JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal seeks to challenge the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 20/11/2008 whereby, the writ petition filed by respondent-Sunder Lal was allowed. Respondent-Sunder Lal in writ petition had prayed for a mandamus seeking direction to the Housing Board to grant him regularisation w.e.f. 31/3/1993, the date on which, his juniors were so regularised with all consequential benefits. The learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition in terms of the prayers made therein. Aggrieved thereby, Rajasthan Housing Board is up in appeal. 2. The factual matrix of the case is that respondent was appointed on daily wage basis in 1983 on the post of Sweeper with the Housing Board. However, his services were terminated by a verbal order on 1/6/1986. Respondent raised an industrial dispute. Reference was made to the labour court, which vide its award dated 23/6/1990 declared his termination as illegal and directed his reinstatement with continuity and full back wages. Respondent was allowed to join the services with the appellant on 23/9/1991. Respondent had to file an application under Section 33(c)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, the "Act of 1947") claiming back wages. The application was allowed vide order dated 20/4/1993. According to the writ petitioner, many of his juniors were granted the benefit of regularisation with pay fixation and regular pay scale, increments and other benefits w.e.f. 31/3/1993, whereas his case was not considered for such regularisation despite availability of regular posts. Writ petitioner therefore made number of representations to the appellant but none of them was considered by the appellant. Secretary to the Rajasthan Housing Board by way of order dated 11/4/2007 sanctioned minimum of the pay scale to the respondent- writ petitioner on the post of Helper but did not pass any order of regularization. 3. Shri Arvind Kumar Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant-Housing Board has argued that the respondent was engaged as part time Sweeper. He was neither appointed on regular basis nor was his appointment was made against regular sanctioned post. In fact, respondent was not even removed from service. He rather abandoned his job on his own and therefore appellant has left with no option but to discontinue his services w.e.f. 1/6/1986. Even though the award was passed by the labour court on 23/6/1990 but respondent did not immediately join the services. He gave joining seven years thereafter on 20/5/1997. In fact, respondent was not even removed from service. He rather abandoned his job on his own and therefore appellant has left with no option but to discontinue his services w.e.f. 1/6/1986. Even though the award was passed by the labour court on 23/6/1990 but respondent did not immediately join the services. He gave joining seven years thereafter on 20/5/1997. It was thereafter vide letter dated 23/9/1998, he was asked to join the duties on 30/9/1998. Thus, for the interregnum period of eight years, he was not actually working with the Housing Board. Therefore, direction for regularisation of the services of respondent ought not to have been issued by the learned Single Judge. It was argued that judgment of Supreme Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi : (2006) 4 SCC 1 has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge. Reliance in this connection was placed on para 53 of the judgment to argue that the High Court cannot issue a mandamus directing regularisation of those, who have been illegally appointed although such direction could be issued only with regard to those appointed on irregular basis, but this observation of the Supreme Court was meant to be applied as a one-time measure. Once it was clear that the respondent was appointed illegally, he was not liable to be regularised in services. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of Supreme Court in R.N. Nanjundappa v. T.Thimmiah : (1972) 4 SCC 409 and argued that Supreme Court in that case held that if appointment itself was made in violation of the rule or of the Constitution, such appointment cannot confer any right on the appointee and he cannot claim regularisation in service. In support of his argument, learned counsel has also placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in Ashwani Kumar v. State of Bihar : (1997) 2 SCC 1 . It is therefore prayed that appeal be allowed and the judgment of the learned Single Judge be set-aside. 4. Smt. Naina Saraf, learned counsel for the respondent has opposed the appeal and supported the judgment of the learned Single Judge. She argued that even if respondent was terminated but at his instance, an industrial dispute was referred to the labour court. 4. Smt. Naina Saraf, learned counsel for the respondent has opposed the appeal and supported the judgment of the learned Single Judge. She argued that even if respondent was terminated but at his instance, an industrial dispute was referred to the labour court. Labour Court vide award dated 23/6/1990 held his removal from service to be illegal and further held him entitled to reinstatement in service with continuity and full back wages. It was denied that respondent joined services with the appellant only on 20/5/1997. Such a plea cannot be accepted because in fact, respondent writ petitioner gave joining on 23/9/1991 as asserted by him in para 3 of the writ petition. The appellant has not effectively contested that position inasmuch as, they cannot be allowed to say that respondent did not come to join immediately after the award. In fact, the appellant did not comply with the award and did not allow respondent to join and did not pay salary therefore he had to file an application u/S.33(c)(2) of the Act of 1947, which was allowed by the learned Labour Court vide order dated 20/4/1993. This clearly shows that respondent had been all along contesting the matter and pressing for his joining in compliance of the award. It was in that context that respondent also submitted representation to the appellant on 20/5/1997, which the Deputy Legal Remembrancer of the Rajasthan Housing Board forwarded to the Government for sanction under the Rajasthan (Regulation of Appointment to Public Services and Rationalisation of Staff) Act, 1999. It was argued that the Division Bench of this Court in Bhawani Singh v. State & Ors. : RLW 2003 (3) Raj. 1755 has declared the provisions of Sections 9 & 11 of the RAPSAR Act illegal and ultra-vires to the Constitution, which created a bar for implementation of judgment of the labour court. 