JUDGMENT : C.L. SONI, J. 1. Rule. Learned Advocate Mr. Ravindra Shah waives service of Rule on behalf of respondent No.1 in all the petitions. Learned A.G.P. Mr. Niraj Ashar waives service of Rule on behalf of Respondents No.8 and 9 in Special Civil Application No. 3754 of 2013. Learned AGP Mr. Ronak Raval waives service of Rule on behalf of Respondents No. 4,5 in Special Civil Application No. 3756 of 2013 and on behalf of respondent No. 8 in Special Civil Application No. 8307 of 2013. 2. Learned Advocate Mr. Masoom Shah appearing for the petitioners has requested to permit the petitioners to delete the rest of respondents -the other defendants in the suits from the title clause of the petitions, as they are not necessary parties for the purpose of deciding the present petitions. Request made by the learned advocate Mr. Shah is granted. Private respondents in these petitions who are defendants in the suits before the Board of Nominees stand deleted from the petitions. With the consent of learned Advocates for the parties, the petitions are taken up for final disposal. 3. In first two petitions, common order dated 18.1.2013 and in third petition, the order dated 29.1.2013 passed by the Gujarat State Cooperative Tribunal (“the Tribunal” for short) are challenged whereby the Tribunal has rejected the applications being Miscellaneous Application No. 82 of 2012, 83 of 2012 and 26 of 2012 respectively, which were filed seeking to condone delay of two years occurred in filing the appeals against two awards passed by the learned Board of Nominees. 4. Miscellaneous Application No. 82 of 2012 seeking condonation of delay was preferred by the petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 3754 of 2013 with an appeal before the Tribunal in connection with Lavad Suit NO. 2393 of 2002 wherein the petitioner was arraigned as defendant No.7. 5. Miscellaneous Application No. 83 of 2012 was preferred by the petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 3756 of 2013 with an appeal before the Tribunal in connection with Lavad Suit No. 2394 of 2002 wherein the petitioner was arraigned as defendant No.3. Misc. Application No. 26 of 2012 was preferred by the petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 8307 of 2013 with an appeal before the Tribunal in connection with Lavad Suit No. 2393 of 2002 wherein the petitioner in third petition was arraigned as defendant No.6. 6. Misc. Application No. 26 of 2012 was preferred by the petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 8307 of 2013 with an appeal before the Tribunal in connection with Lavad Suit No. 2393 of 2002 wherein the petitioner in third petition was arraigned as defendant No.6. 6. Both the above lavad suits were filed by respondent No.1 Bank for recovery of different amounts from the original borrowers and the petitioners who are stated to be the guarantors. In the suits, the petitioners had engaged advocate to represent them. 7. The learned Board of nominees allowed the suits by order dated 31.8.2010. 8. The case of the petitioners is that since they were not communicated the decision rendered by the learned Board of Nominees as statutorily required by Rule 41 of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Rules, 1965 (“the Rules” for short), limitation for filing the appeals did not commence and therefore, the appeals were within the period of limitation. 9. It appears that in the first two petitions, since petitioner has challenged virus of some of the provisions of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 (“the Act” for short) while challenging the order passed by the Tribunal, the petitions were initially placed before the Hon’ble Division Bench. Hon’ble Division Bench did not accept such challenge however examined the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner in context of rule 41 the Rules and after holding that the decision in the case of Suryakant Bhikhabhai Hakani versus Bombay Mercantile Cooperative Bank Limited and Others reported in 2012 (2) GLH 170 is per incurium to the decision of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of D. Saibaba v/s. Bar Council of India and another reported in AIR 2003 SC 2502 , directed registry to place the petitions before learned Single Judge. That is how first two petitions are placed before this Court with the third petition. 10. I have heard the learned advocates for the parties. 11. Learned Advocate Mr. Masoom K. Shah appearing for the petitioners submitted that the learned Board of Nominees proceeded to decide the suits in absence of the petitioners, however, the petitioners were neither given due notice of decision nor even the learned advocate appearing for the petitioners was present at the time of pronouncement of the order/award by the learned Board of Nominees. Learned Advocate Mr. Learned Advocate Mr. Masoom Shah submitted that the Tribunal has committed serious error in rejecting the applications of the petitioner for condonation of delay by simply relying on the decision of this Court in the case of Suryakant Hakani (supra) without appreciating the cause for delay in the context of Rule 41. Learned Advocate Mr. Masoom Shah submitted that in the case of Suryakant Hakani (supra), this Court has ruled that if the party has engaged advocate in the suit, such party could be said to have due knowledge of notice of decision to be given by the learned Board of Nominees in the open Court. However, the Court in the said decision has not examined the question about the communication of the decision by the learned Board of Nominees to the party either by Registered Post or by ordinary post if the said