dulariya over which appellant had accepted his complicity by way of murdering her. This part is found intact during course of cross-examination. PW-2 is informant himself. He had elaborately detailed the conduct of the appellant till recovery of dead body of Dulariya at the instance of appellant. PW-6, the I.O. had elaborately detailed the events after having presence of appellant before him as well as the place from where dead body was excavated on being pointed out by the appellant. Again the defence failed to elicit any adverse from his evidence on this very score. 27. The non-examination of Chowkidar and Dafadar, who ought to have been examined is not going to adversely affect the case of the prosecution in the background of the fact that the theme of recovery of dead body from the place on being pointed out by the appellant has not been found controverted. PW-3, PW-4 and PW-5 though remained hostile but supported recovery of dead body. Pw-5 had also admitted his signature over inquest report. 28. At this juncture one should not loss sight of examination of two DWs on behalf of defence. By examining those two DWs controverted the death of Dulariya in a manner as suggested by the prosecution but had admitted death of Dulariya at the place of PW-2 in between night of 18/19-08.1988, a few days prior to the alleged date of occurrence. The defence had also exhibited one register (Ext.A) purported to be in the pen of DW-1 which detailed the examination of patients on respective dates. After going through the same it is apparent that no reliance could be placed over its authenticity and in likewise manner happens to be the evidence of DW-1. DW-2 had stated that “Shradh” was performed at the Sasural of deceased Dulariya. After going through the same it is apparent that no reliance could be placed over its authenticity and in likewise manner happens to be the evidence of DW-1. DW-2 had stated that “Shradh” was performed at the Sasural of deceased Dulariya. Neither the specific date has been detailed nor its relevance happens to be because of the fact that apprehension of appellant on 01.11.1988 followed with his production before the CJM on 02.11.1988 is found to be fully proved. 29. After scrutinizing the evidence as well as dealing with the events, the following chain of circumstances emerge out. (a) dead body belonged to Dulariya Devi daughter of PW-2, wife of appellant, (b) it was a case of throttling, (c) the place from where dead body was taken out was nearby to the house of the appellant, (d) appellant had made inculpatory extra judicial confessional statement before PW-1 and 2. (e) after apprehension of appellant he again made extra judicial confession before the police leading to recovery of the dead body at his instance. 30. True it is, basically, the extra judicial confessional statement made before the police has been identified as in admissible in the eye of law. Moreover, when it leads to recovery, the same happens to be admissible in terms of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 31. In likewise manner, the extra judicial confessional statement made before witnesses, and independent personality happens to be admissible in the eye of law subject to condition that the same should be voluntary without any threat, compulsion, coercion and inducement. In a case R. Kuppusamy Vs. State Represented by Inspector of Police Ambeiligai reported in (2013) 3 SCC 322 . “8. That a truthful extra judicial confession made voluntarily and without any inducement can be made a basis for recording a conviction against the person making the confessions was not disputed before us at the hearing. What was argued by Ms. Mahalakshmi Pavani, counsel appearing for the appellant, was that an extra judicial confession being in its very nature an evidence of a weak type, the Courts would adopt a cautious approach while dealing with such evidence and record a conviction only if the extra judicial confession is, apart from being found truthful and voluntary, also corroborated by other evidence. Mahalakshmi Pavani, counsel appearing for the appellant, was that an extra judicial confession being in its very nature an evidence of a weak type, the Courts would adopt a cautious approach while dealing with such evidence and record a conviction only if the extra judicial confession is, apart from being found truthful and voluntary, also corroborated by other evidence. There was, according to the learned counsel, no such corroboration forthcoming in the present case which according to her was sufficient by itself to justify rejection of the confessional statement as a piece of evidence against the appellant. Reliance, in support of the contention urged by the learned counsel, was placed upon the decisions of this Court in Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2001) 2 SCC 205 and Sahadevan and Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu (2012) 6 SCC 403 . 9. In Gura Singh’s case (supra) a two-Judge Bench of this Court was also dealing with an extra judicial confession and the question whether the same could be made a basis for recording the conviction against the accused. This Court held that despite the inherent weakness of an extra judicial confession as a piece of evidence, the same cannot be ignored if it is otherwise shown to be voluntary and truthful. This Court also held that extra judicial confession cannot always be termed as tainted evidence and that corroboration of such evidence is required only as a measure of abundant caution. If the Court found the witness to whom confession was made to be trustworthy and that the confession was true and voluntary, a conviction can be founded on such evidence alone. More importantly, the Court declared that Courts cannot start with the presumption that extra judicial confession is always suspect or a weak type of evidence but it would depend on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession is made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak about such a confession and whether the confession is voluntary and truthful. 10. In Sahadevan’s case (supra) a two-Judge Bench of this Court comprehensively reviewed the case law on the subject and concluded that an extra judicial confession is an admissible piece of evidence capable of supporting the conviction of an accused provided the same is made voluntarily and is otherwise found to be truthful. 10. In Sahadevan’s case (supra) a two-Judge Bench of this Court comprehensively reviewed the case law on the subject and concluded that an extra judicial confession is an admissible piece of evidence capable of supporting the conviction of an accused provided the same is made voluntarily and is otherwise found to be truthful. This Court also reiterated the principle that if an extra judicial confession is supported by a chain of cogent circumstances and is corroborated by other evidence, it acquires credibility. To the same effect are the decisions of this Court in Balbir Singh and Anr. V. State of Punjab 1996 (SCC) Crl. 1158 and Jaspal Singh @ Pali v. State of Punjab (1997) 1 SCC 510 . 