5. Mrs.Naina Saraf, learned counsel for the respondent argued that in substance the learned Single Judge directed, for granting benefit of regularisation to the respondent on the basis of argument of discrimination because many of his juniors, who were continued in service at the time of his removal and those who were engaged subsequent to his removal were regularised in service w.e.f. 31/3/1993. Action of the appellant was thus discriminatory qua the respondent. Action of the appellant was thus discriminatory qua the respondent. It was argued that judgment of Supreme Court in Uma Devi supra does not in any manner create a bar for issuance of a writ of mandamus if the ground of discrimination is substantiated. Reliance in this connection is placed on the judgment of this Court in Bhagwan Sahai v. Udyog Bhawan Common Facility & Anr. : 2009(1) WLC (Raj.) 524 and argued that this court while upholding the argument of discrimination raised by the writ petitioner, allowed the writ petition and directed for regularisation w.e.f. 1/4/1993, the date on which his juniors were so regularised with all consequential benefits. The Division Bench also upheld that judgment of Single Bench and even the Supreme Court also rejected the Special Leave to Appeal filed by the Housing Board against the Division Bench judgment. 6. Smt. Naina Saraf, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the appellant having already complied with the judgment of the labour court by granting benefit of regularisation to the respondent vide order dated 30/9/2011, the appeal be dismissed. 7. We having heard learned counsel for the given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions.What is not disputed before us is that termination of respondent was held to be illegal by award of the labour court dated 23/6/1990, which also directed the appellant to reinstate the respondent in service and granted him benefit of continuity and full back wages. That award has attained finality. Respondent immediately approached the appellant within time to join. He was not allowed to join nor he was paid benefit of salary and other benefits. Respondent filed an application before the labour court under Section 33(c)(2) of the Act of 1947. Such application was allowed by the labour court vide order dated 20/4/1993. In response to the specific query of this court, learned counsel for the appellant has even admitted that this order was not challenged by the appellant thus clearly proving that even this order has attained finality. When respondent immediately approached the labour court and filed an application under Section 33(c)(2), which was allowed in 1993, it cannot be accepted that respondent belatedly approached the appellant for joining and did not press for compliance of the award. When respondent immediately approached the labour court and filed an application under Section 33(c)(2), which was allowed in 1993, it cannot be accepted that respondent belatedly approached the appellant for joining and did not press for compliance of the award. The argument of the appellant that he should be denied benefit of consequential benefits, has to be therefore rejected for two reasons; first is that the labour court in award has granted the benefit of full back wages with continuity in service, which award has attained finality and second reason is that application filed by the respondent under Section 33(c)(2) was allowed by the labour court vide order dated 20/4/1993 quantifying the salary/wages payable to the respondent, which order too has attained finality. Principles of sine dies non i.e. no work no pay, wouold therefore be wholly inapplicable to the facts of the present case. 8. Judgment of Supreme Court in Uma Devi supra cannot be taken to have created any bar for issuance of a writ of mandamus in the present case because the respondent approached this court with a definite case of discrimination qua him. It is his allegation that many of his juniors were regularised in service vide order dated 31/3/1993, which allegation has not been seriously contested by the appellant. If persons, who were junior to the respondent or those, who were engaged subsequently have been regularised in service vide order dated 31/3/1993, appellant certainly practiced discrimination against the respondent because by virtue of award of the labour court, respondent having been granted the benefit of reinstatement with continuity in service, would be deemed to have throughout continued in their service from the date of his initial engagement in 1983, as if he was never removed from service. It was on this analogy that a writ of mandamus was issued in the case of Bhagwan Sahai supra. That judgment has even been upheld by the Supreme Court. 9. The controversy involved therein was somewhat similar, where the labour court directed reinstatement with continuity in service. When he was out of service, persons who were junior to him and were subsequently engaged, were regularised in service. This Court proceeded on the analogy that if petitioner had not been removed and continued in service, he would have also received the same benefit at par with his juniors. When he was out of service, persons who were junior to him and were subsequently engaged, were regularised in service. This Court proceeded on the analogy that if petitioner had not been removed and continued in service, he would have also received the same benefit at par with his juniors. Judgment of Supreme Court in Uma Devi supra, was also considered but then reliance was also placed on the subsequent judgment of Supreme Court in UPSEB v. Poonam Chandra Pandey & Others : (2007) 7 SCC 374 in which case also, argument of discrimination was accepted and writ of mandamus directing regularisation on that basis was issued. 10. In view of above discussion, we do not find any infirmity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge so as to warrant our interference.The appeal being devoid of merit is dismissed with no order as to costs. *******