party either himself or through his advocate is not present after due notice at the time of pronouncement of the decision by the learned Board of Nominees. Learned advocate Mr. Shah submitted that as per rule 41 (4)(b)(c) even if the party or his advocate could be said to have due notice of the decision and if such party is not present at the time of pronouncement of the decision by the learned Board of Nominees, then, unless such party is sent with the award either by Registered Post or by ordinary post, the decision of the learned Board of Nominees could not be said to have been communicated to such party. Learned advocate Mr. Shah submitted that in the present case, when the decision was pronounced, advocate of the petitioner was not present before the learned Board of Nominees, therefore, the petitioner was required to be communicated the decision as per the manner and mode statutorily provided under rule 41 of the Rules. 12. Learned Advocate Mr. Shah submitted that the decision in the case of Suryakant Hakani (supra) is now held to be per incurium by the another Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 3.7.2013 passed in first two petitions Learned advocate Mr. Shah submitted that the Hon’ble Division Bench has distinguished knowledge of decision by the advocate from the knowledge of the decision by the party because of incorporation of clause (b) and (c) in sub-rule 4 of Rule 41. Shah submitted that the Hon’ble Division Bench has distinguished knowledge of decision by the advocate from the knowledge of the decision by the party because of incorporation of clause (b) and (c) in sub-rule 4 of Rule 41. Learned advocate Mr Shah submitted that when the communication of the award is to be made to the party in a particular way as provided in the statute, such communication has to be in the same way and if such mode is not followed as required, the period of limitation would not commence unless the party receives the award in the manner provided. Learned advocate Mr. Shah has relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of the State of Maharashtra versus Ark Builders Pvt. Ltd. reported in AIR 2011 SC 1374 and submitted that since neither the petitioner nor his advocate was present when the decision was pronounced by the learned Board of Nominees and since the petitioner was not communicated the award either by Registered Post or by ordinary post, limitation for filing of the appeal by the petitioner had not commenced. He thus submitted that in such fact situation, the Tribunal ought to have allowed the applications for condonation of delay and treated appeals within prescribed time limit so as to decide the appeals filed by the petitioners on its own merits. 13. As against the above arguments, learned advocate Mr. Ravindra Shah appearing for respondent No.1 Bank submitted that the petitioner having engaged advocate to represent them in the suits, they cannot be al lowed to say that the petitioner had no knowledge about the date of decision in the suits and the knowledge of award passed in the suits. Learned Advocate Mr. Ravindra Shah submitted that under the provisions of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act (“the Act” for short) and the Rules, no party is entitled as a matter of course to engage advocate. A party to the suit filed under the provisions of the Act is required to obtain permission o the Court for engaging advocate. Learned Advocate Mr. Ravindra Shah submitted that once such party is permitted to be represented by the advocate, knowledge of such advocate could be said to be the knowledge of the party in respect of the proceedings of the suit. Learned advocate Mr. Learned Advocate Mr. Ravindra Shah submitted that once such party is permitted to be represented by the advocate, knowledge of such advocate could be said to be the knowledge of the party in respect of the proceedings of the suit. Learned advocate Mr. Ravindra Shah submitted that if such party is permitted to contend that the knowledge of his advocate in respect of the proceedings of the suit cannot be taken as knowledge of the party, then, successful party in the suit will face great hardships in getting fruits of the award on account of unsuccessful party subsequently delaying or avoiding communication of the award. Learned advocate Mr. Shah submitted that the legislature never intended when it incorporated clause (b) and (c) in Rule 41 of the Rules to help out unscrupulous litigants to take undue advantage by misconstruing the provisions of Rule 41 of the Rules. Learned Advocate Mr. Ravindra Shah submitted that the intention of the legislature is to see that the party if not present on the date of pronouncement of award either on account of no knowledge about date of decision or having received the notice still not remaining present on the date of pronouncement of award is communicated with the Award but not to a party who has engaged advocate with the permission of the Board of Nominees. Learned advocate Mr. Ravindra Shah submitted that the Tribunal has not committed any error in following the decision in the case of Suryakant Bhikhabhai (supra) since the petitioner had engaged advocate who had participated in the proceedings of the suits before the learned Board of Nominees. Learned advocate Mr. Ravindra Shah submitted that clause (b) and (c) of sub-rule 4 of Rule 41 cannot be read in isolation but is required to be read harmoniously with clause (a) of sub rule (4) of rule 41 of the Rules. Learned advocate Mr. Shah submitted that rule 41 provides for communication of the award in two different modes and if the communication of the award is made by any of