11. It is unnecessary, in the light of above pronouncements, to embark upon any further review of the decisions of this Court on the subject. The legal position is fairly well-settled that an extra judicial confession is capable of sustaining a conviction provided the same is not made under any inducement, is voluntary and truthful. Whether or not these attributes of an extra judicial confession are satisfied in a given case will, however, depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is eventually the satisfaction of the Court as to the reliability of the confession, keeping in view the circumstances in which the same is made, the person to whom it is alleged to have been made and the corroboration, if any, available as to the truth of such a confession that will determine whether the extra judicial confession ought to be made a basis for holding the accused guilty.” 32. Over admissibility of inculpatory extra judicial confessional statement made by accused before police while being under police custody is concerned, the same has been dealt with in Chunda Murma Vs. State of West Bengal reported in 2012 Cr.L.J. 2861 at para-9 wherein it has been held: “9. ……..From the evidence of Investigating Officer it is also clear that the statement of the accused leading to the recovery of dead body was made while he was in custody and the same was in the presence of police officer, though, at that time some other persons were also present in the police station. The recovery of the dead body, therefore is a fact which is under Section 27 of the Evidence Act” 33. In Prithipal Singh & Ors. The recovery of the dead body, therefore is a fact which is under Section 27 of the Evidence Act” 33. In Prithipal Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab& anr. with Jaspal Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2012) 1 SCC 10 . Evidence of the sole eyewitness 49. This Court has consistently held that as a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act. But if there are doubts about the testimony, the court will insist on corroboration. In fact, it is not the number or the quantity, but the quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise. The legal system has laid emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence, rather than on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is, therefore, open to a competent court to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and record conviction. Conversely, it may acquit the accused in spite of testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied about the quality of evidence. [See Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras AIR 1957 SC 614 , Sunil Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2003) 11 SCC 367, Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 14 SCC 150 and Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B. (2010) 12 SCC 91 ] 34. After visualizing the chain of circumstances so referred in forgoing paragraph, the same is found plumaged with the aid of Section 106 of the Evidence Act which cast specific burden upon the person to prove the same which happens to be within his special knowledge. Its application, by means of judicial pronouncement has been highlighted in a catena of decision laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court. In Prithipal Singh (supra) the same has been explained in following way:- Burden of proof under Section 106 53. Its application, by means of judicial pronouncement has been highlighted in a catena of decision laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court. In Prithipal Singh (supra) the same has been explained in following way:- Burden of proof under Section 106 53. In State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar (2000) 8 SCC 382 this Court held that if fact is especially in the knowledge of any person, then burden of proving that fact is upon him. It is impossible for the prosecution to prove certain facts particularly within the knowledge of the accused. Section 106 is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. But the section would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference. Section 106 of the Evidence Act is designed to meet certain exceptional cases, in which, it would be impossible for the prosecution to establish certain facts which are particularly within the knowledge of the accused. (See also Shambhu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajme ( AIR 1956 SC 404 ), Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab (2001)4 SCC 375 and Sahadevan v. State (2003) 1 SCC 534 ) 35. Though two DWs have been proceed on behalf of appellant but so far conduct of appellant during course of recording of his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is concerned, that could be taken into consideration. All kinds of incriminating material was placed before the appellant which was flatly denied by him. This part is found to be adverse in a case Munish Mubar v. State of Haryana reported in 2013 Cr.L.J. 56. 24. It is obligatory on the part of the accused, while being examined under Section 313, Cr.P.C. to furnish some explanation with respect to the incriminating circumstances associated with him, and the Court must take note of such explanation, even in a case of circumstantial evidence, so to decide, whether or not, the chain of circumstances is complete. 24. It is obligatory on the part of the accused, while being examined under Section 313, Cr.P.C. to furnish some explanation with respect to the incriminating circumstances associated with him, and the Court must take note of such explanation, even in a case of circumstantial evidence, so to decide, whether or not, the chain of circumstances is complete. The aforesaid judgment has been approved and followed in Musheer Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 748 : ( AIR 2010 SC 762 : 2010 AIR SCW 996) (See also: The Transport Commissioner, A.P. Hyderabad & Anr. v. S. Sardar Ali & Ors. AIR 1983 SC 1225 ).” 36. Thus after having categorical analysis of the evidence adduced on behalf of prosecution coupled with the chain of circumstances as apparent, along with conduct of appellant, more particularly during course of recording of his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the irresistible conclusion, leads no other hypothesis than the guilt of the appellant. 37. As such, we do not see any merit in this appeal and is accordingly dismissed. Appellant is on bail. The same is cancelled with a direction to the appellant to surrender before the learned lower court to serve out the remaining part of sentences.