the modes, statutory provisions for communication of the award to the party could be said to have been satisfied. Learned advocate Mr. Learned advocate Mr. Shah submitted that rule 41 provides for communication of the award in two different modes and if the communication of the award is made by any of the modes, statutory provisions for communication of the award to the party could be said to have been satisfied. Learned advocate Mr. Ravindra Shah submitted that out of two modes for communication of the award of the Board of Nominees, the first mode provided in sub rule (4) is by pronouncement of the award, and if the communication of the award is made by the first mode, there is no question of making communication of the decision either by Registered Post or by ordinary post. Learned advocate Mr. Shah submitted that when the advocate is permitted to represent the party in the suit, he is bound to have knowledge not only about the date of decision for pronouncement of the decision by the learned Board of Nominees but also about the actual pronouncement in the open Court by the learned Board of Nominees. Learned advocate Mr. Ravindra Shah submitted that the party engaging the advocate cannot be heard to say that he has no knowledge about decision pronounced by the learned Board of Nominees. Mr. Shah submitted that the Tribunal has not committed any error in following the decision in the case of Suryakant Bhikhabhai (supra). Learned advocate Mr. Ravindra Shah submitted that since the bank was not heard by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court before passing the order dated 3.7.2013 in first two petitions, this Court may follow the view taken in the case of Suryakant Hakani (supra) and may affirm the view taken by the Tribunal. Learned advocate Mr. Ravindra Shah thus urged to dismiss the petitions. 14. Learned A.G.Ps. Mr. Niraj Ashar and Mr. Ronak Raval appearing for the respondent State in the petitions have taken the Court through the provisions of the Act and the Rules and submitted that the legislature intended to see that the order/award passed by the learned Board of Nominees in the suits is communicated as required by the provisions of Rule 41 of the Rules. 15. Having heard the learned advocates for the parties and having perused the impugned orders passed by the Tribunal, it appears that the main ground urged by the petitioners seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeals before the Tribunal under sec. 15. Having heard the learned advocates for the parties and having perused the impugned orders passed by the Tribunal, it appears that the main ground urged by the petitioners seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeals before the Tribunal under sec. 102 of the Act against the award passed by the learned Board of Nominees was non-communication of the award as required by rule 41 of the Rules. 16. Learned Board of Nominees passed award on 31.8.2010. After about two years, the petitioners preferred appeals with applications for condonation of delay. They have stated that they were not communicated the decision of the Board of Nominees. 17. The Tribunal recorded that the petitioners had appeared in the suit through their advocates and also cross examined witness of the plaintiff bank. Relying on the decision in the case of Suryakant Hakani (supra), the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the petitioners could be presumed to have knowledge about the decision/award of the Board of Nominees. The Tribunal accordingly rejected the Miscellaneous applications preferred by the petitioners for condonation of delay. 18. Learned advocate for the petitioners however contended that the decision in the case of Suryakant Hakani (supra) could not have been pressed into service in the facts of the case and in view of the provisions of clause (b) and (c) of sub rule (4) of Rule 41 of the Rules. Rule 41 of the Rules reads as under: “41. Procedure of hearing and decision: (1) The adjudicating authority shall record a brief note in English or in Gujarati language or the evidence of the parties and witnesses who attend and upon the evidence so recorded and upon consideration of any documentary evidence produced by either side, a decision shall be given in accordance with justice, enquiry and good conscience and it shall be reduced to writing. Such a decision shall be given in open Court either at once or on such future date of which due notice shall be given to the parties. (2) If any of the parties duly summoned or informed to attend, fails to appear, the dispute may be decided in accordance with the relevant provisions of Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (2) If any of the parties duly summoned or informed to attend, fails to appear, the dispute may be decided in accordance with the relevant provisions of Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (3) Where the adjudicating authority is a board of nominees consisting of the board of nominee of two nominees and if their opinions differ regarding the decision, the adjudicating authority shall return the case to the Registrar with its notes of dissent and thereupon the dispute may be decided by the Registrar himself or the case may be forwarded to a fresh board of three nominees for decision. (4) The decision shall be communicated to the parties by : (a) pronouncement of the award; or (b) registered post to any party which may be absent on the date if due notice of the decision is not given to such party, (c) Ordinary post with U.P.C. to any party which may be absent on the date if due notice of the date of decision is given to such party. (5) After the decision of the case, if the adjudicating authority is a nominee or the board of nominee it shall return a the case papers to the Registrar.” 19. Sub Rule (1) of Rule 41 requires Board of Nominees to give decision in the open Court either at once or on some future date of which due notice is given to the party. As stated above, one of the modes of communication of the decision to a party is by pronouncement of such decision provided the party is present at the time of such pronouncement. Another mode to communicate the decision to the party is by registered post if he is not given due notice of decision or by ordinary post if given due notice of date but not present on the date when decision is given in open Court. Such provision for another mode is found in clause (b) and (c) of sub rule 4. Clause (c) provides that even if the due notice of the date of decision is given to the party and the party does not remain present on the date of decision, then, he has to be still communicated the award by ordinary post with U.P.C. 20. Clause (c) provides that even if the due notice of the date of decision is given to the party and the party does not remain present on the date of decision, then, he has to be still communicated the award by ordinary post with U.P.C. 20. Therefore, if the advocate engaged by the party is presumed to have due notice of the date of decision, the party engaging such advocate could at the best be presumed to have due notice of the date of decision to be pronounced in the open court. However, if his advocate is not present on the date of pronouncement of the decision by the learned Board of Nominees, such party shall be entitled to communication of award by ordinary post, if not by registered post, as per clause (c) of sub rule (4) of Rule 41 of the Rules. 21. In the case of Suryakant Hakani (supra), the Court held that since the appellant in that case had appeared through lawyer who was bound to attend the proceedings pending before the Board of Nominees and who did not remain present and plead the case of the appellant before the Board of Nominees, the appellant was presumed to be aware about the day to day proceedings and the date of pronouncement of the judgment and award by the Board of Nominees, therefore, such party not personally present cannot be said to have no knowledge about the date of pronouncement of the decision. It is further held that the party who engages the advocate may not attend the proceedings on every occasion, and it is the duty of the lawyer to attend the case on his client’s behalf, and therefore it is presumed that the lawyer had knowledge of judgment and award. Taking such view of the matter, the Court held that the Registrar of the Board of Nominees was not bound to communicate the decision by Registered Post to the party who was not physically present on the date of pronouncement of the decision and it was the duty of the lawyer to inform the decision of the Board of Nominees which had gone against such party. 22. 22. Thus, in the case of Suryakant Hakani (supra), the Court was not dealing with the question whether communication of decision by ordinary post was required to the party who have due notice of the date of the decision and not present on the date of pronouncement of the decision as provided by Rule 41(4)(c) of the Rules. 23. There is no dispute about the fact that the advocate of the petitioners was not present when the decision was pronounced by the learned Board of Nominees. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be said to have been communicated the decision of the Board of Nominees as required by the first mode for communication of the decision by pronouncement of the award. However, if the petitioners are presumed to have knowledge of due notice of the date of decision since the petitioners had engaged advocate, the petitioners shall not be entitled to communication of the award by Registered Post, but would still remain entitled to communication of the award by ordinary post with UPC as statutorily required by Rule 41(4)(c) of the Rules. 24. In the case of Ark Builders Pvt. Ltd.(supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court held and observed in para 13 as under: “13. The highlighted portion of the judgment extracted above, leaves no room for doubt that the period of limitation prescribed under section 34(3) of the Act would start running only from the date a signed copy of the award is delivered to/received by the party making the application for setting it aside under section 34(1) of the Act. The legal position on the issue may be stated thus. If the law prescribes that a copy of the order/award is to be communicated, delivered, dispatched, forwarded, rendered or sent to the parties concerned in a particular way and in case the law also sets a period of limitation for challenging the order/award in question by the aggrieved party, then the period of limitation can only commence from the date on which the order/award was received by the party concerned in the manner prescribed by the law.” 25. In light of above and considering the provision of Rule 41(4) (c) of the Rules in the facts of the case, there is no escape from the conclusion that in absence of the communication of decision as per the prescribed mode to the petitioner, the period of limitation had not commenced for filing the appeals by the petitioners. 26. At this stage, following observations made by the Hon’ble Division Bench in order dated 3.7.2013 passed in the first two petitions need to be quoted. “In our opinion, to make Section 102 workable, it will have to be read harmoniously with Rule 41. After the evidence is over, the nominee is to give the decision and he may pronounce the same in open court either at once or on some future date of which due notice would be given to the parties. If the nominee does not pronounce the decision at once in the court and a future date is fixed for pronouncing the decision, the decision is deemed to be communicated to the parties either by pronouncement of the award or by registered post to any party who may be absent on the date if due notice of the decision is not given to such a party or by ordinary post with U.P.C. to a party who may be absent on the date if due notice of the date of decision is given to such a party. The communication can be made by pronouncing the award if both the parties are present. In such circumstances, perhaps there may not be any further necessity of complying with clause (b) and clause (c) of sub-rule (4) of Rule 41. The intention of the statute appears to be to communicate the decision to a party who may be absent despite due notice of the date of decision and also to a party to whom due notice of such decision is not given to such a party. The view which we have taken is in conformity with the decision in the case of D. Saibaba (supra) to which it appears that the attention was not drawn of Their Lordships while deciding the case of Suryakant Bhikhabhai Hakani (supra) and deserves to be considered in light of Rule 41(4)(b) and Rule 41(4)(c). The view which we have taken is in conformity with the decision in the case of D. Saibaba (supra) to which it appears that the attention was not drawn of Their Lordships while deciding the case of Suryakant Bhikhabhai Hakani (supra) and deserves to be considered in light of Rule 41(4)(b) and Rule 41(4)(c). If an advocate is presumed to have knowledge of the pronouncement of the award and thereby a client is also presumed to have knowledge about the same, then in such circumstances, clauses (b) and (c) will have to be construed as if they are applicable only in cases where the party is not being represented by any advocate. It is difficult for us to place such a construction on plain reading of clauses (b) and (c). We also lay emphasis on the phrase “such a decision shall be given to the parties” as it appears in Rule 41(1). To the aforesaid extent, we hold that the Division Bench decision of this High Court in the case of Suryakant Bhikhabhai Hakani (supra) is per incurium as the Supreme Court decision in the case of D. Saibaba (supra) has not been taken into consideration.” 27. As observed by the Hon’ble Division Bench in the said order, the intention of the statute is to communicate the decision to a party who may be absent despite due notice of date of decision and also the party to whom due notice of such decision is not given to such party. Hon’ble Division Bench further observed that if an advocate is presumed to have knowledge of pronouncement of award and thereby his client is also presumed to have knowledge about the same, then, in such circumstances, clause (b) and (c) will have to be considered as if they are applicable only in the cases where the party is not being represented by an advocate. It is difficult to place such construction on plain reading of clause (b) and (c). 28. Therefore, clause (b) and (c) of sub rule (4) of Rule 41 cannot be read as applicable only to a party not represented by advocate and if not so read, clause (b) and (c) will be equally applicable in a case where the party is represented by an advocate. 29. 28. Therefore, clause (b) and (c) of sub rule (4) of Rule 41 cannot be read as applicable only to a party not represented by advocate and if not so read, clause (b) and (c) will be equally applicable in a case where the party is represented by an advocate. 29. In this view of the matter, as discussed above, even if the advocate for the party is presumed to have notice of the date of decision to be given by the Board of Nominees and still he remains absent at the time of pronouncement of the decision, the party represented by advocate would be required to be communicated the award by the Board of Nominees by ordinary post. 30. There is no dispute about the fact that the petitioners were not communicated with the award by ordinary post. Therefore, as stated by the petitioners in their applications for condonation of delay, they acquired the knowledge about the pronouncement of the decision of the Board of Nominees through relatives when they informed the petitioner about demand notice published in the daily news paper in first two petitions and in the third petition when the Bank issued notice to the petitioner on 22.6.2011. The petitioner in the third petition has explained further delay occurred after the bank sent notice to him. The petitioner in the third petition has stated in his application that he was on dialysis in the hospital and he has annexed the discharge certificate from the hospital dated 10.2.2012. 31. Thus, in view of the above stated facts and circumstances of the case, delay occurred in filing the appeals by the petitioners before the Tribunal against the awards passed by the learned Board of Nominees is be required to be condoned. 32. For the reasons stated above, the petitions are allowed. The order dated 18.1.2013 impugned in the first two petition and the order dated 29.1.2013 impugned in the third petition passed by the Tribunal are quashed and set aside. Applications for condonation of delay preferred by the petitioners would stand allowed. The Tribunal is directed to hear and decide the appeals preferred by the petitioners on their own merits. Rule is made absolute in all the petitions. Petition allowed.